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Thesis Abstract
2
The thesis analyses factors that led to the growth and export leadership of the River Plate meat packing 
industry from c.1900 to the 1930s and its subsequent decline. In addition, it assesses the renaissance of 
the industry in the mid-1990s. Within this context, the thesis studies: (i) the impact of technological 
innovation on production, preservation and transportation methods; (ii) the transformation of the 
ownership structure, especially consequences for the organisation o f the industry; (iii) the effect of 
changing international trade regimes, namely the shift from multilateralism to bilateralism and (after the 
1980s) a return to more trade liberalisation; and (iv) domestic policy factors such as the establishment of 
property rights.
Although one factor was predominant in any phase in the history of the industry, the thesis proves that 
there were a series of interrelations and connections. Several elements affected and accelerated the rise of 
the industry until the 1920s, its decline after the 1930s, and recovery in the mid-1990s. For example, the 
rise of the industry cannot just be attributed to technological innovation. Other factors, such as the 
integration and adaptation of refrigeration technology, the transfer of related technical and management 
knowhow, improved railway networks and oceanic refrigerated shipping lines, as well as better cattle 
quality through cross breeding, also played a major role. Moreover, the establishment of a legal 
framework of property rights in the River Plate and the ability to export cattle products freely, were 
fundamental preconditions for the development of the industry. Similarly, consolidation in the ownership 
structure was driven by the meat packers’ goal to increase economies of scale and scope. Yet, 
advancement was only possible thanks to technological innovation and adaptation, as well as a conducive 
domestic policy that failed to curb the heightened consolidation o f the industry. Whereas changing 
international trade regimes were the primary reason for the decline o f the industry in the 1930s, domestic 
policy and modifications in the industry structure also contributed to the long-term stagnation of the 
sector. For example, in the 1940s and 1950s domestic policy prevented the development of the industry 
and obstructed meat exports, even though there was increased international demand for River Plate meat. 
Indeed, domestic policy overreacted to international market access restrictions and introduced a severe 
import substitution industrialisation policy, which extracted so much surplus from the rural sector, that it 
became unremunerative to produce cattle. In contrast, the revival of the River Plate meat packing industry 
that is taking place in the 1990s is driven by a ‘freer’ international trade regime and domestic 
liberalisation policies, which are generating renewed foreign capital interest in the industry.
Most existing literature concentrates on a single aspect of the industry, either technology, ownership and 
domestic policy, or international trade regimes. In addition, most publications have studied the 
development o f the industry up to the 1950s. Moreover, the majority of studies centre only on one country 
- Argentina or Uruguay, rather than analysing the River Plate as a whole. Hence, most existing 
publications are narrow in focus and limited by time span. The thesis makes a distinct contribution to the 
historiography of River Plate meat packing, not just by demonstrating the interrelations between the 
various factors affecting the industry. It also advances existing literature by compiling a complete 
historical analysis since the beginning of the century until the mid-1990s. Furthermore, by extending and 
bringing up to date the inpact of changing international trade regimes to the mid-1990s, the thesis proves 
that a full cycle has taken place, from free trade in the early twentieth century, to control and bilateralism 
since the 1930s and back to more open trade in the mid-1990s. Similarly, it shows a full cycle in the 
ownership structure, from local to primarily foreign ownership in the early twentieth century, then a 
period o f state intervention and control after the Second World War, and back to local ownership in the 
1960-70s with the rise of the nueva industria, while in the 1990s there is renewed foreign capital interest 
in the industry. Finally, by studying both Argentina and Uruguay, the thesis sheds light on the differences 
and interactions between the meat packing industries of both countries.
The thesis utilises a unique methodology and constructs a new data set. It uses the concept of global 
export market share to analyse the performances of the sector. Given that the export sector was and 
remains extremely important for River Plate meat packing, it is imperative not just to examine output and 
exports alone, but rather analyse them in the context of the world export market for meat. Through the 
calculation of global export market shares, the thesis scrutinises the relationships between the factors 
impacting the industry, as well as the growth or decline of meat exports from Argentina and Uruguay. 
Furthermore, the thesis also calculates the distribution of global meat imports since 1900 to appraise the 
shifts of the major international markets for meat and how they affected River Plate meat exports.
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1.1 Introduction
In this introductory chapter, the overall scope and objectives of the thesis are spelled 
out, followed by an explanation of the theoretical framework, methodology and 
hypotheses. Thereafter, an in-depth literature review analyses the publications on the 
River Plate meat packing industry to date. This is followed by a thorough explanation of 
how the thesis advances existing literature, the purpose of the research and the thesis’ 
importance in contributing to the understanding of the River Plate meat packing 
industry. Finally, the sources utilised in the thesis are examined, including an overview 
of the primary and secondary data employed in the research.
1.2 Thesis’ Scope, Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
1.2.1 Definitions
It is important to define certain terms which appertain to this thesis, in order to clarify 
the meanings of the terminology utilised in this study. To start with the River Plate is 
sometimes associated with three countries, namely Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Whereas Paraguay and Southern Brazil were also important meat producers, it was in 
Argentina and Uruguay that the meat sector played a principal role as the producer and 
processor of a major export commodity. Due to these factors and in order to reduce 
complexity, the River Plate is defined in this thesis as Argentina and Uruguay. 
Additionally, the thesis will concentrate on the meat packing industry, which represents 
the processing of meat starting with the slaughtering of the animal, as opposed to the 
cattle industry, which concerns itself with the production of cattle, through breeding and 
fattening of animals. Although the thesis will also examine and make reference to the
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 16
cattle industry and its relation to the meat packing industry, it will be primarily
concerned with the latter. Similarly, technological innovation relates to the new
scientific advances, which affect meat packing techniques as well as to a lesser extent
cattle production. Furthermore, modifications in the ownership structure refer mainly to
the impact of the change from local to predominately foreign ownership of the meat
packing plants, particularly after the 1900s, and then back to domestic control starting in
the 1960s. The ownership structure also pertains to shifts between private and public
capital or cooperative organisations, as well as to periods of state intervention or
control. Moreover, an essential aspect of the thesis are changing international trade
regimes, which are defined for the purpose of the research as periods of significant
continuity in international trade policy that affect the global meat trade and particularly
the terms of trade of River Plate meat exports. The thesis is concerned with shifts in
international trade regimes and their repercussion on the meat packing industry.
1.2.2 Thesis* Scope and Objectives
Overall, the objective of the thesis is to determine the elements that led to the strong 
growth as well as international export leadership position of the River Plate meat 
packing industry until the 1930s and the factors that brought about its subsequent 
decline. An additional objective of the thesis is to examine whether the industry is 
undergoing a renaissance in the mid-1990s and if there are signs of a reversal of the 
declining trend since the late 1920s that could epitomise a significant turnaround, and 
thus denote favourable prospects for the new millennium. Within the context of the 
objectives outlined, the thesis will study the impact of technological innovation, 
modifications in the ownership structure and changing international trade regimes on the 
River Plate meat packing industry, while examining the effects that each one of these
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factors had on the meat processing corporations. Additionally, the elements that
triggered modifications in domestic policy from the Argentinian and Uruguayan
governments will be analysed, as well as the reasons for their implementation.
Importantly, the research will examine the interactions and interrelations between these
factors, thereby seeking a comprehensive and ample explanation for the growth, decline
and prospects of the River Plate meat packing industry.
The thesis will study the effect that technological innovation had on the development of 
the industry, in terms of improved production, preservation and transportation methods. 
Indeed, this analysis will show how crucial technological innovations were for the rise 
of the River Plate meat packing industry, while highlighting the augmented value added 
that they provided and their increasing capital requirements. Additionally, the research 
will examine the effect that transformations in the ownership structure had on the 
organisation of the industry. In particular, the practices of large meat packers in the fight 
for supremacy and supply control will be studied. The analysis will highlight the 
importance of economies of scale for meat packers, the resulting vertical and horizontal 
integration, as well as the significance of technical and managerial know-how. 
Furthermore, the rapid expansion of foreign meat packers in the beginning of the 
twentieth century and the reasons for their retreat in the 1950s will be analysed, as well 
as the subsequent rise of locally owned frigorificos and new foreign capital interest in 
the 1990s. Moreover, the thesis will focus on international trade regimes and their 
impact on the meat packing industry, especially the advent of bilateralism and trade 
restrictions for River Plate meat starting in the late 1920s, the development of a broad 
trade negotiations deadlock thereafter, and freer trade in the 1990s. Finally, the research 
will examine the effect of domestic policy towards the industry. To start with, the
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analysis will demonstrate how crucial the establishment of a legal framework and
property rights were in building the foundations for the growth of the industry. In
addition, domestic policy will be investigated, concentrating on the decline in
profitability for cattle producers particularly after the 1920s, the influence of the Rural
Society/Association, the emergence of import substitution, intervention and inward
looking policies in the mid-1940s, as well as renewed liberalisation and openness in the
1990s.
Though the impact of technological innovation, modifications in the ownership structure 
and changing international trade regimes will be studied, the relative importance of 
these factors varies depending on historical circumstances and the development phase of 
the River Plate meat packing industry. Indeed, three main phases can be identified. In 
each phase one of the factors played the most important role in the industry. 
Technological innovation was the most significant factor in the rise of the industry, 
given that it enabled the production and distribution of ever better quality meat and by­
products. However, technological innovation reached an apogee in the early 1910s, as 
advancements in refrigeration techniques and shipping provided the means to produce 
high quality chilled meat and to transport it to far away markets. Thereafter, 
technological innovations related to meat packing were unimportant and only led to very 
marginal improvements in the texture and taste of meat. Thus the thesis will analyse the 
impact of technological innovation from the rise of the industry in the early nineteenth 
century until the 1910s. Modifications in the ownership structure started to play a role 
with the advent of refrigeration in the 1880s, given that foreign capital and technical 
know-how were needed for the capital intensive and complex machinery. But it was 
only in the 1900s that foreign capital began to be consequential, as it increasingly
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displaced domestic capital. The modification in the ownership structure was the most
important factor in the 1900-20s consolidation phase of the industry, although it
remained a meaningful element, particularly with the rebirth of domestic meat packers
after the 1960s and renewed foreign capital interest in the 1990s. Therefore,
modifications in the ownership structure will be examined since 1900. International
trade regimes started to be an issue in the late-1920s, when major restrictions began to
be imposed on River Plate meat exports. Prior to the late-1920s, an ‘open’ international
trade regime was in place that enabled exports of River Plate meat to Europe and
especially to the main British market. The shift in international trade regimes became
the crucial factor in the late-1920s and remained the primary hindrance to the growth of
the River Plate meat packing industry, although there has been a move back to ‘freer’
trade in the 1990s. Thus, changing international trade regimes will be studied since the
late 1920s. Moreover, domestic policy is examined throughout the industry’s evolution.
In this overall context, the development of the industry is divided into three main 
chapters, each of which incorporates one of the main factors: (i) the importance of 
technological innovation in the rise of the River Plate meat packing industry (until the 
1910s), (ii) modifications in the ownership structure and the governments’ response 
(since 1900) and (iii) changing international trade regimes and the domestic policy 
reaction (since the late 1920s). Finally, the thesis analyses the River Plate meat packing 
industry up to mid-1997, when the research programme was completed. Hence, any 
events that occurred thereafter are not included.
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1.2.3 Theoretical Framework
This thesis will utilise a comprehensive theoretical framework to enhance the analysis of 
the data. Specifically, a combination of theories will be applied that complement each 
other and reinforce the explanation for the growth, subsequent decline and renewed 
expansion of the River Plate meat packing industry. In addition, the theories will help to 
explain the impact of technological innovation, modifications in the ownership structure 
and changing international trade regimes, as well as domestic policy.
Firstly, the staple theory, developed by the Canadian economic historian Harold Innis 
and strengthened by contributions from M. Watkins and C.B. Schedvin will be used to 
analyse the rise of the River Plate meat packing industry.1 The thesis will apply the 
staple theory to examine how linkages and spread effects that were derived from meat 
enabled the expansion of the industry until the early twentieth century. Within this 
context, demand side responses will be analysed, including forward, backward and final 
demand linkages, as well as supply factors. In addition, the thesis will also evaluate 
whether the decline of the meat packing industry in Argentina and Uruguay after the late 
1920s can be attributed to a ‘staple trap’. See section 3.1 for a review of the staple 
theory and its application to the analysis of the rise of the River Plate meat packing 
industry, as well as an explanation of the ‘staple trap’.
Secondly, the marketing mix concept advanced by P. Kotler and expanded by N.H. 
Borden will be used to analyse the strategic reasons for the foreign meat packing firms’
1 H.A. Innis depicted how staples contributed to the growth of the Canadian economy, especially in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century. In particular, his pioneering work included the study of the Cod Fisheries and Fur Trade in Canada in The 
Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy (The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1940) and The Fur Trade in Canada: 
An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1956) as well as Essays in Political 
Economy (The University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1938), which he edited. Additionally, Schedvin, C.B., "Staples and 
Regions of Pax Britannica", Economic History Review. November 1990, Vol. XLm, No. 4, pp. 533-559 and Watkins, M., 
"A Staple Theory of Economic Growth", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. May 1963, Vol. XXIX,
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decision to invest in the River Plate.2 Specifically, the analysis will seek to understand
how variations in the macro- and micro- environments shaped management decisions
concerning the marketing mix and hence the firm’s strategies. The company’s strategies,
particularly in regards to the foreign meat packers investments in the River Plate, had a
profound effect on the growth of the industry, as well as on the ownership structure. See
section 3.1 for an explanation of the marketing mix and its application to the analysis of
the rise of the River Plate meat packing industry. In addition, the marketing mix concept
will also highlight the reasons for the withdrawal of foreign meat packers from the River
Plate in the 1950s.
Thirdly, Alfred Chandler’s general theory of business will be applied to the analysis of 
the modifications in the ownership structure. Since Alfred Chandler’s work is vast, the 
thesis will focus on particular ideas developed in two of his most recognised books, The 
Visible Hand and Scale and Scope.3 Yet, some of Chandler’s other publications will 
also be used to complement the theoretical framework.4 The thesis is particularly 
interested in employing some of Chandler’s core concepts, such as the importance of 
economies of ‘scale and scope’, ‘throughput’ and ‘minimum efficient scale’, which help 
explain the reasons for the meat packing firms rivalry and their objective of market 
share maximisation. Furthermore, the notion put forward by Chandler that the ‘visible 
hand of management’ took over the supply control from the invisible hand of market
No. 2, p. 144, expanded and reinforced Innis' staple theory further.
2 Kotler, P., Marketing Management - Analysis. Planning. Implementation and Control (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1991), pp. 
71-72 and Borden, N., The Concept of the Marketing Mix in Enis. B., Cox, K.., Marketing Classics - A Selection of 
Influential Articles (Allyn and Bacon, Massachusetts, 1988), pp. 429-480.
3 Chandler, A., Scale and Scope - The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1990) and The Visible Hand - The Managerial Revolution in American Business (The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978).
4 References will also be made to Chandler, A., "The Enduring Logic of Industrial Success", Harvard Business Review. 
Number 2, March-April 1990, "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism", Business History Review. Volume 58, Number 4, 
Winter 1984, "The Beginnings of Big Business' in American Industry", Business History Review. Volume XXXIII, Number 
1, Spring 1959, [with F. Redlich] "Recent Developments in American Business Administration and their Conceptualization", 
Business History Review. Volume XXXV, Number 1, Spring 1961, "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism", Business
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forces, sheds light on the motives for setting up shipment pools among meat packing 
firms. See section 4.1 for a thorough review of Chandler’s overall theory of business 
and its application to the analysis of modifications in the ownership structure.
Fourthly, P.R. Krugman’s and J.A. Brander’s ‘new thinking’ regarding trade policy will 
be utilised in the analysis of changing international trade regimes, in addition to the 
staple theory.5 Krugman’s and Brander’s proposal of identifying strategic sectors and 
implementing an ‘activist trade policy’ will be examined, as well as their notion of 
expanding the share of ‘rent’ and ‘external economies’ for the sectors. Specifically, the 
analysis will discuss whether protectionist measures and subsidies have been used as a 
means to increase ‘rent’ and ‘external economies’ for the River Plate meat packing 
industry until the 1990s. Additionally, the thesis will consider whether the Argentinian 
and Uruguayan governments are applying an ‘activist trade policy’ in the 1990s. 
Moreover, the thesis will take into consideration Brander’s examination of the strategic 
game played by states. The analysis will reflect on the process of interaction and 
retaliation among countries in regards to the River Plate meat packing industry, 
including the utilisation of ‘tit for tat’ tactics. In particular, the thesis will concentrate on 
recognising broad movements in trade policy, between ‘cooperative’ and ‘non- 
cooperative’ stands, and will identify periods when governments were faced with a 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’. However, the thesis is not interested in particular ‘tit for tat’ 
strategies, but mainly in studying significant tendencies and periods of cooperation or
History Review. Volume 58, Number 4, Winter 1984.
5 Krugman, P.R., “New Thinking about Trade Policy” and Brander, J.A., “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy”
in Krugman, P.R. (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1992), pp. 1-45 and pp. 257-281. In addition, Krugman’s other publications related to trade policy include 
“Free Trade and Protectionism’ in The Age of Diminished Expectations (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994), 
pp. 123-135, Rethinking International Trade (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990), the chapters “Does Third 
World Growth Hurt First World Prosperity” and “The Illusion of Conflict in International Trade” in Pop Internationalism (The 
MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1996), pp. 49-84 and “The Political Economy of Trade Policy” in Krugman’s textbook 
International Economics - Theory and Policy (Harper Collins, New York, New York, 1994), especially pp. 238-241.
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defection between the Argentinian and Uruguayan governments and their trading
partners. See section 5.1 for an in-depth examination of Krugman’s and Brander’s new
thinking about trade policy and its application to the analysis of changing international
trade regimes.
1.2.4 Methodology
In order to determine the reasons and degree of the growth and decline of River Plate 
meat, it is important to first quantify the increase or decrease of the industry. Many 
authors have used exports as an indicator of the River Plate meat packing industry’s 
performance. This is traceable to the importance of exports in a small local market. 
Although the domestic market also plays a role in determining the size of the meat 
packing industry, the limitations of both Argentina's and Uruguay's small local markets 
are evident, despite the high per capita consumption of meat in the River Plate. 
Therefore, exports are a crucial measurement and will be used as a proxy to determine 
the growth of the industry. Thus the thesis is interested in the ‘production surplus’ for 
export, over and above the production for the domestic markets. Whereas numerous 
authors have used exports as a method of appraisal, they tended to use nominal export 
volume as a numeric value that mostly ignored changes in the world market and even in 
domestic growth. Hence, the relative or weighted value has often been neglected and a 
nominal figure has been used as an indicator of export performance and thus growth. It 
appears as if this practice is traceable to the use of short time frames, which tends to 
decrease the importance of weighted or relative values in export volume analysis. 
Indeed, most studies consider export volume index figures as indicative of the growth or 
decline of the industry. Although this analytical method might be adequate in the short 
term, it can be deceptive when analysing longer periods, as this thesis will do.
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Therefore, a broader method or concept has to be taken into consideration to measure
exports. In this context, the thesis will apply global export market shares and import 
distribution shares to economic history, by using four principal measures to evaluate the 
performance of the River Plate meat packing industry. Firstly, it will calculate 
comprehensive global export market shares from 1890 until the 1990s, using a series of 
five year average periods. Secondly, the thesis will calculate the distribution of world­
wide imports for meat since 1900, in order to show the trends in the key meat 
purchasing markets of the world. This will help illustrate the principal changes that 
occurred in the important world markets, as well as showing the rising and falling trends 
of the main global meat importers. Thirdly, given that volume export market shares will 
be calculated using total meat in tons, disregarding the quality and most importantly the 
price of meat, it is also meaningful to calculate the value share, or in this case the export 
value market share, as opposed to the export volume market share, which is described 
above. The value share takes into consideration the various cuts and quality of meat, 
which vary in price and hence influence sales figures, which in turn has an effect on the 
profitability of the industry. See chapter 2 for the benefits and limitations of applying 
global export market shares and import distribution shares to Economic History, as well 
as for explanations of their estimation and calculation methods for the River Plate meat 
packing industry.
This extensive quantitative study of the River Plate meat packing industry from 1900 to 
the 1990s will be of vital importance in providing the foundation, as well as the 
quantitative evidence for the analysis on the impact of technological innovation, 
modifications in the ownership structure and particularly changing international trade 
regimes on the meat packing industry. Importantly, it represents a novel and thorough
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measuring method that will enable to assess the growth, decline and prospects of the 
River Plate meat packing industry since 1900, while strongly enhancing the qualitative 
research and analysis.
1.2.5 Results Expected and Hypotheses
The thesis seeks to study the different factors that had an impact on the meat packing 
industry in detail and then formulate a clear conclusion about the interrelations and 
connections between the various elements. Thereby, the aim is to determine and explain 
the causes for the performance of the meat packing industry. Many studies blame 
changing international trade regimes for the decline of the industry after the 1920s and 
although the research aims to show that this was the primary reason, it also 
conjecturalises that various factors influenced, affected and accelerated the move 
towards the decline of the River Plate meat packing industry after the 1930s, while more 
recently in the mid-1990s inducing a shift back towards renewed expansion. In this 
context, it is hypothesised overall that the River Plate meat packing industry grew and 
then declined, due to a combination of reasons and forces, which were interdependent, 
while having a bearing on each other. Although the predominant factor in the decline 
was a shift in international trade regimes, other elements impacted the industry, namely 
domestic policy, technological innovation and modifications in the ownership structure, 
which conflicted and forced each other into certain directions, thereby determining the 
fate of the River Plate meat packing industry. From this overall premise, a number of 
specific hypotheses will be tested that build on the theoretical framework.
Firstly, it is hypothesised that whereas the rise of the River Plate meat packing industry 
can be attributed principally to technological innovation, other factors were also crucial
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in enabling the expansion. Indeed, a number of supply as well as demand side responses
derived from the meat staple occurred and strengthened over time, which facilitated the
development of the industry. As such, the growth of the industry reflects, among others,
the integration and full adaptation of refrigeration technology with the transfer of related
technical know-how and management techniques, improved transportation networks, in
terms of the development of local railways and oceanic refrigerated shipping lines, as
well as ameliorated cattle quality through cross breeding. However, a conducive
domestic policy environment combined with an ‘open’ international trade regime were
also essential factors for the rise of the industry. Indeed, the establishment of a legal
framework and property rights in the River Plate, as well as the ability to export meat
and cattle products freely, were fundamental preconditions that enabled the development
of the industry, which in turn contributed to the transfer of capital and technology, while
fostering meat exports. The supply and demand side responses expanded, gained
strength and were consolidated through a ‘multiplier accelerator mechanism’. This
boosted the growth of the meat packing industry, especially in the late nineteenth- and
early twentieth- century. By the 1920s the River Plate meat packing industry was the
overwhelming global meat export leader.
Secondly, it is argued that the consolidation in the ownership structure was driven by the 
U.S. meat packers goal to increase their economies of scale and scope, as well as 
achieve adequate ‘minimum efficient scale’ and higher ‘throughput’ for their expanding 
plants. However, their advancement was only possible thanks to technological 
innovation and adaptation, as well as a conducive laissez faire domestic policy. To start 
with, the transfer of refrigeration technology and the ability to ship chilled and frozen 
meat from the River Plate to Europe were essential for the expansion of foreign meat
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packers. In addition, domestic policy, which was strongly influenced by cattle
producers, did not discourage rivalries and price wars among meat packers, given that
they increased cattle prices. Moreover, American meat packers had significant first
mover advantages vs. their Anglo-Argentinian counterparts that enabled them to expand
their market share rapidly. They had acquired substantial technical and managerial
knowledge through their developed American business, particularly in exporting to the
U.K. market. Indeed, they pioneered the export of high value chilled beef from the River
Plate. Additionally, they had large U.S. operations from which they could draw funds to
finance expensive price wars. These two benefits enabled the American meat packers to
achieve leadership in a remarkably short timeframe. Through price wars they
successively increased their market share, at the expense of the Anglo-Argentinian meat
packers, thereby intensifying the consolidation of the industry. In the 1920s, with the
rise of the British Vestey concern, price wars occurred between large and small packers.
Specifically, the American meat packers and Vestey increased their economies of scale
and scope at the expense of smaller frigorificos, resulting in further consolidation,
which reached extreme oligopolistic proportions. Domestic policy makers failed to curb
the heightened consolidation of the meat packing industry, especially when it attained
extreme oligopolistic dimensions in the 1920s, partly due to the sheer size of meat
packers, but primarily as a result of their alliance with fatteners. Meat packers developed
a particular relationship with fatteners, through special pricing arrangements and other
benefits, which in turn provided them with a powerful domestic policy influence. The
creation of the Frigorifico Nacional in the late 1920s acted as a significant
counterweight against the heightened consolidation in Uruguay. However, in the much
larger Argentinian market, it was not until intensive and frantic parliamentary debates
occurred in the mid-193 Os that this relationship was weakened.
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Thirdly, although meat exports in volume terms reached their apogee in the late 1920s, 
the first signs of a ‘staple trap’ were already evident. The value of exports started to fall 
and there was a gradual shift in international trade regimes away from ‘free trade’ 
towards bilateralism, while the ‘multiplier accelerator mechanism’ reached a saturation 
point. Thus the effectiveness of the meat staple in generating supply and demand side 
responses diminished. This reduced the attractiveness of meat, especially beef, as a 
staple. It is hypothesised that although the first signs were already apparent in the late 
1920s, the ‘staple trap’ was established in the 1930s, especially after the Ottawa 
Conference, and was consolidated in the 1940-50s. In the early 1930s, the decline 
became evident, after Britain imposed significant trade barriers for River Plate meat, 
thereby limiting exports and placing a substantial strain on the industry. Whereas a 
change in international trade regimes was the primary reason for the ‘staple trap’ and 
thus the decline of the industry, domestic policy and modifications in the ownership 
structure also contributed to the long-term stagnation of the sector. The thesis will show 
how in the 1940-50s domestic policy prevented the development of the industry and 
obstructed meat exports, even though there was increased international demand for 
River Plate meat within an improved trade environment. Indeed, domestic policy 
overreacted to international market access restrictions and introduced a severe import 
substitution industrialisation policy, which extracted so much surplus from meat, that it 
became unremunerative to produce cattle. Thus this represented the consolidation of the 
‘staple trap’. In addition, Argentina and Uruguay were increasingly facing a broad 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ due to their inward looking and non-cooperative stand. Moreover, 
state intervention and control in the meat packing industry led to severe distortions in 
the ownership structure, by maintaining large outdated plants, while smaller and more 
efficient meat packers emerged. The I.S.I. policies remained broadly in place until the
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1990s, albeit with periods of moderate liberalisation. Starting in the late 1950s the
U.S.A. imposed even stricter sanitary restrictions for River Plate meat and continued the
ban on chilled and frozen exports until the 1990s. This combined with the establishment
of the European Community’s Common Agricultural Policy, that subsidised producers
as well as exports, led to a further increase in market access restrictions and lower
exports for River Plate meat, especially since the E.C. restrained meat imports through
strict quotas and became a net meat exporter.
Fourthly, it is argued that a revival of the River Plate meat packing industry is taking 
place in the 1990s, as the industry is entering a new period of growth, albeit through a 
gradual process. The elimination of Foot and Mouth Disease in the River Plate led to the 
lifting of the U.S. embargo and has helped secure an increase in export quotas to North 
America. In addition, the Uruguay Round G.A.T.T. negotiations have led to a ‘freer’ 
international trade regime, which is gradually increasing the export opportunities for 
River Plate meat. Furthermore, both Argentina and Uruguay have liberalised the meat 
packing industry and their economies. This has led to significant efficiency gains, as 
meat packers operate within an economic environment driven by market forces. As a 
result of these changes, there is renewed foreign capital interest in the industry. 
Moreover, Argentina and Uruguay are no longer confronted with a ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’, due to their cooperative and outward looking position. They have also 
identified the industry as a strategic sector and have adopted an ‘activist trade policy’ for 
meat packing.
Finally and following the renewed ‘openness’ in the 1990s, it is hypothesised that a full 
cycle has taken place in the River Plate meat packing industry in the twentieth century,
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shifting from a ‘free’ international trade regime until the late 1920s, to a period of
‘bilateralism and control’ thereafter, and back to ‘freer’ trade in the 1990s. Similarly, the
ownership structure changed from local ownership until the 1900s to principally foreign
ownership until the mid-1940s, followed by a period of intervention and state control,
then back to local ownership in the 1960-70s, while in the 1990s there is renewed
foreign capital interest in the industry. Moreover, domestic policy also shifted, from
laissez faire economic policies until the mid-1940s, to broadly based import substitution
industrialisation, control and intervention from the end of the Second World War until
the late 1980s, and back to liberalisation and market oriented policies in the 1990s.
1.3 Literature Review, Thesis’ Contribution and Sources
1.3.1 A Review of Publications on the River Plate Meat Packing Industry and 
How this Thesis Advances Existing Literature
Before we examine how this thesis will advance existing literature, an analysis of the
works to date will shed light on the importance of this thesis in contributing to the
understanding of the River Plate meat packing industry. Due to the significance of the
River Plate meat packing industry, especially in the first half of this century, a variety of
literature exists on the topic. However, the existing literature is narrow in focus, given
that most authors concentrate on a single aspect of industry. These include: (i) the effect
of technological innovation on the growth of the industry, (ii) the shift in the ownership
structure and the impact of domestic policy as well as (iii) international trade regimes.
When it comes to technological innovation, various authors have written about its effect 
on the growth of the River Plate meat packing industry. Most concentrate on the 
evolution of the industry from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century,
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especially the shift to saladeros and then frigorificos. One of the best known writers on
the impact of technological innovation for Argentina is H. Giberti, who describes how
technology enabled gradual improvements in meat conservation and how it helped the
development of the industry since colonial times.6 He argues that first gradual
indigenous technological innovation and later on foreign technology allowed the
expansion of the River Plate meat packing industry. He focuses on the changes that
cattle producers had to undergo in breeding methods to adjust to foreign technology,
particularly the new requirements of refrigerated meat packing plants. For Uruguay a
similar meat packing industry evolution was compiled by P. Seoane who depicted
technological changes and their effect on the production and commercialisation of
meat.7 Seoane examines the effect that the industrialisation of saladeros and then the
frigorificos had on the growth of the industry, concentrating on the improvement in
meat production techniques and the greater utilisation of cattle. In this respect, he points
out that technological innovation facilitated the manufacturing of an ever increasing
number of by-products and improved meat quality. The value of cattle was increased
through expansive utilisation of the animal, as well as better conservation techniques.
Hence, he maintains that technological innovation increased value added production that
combined with better processing methods, enabled the meat industry to grow through
greater export value. Another writer which has examined the importance of
o
technological innovation in Uruguay is A. Castellanos. His main analysis centres on the 
changes that cattle producers underwent to adjust to technological innovation and 
technology transfer. In particular, he evaluates how production methods changed, from 
encircling herds on open land, concentrating primarily on expansive cattle rearing, to the
6 Giberti, H., Historia Economica de la Ganaderia Argentina (Ediciones Solar / Hachette, Buenos Aires, 1961).
7 Seoane, P., La Industria de las Carnes en el Uruguay (Montevideo, 1928).
8 Castellanos, A., Breve Historia de la Ganaderia en el Uruguay (Banco de Credito, Montevideo, 1973).
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introduction of fencing and mixed breeding techniques. He sustains that cattle producers
were often proactive and through the Rural Association encouraged production
improvements, while additionally promoting meat and animal by-products in export
markets. Finally, J.P. Barran and B. Nahum, in their broad analysis of the Uruguayan
political history from 1851-1904, provide an evolution of the meat packing industry,
particularly the impact of technological innovation and the effect of domestic policy.9
Importantly, among other significant findings, they show how political instability in
Uruguay, until peace was finally established in 1904, affected the development of the
industry, which combined with the lack of good quality cattle hindered the
establishment offrigorificos until the early twentieth century.
Various writers have focused on the ownership structure and the impact of domestic 
policy in Argentina and Uruguay. To start with, J. Liceaga, who examines the events up 
to 1950, centres his argument on the formation of the industry, the creation of 
oligopolistic pools by foreign meat packers before the Second World War and their 
effect on cattle producers.10 Additionally, his book investigates some aspects of the 
export sector and evaluates the Roca-Runciman agreement, a bilateral Anglo- 
Argentinian trade accord, as well as the succeeding pacts in the 1930s. His analysis aims 
to provide the basis to defend the creation of the C.A.P., a group of Argentinian public 
cooperative frigorificos set up in the 1930s, and to protect this newcomer in a novel 
industrial ownership structure. Similarly, G. Bernhard, appraises the industrial 
composition of the meat packing industry in Uruguay until 1970, using his evaluation to 
defend the establishment of the Frigorifico Nacional, a public meat packing plant in
9 Barran, J.P. and Nahum, B., Historia Rural del Uruguay Modemo (Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo, Vol. 1/1, 
1967, Vol. 2, 1971, Vol. 3, 1973).
10 Liceaga, J., Las Carnes en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1952).
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Montevideo, as well as arguing that it should remain a public firm in the long term.11
Furthermore, Hanson researches the ownership structure of the Argentinian frigorificos
from their beginnings until the 1930s, while being critical of the meat export pool
i  j
formation. An extreme in the literature is R. Puiggros, who in his book written in the 
1950s, not only defends the establishment of the C.A.P. in Argentina and condemns the 
oligopolistic nature of the ownership structure, but most importantly supports the 
nationalisation of foreign frigorificos and the establishment of regional cooperative 
frigorificos across Argentina, with the aim to provide higher profitability for cattle 
producers.13 Puigross points out that foreign frigorificos paid low prices to cattle 
producers, thereby providing very low margin yields to land owners, while they 
maintained high profits. Another author who defends the C.A.P. in the 1970s is J. 
Calvet. He gives a strong background of the conflicts of interest between foreign meat 
packers, the state and estancieros, while describing the Roca-Runciman agreement and 
following bilateral pacts, as well as studying the rise of the meat packing industry in 
Argentina.14 His thesis centred on the reasons for maintaining the C.A.P. operational in 
the 1970s and he suggested that a complete liberalisation and the dismantling of the 
C.A.P. would not provide the basis for improved productivity and increased cattle 
producer profitability. A broader analysis of domestic policy and the effects of the 
ownership structure change, is provided by P.H. Smith, whose assessment of the internal 
political power struggles, sheds light on the interaction and conflicts between different 
interest groups involved in the meat sector.15 Indeed, P.H. Smith investigates the 
political development of the Argentinian meat industry in 1900-1946, analysing 
foremost the development of the industry as well as disputes between the various
11 Bernhard, G., Los Monopolios v la Industria Frigorifica (Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1970).
12 Hanson, S., Argentine Meat and the British Market (Stanford University Press, California, 1938).
13 Puiggros, R., Libre Empresa o Nacionalizacion en la Industria de la Came (Editorial Argumentos, Buenos Aires, 1957).
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interest groups and the frigorificos. Moreover, he reviews the 1930s bilateral
agreements, but relates it primarily to the diverse opposing interest groups. Smith's
findings explain the internal political conflicts and their relations to the distribution of
power in Argentina, while identifying a power shift from packers and fatteners until the
mid-1930s to breeders until the rise of Peron. Finally, M.H.J. Finch provides a broad,
yet short perspective of the Uruguayan meat packing industry, in one of the chapters of
his book.16
Changing international trade regimes are a key component to explain the decline of the 
River Plate meat packing industry. Although many authors analysed international trade 
regimes, most did not incorporate them as a main element in their research and they 
tended to focus on the events up to the late 1940s. Nevertheless, two key writers have 
centred on international trade regimes, namely D. Drosdoff and A. de las Carreras. 
Specifically, D. Drosdoff examined the Roca-Runciman agreement and subsequent 
pacts until 1956 in detail, while demonstrating a clear shift to bilateralism in the 1930s 
and depicting the effects it had on the meat packing industry.17 Drosdoff shows how the 
decline in the River Plate meat packing industry after 1930s is attributable primarily to 
the changes in international trade regimes. While Drosdoff examines mainly the 
international trade regime in the 1930s and 1940s, A. de las Carreras, concentrates on 
the issues faced after the Second World War. Indeed, one of A. de las Carreras' key 
publications provides an excellent review of the problems encountered due to Foot and 
Mouth Disease and explains the limitations placed on the River Plate meat packing 
industry by the existence of the disease, especially since the 1950s, in terms of
14 Calvet, J., Un Siglo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (Carbap, Buenos Aires, 1977).
15 Smith, P.H., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969).
14 Finch, M.H.J., A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (The Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 123-152.
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1 ftinternational market access restrictions due to strict sanitary regulations. His overall 
findings maintain that Foot and Mouth Disease sanitary restrictions placed on the River 
Plate represented a non-tariff barrier. Through the development and usage of the ‘no- 
risk’ and ‘minimum-risk’ hypotheses, A. de las Carreras shows that the severe hygiene 
regulations put in place by the U.S.A. starting in the 1950s, lacked scientific 
justification and hence represented a non-tariff barrier. Furthermore, another important 
book of A. de las Carreras presents a well laid out evolution of the industry until the 
1980s, one section of which also studies changing international trade regimes.19 Finally, 
R. Munoz Duran analysed international trade regimes in several reports, primarily in the
901990s. Munoz Duran was one of the first to recognise the shift back to ‘freer’ 
international trade in the 1990s and the positive implications for the Uruguayan meat 
packing industry.
Overall, most writers have centred on primarily one aspect of the change and 
development of the River Plate meat packing industry up to the 1950s. This is traceable 
to the key role that meat played in the River Plate in the first half of the century, when it 
expanded rapidly and became the world's leading meat exporter, while it lost importance 
after the Second World War. In addition, much of the literature dates from before the 
1950s, thereby only covering events up to the point at which they were written. 
Therefore, very few publications have taken the complete lifespan of the meat packing 
industry into consideration and prepared a full historical analysis since the beginning of
17 Drosdoff, D., El Gobiemo de las Vacas (Ediciones La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1972).
18 Carreras de las, A., La Aftosa en la Argentina. Un Desafio Competitivo (Editorial Hemisferio Sur, Buenos Aires, 1993).
19 Carreras de las, A., El Comercio de Ganados v Carnes en la Argentina (Editorial Hemisferio Sur, Buenos Aires, 1986).
20 Mufioz Duran, R., Cambios en las Corrientes Comerciales de Came Bovina en el Mercado Intemacional para los Anos 90 
(Banco Central del Uruguay, Departamento de Investigaciones Economicas, Montevideo, April 1990), “Informe Sobre el 
Mercado de Came Bovina de la Comunidad Europea en lo que Va del Ano 1996”, INAC, 11 November 1996, Resultados en 
el Sector Came Bovina de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT (Comision Sectorial para el Mercosur), Montevideo, April 1995, "El 
Mercado de Carnes del Rio de la Plata", Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay. Montevideo, 1966, "Aspectos Basicos 
de la Industria de Carnes de Uruguay", Banco Central del Uruguay. Asesoria Economica, Montevideo, 1974, pp. 84-91.
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the century, which includes the major changes that took place since the 1950s, with the
exception of A. de las Carreras work, which expands until the early 1990s and to a
lesser extent that of J. Calvet and M.HJ. Finch, whose research spans up to the 1970s.
Importantly, though some publications assimilate a supplementary viewpoint, most
research focuses on a single angle of the River Plate meat packing industry, while
analysing other factors sparsely. Additionally, most studies either centre on Argentina or
Uruguay, rather than analysing the River Plate as a whole, thereby ignoring
complementary and interrelated forces that had a bearing on the combined industry of
both countries. Hence, in general most publications on the River Plate meat packing
industry are limited by time span, subject or analytical angle and often country.
The thesis will advance existing literature and change the focus of technological 
innovation, modifications in the ownership structure and international trade regimes, by 
analysing the River Plate meat packing industry in the six following ways. Firstly, it will 
compile a complete historical analysis since the beginning of the century until the mid- 
1990s. Secondly, it will re-examine the influence of technological innovation and to 
what an extent it was responsible for the rise of the meat packing industry. Thirdly, by 
extending and bringing up to date the impact of changing international trade regimes to 
the mid-1990s, the thesis will contain a full international trade regime cycle, from free 
trade in the early twentieth century, to control and bilateralism since the 1930s and back 
to more open trade in the mid-1990s, given the latest trade initiatives. Similarly, it will 
include a full cycle in the ownership structure, from local to primarily foreign ownership 
in the early twentieth century, then a period of state intervention and control after the 
Second World War, and back to local ownership in the 1960-70s, while in the 1990s
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there is renewed foreign capital interest in the industry. Fourthly, the thesis will
investigate the changes in the ownership structure and their impact on the organisation
of the industry, the importance of management know-how as well as the role played by
large foreign meat packers. Fifthly, the reaction of domestic policy to changes in the
industry’s ownership structure and international trade regimes will be studied, as well as
the influence that cattle producers had on policy makers. In addition, the interactions
between meat packers, cattle producers and policy makers will be analysed. Moreover,
the thesis will determine to what an extent domestic policy contributed to the meat
packing crisis, especially after the Second World War. Finally, by studying both
Argentina and Uruguay, the thesis will shed light on the differences and interactions
between the meat packing industries of both countries.
Another important contribution that this thesis aims to make is by calculating and 
applying global export market shares and import distribution shares to Economic 
History. Given that the export sector was and remains extremely important for the River 
Plate meat packing industry, it is imperative not just to examine exports alone, but 
rather analyse them in the context of a growing world export market for meat. Through 
the calculation of novel global export market shares for River Plate meat since 1900, the 
thesis aims to scrutinise as well as reassess the relationships between the factors 
impacting the industry, as well as the growth or decline of meat exports from Argentina 
and Uruguay. Furthermore, the thesis will also calculate the distribution of global meat 
imports since 1900 to measure and appraise the shifts of the key international markets 
for meat and how they affected River Plate meat exports.
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1.3.2 Sources
This thesis considers the work of numerous authors and various sources. The data 
found, libraries consulted and fieldwork undertook have provided substantial material 
for the thesis. Indeed, facts, statistics and information from numerous sources in Europe, 
the U.S.A. and the River Plate have been obtained. To start with, the qualitative sources 
incorporate a vast array of publications. These include books, journal articles, company 
and government reports, abstracts, estate papers and numerous official documents, 
which concentrate on the economic history of Argentina as well as Uruguay and more 
specifically on the River Plate meat packing industry. In-depth research at numerous 
libraries in the U.K., such as the L.S.E., Imperial College, Oxford University and the 
University of London libraries, as well as the British Library, have provided the 
groundwork for the thesis. Additionally, archive research in England, including the 
Annual Report archives at the London Guildhall Library (Corporation of London), were 
crucial in enhancing the thesis.
Although various publications were available in the U.K., travel to the River Plate has 
been very beneficial to detail and sharpen the thesis, through additional materials, which 
were difficult to obtain, particularly those items which were out of print and with work 
in progress. My fieldwork in Argentina and Uruguay, which entailed numerous trips in 
1994-97, has provided specific local information and data on the River Plate meat 
packing industry. Specifically, the field programme in Buenos Aires and Montevideo 
included extensive research in the main as well as specialist libraries and archives. In 
Argentina, I obtained large quantities of archive material in the Argentinian Central 
Bank, both at the Tomquist and Prebisch libraries. At the Tomquist library, I found 
various documents, articles and reports appertaining to the River Plate meat packing
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industry from the late nineteenth century until the 1930s. Moreover, at the Prebisch
library, I obtained archive material for the post 1930s period. Furthermore, I analysed
nineteenth century estate papers at the Di Telia University in Buenos Aires, in particular
the William Walker accounts and also found other relevant material. In Uruguay, I
gathered various documents on the development of the meat packing industry in the late
nineteenth- and early twentieth- century at the National General Archive in Montevideo
(Archivo General de la Nacion). Additionally, I also obtained numerous reports, books
and articles for the twentieth century at the library of the Uruguayan National Meat
Institute (Instituto Nacional de Carnes [I.N.A.C.]).
It is important to note that fewer archive documents relating to the River Plate meat 
packing industry exist after the 1950s. Thus for the 1950-90s period, I have broadened 
the primary sources substantially by conducting interviews and fact gathering meetings 
with key individuals in the meat packing industry, in related organisations, with 
academics, economists, economic historians and specific writers on the industry, as well 
as with prominent decision makers. In Buenos Aires, I interviewed Dr. Roberto 
Alemann, the leading Economist and former Economy Minister, who played a key role 
in negotiating the quota for cooked River Plate meat imports to the USA with the 
Kennedy administration. Dr. Alemann was the Argentinian Ambassador in Washington 
during the market access crisis in the late 1950s. Additionally, I interviewed Ing. 
Alberto de las Carreras, a former Argentinian Secretary of Commerce and a prominent 
writer on the River Plate meat packing industry, as well as Mr. Luis Baumeule, director 
of Frigorifico Quickfood (Paty), Argentina’s third largest meat packing company, that 
also owns a plant in Uruguay. In Montevideo, I conducted interviews with Ing. Roberto 
Munoz Duran, consultant and former director of I.N.A.C. and the Uruguayan Central
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Bank, as well as with Dr. Barrios Mariezcurrena, director of Frigorifico San Jacinto- 
Nirea, Uruguay’s second largest meat packing plant. Finally, I talked to Ec. Fernando 
Calloia from the Uruguayan Central Bank in Montevideo, relating to his study of the 
industry in the 1960-80s. Importantly, during these interviews and through numerous 
meetings with other experts in the field, I obtained additional post-1950s primary data, 
such as conference proceedings, newspaper articles as well as governmental and trade 
documents.
The research in the River Plate was complemented with field work in Geneva and 
California. I obtained key evidence and findings in libraries and from international 
organisations, such as the W.T.O., the U.N. (Geneva), particularly U.N.C.T.A.D. and 
the International Meat Secretariat (Paris). In Geneva, I conducted interviews with 
officers at the W.T.O. and diplomats representing Argentina and Uruguay. Specifically, 
I interviewed Mr. Joao Magalhaes, Counsellor of the Agriculture and Commodities 
Division at the W.T.O., Dr. Miguel Berthet, Ambassador of the Uruguayan Permanent 
Representation to the W.T.O. and the U.N., as well as Mr. Riaboi, the Minister from the 
Argentinian Mission to the W.T.O. and the U.N. Additionally, I obtained numerous 
publications at the Graduate School of International Studies library in Geneva and from 
the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California.
Furthermore, the statistical data on River Plate and world exports, imports and 
production have been gathered from a number of official publications, compromising 
the Institute of Agriculture for reports up to the 1950s, and for the 1950-90s period from 
the Food and Agriculture Organization, G.A.T.T. / W.T.O. and the International Meat 
Secretariat.
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2. APPLYING GLOBAL EXPORT MARKET SHARES AND IMPORT 
DISTRIBUTION SHARES TO ECONOMIC HISTORY: THEIR 
ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates how the application of global export market shares and 
import distribution shares can be utilised as a methodological tool to analyse the export 
performance of industries on a global scale, especially when examining long-term 
trends. In particular, this chapter analyses the global export market shares and import 
distribution shares of the River Plate meat packing industry, and explains the calculation 
and estimation methods. Moreover, it considers the overall importance, advantages and 
limitations of global export market shares and import distribution shares as an analytical 
device in Economic History, which can be applied to further industries in different 
regions or countries.
Global export market shares measure the share of a particular export product(s) from 
one country or region, in this case River Plate meat, as a percentage of the total global 
exports of that product(s). Worldwide import distribution shares measure imports of a 
specific product(s) in one country or region, in this case imports of meat, as a percentage 
of the total global imports of that product(s).
Whereas the calculation of market shares is a fairly conventional device to organise or 
process data, in this thesis its use is more elaborate and incorporates a strong analytical 
dimension. Specifically, market shares have been used by industry, but they have tended 
to concentrate on a national market for a particular product in comparison with other 
manufacturers. Only occasionally have manufacturers used a regional market (i.e.
GLOBAL EXPORT MARKET SHARES AND IMPORT DISTRIBUTION SHARES 42
Europe) as the ‘universe’ from which to calculate the shares, while very rarely 
determining world market shares for their products. In addition, companies are inclined 
to analyse their products vs. their competitors and tend not to compute market shares of 
an entire industry for one region and compare it to another. Some governments and 
industry boards or associations of certain countries have started, albeit seldom, to 
measure some of their principal industries’ export market share vs. other countries in the 
world market. But they tend to concentrate on very recent periods (i.e. last 5 years) and 
often neglect historical export market share data, which can reveal strong fluctuations 
and thus important changes in the global export market, particularly when dealing with 
traditional exports.21 Through the application of global export market shares and import 
distribution shares over longer periods of time, the analysis goes beyond nominal export 
/ import figures, or short-term market share changes, which can often be misleading. 
Indeed, weighted or relative figures are measured by comparing them with the world 
market over long periods of time. As a result, global export market shares and import 
distribution shares facilitate the identification of shifts in global markets, which in turn 
enable companies and governments to recognise the need for new strategies, priorities 
and policies. Furthermore, global export market shares can serve as an ‘attractiveness 
barometer’ for investments in particular export industries in one region or country vs. 
other worldwide areas.
When calculating market shares, as a first step the total market, known as the ‘universe’, 
must be defined geographically, demographically as well as by product range. 
Additionally, the unit of measurement must be determined, such as whether the market
21 For example, the British Tourist Authority (BTA) utilises market shares to estimate the U.K.’s share of total global tourist 
spending and number of tourist arrivals per country.
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share will be measured either in value or volume. Another approach often used in 
industry is a system of statistical units, which combines volume, value and profitability 
elements to analyse a broad range of products within a market.22
The overall aim of global export market shares is to quantify the increase or decrease of 
a particular industry or company in the world export market. Thus, when applying 
global export market shares to the River Plate meat packing industry, they will 
demonstrate the increasing or declining role of River Plate meat exports and can be used 
to identify moments of change within the sector and, consequently, act as a proxy for 
positive or negative factors affecting the industry. These can include the impact of 
technological innovation, modifications in the ownership structure and changing 
international trade regimes. Importantly, numerous publications have utilised exports to 
analyse the progress of the River Plate meat packing industry.23 The reason for this is 
that the River Plate domestic markets are limited, given the low number of inhabitants 
in Argentina and Uruguay. Although the consumption of meat per capita in the River 
Plate is high when compared with the rest of the world, the domestic market remains 
small. Consequently, exports constitute a determining evaluation method of the River 
Plate meat packing industry. Whereas many authors have employed exports as a 
assessment tool, they were inclined to disregard alterations in the global market, thereby 
using exports as a nominal value. Accordingly, the relative or weighted value has been 
mostly ignored and the nominal amount utilised as an indicator of the industry’s growth. 
This seems to reflect the brief periods of investigation in most studies, that are inclined
22 Statistical units (SU) are often used by international companies to analyse a range of products that might have different units 
of volume measure (i.e. weight, liquid content), value and level of profitability. A SU factor is calculated / assigned to each 
product version and size in the various product categories, thereby facilitating volume and market share analysis across a 
series of products, which are often not related.
23 Finch, M.H.J., A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (The Macmillan Press, London, 1981), pp. 124-131, Liceaga, J.,
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to reduce the significance of weighted or relative values of export figures. Many 
publications regard export figures as representative of the growth and decline of the 
industry. Whereas this might be appropriate when studying short periods, it can be 
misleading in the analysis of longer time-ffames, such as the over one hundred year 
period that this thesis will study. While many authors have utilised export nominal 
quantities, only a very limited number of publications have made reference to weighted 
export figures in comparison with the world meat market. One of the few exceptions is 
A. de las Carreras, who actually computed and displayed global export market shares 
and worldwide meat import distribution shares, though confined to two periods, one in 
1934-38 and the other in 1970.24 Overall, when analysing exports as a nominal figure, it 
implies that the world market has not changed and that exports have grown or declined 
in line with the global market for a particular export product. This may at times be 
deceptive and therefore highlights the significance of examining exports with an ample 
viewpoint by producing global export market shares. The scarcity of global export 
market shares production and allusion in most studies of the River Plate meat packing 
industry, reflects the intricacy of collecting, ordering and computing them, especially for 
numerous periods.
This thesis will reexamine the correlation and links of the elements that changed and 
influenced the River Plate meat packing industry, through the calculation of 
comprehensive global export market shares since the late nineteenth century until the 
1990s, while analysing the growth and decline of Argentinian and Uruguayan meat 
exports. In this context, global export market shares will be calculated from 1890s to the
Las Carnes en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1952),pp. 102 and 296, Giberti, H., Historia 
Economica de la Ganaderia Argentina (Ediciones Solar /  Hachette, Buenos Aires, 1961), p. 184.
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mid-1990s, using a series of five year average periods. This will be measured firstly for 
the River Plate meat packing industry as well as in comparison with other key 
worldwide meat exporters, including Australia, New Zealand, the U.S.A. and the 
countries that belong to the European Community / European Union. In addition, 
distribution of worldwide imports for meat will be computed in order to assess the 
changes and key shifts in the main international markets for meat as well as the effect 
they had on the River Plate meat exports. Specifically, import distribution shares will be 
calculated from the early twentieth century until the mid-1990s of the principal 
importers of meat, such as the U.K., Germany, France, the U.S.A. and Japan, which will 
reflect the allocation of worldwide imports for meat and thus indicate which countries 
played an important role as meat importers, as well as demonstrating changes in the 
pattern of importing markets since the early twentieth century. Separately, production 
and consumption of meat will also be analysed, especially in chapter 5.
In addition to the global export volume market share, in which volume in tonnes will be 
used for the calculation, this thesis will also compute global export value market shares, 
which appraises the value of meat. Indeed, the global export value market share may 
vary from the volume share depending on the quality of the meat exported. This is due 
to the varying cuts and quality of meat, which can command higher or lower prices, 
thereby influencing the global export market value share. Moreover, value shares might 
be affected by international or domestic policy, which might create artificial price 
corridors and inflated or deflated prices vs. the world market, due to tariff or non-tariff 
barriers and taxation procedures, among other reasons. Thus the global export value
24 Carreras de las, A., La Aftosa en la Argentina. Un Desafio Competitive) (Editorial Hemisferio Sur, Buenos Aires, 1993), pp. 
14-15.
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share provides an indication of the export sales, which are influenced by prices and in 
turn can have an effect on the industry's profitability. However, calculating the global 
export value market share is very complex and many technical differences have to be 
overcome. To start with a breakdown of export values of meat is extremely intricate, 
given that many countries have varying meat cuts. Hence, the value share will be 
calculated for total meat exports, thereby taking into consideration the various meat cuts 
and price differentiation since 1890.
Overall meat global export market shares, both in volume and value as well as 
distribution of worldwide imports for meat can be very important and have a number of 
benefits. The next section will highlight the key advantages of global export market 
shares and import distribution shares, while outlining their main limitations.
2.2 Advantages and Limitations of Meat Global Export Market Shares and 
Distribution of Worldwide Imports for Meat
Global export market shares and import distribution shares can be applied to most
industries that produce for the export market. The utilisation of this analytical method is
particularly important for industries in specific countries or regions which are highly
dependent on exports. This can be the case if their products do not have a significant
local market, either due to sheer market size or due to demand constraints (lack of local
purchasing power), or an industry could be facing the saturation of the local market. One
of the most significant advantages of global export market shares is that they help
establish a relative weighted value for exports, given that local exports (in this case of
River Plate meat) are compared with the global export market (in this instance total
meat world exports). Thus, changes in the world export market for a particular product
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are taken into consideration and therefore exports are not just seen in the local context 
but vs. the global marketplace. Indeed, exports in volume or value of an industry in a 
particular country may increase, but this augmentation might be much lower than the 
export increase of the same industry in other countries and accordingly the global export 
market could have risen by a significantly larger index than local exports. Therefore, the 
absolute need for countries to look at the global export market share of their principal 
exports or those which are considered to have potential.
If the analysis encompasses a long period (i.e. over 30 years), global export market 
shares and import distribution shares can show long term trends and changes in markets, 
while they can help identify key "breaking or crisis points" which might derive from 
repercussions of influential policy implementation, either on a national or international 
basis, such as amendments in domestic policy as well as changes in international trade 
regimes. In addition, these "breaking or crisis points" might indicate or help recognise 
significant transformations in the use of technology or technological innovation, 
changes in the priorities of companies as well as potential effects of modifications in the 
ownership structure of particular industries. Moreover, global export market shares and 
worldwide import distribution shares enable countries or companies to identify shifts in 
the global market buyers (the importers) and sellers (the exporters), which will show 
potential new markets, a possible decline of traditional markets and changes in 
competing countries or regions. Importantly, global export market shares and worldwide 
import distribution shares will enable countries or regions to identify new priorities for 
policy making, both on an international and national basis. On an international basis, a 
decline in the global export market share for an important export product could signal
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the need for trade negotiations, to remove potential tariff or non-tariff barriers and / or a 
stronger marketing concentration in a particular market or markets, by for example 
running a country, industry or firm related marketing campaign for a particular export 
product. In parallel, on a national policy basis, a global export market share decrease 
might indicate the decline of an export product or staple, while it also could confirm the 
need to shift export products and look for new export commodities or products. 
Moreover, global export value market shares will show if the value of products 
increased or declined vs. the global export volume market share. If there is a large 
divergence between the global export volume and value share, this might indicate that 
either the quality of the export product has improved or declined in the world market, or 
that tariff, non-tariff barriers or subsidies have distorted the world prices or created 
global pricing corridors. All these factors might also influence policy decisions, while 
indicating clear shifts in the export industry position vs. the global market.
Most companies' or industries' objective is to maximise market share within their market 
"universe", which could be the national, regional or global marketplace. This is 
primarily based on the assumption that market share maximisation will ensure long term 
earnings growth potential. Thus many firms might reduce or ignore profitability in the 
short term with the aim to increase their long term earnings potential. Although certain 
corporations or industries sometimes, yet rarely, reduce their market share deliberately 
to augment profitability in the short term, most aim at market leadership, as this entails a 
number of benefits. Firstly, the market leader can frequently influence prices in certain 
industries, as the market (i.e. other firms) often follows the leader on pricing, thereby 
maximising overall profitability for the leading firm or industry. Additionally, the
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leading firm will also gain from quantity discounts when purchasing inputs, thus also 
often buying raw materials and other inputs at lower prices. Secondly, market leadership 
represents larger economies of scale, given that fixed costs per unit decline as more 
volume of a particular product or commodity is sold, thus achieving greater resource 
maximisation. Thus global export market shares can show which firms or group of firms 
become market leaders and which are the firms or industries which are disputing the 
market supremacy position.
When considering policy development, another important aspect of global export 
market shares is that they might show to a country or region that their policies or that the 
overall macro-environment is changing, while they might indicate that the country or 
region is losing competitiveness vs. other areas or nations for particular export products. 
This can be traced to the conflicting interests that firms within an industry and 
governments can have, in that a country's or region's objective could be to maximise the 
global market share of their principal export products or those who seem to have 
potential, while a firm often wants to maximise the global market share for their 
products but do not necessarily care whether they do this within one country or region. 
Rather many firms would try to produce their products while minimising costs, 
regardless o f geographical location, as long as the region of production has a number of 
advantages, which could include a friendly investment climate, appropriate 
infrastructure, availability of the necessary inputs for production as well as access to 
their markets locally and abroad. This is especially the case if the principal firms of an 
industry within a country or region is a foreign corporation or a transnational 
corporation, in particular if it is foreign and operates in many markets. Thus global
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export market shares can act as a country or region "attractiveness barometer" for 
investments in the particular export industries vs. other worldwide areas.
Overall, global export market shares and import distribution shares are important, while 
having a number of advantages when applying them to Economic History and in 
particular to the study of export based industries within a country or region, but this 
technique also has some limitations. To start with, global export market shares measure 
exports either in volume or value of a particular country or region vs. world exports, 
while import distribution shares assess imports of a specific country or region vs. world 
imports. However, a country or region that imports can often also re-export some of 
their imports, or alternatively export their production while using imports for domestic 
consumption. This can distort the notion of the two bloc approach, namely that 
importers (buyers) are separate from exporters (sellers) and can artificially increase the 
size of the import as well as export markets, given that re-exports or domestic 
production for export of importing countries are often counted double in the global 
export and import market size. Nevertheless, this distortion in market size and hence in 
the import and export market is only significant if  the degree of re-exports or the export 
level of local production of a key importer is very high, particularly if an importing 
country or region becomes a net-exporter. When analysing the River Plate meat packing 
industry since 1900, re-exports of imports or exports of domestic production of key 
importing countries are minimal until the 1960s. This is traceable to the importance of 
the British market as the major importer of meat until the 1950s, accounting for between 
approximately two-thirds and four-fifths of global beef and sheepmeat imports, while
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exports of beef and sheepmeat rarely surpassed the 2% of total imports.25 Starting in the 
1950s and especially in the 1960s, the U.S.A. became the second key importer of beef 
and sheepmeat, which together with the U.K. represented the great majority of 
worldwide meat imports until the 1970s. Most importantly, the combined U.K. and U.S. 
exports, continued to represent a very small ratio of joined imports. Thus from the early 
twentieth century until the 1970s the overall notion of the two block approach of buyers 
(importers) and sellers (exporters) was still applicable, while the distortions of the 
worldwide import and export markets were minimal. However, with the creation of the 
Common Agricultural Policy within the European Economic Community and its 
subsequent consolidation, the E.E.C. became a net beef and sheepmeat exporter in the 
1970s. This created some distortions in the worldwide import and export markets, 
primarily driven by high producer and export subsidies. Despite the distortions driven 
by the E.E.C. / E.U. subsidies after the 1970s, which artificially inflated the worldwide 
export and import market for meat, due to lower prices driven by subsidised exports, the 
overall direction of global meat export market shares and meat import distribution 
shares were not significantly affected. Importantly, this limitation may also appertain to 
other studies which might apply global export market shares and worldwide import 
distribution shares. It is therefore important to measure the ratio of exports vs. imports 
of a particular product or commodity for key importing countries, in order to establish 
whether the global import or export markets might be artificially inflated and how this 
might affect the interpretation and analysis of the shares.
25 The export / import ratio of approximately 2% (i.e. that the amount of exports as a percentage of imports) is calculated based 
on 1909-13,1926-30,1934-38 and 1948-52 periods. Please see Appendix 13 for a full list of sources.
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Another limitation of export market shares, is the difficulty in measuring accurate global 
export value market shares, due to transfer pricing or over-invoicing practices by 
corporations. Whether global export market value shares are calculated from countries' 
or regions' export values or computed using import values of key importing countries, 
the value of exports or imports are often distorted, due to transfer pricing or 
over-invoicing by vertically integrated companies. This is particularly the case when 
studying the River Plate meat packing industry's global export value market share. 
Specifically, the majority of River Plate meat exports from the early twentieth century 
until the 1950s occurred through vertically integrated companies who controlled the 
production and distribution of meat from the slaughtering of animals in the River Plate 
through to the wholesaler or even retailers in key importing markets, primarily the U.K. 
This was not just the case for the U.K. and U.S. transnational corporations, but also the 
large Argentinian meat packing houses, which often had offices in the U.K. These firms 
used transfer pricing and over-invoicing techniques to minimise their tax burden, but by 
doing so often distorted the value of exports and imports. Although global export value 
market shares might be misrepresented at times, they are nevertheless indicative and 
show the direction of overall export values of particular countries or regions. 
Importantly, this does not only apply to the River Plate meat packing industry and the 
calculation of world export market value shares for meat, but is also relevant for other 
studies which might use this technique, involving industries in which companies are 
strongly vertically integrated on an international level.
Finally, a further limitation of global export market shares and import distribution 
shares is that although they assess the export growth or decline for a particular industry
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or company, they are not an accurate measure of economic development. Whereas 
export growth of a particular product or industry in a country or region is usually 
associated with strong earnings and thus economic development for the country and 
region concerned, an increase in exports might have a greater or smaller effect on 
economic development depending on the type of composition, ownership structure and 
the laws governing the industry. Given that this thesis studies the reasons for the growth 
and decline of the River Plate meat packing industry, it is not interested in the effect that 
the industry's growth might have had on the economic development of Argentina and 
Uruguay. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify this limitation for the potential 
application of global export market shares and import distribution shares in other 
economic history or especially economic development studies. In order to establish how 
important an increase in exports or in the global export market share is for a country's or 
region's economic development, the global export market share and worldwide import 
distribution share data could be complimented and further enhanced using a domestic 
expenditure approach concept, which analyses the value-added disaggregation of 
production processes, such as the "retained/returned" value models developed by M. 
Mamalakis and C. W. Reynolds as well as R. Thorp and G. Bertram. Specifically, M. 
Mamalakis and C. W. Reynolds applied the "retained/returned" value concept to the 
Chilean copper industry, while R. Thorp and G. Bertram used it to analyse key export 
staples in Peru.26 Overall, the "retained/returned" model concentrates on how much 
benefit the domestic market obtained from particular exports. As Reynolds points out:
26 Mamalakis, M., Reynolds, C., Essays on the Chilean Economy (R. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1965), pp. 256-343, as well as 
Thorp, R., Bertram G., Peru 1890-1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy (Columbia University Press, New York, 
1978), pp. 26-38.
GLOBAL EXPORT MARKET SHARES AND IMPORT DISTRIBUTION SHARES 54
“The convenience of this model is that it isolates all operating and investment 
expenditures which accrue to the local economy in the absence of detailed data on 
individual factor payments. The residual between these local charges and total value of 
production may be said to be expatriated.” 27
Importantly, the "retained/returned” value model distinguishes between the total product 
of an industry (sales and inventory change) and the payments to domestic factors for 
operating expenses, including taxes, local capital acquisitions and import duties. Indeed, 
payments to foreign factors of production, expatriated profits and depreciation are not 
included. Thus, the "retained/returned" value model shows the gain to the domestic 
economy derived from exports and hence their potential "net benefit" obtained, which in 
turn releases a domestic surplus for economic development. However, though the 
degree of "net benefit" can be influenced through changes in domestic policy, it is 
important to find the right balance between allowing a reasonable "surplus" to foreign 
and local corporations and maximising the "retained/returned" value to countries. The 
reasonable "surplus" should enable firms to pay competitive dividends and be able to 
invest in new technology as well as research and development. Most importantly, the 
reasonable "surplus" must also be competitive in comparison with other countries or 
regions, in that firms might decide to change their production, wherever possible, to 
another location or stop producing / extracting a particular product or commodity in a 
country or region, because it has become uncompetitive. This is where global export 
market shares could help in showing whether a country's or region's competitiveness in 
an industry is increasing or declining vs. other nations or worldwide areas, by revealing 
global trends in the export market of a particular industry.
27 As outlined in Mamalakis, M., Reynolds, C., Essays on the Chilean Economy (R. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1965), p. 274.
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After examining global export market shares and import distribution shares, this section 
has shown how important these marketing techniques can be when analysing an export 
industry, despite their limitations. The benefits of the global export market shares, both 
in volume and value as well as import distribution shares will become even more 
evident when applying these techniques to the River Plate meat packing industry. Before 
the key findings are examined since the late nineteenth- and early twentieth- century, the 
next section will outline the calculation and estimation methods of global export market 
shares and distribution of worldwide imports for meat.
2.3 Calculation and Estimation Methods of Global Export Market Shares and 
Distribution of Worldwide Imports for Meat
Global export volume market shares and worldwide import distribution shares will be
computed from the late nineteenth- and early twentieth- century until the beginning of
the 1990s, using a series of five year average periods. Specifically, the periods which
will be used are 1890-94, 1900-04, 1909-13, 1926-30, 1934-38, 1948-52, 1968-72 and
1988-92. These periods were chosen due to a combination of available data and in order
to minimise distortions of major world events, such as the First and Second World
Wars, as well as the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression. In addition, these
periods represent significant shifts in global export market shares and distribution of
worldwide imports for meat. Importantly, global export market volume and value
market shares for the River Plate meat packing industry will be determined from 1890-
94 until 1988-92. However, the global export market shares for the 1890-94 and 1900-
04 periods will be estimated, due to the lack of available global export data for these
periods. The estimation process and method will be described later on in this section.
After 1909 reliable world import and export volume figures exists, therefore the global
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export market shares can be calculated for the River Plate meat packing industry and 
other countries. Indeed, worldwide import distribution shares as well as global export 
distribution shares for countries and regions other than the River Plate will be calculated 
starting in 1909.
Global export volume market shares will be calculated using exports volume (in 
thousands of tons) and global export value shares will be computed calculating the value 
of exports. The succeeding equation will exemplify the overall calculation method that 
will be used to compute global meat export volume market shares, as well as global 
export value shares. However, many sources must be used to compute global export 
market shares for such a long period, due to the long span of the study, while full export 
volume and especially value data are not available for the entire calculation period, 
especially before 1909. Therefore, the following equation 2.1 as well as the calculation 
method will vary in certain periods, as will be explained later in this section.
Equation 2.1: River Plate Global Meat Export Market Volume and Value Shares
n
RPGMEMS = £  CME A + CME u / CME
i = 1
Where: RPGMEMS River Plate Global Meat Export Market Share [%] 
(Volume or Value)
CME Country Meat Exports (Volume or Value)
A Argentina
U Uruguay
All Meat Exporting Countries (Volume or Value)
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This equation can be used to calculate global meat export market share (in volume or 
value) for any country or region by substituting:
CME A + CME u 
With: CME a e c
Where: AEC = Any Exporting Country (or Region)
Although this equation represents the overall calculation method that will be used to 
compute global export market shares, for some periods estimates will be made due to 
the lack of available data. Specifically, given that comprehensive global export volume 
sources are only available since 1909, the period between 1890-1909 must be estimated 
using import data. However, this task is facilitated by the fact that the U.K. was the 
main worldwide importer of beef and sheepmeat in 1909-13, when she imported almost 
80% of the world's meat.28 Thus it is assumed that for the 1890-94 and 1900-04 periods 
the U.K. represented the overwhelming majority of worldwide imports of meat and 
hence that meat imports by country into the U.K. were almost equivalent to global 
exports from those countries. Whereas this is a prudent assumption for chilled and 
frozen meat, it is less so for global salted beef exports (jerked beef or tasajo), given that 
most salted beef was exported from the River Plate primarily to Brazil and Cuba. For 
perspective, salted beef exports were still significant in the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century, while they declined considerably and lost importance after the 
1910s, due to the proliferation of refrigeration technology and thus widespread 
availability of better quality chilled and frozen meats. Thus for the 1890-94 and 1900-04
28 Calculated from the 'International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics', Institute of Agriculture, Rome, 1929, tables 139-140, 
pp. 416-425.
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estimates we will take global salted beef exports into consideration (prepared salted 
meat). Indeed, by adding total British meat imports with Argentinian and Uruguayan 
salted beef exports, a fairly accurate estimate can be made of the global meat export 
market. However, salted beef imports into the U.K. which came from other countries 
than the U.S.A. will be subtracted to avoid double counting of River Plate salted beef 
exports. This will then provide an even more reliable estimate of the global meat export 
market. Finally, by dividing total Argentinian and Uruguayan meat exports by the global 
meat export market, a good estimate of the River Plate global meat export market share, 
either in volume and value, can be made. Equation 2.2 on the next page depicts the 
estimation method for the 1890-94 and 1900-04 periods.
Equation 2.2: Estimated River Plate Global Meat Export Market Volume and Value 
Shares (1890-94 and 1900-041
n











Estimated River Plate Global Meat Export Market 
Share [%] (Volume or Value 1890-94 and 1900-04 
Periods)
Country Meat Exports (Volume or Value)
British Meat Imports (Volume or Value)
British Salted Beef Imports (Volume or Value) 




All Meat Importing Countries (Volume or Value)
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After 1909 there are reliable worldwide export volume figures to calculate the River 
Plate meat packing industry's global volume export market share. In contrast, the global 
export value data is very difficult to assimilate until the mid-1950s, given that meat 
value exports would have to be calculated for each country in the world, while export 
values are often only provided by each individual country in local currency, with 
frequently fluctuating exchange rates, making an accurate calculation extremely 
difficult. Thus from 1909 until 1952, global export value market share will be calculated 
using a similar principle than with the export volume global export market shares in the 
1890-94 and 1900-04 periods, portrayed in equation 2.2. Indeed, global export value 
shares will be computed based on U.K. imports, which until the mid-1950s represented 
the great majority of worldwide imports of meat. For perspective, U.K. imports 
represented 79.2% of total global meat imports in 1909-13, 66.9% in 1926-30, 82.2% in 
1934-38 and 68.7% in 1948-52.29 However, unlike the 1890-94 and 1900-04 periods, 
depicted in equation 2.2, after 1909 tasajo or jerked beef from the River Plate will not 
be added to the worldwide meat export market calculation, given that the quantities of 
jerked beef exports became significantly less important after the 1910s, especially the 
trade in tasajo between the River Plate with Brazil and Cuba. Hence, global export 
value market share will be calculated as a percentage of U.K. imports, as shown in 
equation 2.3 on the next page.
29 Calculated based on worldwide meat import distribution volumes. Please see Appendix 13 for a full list of data and sources, 
as well as equation 2.4 for a full explanation of global meat import distribution share calculation method.
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Equation 2.3: River Plate Global Meat Export Value Market Shares (For Periods 
between 1909-52)
RPGMEVMS = Z  BMI a + BMI u / BMI j
i = 1
Where: RPGMEVMS = River Plate Global Meat Export Value Market 
Share [%] (1909-13,1926-30, 1934-38 and 
1948-52 Periods)
BMI British Meat Imports (Value)
A Argentina
U Uruguay
i = All Meat Importing Countries (Value)
So far this section has demonstrated the estimation and calculation methods for global 
export volume and value market shares. However, it is also vital to examine which 
countries or areas are the main importers and how their position as significant players in 
the import market has changed over time. Moreover, newcomers to the world import 
market need to be assessed, in order to determine their importance. For this it is 
necessary to calculate the distribution of worldwide imports for meat, which will be 
computed using the equation shown below. Importantly, the distribution of worldwide 
imports for meat will be determined for a specific set of key meat importing countries, 
namely the U.K., France, Germany, Italy, the U.S.A., Canada and Japan as well as 
comparing them to the rest of the world. This process will identify fluctuations in the 
main meat importing countries as well as acting as a tool to establish trends in the global 
market for meat since 1909, as depicted in the following equation 2.4.
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Equation 2.4: Distribution of Worldwide Imports For Meat (Volume)
n
DWIMj = Z c M I j / C M I j
i = 1
Where: DWIM Distribution of Worldwide Imports For Meat (%)
CMI Country Meat Imports (Volume)
All Meat Importing Countries (Volume)
J One Particular Meat Importing Country
Finally, global export market shares by country will also be calculated, showing the 
important meat export countries, namely Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, New Zealand 
and the U.S.A., as well as exports of the rest of the world. For perspective, global export 
market shares will be computed using equation 2.1, while substituting (CMEa+ CMEu) 
with CMEaec and inputting the various key importing countries separately in CMEaec- 
This will help determine trends and show which countries have increased or decreased 
their exports in the global meat export market.
2.4 Key Findings
So far, this chapter has provided an assessment of the methodology, namely market 
share analysis, while explaining calculation and estimation methods of the global meat 
trade since the late nineteenth century. In this section, the most important findings of the 
River Plate global export volume and value shares will be analysed. This section will 
provide an overall review and examination of the findings, while the in-depth analysis 
of any reasons that might have induced changes in the River Plate meat packing industry
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global export market shares and worldwide import distribution shares will be 
investigated thoroughly in subsequent chapters.
The application of global export market shares and worldwide import distribution shares 
to the River Plate meat packing industry, revealed some key findings. To start with, the 
River Plate global meat export volume market share increased strongly from 1890 until 
the 1930s, rising by 25.1 percentage points from an important 35.4% in 1890-94 to an 
all time high of 60.5% in 1926-30. The 1890-94 high market share suggests that the 
River Plate was already an important player before 1890. However, after the 1930s the 
River Plate global meat export volume market share decreased a drastic 55.8 percentage 
points from the record 60.5% in 1926-30 to 4.7% in 1988-92. Whereas this decline 
occurred gradually, it still represents a highly significant drop in River Plate global meat 
export volume share. Importantly, although this strong decrease in global export volume 
market shares occurred in both Argentina and Uruguay, it was not evenly spread among 
both countries. While Argentina global export volume market share declined from 
49.4% in 1926-30 to 11.7% in 1968-72 and 3.1% in 1988-92, Uruguay's decrease was 
proportionally less pronounced falling from 11.1% in 1926-30 to 3.0% in 1968-72 to 
1.6% in 1988-92. Chart 2.1 clearly shows the upswing in River Plate meat global 
volume market shares from a high base in 1890 until the 1930s and the drastic decline 
thereafter.
Importantly, the increase from 1890-94 until 1926-30, can be traced to adaptation of 
technological innovation, particularly the introduction of refrigeration, as well as 
changes in the supply of beef in the U.S.A. for the key growing U.K. market, which will
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be analysed in depth in chapter 3. In contrast, the drastic decline after the 1930s reflects 
firstly the Ottawa conference and the Roca Runciman agreements in the 1930s, the Foot 
and Mouth Disease sanitary restrictions in the 1950-60s, in addition to the E.E.C.’s 
/E.U.’s Common Agricultural Policy, which encouraged subsidised meat exports, 
particularly after the 1970s. These factors will be investigated as part of the analysis of 
changing international trade regimes in chapter 5.
Chart 2.1 - River Plate Meat Global Export Volume Market Share (% 















Sources: See Appendixes 1, 2 ,4  and 5 as well as Section 2.3 for calculation and estimation methods.
The findings relating to the River Plate meat global export value market share reveal 
similar patterns than the volume share, namely an increase, albeit later than in volume 
shares, until 1926-30 and thereafter a gradual, yet drastic decline until the 1988-92.
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Specifically, the River Plate meat global export value shares increased 41.5 percentage 
points, from 23.1% in 1890-94 to 64.6% in 1926-30. However, the overall 
augmentation pattern of the global export market value share from the late nineteenth 
century until the 1930s changed vs. the volume share, given that the value share inched 
downwards from 23.1% in 1890-94 to 22.8% in 1900-04 and then jumped 34.9 
percentage points to 57.7% in 1909-13, as can be seen in chart 2.2.
Chart 2.2 - River Plate Meat Global Export Value Market Share (%) 
Beef and Sheepmeat - Average Yearly Periods Between 1890-1992
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Sources: See Appendixes 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 as well as Section 2.3 for calculation and estimation methods.
Most importantly, the meat global value market share had a much lower base than the 
volume share in 1890-94 and 1900-04. Indeed, the River Plate meat global export value 
market share was 23.1% in 1890-94 and 22.8% in 1900-04 vs. a volume share of 35.4% 
in 1890-94 and 39.6% in 1900-04. The overall lower figures in 1890-94 and 1900-04 as 
well as the strong increase in the River Plate meat global export value share from 1900-
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04 to 1909-13, is traceable to the importance of tasajo or salted jerked beef exports from 
the River Plate until the 1910s, after which refrigerated technology became more 
widespread and chilled beef started being exported in large quantities. Thus the value of 
exports increased as the River Plate improved the quality and hence the price of exports, 
from tasajo to frozen meat to chilled beef, whose exports expanded rapidly after the 
1910s, while tasajo exports slowly declined and became much less important. This 
implies a ‘technology lag’, in that other exporting regions, in particular the U.S.A., were 
processing higher value, more sophisticated products before the River Plate. The U.S.A. 
was exporting large quantities of frozen beef to the U.K. in the early 1890s. In contrast, 
the River Plate was just starting to export limited quantities of frozen beef and was 
primarily concentrating on frozen mutton, conserved meat, meat extract and tasajo 
exports. The River Plate meat global export value share was lower in 1890-94 and 1900- 
04 than the volume share, but thereafter both shares moved within similar ranges and in 
the same direction, as can be seen in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: River Plate Meat Global Export Value vs. Volume Market Share Comparison 
Beef and Sheepmeat -  (%) Average Yearly Periods Between 1890-1992









1890-94 23.1 35.4 -12.3
1900-04 22.8 39.6 -16.8
1909-13 57.7 52.2 5.5
1926-30 64.6 60.5 4.1
1934-38 45.7 48.9 -3.2
1948-52 33.7 32.8 0.9
1968-72 14.7 14.7 0.0
1988-92 3.7 4.7 -1.0
Sources: See Appendixes 1, 2 ,4 , 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
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When examining the meat global export volume market share by country or region, the 
River Plate, Australia and New Zealand combined provided more than 70% of the 
world's meat exports until 1948-52. Although the River Plate global meat market share 
decreases after 1926-30, the decline of River Plate meat exports was more than offset by 
Australian and New Zealand exports in 1934-38 vs. 1926-30. This was primarily due 
changing international trade regimes, already starting in the late 1920s and especially 
after the Ottawa Conference in 1932, as will be analysed in chapter 5. However, in 
1948-52, despite a strong increase in New Zealand exports, the combined total of the 
three exporting regions declines to just over 71.9% global export volume market share, 
while thereafter a steady decrease in all three traditionally exporting regions occurs. 
Specifically, the River Plate falls to a single digit global export market share by 1988-92 
and New Zealand declines to less than 2/5 of its all time high 25.5% world meat global 
export market share in 1948-52, declining to 9.7% in 1988-92. Whereas, the River Plate 
lost by far the highest meat global export market share, New Zealand also experienced a 
strong decline after 1948-52, while Australia lost the least of the three traditional global 
meat export regions, maintaining a healthy 12.3% global export market share in 1988- 
92. Table 2.2 exhibits the meat global export volume market share of the three meat 
exporting regions separately and combined.
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Table 2.2: Meat Global Export Volume Market Share of the River Plate, Australia and
New Zealand
Beef and Sheepmeat - Average Yearly Periods Between 1909-1992 (%)
Periods River Plate Australia New Zealand Total Three 
Regions 
Combined
1909-13 52.2 16.4 14.1 82.7
1926-30 60.5 7.8 12.1 80.4
1934-38 48.9 15.5 17.9 82.3
1948-52 32.8 13.6 25.5 71.9
1968-72 14.7 12.6 15.0 42.3
1988-92 4.7 12.3 9.7 26.7
Sources: See Appendix 12.
As the export volume market share of the three traditional exporting regions declined, as 
shown in table 2.2, from 82.7% of world exports in 1909-13 to just above a quarter in 
1988-92, it is important to determine who became the "newcomers" to the world market, 
especially in the 1968-72 and 1988-92 periods. Not surprisingly, it were the countries of 
the E.C.C. / E.U. who represented the vast majority of new meat exporters. As early as 
1948-52, the countries which would become part of the European Community had a 
12.3% share of the global market by volume. This rose to 33.1% in 1968-72 and 46.3% 
by 1988-92. Importantly, the increase of European Community exports in 1968-72 and 
particularly in 1988-92 can be traced to the generous system of producer and export 
subsidies provided after the introduction and consolidation of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, which is analysed in chapter 5. Indeed, the combination of production and export 
subsidies, stimulated the strong rise in meat exports from European Community 
countries which quickly expanded reaching almost half of the world’s meat exports in 
1988-92. Indeed, this led to unprecedented increases in exports from the E.E.C. / E.U., 
which for the first time during the 1970s became a net exporter of meat. Chart 2.3 below
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shows the importance of the River Plate as the largest meat world exporter in the 1909- 
13, 1926-30, 1934-38 and 1948-52 periods, which combined with Australia and New 
Zealand represented the great majority of global meat exports from the early twentieth 
century through to 1948-52. Thereafter, the chart clearly displays an increase in the 
E.E.C. /E.U. countries exports in 1968-72 and especially in 1988-92.
Chart 2.3 - Meat Global Export Volume Market Share - By Country / Region 
Beef and Sheepmeat - Average Yearly Periods Between 1909-1992
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Sources: See Appendix 12 as well as Section 2.3 for calculation and estimation methods.
So far the key findings have concentrated on meat global export market shares, both for 
River Plate meat exports and other key exporting countries. This has shown specific 
trends and developments in meat export markets since the late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth- century until the beginning of the 1990s. However, it is also important to 
examine the worldwide import distribution shares for meat, in order to determine any 
changes in the pattern of global importers and the effects that this had on the River Plate 
meat packing industry. Since the early twentieth century and until the 1950s, the U.K.
GLOBAL EXPORT MARKET SHARES AND IMPORT DISTRIBUTION SHARES 69
was overwhelmingly the largest importer of meat, with a global meat import distribution 
share which ranged between two-thirds and 80 percent of total global imports between 
1909-13 until 1948-52. In the 1950s the U.S.A. became the second most important 
market, while the U.S.A. and the U.K. combined still accounted for the vast majority of 
the worlds meat imports, with a share of 78.4% in 1948-52. However, by 1968-72 the 
U.K. had significantly reduced her imports, with her share falling 38.8 percentage points 
from 68.7% in 1948-52 to 29.9% in 1968-72. Although the increase in U.S. meat 
imports partly offset the fall in relative U.K. demand, the combined share was reduced 
from over 70% since the early twentieth century to just under 50% in 1968-72, while 
falling further to 24.3% in 1988-92, as can be seen in table 2.3, column (c).
Table 2.3: U.K. and U.S. Global Meat Import Distribution Shares (%) 





Total U.K. and 
U.S. Combined 
(c)
1909-13 79.2 1.9 81.1
1926-30 66.9 3.2 70.1
1934-38 82.2 2.9 85.1
1948-52 68.7 9.7 78.4
1968-72 29.9 19.4 49.3
1988-92 11.1 13.2 24.3
Sources: See Appendix 13.
The global meat import distribution share decline of the traditional world meat 
importers, namely the U.K. and the U.S.A., in the 1968-72 period, is due to the larger 
imports of Japan, Italy, Germany and France, as well as "other countries". This latter 
category of "other countries" grew substantially in 1968-72, while augmenting 
dramatically in 1988-92 and reaching an unprecedented 44% global meat import 
distribution share, excluding Canada. Specifically, the strong growth of "other
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countries" imports is traceable to large subsidised meat exports from the European 
Community, which were primarily imported by countries in Northern Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia. Importantly, the growth in meat imports from these countries, reflects an 
increase in the overall purchase of meat due to their low prices, given the generous 
subsidies of the European Community, as well as the rising standards of living in the 
population of the purchasing regions, due to higher levels of economic growth. These 
combined factors encouraged an increase in consumption, which in turn translated into 
even higher imports. Chart 2.4 below exhibits the importance of the U.K. market as a 
key importer of meat until the 1948-52 period and then the growing role played by the 
U.S.A, Italy, Germany, France and Japan, as the main world importers of meat. Hence, 
it shows a clear switch after 1948-52 in the world's meat importers structure, moving 
from the U.K. as the most important importer by far, to the growing significance of the 
U.S.A. already in the 1948-52 period and especially in 1968-72, to the drastic switch 
and increase in imports of "other countries".
Chart 2.4 - Worldwide Meat Import Distribution Shares - By Country (%) 
Beef and Sheepmeat - Average Yearly Periods Between 1890-1992
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Sources: See Appendix 13 as well as Section 2.3 for calculation and estimation methods.
GLOBAL EXPORT MARKET SHARES AND IMPORT DISTRIBUTION SHARES 71
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how global export market shares and import distribution shares 
can be utilised in order to improve the understanding of different subjects. In this 
context, the chapter has applied global export market shares and worldwide import 
distribution shares for the River Plate meat packing industry since the late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth- century, as well as examining their advantages and limitations as an 
analytical tool. Additionally, it has provided an explanation of the calculation and 
estimation methods of global export market shares and worldwide import distribution 
shares, which specify how they were measured and computed, while representing the 
basis for potential future calculation and analysis of these techniques in other economic 
history studies.
There are numerous advantages in the application of global export market shares and 
worldwide import distribution shares for the purpose of this research. Global export 
market shares measure exports of an industry or company vs. the world's export market 
and thereby produce a weighted value rather than viewing exports in isolation as a 
nominal figure, which does not take into consideration changes in the global 
marketplace. Most importantly, through careful analysis over long periods of time, they 
can disclose influential "breaking or crisis points", which in turn might indicate 
significant changes either in domestic policy decisions, alterations in the international 
trade regimes, modifications in the ownership structure of an industry, amendments in 
utilisation, application or the generation of new technology and potentially a shift in the 
priority of firms. Thus global export market shares and worldwide import distribution 
shares can identify key turning points in the examination of an industry, company or the
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export economy of a country, which can not only improve the understanding of the 
historical analysis, but also represent a useful tool in economic policy making. 
Specifically, they might signal the need for changes in policy, such as augmented efforts 
in trade negotiations, a reduction of domestic taxes or tariffs, an increase in investment 
and training incentives or boosting marketing efforts in a particular market for certain 
export products. Furthermore, worldwide import distribution shares show if traditional 
importing countries or regions are reducing their worldwide imports vs. other importers. 
In addition, they disclose any shifts in importing markets and thus pinpoint growing, 
declining or potential future markets.
The assumption is that an industry or a company aims at maximising their global export 
market share, as this can entail a number of advantages, including larger economies of 
scale as well as influencing pricing, which in turn has an effect on long-term 
profitability. However, companies and governments can have conflicting interests, given 
that a firm might want to maximise their global export market share, often ignoring 
geographical location. Thus companies might produce or extract a product or 
commodity in any country or region depending on cost and the investment climate. 
Therefore, global export market shares might also act as an "attractiveness barometer", 
in that a significant decline in the share might symbolise better conditions in other 
countries or regions. Moreover, global export market value shares, which take into 
consideration the price of products rather than the physical weight or volume, could 
indicate fluctuations in the quality of products or modifications in the international trade 
regime, which could have distorted global prices by the artificial creation of pricing 
corridors.
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Overall, global export market shares and worldwide import distribution shares have 
numerous advantages and benefits, though they also have limitations. Specifically, one 
significant limitation originates due to potential re-export of particular export 
commodities or products by importing countries, which can therefore create a double­
counting effect of exports and imports. Another notable limitation is that global export 
market shares and worldwide import distribution shares are not an exact measure of 
economic development, but rather concentrate primarily on the growth and decline of an 
export product or industry vs. the world market. Although this thesis is not concerned 
with economic development, for future studies that might be interested in development, 
the global export market shares and worldwide import distribution shares can be 
complimented using the "returned/retained" value model. This is applicable in 
particular to research that involves measuring the effect that an export product or 
commodity might have on a country's or region's economic development.
Finally, the application of global export market shares and worldwide import 
distribution shares to the study of the River Plate meat packing industry has shown some 
important findings and confirmed some of the key advantages of utilising these 
marketing techniques. Specifically, one of the most significant findings is that the meat 
global export market shares of the River Plate grew strongly until the 1930s and 
declined drastically thereafter. However, the key is that the fall after the 1930s of the 
River Plate meat global export market share was proportionally much larger than the 
decline in meat exports in nominal terms. Thus, the importance in the world market of 
Argentinian and Uruguayan meat exports declined substantially more after the 1930s 
than the decrease in exports might suggest. In addition, the analysis of the global export
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market shares by country or region has shown that the decline of the River Plate meat 
global export market share after the 1930s was initially offset by Australian and New 
Zealand meat exports, but starting in the 1960s the countries of the European 
Community started exporting ever larger quantities of meat and managed to surpass the 
combined exports of the traditional exporters, namely the River Plate, Australia and 
New Zealand in the 1980s. Furthermore, the global meat import distribution shares also 
revealed some significant findings, in particular they highlighted the importance of the 
U.K. as the world's largest importer until 1950s, the rise of the U.S.A. as an notable 
importer thereafter and most importantly the enormous growth of non-traditional meat 
importing markets already starting in the 1960s, but particularly in the 1980s. So far this 
thesis has provided an overall overview of the River Plate meat global export market 
shares and worldwide import distribution shares main findings. In subsequent chapters, 
these findings will be examined in more detail, while they will provide strong support 
for the in-depth analysis of the River Plate meat packing industry since the late 
nineteenth century.
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3. THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE 
RISE OF THE RIVER PLATE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY
3.1 Introduction
The rise of the River Plate meat packing industry was led by technological innovation, 
combined with changes in domestic policy, in a "free" international trade regime. 
Whereas the most important aspect of the historical development of River Plate meat 
packing until the early twentieth century is the key role that technological innovation 
played in building and expanding the industry, it is also crucial to understand the 
parallel elements that advanced the process. Therefore, not just the impact of 
technological innovation will be analysed, but also the following factors will be 
examined, namely (i) the effects of domestic policy, in particular the establishment, 
integration and consolidation of the modem state, the creation of property rights and a 
legal framework, (ii) the modernisation of cattle production and (iii) the reasons for 
investment of foreign firms and capital in the River Plate meat packing industry. In 
order to enhance the analysis of the rise of the River meat packing industry and in 
particular the additional factors that influenced the growth process, the thesis will draw 
on the staple theory, which was developed by Harold Innis and expanded by M. Watkins 
and C.B. Schedvin.30
Harold Innis was mainly interested in the effect of staple production on the Canadian 
economy and society. He studied the cod fisheries and the fur trade, while analysing 
their impact on Canadian development. Cod and fur constituted an abundant and readily
30 Innis, H.A., The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy (The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1940), The Fur Trade 
in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1956) and Essays in 
Political Economy (The University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1938), which he edited. Moreover, Schedvin, C.B., "Staples 
and Regions of Pax Britannica", Economic History Review. November 1990, Vol. XLIH, No. 4, pp. 533-559 and Watkins, 
M., "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. May 1963, Vol. 
XXEX, No. 2, pp. 141-158, reinforced Innis1 staple theory.
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available resource in the early settlement period - cod in the coastal areas and fur further 
inland - that could be traded primarily with Europe.
“The most promising source of early trade was found in the abundance of fish, especially cod,
to be caught off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and in the territory adjacent to the Gulf of
St. Lawrence. The abundance of cod led the peoples concerned to direct all their available
energy to the prosecution of the fishing industry which developed extensively. In the interior,
trade with the Indians offered the largest returns in the commodity which was available on a
31large scale and which yielded substantial profits, namely furs and especially beaver.”
Innis also emphasised the importance of the lumber trade and wheat after the decline of 
fur, due to the extinction of the beaver following widespread hunting in ever more 
remote areas, as settlements moved further inland.32
Moreover, Innis pointed out that the improvement of transportation systems was crucial 
to the exploitation and development of staple production. In the early stages, the 
adoption of the canoe and the utilisation of existing waterways were fundamental in 
Canada to transport furs. This was followed by the development of lake transport, the 
utilisation of the York boat as well as the building of canals in the mid-nineteenth 
century, which facilitated the movement of staples, through an increasingly more 
sophisticated transportation and trading system. Finally, the expansion of the railways in 
the second half of the nineteenth century encouraged the settlement of areas which were 
not close to waterways and enabled easier transportation of staples from inland regions 
to important ports, while the development of steam vessels made transatlantic shipping 
faster and more reliable. In addition to improvements in transportation networks, Innis 
emphasised that better production techniques and marketing facilitated the development 
of staples. In parallel, numerous activities developed, including the financing of staple
31 Drache, D., ed., Staples. Markets, and Cultural Change - Selected Essavs of Harold Innis (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
Montreal, 1995), pp. 4-5. Also see Innis, H.A., The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History 
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1956).
32 Ibid, p. 13.
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production and trade, as well as the manufacturing and trading of semi-finished and 
finished goods derived from the staple. Furthermore, public policy was also influenced 
through staple developments.
“Large-scale production of raw materials was encouraged by improvement of technique of 
production, of marketing and of transport as well as by improvement in the manufacture of the 
finished product. As a consequence, energy in the colony was drawn into the production of the 
staple commodity both directly and indirectly. Population was involved directly in the 
production of the staple and indirectly in the production of facilities promoting production.
Agriculture, industry, transportation, trade, finance, and government activities tend to become
33subordinate to the production of the staple...”
Overall, Innis analysed the general effect of the production of staples on the 
development and historical evolution of Canada. He concentrated on the products and 
services that were derived from staples, as well as to a lesser extent domestic policy. An 
important part of his analysis centred on technological innovation. Indeed, he was 
concerned with the improvement of staple production methods and the manufacturing of 
value added goods obtained from staples, as well as the impact of better transportation 
systems. In addition, he placed significant emphasis on management know-how and 
logistics and their importance in facilitating the distribution and marketing of staples.
In essence, Innis demonstrated the importance of staples in Canadian development, 
while compiling a broad technological history. Whereas Innis pioneered the staple 
approach and prepared comprehensive historical analysis, he failed to build a clear 
theoretical framework.
“[Innis’] method was to caste the net widely. The staple approach became a unifying theme of 
diffuse application rather than an analytic tool fashioned for specific uses. There was little 
attempt to limit its application by the use of an explicit framework. Methodologically, Innis’ 
staple approach was more technological history writ large than a theory of economic growth in 
the conventional sense.”34
Drache, D., ed., Staples. Markets, and Cultural Change - Selected Essays of Harold Innis (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
Montreal, 1995), p. 5.
Watkins, M., "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. May 1963, 
Vol. XXIX, No. 2, p. 141.
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Melville H. Watkins built on Harold Innis’ work and developed a framework for staple 
theory. Although Watkins created a ‘staple theory of economic growth’, he insisted that 
the staple theory was not presented by him as “a general theory of economic growth, nor 
even a general theory about the growth of export-oriented economies, but rather as 
applicable to the atypical case of the new country.” Indeed, the staple theory is highly 
relevant and suitable for all regions of recent settlement, which were identified by T. 
Duncan and J. Fogarty as Australia, Argentina, the U.S.A., Canada, South Africa, New 
Zealand and Uruguay. These countries had similar characteristics. They were land 
abundant and labour scarce, while dependent on exports of primary products. 
Furthermore, they concentrated on a limited number of export staples, which were the 
prominent sector. The surplus quantities of land available, lack of labour and capital, as 
well as generally restricted local market, gave them a comparative advantage in specific 
export staples.
“The fundamental assumption of the staple theory is that staple exports are the leading sector 
of the economy and set the pace for economic growth ... Economic development will be a 
process of diversification around the export base. The central concept of a staple theory, 
therefore, is the spread effects of the export sector ... To construct a staple theory, then, it is 
necessary to classify these spread effects and indicate their determinants.”37
The strength of the spread effects will be dependent on the character of the staple, in 
particular where and how it is produced and possibly processed. This in turn will 
determine the level of investment in the staple industry and potentially the amount of 
diversification around the staple. Watkins praised Innis’ analysis of the character of 
staples and quoted C.R. Fay to highlight its importance:
Ibid, p. 148.
Duncan, T., Fogarty, J., Australia and Argentina - Parallel Paths (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1984), p. 16. 
Watkins, M., "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. May 1963, 
Vol. XXIX, No. 2, p. 144.
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.. the emphasis is on the commodity itself: its significance for policy, the tying in of one 
activity with another, the way in which a basic commodity sets the general pace, creates new 
activities and is itself strengthened or perhaps dethroned, by its own creation.” 38
Within this context, the level of technology needed to produce or extract and process the 
staple is fundamental, as explained by Watkins:
“The important determinant is the technology of the industry, that is, the production function, 
which defines the degree of factor substitutability and the nature of returns to scale. With the 
production function specified and the necessary ceteris paribus assumptions - including the 
demand for goods and the supply of factors - a number of things follow: demand for factors; 
demand for intermediate inputs; possibility of further processing; and the distribution of 
income ... These determine the range of investment opportunities in domestic markets, or the 
extent of diversification around the export base. If the demand for the export staple increases, 
the quantity supplied by the new country will increase. This export expansion means a rise in 
income in the export sector.”39
The character and production function of the staple, combined with the possibilities of 
further processing, the domestic policy environment, as well as the size and income 
distribution of the local market, will determine if and to what an extent the export 
income is invested domestically. Investment could flow back into staple production, or 
occur in industries, transportation and services related to the staple. Alternatively, 
investments could also take place in other domestic industries (i.e. consumer goods) or 
services. Watkins makes use of Albert Hirschman’s linkage approach to classify 
domestic investments derived from the export staple.
“In Hirschman’s terms, the inducement to domestic investment resulting from the increased 
activity of the export sector can be broken down into three linkage effects: backward linkage, 
forward linkage and what we shall call final demand linkage.” 40
Linkages broadly defined, occur when a prevailing operation leads to novel activities 
due to economic or other forces. The following statement by Albert Hirschman provides 
a general definition of linkages:
Ibid, p. 148. 
Ibid, p. 144.
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“A linkage exists whenever an ongoing activity gives rise to economic or other pressures that 
lead to the taking up of a new activity. ... They [linkages] focus on certain characteristics 
inherent in the productive activities already in process at a certain time. These ongoing 
activities, because of their characteristics, push or, more modestly, invite some operators to 
take up new activities. Whenever that is the case, a linkage exists between the ongoing and the 
new activity.” 41
Watkins defines the backward, forward and final demand linkages as follows:
“Backward linkage is a measure of the inducement to invest in the home-production of inputs, 
including capital goods, for the expanding export sector ... Theory and history suggest that the 
most important example of backward linkage is the building of transport systems for 
collection of the staple, for that can have further and powerful spread effects. Forward linkage 
is a measure of the inducement to invest in industries using the output of the export industry as 
an input. The most obvious, and typically most important, example is the increasing value 
added in the export sector; the economic possibilities of further processing and the nature of 
foreign tariffs will be the prime determinants. Final demand linkage is a measure of the 
inducement to invest in domestic industries producing consumer goods for factors in the 
export sector. Its prime determinants is the size of the domestic market, which is in turn 
dependent on the level of income-aggregate and average - and its distribution.” 42
Watkins points out that investment is not only induced by demand side responses. There 
are also a number of supply side factors, such as the “relationship between staple 
production and the supply of entrepreneurship and complementary inputs, including 
technology.”43 This technology, Watkins adds, is “likely to be substantially borrowed 
from abroad [and that] ... the inflow of foreign technology will be facilitated by the 
inflow of foreign entrepreneurship and capital.” 44
Importantly, through the classification of linkages and supply side factors, the staple 
theory can be seen as a ‘multiplier accelerator mechanism’. Specifically, as staple
Watkins, M., "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. May 1963, 
Vol. XXIX, No. 2, p. 145.
Hirschman, A., A Generalized Linkaee Approach to Development, with Special Reference to Staples in Nash, M., Essays on 
Economic Development and Cultural Change in Honor of Bert F. Hoselitz (Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
Volume 25, Supplement, 1977), p. 80-81.
Watkins, M., "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. May 1963, 
Vol. XXIX, No. 2, p. 145. Also see Hirschman, A., The Strategy of Economic Development (Westview Press, London, 
1988), pp. 98-119 and Schedvin, C.B., "Staples and Regions of Pax Britannica", Economic History Review. November 1990, 
Vol. XLRI, No. 4, p. pp. 533-559.
Watkins, M., "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. May 1963, 
Vol. XXIX, No. 2, p. 146.
Ibid, p. 148.
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exports generate intensifying linkages, they facilitate growth, which in turn strengthen 
linkages further and generate more growth, thereby creating a multiplier accelerator 
effect.
Through the application of the staple theory, the chapter will demonstrate how linkages 
and spread effects derived from the meat staple enabled the rise of the River Plate meat 
packing industry. Within the framework of the staple theory put forward by Watkins, 
supply and demand side responses will be analysed, including forward, backward and 
final demand linkages. Importantly, for the purpose of this thesis, the staple theory will 
only be used in order to allow for a thorough explanation of the growth of the River 
Plate meat packing industry, rather than for the development of the economy as a whole. 
Indeed, this thesis is not interested in the impact of meat packing on the River Plate 
economy or its development, but on how linkages and spread effects of meat as a staple 
benefited the River Plate meat packing industry.
As part of the demand side responses, forward and backward linkages will be analysed, 
while final demand linkages will only be investigated to see how they benefited the 
development of the meat packing industry. In addition to the important forward, 
backward, final demand linkages, the chapter will also analyse fiscal linkages. 
Specifically, fiscal linkages represent the participation of a government in the earnings 
flow created by the export sector.45 This could occur through levying taxes to the export 
sector, while the additional fiscal revenues could be used by the government to invest in 
infrastructure for areas related to the export staple or in other sectors. Moreover, supply
Hirschman, A., A Generalized Linkage Approach to Development, with Special Reference to Staples in Nash, M., Essays on 
Economic Development and Cultural Change in Honor of Bert F. Hoselitz (Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
Volume 25, Supplement, 1977), p. 77.
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side responses will be examined, especially the supply of additional inputs. Finally, 
there are also some spread effects that derive from the staple. These could be the 
establishment of legal frameworks, such as property rights or the creation of a monetary 
system, which could also stem from fiscal linkages. The chapter will analyse the main 
spread effects and their contribution to the growth of the River Plate meat packing 
industry.
Importantly, the chapter will show how meat staple exports generated intensifying 
linkages and spread effects that facilitated the further growth of the meat packing 
industry. As such, the chapter will depict how meat exports acted as an ‘multiplier 
accelerator mechanism’ that induced augmenting growth and progressively generated 
increasing staple linkages and spread effects, which in turn enabled the further 
expansion of the industry.
Overall, the chapter will analyse how spread effects and linkages derived from the meat 
staple have enabled the rise of the industry in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth- 
century. However, the staple has a dynamic aspect, in that amendments in the 
environment can reduce its importance. This can occur through simple depletion of the 
staple, given that it might be a limited resource. The staple can become obsolete due to 
new technology. Or the importance of a staple can also be reduced depending on actions 
taken by local governments, such as shifts in development strategies, or through changes 
in international markets. Specifically, international demand could decline or supply 
increase in the world market, changes could occur in the international trade regime or 
the cost of production abroad might decrease. Moreover, the institutional framework, 
the political structure and the influence of key industrial or land-owner groups on the
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policy making process could also affect the long term prospects of a staple. These 
factors could lead to a ‘staple trap’ and thus the ability of the staple to generate spread 
effects and linkages would diminished. In this respect, in chapter 5, the thesis will 
examine whether the River Plate meat packing industry entered into a ‘staple trap’ 
starting in the late 1920s.
Whereas the staple theory will be used as a method of assessment of how linkages 
derived from the meat staple enabled the rise of the industry, it is also important to 
understand the factors that shaped the meat packing firms decision regarding their 
investments in the River Plate. In this context, foreign capital and firms reasons to 
invest in River Plate meat packing will be analysed, while examining the elements that 
encouraged capital transfer. In addition, the thesis will determine the factors that led to 
the River Plate becoming a key foreign meat supplier for the British market, rather than 
other areas of the world. For this purpose, the thesis will utilise the marketing mix 
concept put forward by P. Kotler and developed further by N.H. Borden.46 Through the 
marketing mix concept, the aim is to understand how changes in the meat packing firms' 
macroenvironment, namely demographic / economic environment, technological / 
physical environment, the political / legal environment and the socio / cultural 
environment, as well as to a lesser extent the microenvironment (suppliers, competitors, 
marketing intermediaries, publics) have affected management decisions regarding the 
companies’ marketing mix, namely product, price, place and promotion, thereby shaping 
their strategies. The River Plate meat packing firms’ strategies in turn have an effect on 
the growth or decline of the industry. Although firms try to influence the
Kotler, P., Marketing Management - Analysis. Planning. Implementation and Control (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1991), pp. 
71-72 and Borden, N., The Concept of the Marketing Mix in Enis. B., Cox, K., Marketing Classics - A Selection of 
Influential Articles (Allyn and Bacon, Massachusetts, 1988), pp.429-480.
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF THE RIVER PLATE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY 3 4
macroenvironment, they often are forced to adapt to it and most importantly shape their 
strategies accordingly. Hence, the examination of the influence of the 
macroenvironment on company strategy will enable the thesis to determine the internal 
dynamics of meat packing firms and how changes in the micro- and macro- environment 
shaped management decisions.
Historians of the River Plate meat packing have identified five stages in the evolution of 
the industry, which mostly coincide with J. Calvet’s and H. Giberti's phases of 
development, namely (i) the introduction and expansion of cattle (until 1600), (ii) the 
vaqueria (1600-1750), (iii) the colonial estancia (1750-1810), (iv) the saladero (1810- 
1880) and (v) the frigorifico (1880- to date).47 These periods will be used to analyse the 
overall historical evolution of the meat packing industry until the early twentieth 
century. They are roughly continuous with the production of distinct commodities and 
technologies, each of which was displaced by a more technically advanced product with 
a higher value. However, the division of the industry’s development is over-simplistic, 
since some overlapping between methods occurred in the various periods, given that 
between one main production technique and another there was a fade out phase, until 
the new one became predominant (i.e. tasajo was still the main Uruguayan export in 
1910). In this context, the chapter will also study the importance of linkages in enabling 
the widespread adaptation of new technology. This is particularly relevant to 
technological change after the mid-nineteenth century, when a clear shift occurred from 
indigenous or local technological innovation to foreign technology transfer in the River 
Plate meat packing industry. Most importantly, historians have often omitted an
Calvet, J., Un Siglo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (Carbap, Buenos Aires, 1977), p. 17-38 and Giberti, H., Historia 
Economica de la Ganaderia Argentina (Ediciones Solar /  Hachette, Buenos Aires, 1961), p. 10.
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important stage in the evolution of the industry. Indeed, in the chapter an additional 
period will be included, 1850-1880, decades when meat extract and cooked canned meat 
(a product similar to corned beef) were produced for the world market. Moreover, the 
analysis will also compare Argentina and Uruguay, while assessing the different stages 
in the evolution of the industry in both countries.
3.2 The Introduction of Cattle and the Rise of Vaauerias (Mid-Sixteenth Century 
to 1750)
Since the early days of the Spanish colonisation, cattle products played a key role in the 
River Plate. Although it lacked mineral wealth and had a shortage of labour, the large 
surplus of fertile and flat grassland, combined with the sub-tropical climate, made it an 
ideal location for cattle breeding. Nevertheless, it was an area of little importance to the 
colonisers, who were seeking to exploit primarily precious metals and a docile work 
force. However, with the introduction of the first cattle from Europe in the mid­
sixteenth century, which quickly reproduced themselves due to the excellent biological 
and topographical conditions, the potential for the large scale exploitation of cattle 
products was soon realised. By the early 1600s, the River Plate had a large number of 
cattle herds which were mostly running wild on open land. Specifically, cattle became 
wild and unruly due to the inhabitants inability to control their expansion, as well as the 
lack of fences and laws prohibiting cattle raising in large urban centres and their 
proximity. This combined with the cattle's capacity to reproduce at rapid speed, due to 
excellent breeding conditions, led to a fast increase in wild cattle herds. Importantly, the 
introduction of cattle by the Spanish represented one of the first major supply side 
linkages, which contributed to the establishment of a useful staple in the River Plate.
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By the early seventeenth century, the first forward linkage from cattle emerged, namely 
the vaquerias, which hunted wild cattle, through inland expeditions in order to obtain 
leather. Vaquerias were organised and mostly licensed cattle hunting expeditions. The 
first official permit to hunt wild cattle was granted by the Buenos Aires council in 
1608.48 Leather extraction was lucrative and soon came to dominate River Plate exports. 
Additionally, some vaquerias supplied fresh cattle meat, primarily to the urban 
population of Buenos Aires and Montevideo. However, overall most vaquerias did not 
use or sell meat, as there was such a large abundance of meat that prices in the local 
market were very low.49 Rather, vaquerias concentrated primarily on leather, which had 
greater value and carcasses were left to rot in the countryside. By 1783 approximately 
800 thousand units of leather per year were exported from Buenos Aires, while 
thereafter, with peace and trade re-established with England, exports rose to 1.4 million 
units per year.50
As the world demand for leather increased, the vaquerias became a more stable cattle 
exploitation system, which led to better handling and operations organisation. 
Specifically, cattle started being funnelled and cornered into natural corridors, instead of 
being laced and hunted on open ground. The system consisted of pushing cattle in a half 
circle towards waterways and then capturing them, thereby providing greater economies 
of scale, as it allowed a larger catch per gaucho, the River Plate version of the cowboy, 
and more leathers could be cut as well as sun-dried simultaneously, which reduced 
production time. This represented the first forward linkage in cattle catching, which 
increased productivity and augmented the number of cattle caught and hence the
48 Coni, E . , Historia de las Vaquerias de Rio de la Plata (Editorial Devenir, Buenos Aires, 1956), p. 11.
49 Seoane, P., La Industria de las Carnes en el Uruguay (Montevideo, 1928), pp. 91-92.
50 Giberti, H., Historia Economica de la Ganaderia Argentina (Ediciones Solar /  Hachette, Buenos Aires, 1961), pp. 42-43.
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production of cattle products. The vaquerias began to capture increasingly larger 
quantities of cattle, which forced them to search for greater cattle herds further inland 
and hence at larger distances from urban centres. By the early eighteenth century, this 
led to overproduction and a near extinction of cattle within the boundaries of the Indian 
frontier. In 1700 cattle could be found for vaquerias at twenty to thirty leagues 
(approximately 110 to 170 km) from Buenos Aires. By 1713 a significant number of 
animals could only be found 90 to 100 leagues (approximately 500 to 560 km) from the 
city.51 Efforts from the Buenos Aires council to control vaquerias, through restrictions 
and cattle catching licences were often undermined by the illegal catching of cattle and 
leather smuggling from illicit vaquerias and Indians, as well as to a lesser extend the
• Ohunting by wild dogs. Moreover, as cattle were caught far away from urban centres, 
even more meat was wasted and left behind. Furthermore, due to the reduction of cattle 
herds, vaquerias were often forced to pass the Indian frontier to obtain cattle.
3.3 The Colonial Estancia (1750-1810)
Colonial estancias were ranches located in the interior of Argentina and Uruguay, which 
controlled cattle herds and took advantage of their location to maximise the utilisation 
of the cattle. The colonial estancia would round up and enclose cattle, letting it feed 
mostly under strict supervision from humans. Wild cattle became domesticated, 
although this was a very gradual process, due to the vast extensions of land in the River 
Plate. Cattle were marked for identification.
Capdevila, P., La Estancia Argentina (Editorial Plus Ultra, Buenos Aires, 1978), p.26. Approximate kilometres calculated on 
the basis 5572.7 metres per league, based on Martinez Amador, E., English Spanish Dictionary (The Dolphin Book 
Company, Oxford, 1946), p.588.
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Estancias became the first fixed centres of cattle exploitation, in which by-products 
were manufactured and production techniques developed. The fixed and central position 
of estancias against the ever shifting vaquerias allowed the former to develop 
indigenous technological innovation. Estancia cattle raising helped improve leather 
drying methods and facilitated the development of by-products as well as the better use 
of meat. The extraction by boiling of tallow and meat grease, as well as the production 
of sun-dried meat were just the start of a technological evolution which later led to the 
salt treatment meat system. Already in the pioneering colonial estancias in the early 
eighteenth century, small quantities of sun-dried meat were being produced for export, 
primarily to Cuba. Nonetheless, demand for sun-dried meat was low, due its poor 
appearance and taste. It was not until the late eighteenth century, with the development 
of salt treated meat conservation techniques that exports of meat in large quantities 
occurred. This was a product called tasajo or jerked beef.
One of the first estancias which started producing tasajo belonged to Francisco Medina 
and was located in the region of Colla, near Colonia del Sacramento, Uruguay. The 
salt treated meat technique consisted of cutting meat into pieces, covering it with salt 
and then drying it in the sun. Once the meat pieces were dry, the final product, tasajo, 
could last for months. Overall the colonial estancias' production methods were 
primitive. These usually comprised a covered area under which the animal was 
slaughtered and the meat, leather and grease cut off. Thereafter, the meat was salted and 
together with the leather, hung in the sun, over wooden bars and left to dry. The 
stimulus to expand and improve production further was restricted primarily due to the
‘El Libro del Centenario del Uruguay’, Archivo Nacional, Montevideo, 1925, pp. 61-62.
Montoya, A. J., Historia de los Saladeros Argentinos (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1956), p.21.
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limited supply of cattle. Colonial estancias relied on their own cattle to supply their 
elementary production facilities, thereby generally lacking the economies of scale to 
justify the large investments required for further technological innovation and 
development, as well as to upgrade their production facilities. On a small scale colonial 
estancias increased forward linkages by expanding the range of products extracted from 
cattle, particularly meat. In the early nineteenth century, the first large scale production 
sites emerged, namely the saladeros, which produced tasajo, leather and other by­
products in large quantities, while being supplied with cattle from various estancias. 
This led to the centralisation and industrialisation of meat, by-products and leather 
production, yielding economies of scale which encouraged further improvements in 
technology and production processes.
3.4 The Rise of Saladeros (1810-1880)
The first saladeros were elementary meat packing houses in or near urban centres, to 
which cattle were brought from estancias. Saladeros slaughtered the animal in their 
plants and then salted the meat, while using almost all the rests of the animal to produce 
by-products. As a consequence, estancias became suppliers of cattle and moved away 
from their vertically integrated production process. Most importantly, saladeros 
encouraged the industrialisation of meat production and thus further forward linkages, 
which led to significant improvements in by-products production techniques, as well as 
an expansion of the by-product range. This process was facilitated by increasing 
economies of scale, as numerous estancias provided large quantities of cattle to 
saladeros. The production of tasajo and a growing range of by-products increased the 
value of cattle. Indeed, the increase in meat production alone, accounted for an
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augmentation in the value of the animals by 30-40% over the extraction of leather.54 In 
the early nineteenth century meat exports rose strongly, with Argentinian tasajo or 
jerked beef increasing from 113,404 quintals in 1835 to 198,046 in 1841 and 431,873 in 
1851.55
By the 1840s, saladeros had slaughtering grounds with water-proof floors, carcass 
hauling devises as well as outbuildings for the salting of hides and to stock products.56 
Their product range was gradually expanded to soaps, sulphuric acid and candles. 
Innovations pioneered by industrial saladeros included covered slaughtering grounds 
with water-proof floors, enclosed farmyards, large covered sheds for manipulation and 
handling of carcasses, improved storage facilities, the use of steam in the extraction of 
fats and revolving traction wheels to haul carcasses. The expansion of technological 
innovations led to further improvements starting in the 1860s, such as pipe-ducts on 
water-proof floors to collect blood, which was often used once dry as blood powder or 
nitrogenous fertiliser, the salting of leather in special basins, wax refinements, 
production of cattle foot oil, improvements in the appearance, smell and preparation of 
meat, due to careful washing of the tasajo prior and after the drying process, improved 
packaging for the tasajo and by-products that aided conservation, as well as the further 
expansion of by-products, such as bone meal.
Barran, J.P. and Nahum, B., Historia Rural del Uruguay Modemo (Volume I/I, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo,
1967), pp. 102-103.
Lynch, J., The River Plate Republics from Independence to the Paraguay War in Bethell, L., ed., The Cambridge History of 
Latin America (Volume HI, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), p. 620.
Seoane, P., La Industria de las Carnes en el Uruguay (Montevideo, 1928), p. 93.
Ibid, pp. 96-97.
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Despite significant improvements in technology and better manufacturing methods, the 
production process of saladeros remained primitive and rudimentary, stemming 
primarily from local craftsmanship and indigenous technological innovation. The 
production utensils, buildings and facilities had been manufactured mostly with local 
materials. Indeed, knives played a fundamental role in the production process, given that 
plant operators would slaughter, cut and extract leather and meat from the animals 
manually with it. Furthermore, the conservation process primarily consisted in placing 
meat in basins with salt and water, letting it dry in the sun and storing the salt treated 
meat in piles.58 Similarly, the leather production system involved salting and hanging 
leather in the sun to dry. Hence, product quality depended on operators, whose ability 
was crucial in order not to ruin leathers and minimise meat wastage, as well as 
maintaining quality across the production process by drying, salting and storing at 
appropriate intervals as well as adjusting them to changes in the environment, such as 
strong meteorological fluctuations. Tasajo was vulnerable to changes in the 
environment, as overexposure to sun could make it too dry, while excessive humidity 
encouraged putrefaction.
“Tasajo is a product of craftsmanship produced, paradoxically, in a factory. It does not require 
machinery, not even packaging; it does not use more than two natural agents: sun and air and 
two other elements which are easily accessible: common salt and water. The attention, 
experience, the personal abilities (of labourers), were much more essential for the quality of 
the product than the technical complex of the European industrial contemporary 
civilisation.”59
With the emergence of the industrial saladeros, meat and by-products exports of both 
Argentina and Uruguay increased dramatically. Specifically, saladeros exported leather 
and by-products, such as fats and waxes to Europe, primarily Great Britain, while tasajo
58 Williams Alzaga, O., Evolucion Historica de la Explotacion del Ganado Vacuno en Buenos Aires (Imprenta Ferrari, Buenos 
Aires, 1943), pp. 24-25.
59 Translated from Spanish: Barran, J. P. and Nahum, B., Historia Rural del Uruguay Modemo (Volume I/I, Ediciones de la 
Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1967), pp. 111.
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was exported to Brazil, the U.S.A. and Cuba. Tasajo was mainly used to feed slaves 
and, later in the late nineteenth century, emancipated labourers working in the Brazilian, 
U.S. and Cuban plantations.60 Some tasajo was also supplied to the navy. But despite 
the gradual amelioration in the quality of the tasajo as production techniques improved, 
it remained a product of poor texture and taste. Hence, tasajo had limited market appeal. 
Nevertheless, tasajo was an important export product in the River Plate and especially 
in Uruguay, in the nineteenth century, as can be seen in Table 3.1.






Source: Bernhard, G., Los Monopolios v la Industria Frigorifica (Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1970), p. 15.
In spite of tasajo export growth, jerked beef ranked second to leather as the saladeros' 
main export. For perspective, in 1862, tasajo only represented 28% of the total value of 
the saladeros' export production in Uruguay.61
3.5 Meat Extract and Cooked Packaged Meat: The Start of Technology Transfer 
(1860-19001
First the colonial estancia and then the saladero played a crucial role in cattle utilisation 
and meat conservation. Given the limited export market for tasajo, there was an interest 
to find a way to conserve meat in a manner that would make it acceptable to Europeans. 
In this context, two technological innovations, which are often omitted in the literature, 
were important, namely meat extract and cooked canned meat. Indeed, the first
Puiggros, R., Libre Empresa o Nacionalizacion en la Industria de la Came (Editorial Argumentos, Buenos Aires, 1957),
pp. 10-11.
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF THE RIVER PLATE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY 9 3
successful technological innovation that allowed the export of meat products to Europe 
was meat extract, which was invented by the German chemist Justus von Liebig.62 In 
1863 a factory was constructed in Fray Bentos, Uruguay, which in 1864 started 
producing meat extract and exporting it to Europe, where it was marketed successfully 
under the "Liebig Extract of Meat" brand name. The Liebig factory had a revolutionary 
impact on the River Plate meat packing industry, in that it was the first to transfer 
technology and build a very large packing plant with modem machinery.
The Liebig invention represented a breakthrough in conservation methods, given that 
the product appealed to consumers in the key European market, especially the industrial 
proletariat of France, Germany and Great Britain, due to its nutritious content with an 
acceptable taste and low price. Meat extract was used extensively in military rations 
across the world. The extract was a prepared food product, solid or liquid, that contained 
the nutritive elements of meat, excluding grease and bones. In order to produce one 
kilogram of meat extract, thirty kilos of boneless, greaseless meat were needed. The 
"Liebig Extract of Meat" was produced on a specially built industrial estate with its own 
slaughter house and machinery. Production volume increased rapidly, slaughtering 
almost 60 thousand cattle already in 1868. Liebig was the first factory to produce meat 
extract in the world and continued growing into the twentieth century, slaughtering over 
110 thousand animals in 1885 and 186 thousand in 1886.64
Finch, M.H.J., A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (The Macmillan Press, London, 1981), p. 133.
After inventing and perfectioning the meat extract Justus von Liebig realised the enormous potential that it could have to 
transport meat from far away and low cost areas of the world, where cattle were abundant and animals were primarily 
valuable for their skins and wool, such as the River Plate, as explained in Shenstone, W. A., Justus von Liebig - His Life and
Work (Cassell and Co., London, 1895), p. 164.
Castellanos, A., Breve Historia de la Ganaderia en el Uruguay (Banco de Credito, Montevideo, 1973), pp. 86-87.
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Importantly, the Liebig factory symbolised the first supply side linkage that involved 
technology transfer to the River Plate for meat production. Another supply side linkage 
was the transfer of management know-how, particularly technical capabilities to operate 
the complex meat extract manufacturing machinery and also in terms of marketing, 
distribution and logistics. Additionally, given that the company was financed via a 
London based company, the foreign capital transferred to fund the technology also 
became an important supply side linkage.
Liebig was the first foreign public company in the River Plate that was involved with 
meat packing. Operating in Fray Bentos, in the west of Uruguay, on the Uruguay River, 
far from saladero cattle purchasers in Montevideo, its location and primarily its size, 
allowed it to pay lower prices for cattle than available in Montevideo. But the Liebig 
factory did not just manufacture meat extract and conserved meats, it also produced a 
wide variety of by-products, similar to those of the industrial saladeros, including 
leather and tasajo. Hence, it acted as an industrial saladero, but made better use of meat, 
while commanding greater prices for meat extract and conserved meat than the saladero 
obtained for its tasajo. In addition, the Liebig Company became an important cattle 
producer, thereby vertically integrating its activities. It acquired numerous estancias 
where it produced cattle for its overall requirements.65 Nevertheless, the vertical 
integration did not occur fully, given that it was still purchasing cattle from outside 
suppliers to meet growing demands. The financial returns of the Liebig company were 
outstanding and proved to be an excellent investment. Indeed, the dividend paid to 
shareholders in 1884 was 12%. In 1894 and 1895 dividends of 15% and 17.5%
Malagraba Elichiri, J.P., Mi Vida - 68  Afios Inintemimpidos en la Industria (Impresos Vanni, Montevideo, 1993) p. 18. 
Scarborough, C ., ... About Oxo - In its Golden Jubilee year 1965 (Spectator Publications, London, 1965), pp. 4-6.
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respectively were paid, increasing to over 20% after 1900, while the £5 shares of the 
company were trading between £23 and £24 in 1910.66
The other significant technological advance was the development of cooked canned 
meat or conserved meat, similar to today's com beef. Both the meat extract and cooked 
canned meat were meaningful forward linkages that improved the value added of the 
meat export staple. In 1868 the first cooked canned meat factory opened in Uruguay, 
called La Trinidad, where the meat was cooked and then packed. Shortly thereafter 
Liebig also started producing conserved meat, on top of the already successful meat 
extract. Like meat extract, cooked canned meat had an appeal to the European 
proletariat and as rations for armies. The La Trinidad factory was highly depended on 
one client, the French. With the loss of the French contract the La Trinidad went out of 
business in 1884.67 The closure of La Trinidad showed the importance of management 
know-how, especially in terms of marketing and international distribution. Indeed, the 
dependence of La Trinidad, a locally owned and run company, on a single buyer, made 
it extremely vulnerable. In contrast, Liebigs had a well established distribution network 
across Europe and did not depend on a single customer for its business, thereby clearly 
showing a competitive advantage in management know-how regarding global 
distribution and marketing.68 Additionally, more capital availability as well as larger 
economies of scale, allowed the Liebig company to have greater financial resources and 
hence access to better management practices and know-how.
Barran, J.P. and Nahum, B., Historia Rural del Uruguay Modemo (Volume HI, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 
1973), pp. 335-338.
Castellanos, A., Breve Historia de la Ganaderia en el Uruguay (Banco de Credito, Montevideo, 1973), p. 8 8 .
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3.6 The Creation of the Modern Estancia (1810-1880)
The development of saladeros coincided with the establishment of the modem estancia, 
which moved away from vertically integrated production and started specialising in 
livestock-raising. Control of cattle movement was vital to the process of blood stock 
improvement as well as reducing losses due to theft. Cattle started to be marked, thereby 
further establishing property rights, and herds were closely supervised by peones. 
However, the first phase of the modernisation process, from the early- to mid­
nineteenth century, consisted in expanding herds and improving security and control, 
while mostly ignoring cattle quality. Thus the backward linkage of improving cattle 
production was restricted in the first phase to maximising the number of cattle. Hence, 
expansion was extensive rather than intensive, given that land was abundant. At this 
stage the nature of the market did not encourage stock improvement.69 By the mid­
nineteenth century estancias began the second phase of modernisation, which consisted 
in consolidating herds and improving them, through the mixing of breeds. Estancieros 
imported superior livestock, primarily from the U.K., to be cross-bred with criollo 
cattle. The objective was to produce fatter, more meaty animals in place of thin criollo 
cattle. Therefore, the second phase of the backward linkage of cattle production 
improvements consisted in refining cattle production and breeding techniques to 
improve the quality of the animals. An important supply side linkage helped this 
process, namely the introduction of European, primarily British superior bred cattle.
One of the most important aspects that contributed to the modernisation of estancias 
was the introduction of fencing. In the late nineteenth century estancias started to use
Scarborough, C ., ... About Oxo - In its Golden Jubilee year 1965 (Spectator Publications, London, 1965), pp. 4-6.
Lynch, J., The River Plate Republics from Independence to the Paraguay War in Bethell, L., ed., The Cambridge History of 
Latin America (Volume ID, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), p. 617.
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wire fencing in order to improve property rights, both in terms of cattle and land.70 
Although prior to the introduction of fencing, the marking of cattle was a means of 
claiming animal ownership, it proved difficult and costly to control property rights in 
animals, given that cattle were mostly running freely, thereby often leading to the
H1mixing of herds, while requiring large manpower to avoid loss or theft of cattle. 
Furthermore, many landowners did not respect the limits of estancias. Therefore, wire 
fencing increased the ability to control property rights, while reducing costs 
substantially, given that much less manpower was needed to manage herds. Wire 
fencing represented an important supply side linkage, as the wire imported from Europe 
facilitated the production and control of cattle. Additionally, it also encouraged the 
improvements of grazing grounds and herd improvements, through selective breeding. 
The formation of the Rural Society in Buenos Aires and Rural Association in 
Montevideo, strongly fomented the estancia modernisation process, especially after the 
1870s. In fact, the Rural Society / Association were consultation and promotion forums 
for estancieros and strongly encouraged the introduction of wire fencing. Although the 
first shipments of fencing wire from the U.K. occurred in the 1850s, large imports were 
not registered until the 1870s. By 1882 64% of all estancias in Uruguay were fenced.72 
Through fencing, the modem estancia was able to improve livestock production, while 
reducing costs significantly. Indeed, fencing reduced manpower requirements, given that 
less peones were needed to control and protect herds. Hence, fencing replaced herd- 
keepers, thereby increasing returns for estancieros.
Castellanos, A., Breve Historia de la Ganaderia en el Uruguay (Banco de Credito, Montevideo, 1973), pp. 74-77.
Each estancia had a specific symbol for cattle marking. These were inscribed in an official emblem registration book to 
ensure property rights. ‘Registro de Marcas de Ganado’, (Archivo Nacional, No. 930, Montevideo, 1874-1876).
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Yet, in the early- and mid- nineteenth century herd improvement efforts of estancieros 
had limited success, as the improved breeds were only in demand for fresh meat 
production for the narrow domestic market. This was traceable to the preferences of 
saladeros, which favoured the criollo cattle. Indeed, criollo cattle constituted the perfect 
raw material for the saladero. Criollo cattle were thin, had meat with a low grease 
content and heavy hides, which facilitated production and improved returns for 
saladeros. Lean criollo meat was favoured by saladeros, given that fat was difficult to 
dry as part of the tasajo. Additionally, the thick leather peculiar to criollo cattle also 
increased the quality and value of their most profitable export. Similarly to saladeros, 
the Liebig company preferred criollo cattle over improved animals. It favoured criollo 
cattle because the meat needed for its extract and conserved meat, as well as tasajo, 
which it produced at least in the first decades of operation, had to be lean with minimal 
grease. Additionally, just like saladeros, leather was still an important part of its 
business, therefore preferring the thick hides of criollo cattle.
“As long as the saladeros remained the principal outlet for the cattle producers, the livestock 
sector remained tied to an institution which frustrated the efforts of'progressive' landowners ...
The contribution of Liebig's to the modernisation of the cattle herds was very limited. The 
most important feature of their purchases was that they should be cheap. The criollo cattle 
were thus perfectly suited to their needs.”73
Hence, herd improvement occurred very gradually and it was only with the growth of 
exports on the hoof that the process accelerated.74 Although live exports were 
expensive, given the high price of feeding the animal during the long trip to Europe, 
prices for cattle producers were attractive, compared with prices paid by the saladeros 
and Liebigs. The live export market favoured improved breeds, due to consumer 
preference and high shipping cost of cattle on the hoof, which were calculated on per
72 Castellanos, A., Breve Historia de la Ganaderia en el Uruguay (Banco de Credito, Montevideo, 1973), pp. 74-77.
73 Finch, M.H.J., A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (The Macmillan Press, London, 1981), p. 134.
74 Gibson, H., Informe sobre la Exportacion de Ganado en Pie (Talleres de Publicaciones del Museo, La Plata, 1896), pp. 8-10.
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animal unit basis, regardless of size or breed.75 The development and growth of exports 
on the hoof particularly in the late nineteenth century, helped accelerate selective and 
mixed breeding. Live exports were also facilitated by an important backward linkage, 
namely the increase in shipping lines and capacity between the British market and the 
River Plate. As shipping rates to Europe declined, exports on the hoof grew, especially 
in the 1890s, as can be seen in chart 3.1.
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Source: Republica Argentina, Extracto Estadistico 1915, Ministerio de Hacienda (Compania Sud-Americana de 
Billetes de Banco, Buenos Aires, 1916), pp. 56-57.
The trade in live animal stock from the River Plate to Europe had a limited life span, 
starting with low yet significant exports in the 1870s, growing, albeit with limited 
volume in the 1890s and then fading away due to prohibitions on live imports. In 
particular, the ban imposed by the U.K. in 1900, which prohibited the import of cattle 
on the hoof due to the high risk that live animal stock posed in spreading Foot and
Calvet, J., Un Siglo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (Carbap, Buenos Aires, 1977), p. 34.
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7Mouth Disease marked the cessation of large scale live stock shipments. However, 
exports on the hoof played a crucial role, given that they encouraged cattle breed 
improvements among the large land owners, the estancieros, especially in Argentina. 
This improved the quality of cattle and was the beginning of a shift away from the local 
criollo breed and towards a gradual total herd improvement of River Plate cattle. In 
addition, the demand for fat cattle promoted the improvement of pastures in estancias, 
especially the planting of Alfalfa. Specifically, the area cultivated with Alfalfa grew 
drastically from 390 thousand hectares in 1888 to 713 thousand hectares in 1895 and 4.6 
million hectares in 1908.77 The refinement of cattle production, breeding techniques and 
improved pastures were fundamental to improve the quality of inputs for refrigerated 
meat packing plants, the frigorificos, in the long run.
3.7 The Emergence of Frieorificos: Their Impact on the Meat Packing Industry 
(1880 to date!
It was not until the invention of the refrigerated plant, by the French scientist Charles 
Tellier in the 1860s, that conservation of fresh meat was possible. After numerous 
improvements, the compression refrigerated plant that Tellier called Le Frigorifique was 
perfected, thereby allowing large scale frozen and chilled meat exports to Europe, 
starting in the 1880s.78 Specifically, the refrigeration system allowed meat to be 
maintained fresh for about five weeks if chilled or several month if frozen, thereby 
enabling it to arrive in time to Europe for consumption. This led to the creation of 
frigorificos, large scale refrigerated meat packing plants in the River Plate, which would 
slaughter animals and export high quality refrigerated meats, while continuing to
76 Liceaga, J., Las Carnes en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 22.
77 Giberti, H., Historia Economica de la Ganaderia Argentina (Ediciones Solar / Hachette, Buenos Aires, 1961), pp. 173, 175
and 185.
78 Tellier, C., Histoire D'une Invention Modeme - Le Frigorifique (Ch. Delagrave, Paris, 1910), pp. 305-307.
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF THE RIVER PLATE M EAT PACKING INDUSTRY J Q J
produce by-products. The first frigorifico in the River Plate, was the River Plate Fresh 
Meat Company, which was set up in 1882 by George W. Drabble in San Nicolas, 
Argentina. First exports of frozen meat were shipped in 1883.79 Many other investors 
followed suit in the 1880s. The establishment of frigorificos represented the most 
important shift in the production process and distribution methods of the River Plate 
meat packing industry. It embodied one of the most significant supply side linkages in 
terms of the transfer of foreign technology, advanced management and foreign capital. 
Frigorificos became large industrial plants, which increased the utilisation of the animal 
through by-product expansion, while improving the production process, thereby 
providing a superior meat and by-products range.80 Hence, frigorificos rapidly increased 
the quality and thus the value of exports, therefore symbolising a key forward linkage 
that enabled the further development of the River Plate meat packing industry. British 
capital was often involved in the establishment of the first frigorificos. Already in 1886, 
in Argentina, the Las Palmas Produce Company was set up with British funds and in 
1902 English and other foreign capital built the La Plata Cold Storage Company, while 
the Smithfield and Argentine Meat company started in 1903. Major Argentinian 
frigorificos were the Sansinena Company established in 1884, then followed by 
Frigorifico La Blanca in 1902 and Argentino in 1905. However, even the Argentinian 
frigorificos often had British capital participation.
“The first period of the freezing industry in Argentina may be said to have been in 1899, up to
the end of which year 442,000,000 killogrammes of mutton and 29,000,000 killogrammes of
beef were exported by the three great concerns (Sansinena's, River Plate Fresh Meat Co., and
81Las Palmas [J. Nelson and Sons], which held the field without competition.”
Richelet, J., L'Industrie de la Viande en Republique Argentine (Societe Industrielle DTmprimerie, Paris, 1928), p. 21.
See Appendix 14, which shows that in addition to the much higher value chilled and frozen meats, the by-product range was 
significantly expanded with the introduction offrigorificos.
Critchell, J. T., A History of the Frozen Meat Trade (Constable & Co., London, 1912), p. 74-75.
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British and Argentine capital dominated the River Plate business from the 1880s until 
1907, after which the large U.S. meat companies entered the Argentinian market. The 
successful frigorificos had offices in the key U.K. markets and highly sophisticated 
international marketing and distribution systems. Frigorificos required a large urban 
labour force, which was primarily composed of new European immigrants and to a 
lesser extend internal migration from the interior of the country.
In Uruguay, the first frigorifico was set up in 1904 with local capital, named La 
Frigorifica Uruguaya. Although prior attempts to open a frigorifico in Uruguay had been 
made, such as the installation of a frigorifico subsidiary of the River Plate Fresh Meat 
Company in Colonia, on the south west coast, in 1884, the lack of large quantities of 
quality breed cattle in Uruguay until 1900, did not allow it to be successful. As a 
consequence, the first frigorificos were established in Argentina, given that more mixed 
bred cattle were available to fulfil their requirements.82 This demonstrates the necessity 
of improved cattle breeds for frigorificos. La Frigorifica Uruguaya was yet another 
example of the importance of management know-how in terms of marketing and 
distribution in the frigorifico business. Indeed, it failed to make a profit in the first years 
of operation, primarily due to poor understanding of the key U.K. market and lack of 
financial resources, given that it did not have an office in Great Britain, nor control over 
its distribution. Although it managed to make a profit after a number of years, it was
0*5
finally bought by the Argentinian Sansinena company in 1911. Uruguay was able to 
benefit of the Argentinian tasajo production decline to build its export volume, thereby 
acting as a niche player, which specialised in tasajo exports, as can be seen in
Williman, J. C., Historia Economica del Uruguay (Vol. n, Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, 1994), p. 139. 
Hanson, S., Argentine Meat and the British Market (Stanford University Press, California, 1937), p. 164.
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appendixes 15 and 16. This enabled Uruguay to increase tasajo production in the 1890s, 
despite lower world-wide demand, and benefit from an important export business until 
the 1910s. However, the continued production of large quantities of tasajo delayed the 
switch from traditional markets for Uruguayan meat exports to the larger and more 
profitable European market. Thus by 1910 Argentina’s main export market was the 
U.K., representing over 88% of total Argentinian meat and by-products exports in 1906- 
1910, as can be seen in appendix 17. In contrast, Uruguay’s meat and by-products 
exports continued to concentrate overwhelmingly on Cuba and Brazil, with 38% and 
16% respectively in 1906-10. Given the lack of significant chilled or frozen meat 
production in Uruguay until the 1910s, Great Britain represented only 14% of total meat 
and by-products exports, as can be seen in appendix 18. Importantly, although Uruguay 
was able to take advantage of the Argentinian tasajo export decline, Uruguay’s role as a 
niche player and prolonged concentration on tasajo exports, does not seem to have been 
an intentional strategy, but is traceable to the low frigorifico capacity and lack of quality 
mixed bred cattle until the 1910s.
The main export of frigorificos in the late 1880s was frozen mutton, but in the 1890s 
frozen beef exports started to grow slowly and in the 1900s chilled beef began to be 
exported in large quantities. Thus from the 1880s to 1900s, the quality of exports 
improved, thereby also increasing the value of the exported volume. Specifically, mutton 
in general, but particularly frozen mutton was considered poor quality meat and 
consequently had a low price. Nevertheless, the quality and therefore the price of mutton 
was still much higher than meat extract, cooked canned meat and low value tasajo. 
Although frigorificos played a key role in fostering better bred cattle, especially after 
1900, in the 1880-90s many were still concentrating on frozen mutton exports.
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Therefore, exports on the hoof in their peak period, 1880-90s, encouraged the 
development of better rearing techniques. The improvement in the value of exports 
increased further with the introduction of frozen and particularly chilled beef production, 
due to its superior quality and texture. Thus, technology and product innovation allowed 
for increased value added industries and higher value meat products, moving from 
tasajo, to meat extract and cooked packed meat, to frozen mutton and eventually chilled 
mutton and beef. Chilled beef represented the highest standard of excellence and thus 
value. Indeed, chilled commanded higher prices than frozen meat, as can be seen in table 
3.2 below.
Table 3.2: Average Top Prices of Imported Beef at Smithfield Market
(Pence per Pound)




Chilled vs. Frozen 
Index
1912 4 7/8 3 7/8 126
1923 6 1/8 5 3/8 114
1927 6 V* 5 1/8 122
Source: Hanson, S., Argentine Meat and the British Market (Stanford University Press, California, 1938), p. 253.
Chilled beef exports grew strongly in the late-1900s and particularly in the 1910s. 
Moreover, the superior quality of chilled vs. frozen meats also allowed the River Plate 
area to gain a competitive advantage vs. Australia and New Zealand, two other key meat 
exporters. Chilled meat could be maintained in good condition only for forty days, 
before it had to be consumed. The journey time from the River Plate area was short 
enough (about three weeks) for chilled meat to arrive in good condition to the U.K. In 
contrast, Australia and New Zealand, were forced to ship frozen rather than chilled meat, 
due to their longer distance with the U.K., thereby offering lower quality meat, 
especially after the 1900s, when River Plate chilled meat exports surged. Indeed, the
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River Plate global export meat market share for bovine and ovine meat reached 52.2% in 
1909-1913, as can be see in chart 3.2, while achieving an even more impressive 62.5% 
world meat export market share of bovine meat.




^ A r g e n t i n a  [ ^ U r u g u a y  ^ A u s t r a l i a  Q N e w  Z e a l a n d  [ j R e s t
Source: Calculated with sources from the ‘International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics’, Institute of Agriculture, Rome, 1929,
tables 139-140, pp.416-425.
Due to the growing purchasing power of the British public and their increasing 
preference for high quality meat, particularly beef, the U.K. represented the largest 
world-wide importer of meat. Indeed, British meat consumption grew strongly from the 
mid-nineteenth century until the First World War, as can be seen in chart 3.3. This can 
be traced to the increase in the standard of living of the working classes in the late 
nineteenth century, as real wages increased in Britain.84 Most importantly, imports of 





The increase in the standard of living of the British working class and the whole of the U.K. population, as well as the 
augmentation in food and particularly meat consumption during the late nineteenth century is depicted in Burnett, J., Plenty 
and Want - A Social History of Diet in England from 1815 to the Present Dav (Scolar Press, London, 1979), pp. 123-148.
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Source: Perren, R., The Meat Trade in Britain in 1840-1914 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978), p.3.
Despite strong growth in domestic production, demand outstripped supply, driven by 
higher per capita consumption, thereby encouraging meat imports. In addition, imports 
of cheaper foreign meat suppliers reduced consumer prices. This helped the volume 
growth of foreign meat suppliers. However, there was a lack of foreign cattle suppliers. 
The U.S.A., which was an important supplier to Britain, gradually reduced its exports 
until they became insignificant. This is due a decline in U.S. cattle production and an 
increase in demand. Moreover, the reduction in meat prices was welcomed by the 
British government, given that they were concerned about inflationary pressures, 
particularly with foodstuffs. Importantly, the increased demand gradually turned the 
U.K. into the largest purchaser of imported meat in the world. In 1909-13, Great Britain 
accounted for 79.2% world imports of bovine and ovine meat, as can be seen in 
appendix 19.
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The quality of chilled and frozen meat gradually improved as refrigeration technology, 
in particular on refrigerated shipping boats, was perfected. Meat aboard the first 
refrigerated ships which arrived in Europe was of inferior quality than local meat. 
However, as refrigeration technology advanced, the quality of meat improved, thus 
becoming as good and often better than local meat. This was particularly the case with 
chilled beef, which matured during transport from the River Plate to the U.K., acquiring 
an excellent texture and taste.
“The temperature of just one degree over cero (centigrade) in the holds (of ships) did not just 
allow the conservation of the characteristics of fresh meat during maritime transport, but also,
due to its subtle maturing process, improved its taste and turned it into highly satisfactory
85(meat) for British consumers.”
Indeed, shipping was one of the main factors which together with the railways facilitated 
the growth of the River Plate meat packing industry.
3.8 The Importance of Transportation Systems: Crucial Linkages for the Growth 
of the Industry
Transportation systems, which gradually improved thanks to advancing technological 
innovations, were crucial to enable the expansion of the River Plate meat packing 
industry. The growth of the internal transportation system, included the establishment of 
water-ways stemming from saladeros in the early nineteenth century and the building of 
the railways in the late nineteenth century. Most importantly, the expansion of trans- 
Atlantic shipping lines to the River Plate enabled the transport of goods to the key 
British market. In the mid- to late- nineteenth century faster ships facilitated the 
transport leather, cattle on the hoof, meat extract and cooked canned meat, while in the 
1890-1900s the expansion of improving refrigerated shipping lines enabled the shipment 
of higher value frozen and particularly chilled meats.
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The establishment of saladeros fostered the expansion of a domestic water-way 
transportation system, which consisted primarily of small cargo boats that would 
transport tasajo, leather and processed cattle products to major ports for loading onto 
larger transatlantic vessels. This constituted a key backward linkage that reduced cost 
significantly. Indeed, as many saladeros were located near navigable water-ways, there 
was a considerable reduction in transport costs. Colonial estancias had been forced to 
transport processed products overland to reach ports. Until the development of the 
railway in the late nineteenth century, the main overland transportation system for bulky 
goods were carretas, primitive carts pulled by bullock, which were slow and expensive. 
It became much more cost effective to move herds either on the hoof or on small vessels 
from estancias to saladeros near waterways and then ship the processed goods with 
small boats to major ports or directly onto large vessels for export.
Similar to saladeros, frigorificos tended to have large plants in urban areas, often 
located near navigable waterways, which facilitated the movement of goods. This also 
meant a concentration of production facilities in urban centres, which in turn required 
transportation systems to move cattle from estancias to frigorificos, such as the railway. 
Frigorificos needed trans-Atlantic refrigerated shipping boats for shipments abroad and 
a local transportation network for internal supply of cattle. This led to the development 
of important backward and forward linkages, such as the construction and expansion of 
the railways as well as regular services from the River Plate to Europe by refrigerated 
shipping lines. Indeed, as the railways expanded further into the interior of Argentina 
and Uruguay, they had an ever increasing network to supply cattle in a fast and efficient
Translated from Spanish: Carreras de las, A., El Comercio de Ganados v Carnes en la Areentina (Editorial Hemisferio Sur, 
Buenos Aires, 1986), p. 111.
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manner from remote areas. In turn this provided frigorificos with a constantly increasing 
supply and thus encouraged the growth of the industry. Likewise, as the amounts of 
cattle supplied to frigorificos increased so did their output, thereby encouraging the 
expansion of refrigerated shipping lines from the River Plate to the U.K.
The shipping of chilled beef required the use of fast steamers, as time was of essence. In 
addition, chilled beef took more space in ships than frozen meat and needed special
holds, given that chilled carcasses had to be hung, instead of stacked, thereby requiring
• • 86 the construction of new steamers or special refrigerated holds on existing vessels.
Moreover, the refrigeration machinery was complex and costly. Chilled meat shipments
had to be maintained at an even temperature throughout the journey to Europe. Yet,
refrigerated transatlantic ships experienced enormous temperature variations, as they had
to cross the Equator, while a very small change in temperature would spoil a cargo of
chilled beef.87 As refrigeration technology on ships progressed, meat arrived in an ever
better condition in Europe. In addition, technological innovation in the shipbuilding
industry enabled the production of faster ships, which made increasingly more frequent
trips to the River Plate.88 Overall, shipping and the expansion of the railways played a
very important role in the growth of the industry, while gradually enabling the
transportation of higher quality and value meat products.
Greenhill, R., ‘Shipping and the Refrigerated Meat Trade from the River Plate’, International Journal of Maritime History. 
June 1992, Vol. IV, No. 1, p. 72.
Ibid.
The improvements in shipbuilding technology is outlined in C. Harley, "British Shipbuilding and Merchant Shipping: 1850 - 
1890", The Journal of Economic History. Volume XXX, March 1970, Number 1, pp. 262-266. Moreover, the number of 
ships arriving in the River Plate from foreign ports grew strongly in the nineteenth century. This is depicted overall in C.B. 
Kroeber, The Growth of the Shipping Industry in the Rio de la Plata Region 1794-1860 (The University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison, 1957) and in particular for the port of Buenos Aires in table VI, p. 126.
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3.9 Prerequisite Spread Effects: Domestic Policy, National Unity and Institutional 
Factors
Domestic policy and institutional factors set the foundation for the development of the 
River Plate meat packing industry, in particular the creation of property rights and a 
legal framework, as well as the establishment of peace and national unity in Argentina 
and Uruguay. Indeed, they were important spread effects that enabled the development 
of the meat packing industry.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the lack of property rights combined with a 
non-enforceable judicial system outside of the urban centres, mainly Buenos Aires and
O Q
Montevideo, made control of cattle and land extremely difficult. In particular, the 
gauchos, the River Plate equivalent of the cowboys, which lived mostly in open 
countryside, were nomads and mainly ate wild cattle meat, rarely obeyed laws and had 
little material interest, except to buy some minimal necessities, for which they worked 
the bare minimum in vaquerias. These men often had contacts with Indians, while 
contributing to the illegal leather trade. The response of the municipal council to the lack 
of control in the countryside, the reduction of cattle stocks within the Indian frontier, as 
well as the unruly nature of the gauchos, was to introduce and try to enforce property 
rights for land, cattle and labour. This combined with the goal of local governments to 
increase the overall utilisation of cattle, led to the establishment of the colonial estancia. 
Cattle were marked for identification, further establishing the property rights of the 
estancieros. Given that land and cattle ownership grew, gauchos were increasingly less 
free to continue their nomad and relatively independent lifestyle and were therefore 
forced to become estancia peons. This was further consolidated through anti-vagrancy
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laws, which were enacted to enforce order outside the large urban centres and provide a 
workforce for the estancias and the army. 90 Importantly, the creation of property rights 
and a legal framework beyond the urban centres also represented a key fiscal linkage, 
given that the Buenos Aires and Montevideo councils could augment their fiscal 
earnings, through higher duty and tax revenues.
The establishment of living quarters on estancias was a slow process, given that 
estancieros were mostly absentee landowners. Nevertheless, in order to increase security 
for their cattle, estancieros started to ensure that at least some personnel lived on the 
estancias. Gradually, the colonial estancias became small settlements with living 
quarters for peons and their families, in addition to corrals and outbuildings, as well as 
the main house. In this way the estancieros provided security against Indian raids and 
bandits. The estancia was also a social system based on retribution and patronage, in 
particular when the estanciero lived on the estate.91 This created the conditions for the 
development of a charismatic, clientelistic and paternalistic political system, 
caudillismo. The estancias became small urban centres and political entities, due to the 
vast distance that separated them from the large urban centres.
The shift to the modem estancia and the entire modernisation process was not stable 
and simple, rather it was plagued with difficulties and conflicts, due to some caudillos 
reluctance to change and the remaining Indian frontier. Indeed, throughout the 
nineteenth century the modernisation process was hindered and slowed by caudillo
89 Puiggros, R., Libre Empresa o Nationalization en la Industria de la Came (Editorial Argumentos, Buenos Aires, 1957), pp. 8- 
9.
90 Lynch, J., The River Plate Republics from Independence to the Paraguayan War in Bethell, L., ed., The Cambridge History of 
Latin America (Volume III, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), p. 629.
91 Caetano, G., Rilla, J., Historia Contemporanea del Uruguay (Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, 1994), p. 19.
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revolts, civil wars and Indian raids. The Indian frontier was pushed in order to conquer 
the so-called desert, mainly the interior of Argentina and the northern areas of Uruguay. 
Nevertheless, Indian raids were common until they were gradually reduced as the 
frontier was pushed further inland and finally stopped through its elimination in the late 
nineteenth century. However, caudillo revolts and civil war still represented a key threat 
and hindrance to modernisation, especially in Uruguay. Importantly, caudillo revolts and 
civil war did not just exemplify confrontation between the countryside and large urban 
centres, namely Buenos Aires and Montevideo, but most importantly, represented 
conflicts between the traditional vs. modernising estancieros, including mainly absentee 
landowners, as well as the urban merchants, bureaucrats and intellectuals. The triumph 
of General Roca in 1880 and his strong subsequent government, put an end to caudillo 
revolts in Argentina and conflicts between the Buenos Aires urban nucleus and the 
provinces, thereby ensuring peace and overall national stability thereafter. 
Nonetheless, in Uruguay periods of fragile peace continued to be interrupted by caudillo 
revolts and civil war, until the last uprising in 1904, which ended with the victory of
Q 'i
Jose Battle y Ordonez. The Uruguayan civil war between the Colorado and Blanco 
fractions, represented a conflict between modernising estancieros together with the 
progressive urbanites, united as Colorados, against the traditional caudillos, grouped as 
the Blancos. However, one of the most important aspects of these conflicts, was the 
instability they brought to the interior of Argentina and Uruguay and the level of 
destruction, which affected animal stocks. Indeed, livestock was reduced strongly by the 
conflicts, as armies not only left a trail of destruction behind, but also needed food 
supplies and horses, while at the same time they slaughtered cattle and horses to
92 Gallo E., Argentina: Society and Politics. 180-1916 in Bethell, L., ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America (Volume V, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), pp. 359-363.
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smuggle leather, thereby reducing stocks in estancias. The eradication of the entire stock 
of estancias by armies was commonplace, which would consume meat, as well as 
smuggle in leather of cattle and horses, especially until the mid-nineteenth century.94 In 
addition to the reduction in overall animal stocks, due to army consumption, destruction 
and smuggling, the passage of cattle and transportation of goods was often hindered, 
thereby further diminishing supplies for saladeros and processed commodities for 
export. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, animal stocks increased 
and plundering by armies was reduced, while the Indian frontier was pushed and finally 
defeated. The final peace and stability achieved in Argentina after 1880 and Uruguay 
already starting in the late nineteenth century, but only established after 1904, helped 
accelerate the overall modernisation process, while it represented the final consolidation 
of the modem estancia. Most importantly, the push of the Indian frontier and the final 
peace agreements between the urban centres with the interior provided further growth 
opportunities for the River Plate meat packing industry through the elimination of a key 
hindrance as well as the consolidation and better enforcement of property rights. The 
push of the Indian frontier occurred in order to expand the land under production, 
thereby representing a vent-for-surplus, which enabled augmented cattle production.95 
Moreover, the last push of the frontier and peace with the provinces also represented an 
important fiscal linkage, in that the national governments of Argentina and Uruguay 
could expand as well as improve their nation-wide tax collection, across their respective
93 Oddone, J. A., The Formation of Modem Uruguay in Bethell, L., ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America (Volume V, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), pp. 461-464.
94 The destruction of livestock by armies is analysed in the extreme context of the Great War (1850s) in Uruguay by Barran, J.P. 
and Nahum, B., in Historia Rural del Uruguay Modemo (Volume I/I, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1967), 
pp. 18-23.
95 The vent-for-surplus attained in the River Plate is analysed in the context of H. Myint’s theory of international trade and 
growth in the Third World, evaluated in his book The Economics of the Developing Countries (Hutchinson, London, 1984), 
pp. 32-56, as well as in his article entitled ‘The ‘Classical Theory’ of International Trade and the Underdeveloped Countries’ 
in The Economic Journal. June 1958, Vol. LXVIII, No. 270, pp. 317-337. In addition, a further examination is provided in R. 
Findlay’s and M. Lundahl’s paper ‘Natural Resources, ‘Vent for Surplus’ and the Staple Theory: Trade and Growth with an 
Endogenous Land Frontier’, Columbia University, Department of Economics, New York, January 1992, Discussion Paper 
Series No. 585, pp. 5-11 and 22-36.
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territories. In the late nineteenth- and early twentieth century domestic policy fostered 
investment in the River Plate meat packing industry and encouraged the transfer of 
technology and capital.
3.10 Incentives for the Establishment of Foreign Meat Packers : An Exemplary
Environment to Shape the Marketing Mix and the 'MultiplierAccelerator 
Mechanism*
Although demand rose in the U.K., it is important to determine what factors allowed the 
River Plate to become a key foreign meat supplier for the British market, rather than 
other areas of the world. For this purpose the concept of the marketing mix will 
exemplify the reasons for the transformation of the River Plate into one of the key 
exporters to the U.K. market, as well as the rationale for the establishment of British and 
thereafter U.S. interests in the River Plate meat packing industry.
The River Plate had a number of characteristics which facilitated its development into a 
key meat supplier to the U.K., while leading to the decision of local and predominantly 
foreign firms to increase their presence and interests in the River Plate meat packing 
industry. To start with the meat packing firms' macroenvironment in the River Plate 
changed drastically in the late nineteenth century. Of foremost importance was the 
technological / physical environment, which through the development of refrigeration, 
enabled high quality meat to be transported to Europe from more distant sources of 
supply. As technological processes progressed, the River Plate had the advantage to be 
able to transport superior quality chilled meat to the U.K. vs. only the frozen meat that 
further away locations could provide, such as Australia and New Zealand, given the 
longer shipping journey. The physical conditions were also advantageous, given that the 
River Plate had an excellent grass replenishment system and sub-tropical climate, which
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encouraged the rapid growth and reproduction of cattle, while abundant cattle herds 
were available, albeit only partially cross bred. In addition, the demographic / economic 
environment had many advantages, including a developed money economy in a land 
abundant and labour scarce region, an established cattle production system which 
provided low price cattle supplies and hence high profitability, as well as a region that 
encouraged free trade, welcomed foreign business and often provided major concessions 
for investment. Moreover, the political / legal environment was very developed in the 
River Plate. It possessed a legal framework and property rights in a relative stable 
political climate, the Indian frontier had been abolished and peace with the provinces 
had been established, albeit only in the early twentieth century in Uruguay. Finally the 
socio / cultural environment also played a role, as investors were dealing mainly with 
immigrants in an extremely Europeanised society. Thus the overall macroenvironment 
was very conducive to foreign investment in the River Plate meat packing industry.
On the microenvironmental front, there was a lack of cattle suppliers, while demand was 
growing in the late nineteenth century. The U.K. cattle production could not keep up 
wi]th domestic demand and the U.S.A., which was an important supplier to Britain, 
gradually reduced its exports until they became insignificant. This is traceable to a 
decline in U.S. cattle production, while their demand for meat was also increasing.
"The population of the U.S. was rapidly increasing, and in order to meet the demands of a 
growing population many of the ranges formerly given over to cattle-raising were being 
broken up and devoted to more intensive farming. The result was that during the decade 1900- 
10 beef cattle production declined 18%, although the increase in population during the same 
period was 20%."96
Putnam, G. E., Supplying Britain's Meat (George G. Harrap & Co., London, 1923), p. 71.
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Indeed, the U.S.A. not only reduced their exports considerably, but became a net meat 
importer by the beginning of the twentieth century.97 This left Australia, New Zealand 
and the River Plate as potential large suppliers of meat, but only the latter was able to 
provide chilled meat. Although other South American suppliers existed, such as 
Colombia and southern Brazil, their meat packing business and cattle production lagged 
behind the River Plate's, in terms of productivity, specialisation and infrastructure 
provided and they could not supply as large quantities of cattle as the River Plate. 
Indeed, the River Plate had the largest stock of bovine and ovine animals combined at 
the turn of the twentieth century.98 Furthermore, the River Plate represented a low cost 
supplier, specialised in cattle raising, with an already established meat packing business, 
while providing an adequate macro-environment for investment in the industry. 
Additionally, competitors could take advantage of low cost supplies in the River Plate 
and thus augment their profitability or increase market share by selling at a lower price. 
This encouraged further investment by competing meat packing firms first from Britain 
and then the U.S.A. in the 1900-10s. Moreover, most meat packing plants in the River 
Plate had their own marketing and distribution networks in the U.K., especially after 
1910, thereby controlling the entire distribution chain from the River Plate to the main 
British cities and often even butchers. In contrast, meat packers in Australia and New 
Zealand often used marketing intermediaries, such as U.K. import houses and 
distributors. Finally the British public did not have a negative perception about River 
Plate meat, while the British government welcomed cheap food imports.
Williman, J. C., Historia Economica del Uruguay (Vol. II, Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, 1994), p. 136.
Cibils, F.R., La Ganaderia Nacional v la Evolucion Frigorifica (Tailhade & Rosselli, Buenos Aires, 1902), p. 9.
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Overall, the River Plate offered meat packing firms as well as investors in the industry a 
good macro- and micro- environment as an important meat supplier, while it provided 
exemplary elements to shape the marketing mix for meat in the U.K. market. Indeed, the 
product was of superior quality (chilled), relatively low priced (lower than the U.S.), the 
distribution was fully controllable from production to the main markets or even 
butchers, while the promotion could be enhanced through branding of major meat 
packers, which had large economies of scale. The excellent macro- and micro­
environment encouraged heavy investment in the meat packing industry, leading to the 
expansion of the sector, while meat exports soared in the late nineteenth century and 
particularly in the early twentieth century.
The linkages derived from the meat staple grew stronger, as the nature of the product 
changed over time. As the price of meat and by-products rose, due to quality 
improvements driven by technological innovation, the value derived from the staple also 
increased, thereby encouraging more linkages. In particular, major backward, forward 
and fiscal linkages developed, accelerated and finally consolidated themselves. The 
escalating supply and demand side responses coupled with growing demand for meat in 
Britain, expedited the production of increasing value added meat products that led to the 
export of mainly prime chilled beef. Thus a ‘multiplier accelerator mechanism’ 
developed which provided stronger demand and supply side responses, while 
multiplying and intensifying the linkages derived from the meat staple. In chart 3.4 the 
‘multiplier accelerator mechanism’ is epitomised through a radar diagram.
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Chart 3.4: Radar Diagram of River Plate Meat Exports - 5 Year Moving Average 1890-
1919













Sources: See Appendix 3 for 1890-1899 and Appendix 24 for 1900-1919.
The spiral in the radar diagram represents an almost ideal growth curve, indicating that 
the export expansion was accelerating. It shows that meat exports grew continuously in 
1890-1919, creating an ever greater radius within the radar frame, thereby depicting how 
the ever strengthening linkages had an increasingly expansionary effect on the meat 
sector.
3.11 Conclusion
Although cattle products represented the backbone of the River Plate economy ever 
since the Spanish brought the first cattle in the late fifteenth century, the large scale 
meat packing industry took more time to develop, due to key technological constraints. 
Indeed, conservation of meat was the main challenge, which limited the early expansion
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of the industry, thereby restricting meat production to the low demand of local urban 
centres. Hence, technological innovation was of vital importance for the growth of the 
meat packing industry. Despite rapid development of other cattle exports, such as 
leather, meat remained an unimportant or even wasted resource during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century. Between the eighteenth and the early twentieth century a series of 
technological innovations played an important role in building the meat packing 
industry, by developing ever more sophisticated methods of conservation, which 
preserved meat and allowed its export to markets beyond the local urban centres. 
Whereas technological innovation was a crucial element that led to the rise of the River 
Plate meat packing industry, a number of other factors also played an important role in 
fostering the development and adaptation of technology, as well as the growth of the 
industry. In particular the effects of domestic policy, the modernisation of cattle 
production as well as the investment of foreign firms and capital were key in generating 
the conditions for the progress of the industry.
The meat staple became an important driving force, which generated linkages that 
enabled the expansion of the River Plate meat packing industry. This created a 
multiplier accelerator effect, by which the stronger the linkages, the more the industry 
would grow and this in turn would generate further linkages. Within this context, a 
number of demand and supply side responses developed. On the demand side, the main 
forward linkage was the improvement of meat production techniques, which enabled a 
gradual, yet fundamental expansion in the range of cattle products that were increasingly 
of better quality. Indeed, in each production phase from the colonial estancia to the 
saladero, to the Liebig plant to the frigorifico, there was a profound improvement in the 
quality of meat and by-products. Another important forward linkage was the
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development of refrigerated shipping between Europe and the River Plate. Furthermore, 
important backward linkages derived from the meat staple included the building of a 
transportation network, particularly of waterways within the River Plate as well as the 
railways. The new transportation network and infrastructure provided an efficient 
method of moving cattle from far away domestic locations to large frigorificos. 
Moreover, the refinement of cattle production and breeding techniques was also a key 
backward linkage. Frigorificos required a different type and quality of animal than the 
saladeros and the Liebig meat extract plant, due to their distinct manufacturing 
requirements and most importantly the varying demands of the end consumer. 
Specifically, the saladeros and Liebig preferred lean traditional criollo cattle, 
characterised for their lack of grease and thick leather, while the frigorificos favoured 
fatter and larger animals, with mixed high quality European pedigree. This is traceable 
to the production process, which allowed lean criollo meat to be dried easier and faster 
in saladeros, due to the lack of grease, while it was lower priced, a key determinant 
given that quality was of secondary importance due to the profile of the end-users. 
Additionally, criollo cattle were preferred, given that leather still represented a key by­
product and an important revenue earner for saladeros as well as for Liebig. In contrast, 
frigorificos depended on the meat itself for a great part of their revenues, while its 
sophisticated consumers, mainly the middle and upper classes in the U.K., demanded 
high quality meat.
Moreover, there were some significant spread effects derived from the meat staple, such 
as domestic policy and institutional factors, in particular the establishment of property 
rights and a legal framework, the push of the Indian frontier and the final internal peace 
agreements between the urban centres and the interior. Indeed, conflicts between the
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provinces and the urban centres hindered the development of the River Plate meat 
packing industry, especially in Uruguay, where final peace was only achieved in 1904.
On the supply side, technological innovation and technology transfer were important, 
especially the transfer of refrigeration technology in the late nineteenth century. 
Moreover, supply factors such as the transfer of capital and management know-how 
played a crucial role in the growth of the River Plate meat packing industry, due to the 
capital intensive and technical nature of the machinery required for frigorificos. Indeed, 
management know-how represented a major supply side response, not just in technical 
or engineering terms, in order to operate and maintain complex refrigeration or 
extraction technology, but also in marketing, logistics and distribution expertise. In 
particular, the establishment of Liebig and the frigorificos also meant dealing with new 
markets, especially regarding the distribution of meat to Britain. Hence, this required 
knowledge of the market, access to an extended distribution system as well as logistical 
and marketing management know-how. Furthermore, there were a number of fiscal 
linkages stemming from the meat staple. Fiscal linkages occurred primarily due to the 
increasing volume and value of cattle product exports, especially meat. Indeed, through 
the expansion of the industry and the increasing exports in a stable legal, political and 
economic environment, especially after the 1890s, the governments of Argentina and 
Uruguay were able to increase duty and tax revenue. These fiscal linkages enabled the 
local councils of Buenos Aires and Montevideo to obtain funding, in order to among 
others, build a strong army, establish a modem state and create a legal system. All of 
these factors were important, first to expand and eliminate the Indian frontier, while 
thereafter to establish peace with the provinces and the interior, as well as to maintain 
and secure property rights.
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Overall, the intensifying supply and demand side responses led to the development of a 
‘multiplier accelerator mechanism’ which enabled the expansion of the meat packing 
industry. In parallel, the value added of the meat staple increased, moving from sun 
dried meat, to tasajo, to meat extract and cooked packaged meat, to frozen mutton (low 
quality) to frozen beef and finally to chilled beef. Additionally, the by-product range 
was vastly improved and expanded. Furthermore, Uruguay played the role of a niche 
tasajo producer until the early-1900s, thereby complementing the growing Argentinian 
frigorifico exports, while benefiting from declining Argentinian tasajo production to 
boost Uruguayan exports, particularly in the 1890s. However, this was not an intentional 
strategy, but rather can be traced to the lack of a key backward linkage, namely 
improved cattle, as well as political instability until 1904.
Finally, through the concept of the marketing mix, the chapter has shown which factors 
allowed the River Plate to become a main foreign meat supplier for the British market 
and which decisions led to the establishment of British interests in the River Plate in the 
late nineteenth century, as well as U.S. meat packing plants in the late 1900s. Indeed, 
the meat packing firms' macroenvironment played a fundamental role, in particular the 
technological environment, given that chilled meat could be transported to the U.K., a 
unique advantage over Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, the excellent grass 
replenishment system represented a good physical environment for cattle production. At 
the same time, the demographic / economic environment was also favourable, especially 
the established large cattle production system, which supplied low priced cattle, while 
the political environment was stable and an enforceable legal framework was in place. 
In addition, the European socio / cultural environment facilitated working methods and 
transactions, through similar value systems and easier communication. Moreover, the
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meat packing firms’ microenvironment was characterised by the lack of global suppliers, 
given that the U.S. was producing less cattle, in order to concentrate on intensive 
agriculture, while the U.S. population and hence the demand for foodstuffs grew. This 
combined with other microenvironmental factors and a favourable macroenvironment 
provided meat packing firms with the incentive to invest in the River Plate meat packing 
industry, which led to its subsequent growth and enabled it to be become the world's 
leading meat exporter, as well as the prime supplier to Britain, by providing an excellent 
marketing mix for the U.K. market.
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4. MODIFICATIONS IN THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND THE
GOVERNMENTS * RESPONSE
4.1 Introduction
The ownership structure of the River Plate meat packing industry experienced 
significant periods of change since the nineteenth century. Indeed, the industry shifted 
from local control in the nineteenth century to primarily foreign ownership by the early 
twentieth century until the end of the Second World War. Then it went through a period 
of intervention and state control, while in parallel smaller locally owned frigorificos 
started to emerge, which gradually achieved leadership until they took over command of 
the industry in the late 1970s. In the 1990s, renewed foreign direct investment is taking 
place, albeit slowly. The analysis will demonstrate how in the early twentieth century 
the capital intensive nature of frigorificos encouraged meat packers to maximise 
economies of scale by establishing ever larger plants, consolidating the industry and 
controlling supply through the infamous shipment pools. Whereas few players 
controlled the oligopolistic industry by the 1910s, the battle for leadership and increased 
economies of ‘scale and scope’ led to various ‘meat wars’ until the late 1920s. As the 
chapter will show, the modification in the ownership structure altered the relationship 
between cattle producers and packers, while leading to a split between fatteners and 
breeders in the first half of the twentieth century. Although the response of cattle 
producers influenced domestic policy formulation until the Second World War, the post­
war era was characterised by an autonomous state apparatus, whose aim was to foster 
industrialisation, while financing it from the surplus of the primary sector. Even though 
severe state control in the 1940-5Os was followed by short periods of moderate 
liberalisation, intervention continued until the 1980s, generating significant market 
distortions. In this context the following factors will be analysed: (i) the repercussions of
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foreign capital involvement in the ownership structure of the industry, in particular its 
level of concentration and the creation of an oligopoly in the first half of the twentieth 
century that increasingly controlled the supply of meat, (ii) the effect of determined 
U.S. investment and the subsequent battle for leadership of the industry to ensure ever 
greater economies of scale through horizontal as well as vertical integration and 
expansion, (iii) the reaction of cattle producers and domestic policy makers, which 
ultimately led to state intervention and control, as well as (iv) the rise of the nueva 
industria. Finally, the elements that are leading to renewed direct foreign investment in 
the industry in the 1990s will be examined.
Alfred Chandler’s work will be utilised to analyse the driving factors that led to 
modifications in the ownership structure of the River Plate meat packing industry, first 
in an oligopolistic foreign controlled industry, then within a system of state 
administration and intervention, and finally back to 'freer' market forces. The analysis 
will concentrate on certain concepts put forward in two of Chandler’s best-known 
books, namely The Visible Hand and Scale and Scope."  Nevertheless, to provide a 
broader framework, references will be made to some of his other publications. The 
overall premise of The Visible Hand is that "modem business enterprise took the place 
of market mechanisms in coordinating the activities of the economy and allocating its 
resources. In many sectors of the economy the visible hand of management replaced 
what Adam Smith referred to as the invisible hand of market forces. The market 
remained the generator of demand for goods and services, but the modem business 
enterprise took over the functions of coordinating flows of goods through existing
99 Chandler, A., Scale and Scope - The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1990) and The Visible Hand - The Managerial Revolution in American Business (The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978).
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processes of production and distribution, and of allocating funds and personnel for
future production and distribution."100 Chandler defined the 'modem business enterprise'
as a firm that "contains many distinct operating units and is managed by a hierarchy of
salaried executives ... The activities of these units and the transactions between them
thus became internalised. They became monitored and coordinated by salaried
employees rather than market mechanisms."101 While keeping the main concept of the
'visible vs. the invisible' hand in the market as an umbrella theorem, Chandler also
provided a number of 'general propositions' in his book, some of which are highly
relevant to the analysis of the modifications in the ownership structure of the River Plate
meat packing industry. Firstly, he proposed that the modem multi-unit business
enterprise displaced traditional firms "when administrative coordination permitted
greater productivity, lower costs, and higher profits than coordination by market 
1
mechanisms". Then he emphasised the essential pre-requisite of a managerial 
hierarchy in order to group together many business units into one firm. As the 
management hierarchy became more professional, these 'career managers' were inclined 
to take a long-term view of the enterprise, given that their future livelihood depended on 
the health of the firm, rather than family run companies whose objective was often to 
maximise short term profit.103
Most importantly, he stressed that the modem business enterprise emerged when 
economic activity expanded to such a degree that it "made administrative coordination 
more efficient and more profitable than market coordination. Such an increase in 
volume of activity came with new technology and expanding markets. New technology
100 Chandler, A., The Visible Hand - The Managerial Revolution in American Business (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978), p. 1-3.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid, p. 6 .
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made possible an unprecedented output and movement of goods."104 The final 
proposition is that big companies led industries and changed the structure of entire 
sectors and the economy.105 Chandler accentuated that the modem business enterprise 
did not displace the market as the main driving force, given that the resources continued 
to assigned depending on demand projections. However, he stressed that the modem 
enterprise "took over from the market the coordination and integration of the flow of 
goods and services from the production of the raw materials through the several 
processes of production to the sale to the ultimate consumer".106 Hereby, the importance 
of vertical integration is highlighted, which enabled the modem corporation not just to 
control the movement of goods, increase efficiency and reduce inventory turnover, but 
also absorb the multiple margins of suppliers, middlemen, wholesalers and sometimes 
retailers, thereby augmenting operating profitability substantially. Finally, Chandler 
asserted that the modem business enterprise represented an institutional answer to the 
accelerated speed of technological innovation and expanding consumer demand in the 
late nineteenth century.107
In Scale and Scope Chandler expanded his 'historical theory of big business' by 
emphasising the importance of horizontal and vertical integration as well as 'throughput' 
and first-mover advantage. He insisted that as a general mle large firms did not continue
to expand in the long-term if  they did not augment efficiency (in marketing, purchasing
108and production) and reduce costs, while increasing the number of busmess units. 
Efficiency and cost reduction came about from taking advantage of economies of scale
103 Ibid, p. 8 .
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid, p. 10.
106 Ibid, p. 11.
107 Ibid, p. 12.
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and/or scope in production and distribution.109 Economies of scale occur when the 
quantity of output of a single product increases, resulting in the cost per unit to 
decrease.110 Moreover, economies of scope take place when joint production or 
distribution of more than one product reduces the combined unit cost.111 Thus, by using 
"many of the same raw and semifinished materials and intermediate production 
processes to make (or distribute) a variety of different products" the cost of each product 
declines.112
Chandler pointed out that technological innovation combined with new markets were
crucial in providing economies of scale and scope in production, in particular the novel
methods of production in the late nineteenth-century, which led to the emergence of new
11^
industries and major changes in old ones. In particular, capital intensive industries 
benefited by building large plants, while bettering and reorganising inputs, 
implementing new production methods and utilising the latest technologically improved 
equipment.114 Indeed, "production units achieved much greater economies of scale ... 
Therefore, large plants operating at their 'minimum efficient scale' (the scale of 
operation necessary to reach the lowest cost per unit) had an impressive cost advantage 
over smaller plants that did not reach that scale."115 In addition, cost reduction was 
achieved through economies of scope, by utilising the same production capacity, inputs 
(raw materials) and manufacturing/processing methods to expand the product range.
108 Chandler, A., Scale and Scope - The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1990), p. 17.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid and Chandler, A., "The Enduring Logic o f Industrial Success", Harvard Business Review. Number 2, March-April 
1990,p . 132.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid, p. 132.
113 Chandler, A., Scale and Scope - The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1990), pp. 18 and 21.
1,4 Ibid, p. 21.
115 Ibid, p. 23.
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However, Chandler emphasised that the economies of scope and scale could only be 
maximised if a "constant flow of materials through the plant or factory was maintained 
to assure effective capacity utilisation. If the realised volume of flow fell below 
capacity, then actual costs per unit rose rapidly."116 This was traceable to the elevated 
fixed costs associated with capital intensive, large scale industries and the significant 
investment capital required to purchase expensive plant and machinery. High capacity 
utilisation was crucial to enable a reasonable amortisation of the costly assets. 
Therefore, the large industrial companies required a high 'throughput' in order to enable 
a significant capacity utilisation and in order to sustain 'minimum efficiency scale' 
levels. Thus meticulous organisation and alignment were needed to ensure that the flow 
within the plants from one production process to the other occurred as fast and efficient 
as possible. Ideally the flow through the plant would be kept constant to maximise 
capacity. In addition, the constant and carefully coordinated flow of supplies was also 
very important, as was the efficient flow of outputs to middlemen and the final 
consumer. As Chandler pointed out, "such coordination did not, and indeed could not, 
happen automatically. It demanded the constant attention of a managerial team or 
hierarchy."117
But there were some major pre-requisites for attaining enough scale and achieving 
minimum efficiency scales. Indeed, Chandler explains that the reason for the very strong 
shift from traditional enterprises to the modem large firm in the late nineteenth century 
are the dramatic technological changes that took place and their subsequent
116 Ibid, p. 24.
117 Chandler, A., Scale and Scone - The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1990), p. 21.
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implementation, a phenomenon he refers to as the 'Second Industrial Revolution'. The 
new 'mass-production technologies' and the organisational knowhow to efficiently 
manage integrated production methods enabled a significant reduction in cost. However, 
"a much more important cause was the coming of modem transportation and 
communication. The railroad, telegraph steamship, and cable made possible the modem 
mass production and distribution."119
In order to compete in capital intensive industries, large investment in plant and 
equipment were needed, especially to achieve higher scale and scope. However, this led 
an increasingly oligopolistic structure in many industries, given that they had to achieve 
extremely high levels of constant throughput to maintain these large plants in operation, 
while maintaining minimum efficiency scales. Furthermore, these large industrial firms 
also benefited from economies of scale and scope in distribution, through vertical 
integration, forward into distribution and backward into purchasing, thereby reducing 
costs and circumventing middlemen and wholesalers.120 First mover advantages also 
played an important role, in that companies that were the first in producing new or 
significantly improved products with novel and technologically advanced methods, had 
a competitive edge, not just due to the preemption to market, but their learning curve 
was usually more advanced than the newcomers. Indeed, newcomers had to increase 
their size to the often enormous scale of the capital intensive industrial enterprises as 
well as having to learn how to utilise new production processes and manage novel 
purchase, distribution and marketing methods. Additionally, newcomers had to acquire 
the knowhow to ensure a constant throughput and the smooth running of the entire
118 Chandler, A., "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism", Business History Review. Volume 58, Number 4, Winter 1984, 
p. 474.
1,9 Ibid.
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integrated production and distribution systems. This 'challenge' was often too large and 
translated into such costly entry barriers, that it often led to the control of an industry by 
only a handful of companies. However, Chandler argues that in order to maintain their 
competitive advantages, the first movers of the capital intensive industries had to 
maintain a long-term strategy.
In Scale and Scope Chandler also emphasised the importance of vertical and horizontal 
integration as well as geographical expansion for the continued growth of the modem 
industrial firm, through organic growth as well as mergers and acquisitions. However, 
he pointed out that mergers and acquisitions with competitive firms often took place to 
"gain more effective control of output, price and markets", while vertical integration 
enabled "faster throughput and with it significant cost reductions and increased
191productivity ". Thereby the oligopolistic structure of the capital intensive industries 
was strengthened. The motivation for internal diversification was to maximise the 
utilisation of the firms resources. Indeed, Chandler uses the meat packing industry's 
extensive development of by-products as an example. "Internal stimulus (for 
diversification) came from the needs and opportunities to use existing facilities and 
capabilities more fully ... An impetus to diversification at the operating level was the
1 99emergence of by-products, such as fertiliser, soap, and glue in meat packing . .." In 
general, though, diversification was primarily driven by the firm's aim of maximising 
the economies of scope, in particular in production and distribution.
120 Chandler, A., Scale and Scope - The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1990), p. 31.
121 Ibid, p. 37.
122 Ibid, p. 40.
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191Chandler used the meat packing industry as examples in many of his publications. 
However, he focused mainly on Swift’s and Armour’s operations in the U.S.A. Indeed, 
already in his early writings Chandler referred to the meat packing industry. In The 
Beginnings of Big Business he examined how the development of a large marketing 
organisation enabled Swift to be become one of the leading meat packers in U.S.A., in 
particular through the establishment of national chain of branch houses. In addition, he 
highlighted the expansion into by-products and how this internal diversification 
facilitated the better use of entire animals. Finally, he stressed that Swift's foothold in 
the U.S. market was strengthened further due to the clout of their vertically integrated 
organisation.124 He also emphasised that the other large meat packers were obliged to 
create comparable organisations in order to remain competitive. "Thus by the middle of 
the 1890s the meat-packing industry, with the rapid growth of these great vertically 
integrated firms had become oligopolistic (the 'Big Five' had the major share of the
1 9^market).' In Recent Developments in American Business Administration and their 
Conceptualization Chandler together with F. Redlich also used the meat packing 
industry as an example.126 They focused primarily on the flow of communication in the 
organisation, in terms of timely reports, forecasts and operating data. These management 
'instruments' enabled the coordination of product flow, by forecasting demand and 
systematically controlling the purchases of inputs. The expansion of the telegraphic 
network was crucial for the large meat packers, given that it facilitated communication
123 Chandler, A., "The Beginnings of TBig Business' in American Industry", Business History Review. Volume XXXIII, 
Number 1, Spring 1959, pp. 7-9, [with F. Redlich] "Recent Developments in American Business Administration and their 
Conceptualization", Business History Review. Volume XXXV, Number 1, Spring 1961, pp. 17-18, pp. 166-168, pp. 375- 
378, "The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism", Business History Review. Volume 58, Number 4, Winter 1984, pp. 488- 
489, The Visible Hand - The Managerial Revolution in American Business (The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978), pp. 299-302, 348-349 and 391-402 and Scale and Scope - The Dynamics of 
Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990, pp. 166-168.
124 Chandler, A., "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry", Business History Review. Volume XXXIII, 
Number 1, Spring 1959, p. 7.
125 Ibid, p. 8 .
126 Chandler, A., [with Redlich, R.] "Recent Developments in American Business Administration and their 
Conceptualization", Business History Review. Volume XXXV, Number 1, Spring 1961, pp. 17-18, pp. 166-168, pp. 375- 
378.
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within the firm, especially through the fast relay of data between sales and purchasing 
managers with the branch houses.127 Thus national off-take could be measured daily and 
livestock purchases finetuned accordingly. This was an early, yet sophisticated, 
inventory control method and the pioneering predecessor to 'just in time' inventory 
system so popular in today's industrial plants. However, "ultimately the total of product 
flow through various departments depended on demand. The more accurately demand 
could be forecast, the more evenly the flow could be channelled and thus the over-all
1 98organisation could be operated closer to the maximum capacity." Indeed, meat 
packers tried to forecast demand and then coordinate meat supply accordingly, in order 
to maintain high prices, optimise capacity utilisation, reduce working capital through 
fast inventory turnaround and strong throughput.
In The Visible Hand Chandler examined the emergence of Swift in the U.S. market 
from the pioneering days of the first refrigerated meat shipments and emphasised the 
importance of integrating mass production with mass distribution in the success of the 
Chicago meat packers.129 Specifically, he stressed that the creation of their own 
marketing networks through vertical integration, by eliminating of middlemen, was one 
of the main reasons for their success in controlling the industry. As already outlined in 
his previous work, Chandler stressed that the vertical integration process included the 
building of their own branch houses, which had refrigerated storage capacity, a sales 
force and staff to deliver meat to retailers, as well as the buying of stockyards including 
their own specialist cattle buyers. In addition, Swift and Armour built new meat packing 
plants and expanded their fleet of refrigerated railroad cars, while the railroad and
127 Ibid, pp. 17-18.
128 Ibid, p. 17
129 Chandler, A., The Visible Hand - The Managerial Revolution in American Business (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978), pp. 299-302.
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telegraph network expansion enabled the growth of the market for meat. Moreover, 
Chandler also emphasised that Swift "became the first modem meat packer because ... 
he was the first to build an integrated enterprise to coordinate the high-volume flow of 
meat from the purchasing of cattle through the slaughtering or disassembling process
1 mthrough distribution to retailer and ultimate consumer."
Chandler also mentioned the U.S. meat packers entrance to the River Plate in both Scale
and Scope and The Visible Hand. In Scale and Scope he used the expansion to the
River Plate as an example of geographical diversification.131 Moreover, he briefly
touches on the impact of the American enterprises on the River Plate meat packing
industry, in particular in the consolidation and centralisation that the intensified
competition brought about.132 Similarly, in the Visible Hand Chandler refers to the need
for American meat packers to find new sources of supply for their exports to European
111markets, which led to their expansion into the River Plate.
Overall, Chandler’s ‘historical theory of big business’ provides a solid explanation for 
the rise of large corporations in the late nineteenth century, primarily by analysing the 
changes in the internal operating structure and functions of firms, as well as their ever 
increasing control over supply. However, one of the main limits of Chandler’s 
theoretical framework is the lack of in-depth analysis of external factors to the firm, in 
particular public policy and the establishment of anti-trust laws.134 Indeed, Chandler 
only considers legislation and public policy in passing, while ignoring the importance of
130 Ibid.
131 Chandler, A., Scale and Scope - The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1990), pp. 167-168.
132 Ibid, pp. 376-377.
133 Chandler, A., The Visible Hand - The Managerial Revolution in American Business (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978), p. 401.
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the reaction of suppliers (i.e. cattle producers) and their ability to influence government. 
In this respect, the chapter will build on Chandler’s theory by also including cattle 
producer’s reactions and the governments’ response to the modifications in the 
ownership structure.
In addition to Chandler’s theoretical framework, the marketing mix concept put forward 
by P. Kotler and developed by N. H. Borden will be used to evaluate how changes in the 
micro- and macro- environment encouraged U.S. investment in the River Plate meat 
packing industry and justified their highly competitive battle for market leadership,
I - j r
especially in the 1910s. In addition, the marketing mix concept will also enhance the 
analysis on how changes in the micro- and macro- environment led to a decline of 
foreign investment in the River Plate meat packing industry and eventually to the 
withdrawal of many of the large foreign meat packers in the late 1950s. Finally, global 
export market shares and import distribution shares will be used to analyse the 
importance of River Plate meat in international markets and the key role that exports 
played in expanding the industry.
4.2 Meat Packers Rivalry: The Battle for ‘Scale and Scope’ (1900-1914)
4.2.1 Pioneering Frisorificosx The Advent of Foreign Capital Participation
Foreign capital played an important role in the establishment of the first freezing plants, 
although often together with domestic capital. Thus the pioneering frigorificos often 
had a combined participation of British and Argentinian capital. A great proportion of
134 Eichner, A. S., "Book Review - The Visible Hand. The Managerial Revolution in American Business", Business History 
Review. Volume LII, Number 1, Spring 1978, pp.98-101.
135 See chapter 3, section 3.1 for a further analysis and applications of the marketing mix concept. Kotler, P., Marketing 
Management - Analysis. Planning. Implementation and Control (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1991), pp. 71-72 and Borden, 
N., The Concept o f the Marketing Mix in Enis, B., Cox, K., Marketing Classics - A Selection of Influential Articles (Allyn 
and Bacon, Massachusetts, 1988), pp. 429-480.
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the funds provided for the first frigoriflcos was from British long-term residents in 
Argentina. However, during the early twentieth century a significant consolidation of the 
industry occurred. Initially British and then U.S. capital invested heavily in the ever 
larger refrigerated meat packing plants. As frigorificos gradually displaced saladeros, 
the ownership structure of the industry was modified, shifting from local to largely 
foreign control. In the 1900s most frigorificos were Anglo-Argentinian firms. For 
example, the frigorifico La Blanca, which was regarded as an Argentinian refrigerated 
meat packing plant, was set up with primarily British capital, representing more than 
57% of the funds invested, while of the remaining 43% in Argentinian capital
• 117 •participation, a quarter came from London. Similarly, the Smithfield and Argentine 
company was partly owned by Argentinian and British capital, while the latter 
participated with a majority ownership. In contrast, Uruguay's first frigorifico, the 
Frigorifica Uruguaya, which was set up in 1904, was financed with local capital and it 
remain in control of Uruguayan shareholders until 1911. For perspective, it was the only 
frigorifico in Uruguay until the early 1910s.
Early frigorificos were extremely profitable and their shareholders obtained excellent, 
albeit volatile returns. For example, in 1901 James Nelson & Sons reported trading 
profits of £85,072 and paid dividends of 12% on preference shares.138 Similarly, the 
River Plate Fresh Meat Company high trading profits of £67,822 in 1901 augmented 
sharply to £272,475 in 1902, while it paid a dividend of 10% in both years, plus a 21-
136 See chapter 2, section 2.3, for the calculation and estimation methods of global export market shares and import 
distribution shares.
137 Calculated with data from Hanson, S. G., Argentine Meat and the British Market. Chapters in the History of the Argentine 
Meat Industry (Stanford University Press, California, 1938), pp. 133-134. In addition, The South American Journal. 
Volume LID, No. 10, September 6 , 1902 on p. 255, examines the ownership of'L a Blanca' in more detail and accentuates 
the perception that the firm is Argentinian, while at the same time highlighting the importance of British capital 
participation.
138 James, Nelson & Sons (thereafter Nelsons), Report of the Directors and Statement of Account for the Year ending 28 
December 1901. presented to the Eleventh General Meeting (London. 1902).
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and 4/- shillings bonus per share in 1901 and 1902 respectively.139 The Compania 
Sansinena de Carnes Congeladas (Sansinena Frozen Meat Company) went even further 
and paid a dividend of 50% in 1902 on all existing shares, after achieving a spectacular 
net profit of $1,833,255 (Argentinian Gold Pesos) for the year, equivalent to 
£363,741.140
Relations between meat packing houses and cattle producers were good in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, given that both were benefiting from the increasing 
meat export trade. Indeed, frigorificos were expanding, exporting larger quantities of 
meat and at the same time improving their production as well as distribution methods. 
This led to an improvement in the quality of meat, which had an increasingly better 
appearance, taste and smell when reaching the U.K. market, thus fetching better prices. 
This increased the value of cattle, thereby benefiting cattle producers. Moreover, cattle 
producers also profited from the robust demand in the U.K. market, which allowed 
larger quantities of meat to be exported. Furthermore, some of the larger cattle 
producers were sometimes shareholders in frigorificos and so obtained a significant 
return from their dividends and share price appreciation. In general, cattle producers 
were benefiting from the expansion of frigorificos and their increasing output, both in 
terms of quantity and value. Similarly, domestic policy, which was strongly influenced 
by cattle producers, was favourable to frigorificos, given that cattle prices and export 
volumes were increasing. Hence, during the strong growth period from the early 
twentieth century to the end of the First World War, domestic policy opposition to the 
meat packing industry was minimal. Indeed, local policy was overwhelmingly in favour
139 River Plate Fresh Meat Company, Reports of the Directors and Statement of Account for the Years ending 30 April 1902 
and 30 April 1903. presented to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth General Meetings (London, 1902 and 1903).
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of foreign meat packing plants. Thus until the 1920s the augmenting foreign control of 
the industry did not induce major resistance, but at times dissatisfaction from cattle 
producers led to some limited short-lived complaints.
4.2.2 Entrance of U.S. Meat Packers: The Fight for Increased Economies of Scale 
and Scope
In the early 1900s, the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos competed primarily with meat 
packing houses in the U.S.A., while secondarily with the Australian and New Zealand 
frozen meat trade, in the supply of the main U.K. market. During the early twentieth 
century, U.S. meat exports declined sharply, due to growing home consumption, while 
cattle production decreased. The U.S. meat packing plants, which had built up an 
important business exporting American meat primarily to Britain in the late nineteenth 
century, became interested in finding a new supplier for the British market in the early 
1900s.141 This combined with the attractive overall returns obtained by the Anglo- 
Argentinian frigorificos, which were benefiting from cheap cattle, low labour costs and 
improving cattle products, made the River Plate an appealing option. By utilising cattle 
from the River Plate, the U.S. meat packing houses could offset the declining production 
for export in the U.S.A. with River Plate meat. Indeed, as River Plate meat exports 
expanded in the early 1900s, U.S. meat companies began to be interested in moving into 
the region.
The first U.S. investment in the River Plate meat packing industry was made by Swift in 
1907, one of the Chicago based meat packing companies, which acquired the biggest
140 Compania Sansinena de Carnes Congeladas (Sansinena Frozen Meat Company), Report o f the Directors and Statement of 
Account for the Year ending 31 December 1902. presented to the Eleventh General Meeting (Buenos Aires, 1903). One 
Pound was equivalent to $5.04 Argentinian Gold Pesos and $11.4545 Paper Pesos.
141 Yeager, M., Competition and Regulation: The Development of Oligopoly in the Meat Packing Industry (Jai Press, 
Greenwich, Connecticut, 1981), pp. 158-159.
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Argentine plant at the time, the La Plata Cold Storage Company. Additionally, in 1909 
the National Packing Co., that was owned by the Chicago meat companies, namely 
Swift, Armour and Morris, purchased the La Blanca plant. Importantly, the entrance of 
the American meat packers was quickly followed by fierce competition between the 
U.S. and Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos. However, business conditions remained 
acceptable until 1910, albeit with intensified competition, given that the U.S. meat 
packers were increasingly augmenting their meat exports.142 The export expansion led to 
a further increase in the number of ships that were able to transport refrigerated cargo. 
Indeed, numerous steamers with refrigeration capacity were built in the early 1910s and 
consequently the capacity as well as frequency of refrigerated services between the 
River Plate and Europe augmented.143 In 1910, the American meat packing houses 
started to export even larger quantities of meat, thereby saturating the British market. As 
a result, meat prices in the U.K. decreased significantly and cattle prices in the River 
Plate augmented drastically. Thus the U.S. meat packers excessive overstocking of the 
British market marked the beginning of a severe price war in 1910. The U.S. meat 
packing houses' aim was to capture an ever increasing market share of the River Plate 
meat export trade, through aggressive pricing. Specifically, the American meat packing 
houses bought cattle at very high prices, usually top quality animals due to their 
concentration on chilled beef exports, while they sold their meat in the U.K. at low 
prices. Through this buying and pricing strategy, they managed to obtain an ever larger 
share of total cattle purchases in the River Plate and of meat sold in the U.K. market. 
The American meat packers had a long-term view and the professional career managers 
that run the firms wanted to maximise long-term profitability. Thus they were willing to 
sacrifice profits in the short-term to gain market share, that would translate into higher
142 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 60.
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earnings in the longer-term. Moreover, they also needed significant economies of scale, 
in order to ensure that the meat packing plants were operating at the ‘minimum efficient 
scale’ and could thereby benefit from a cost advantage vs. smaller frigorificos.
Due to the intense price war, the profitability of most Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos 
declined sharply, given that they had difficulty in competing with the larger and better 
capitalised American meat packers. The River Plate Meat Company's net profit on 
trading declined from £104,996 in 1910 to £25,119 in 1911 and dividends for ordinary 
shares decreased from 10% plus a bonus of 1 shilling in 1910 to 5% in 1911, although 
the dividend on preference shares remained at 10%.144 Similarly, the Sansinena net 
profit was low in 1911, while the merchandise account profit fell from $1,174,286 
(Argentinian Gold Pesos) in 1910 to $323,261 in 1911 and dividends declined from 
15% on all shares in 1910 to 6% and 10% in 1911 on preferred shares and ordinary 
shares respectively.145 Although the U.S. meat packing houses were not maximising 
their returns in the short term and at times also suffered from a lack of profitability, their 
objective was market share growth. However, the U.S. meat packers were also more 
competitive, while there were two important factors which made the Anglo-Argentinian 
frigorificos vulnerable to the forceful American competition in the River Plate. Firstly, 
the U.S. meat packing houses were more efficient and had better production, logistics as 
well as distribution methods, traceable to their extensive management as well as 
technical knowhow acquired and perfected since the 1870s through their operations in 
the large U.S. market. This accumulation of experience and knowhow represented a
143 The Times. 'Argentine Meat and the Construction of New Steamers', London, November 26,1910, p. 19, col. 3.
144 River Plate Fresh Meat Company, Reports of the Directors and Statements of Account. Years ending 31 December 1910 
and 31 December 1911. presented to the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third General Meetings (London. 1911 and 1912).
145 Compania Sansinena de Carnes Congeladas (Sansinena Frozen Meat Company), Reports of the Directors and Statements 
o f Account. Years ending 31 December 1910 and 31 December 1911. presented to the Nineteenth and Twentieth General 
Meetings (Buenos Aires, 1911 and 1912).
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clear first mover advantage, that enabled them to produce and deliver meat as well as 
by-products of better quality faster and at lower costs, while they utilised more of the 
slaughtered animal, through superior manufacturing methods and refrigeration 
techniques. Additionally, they increased their economies of scope by expanding the by­
product range and thereby maximising the utilisation of the slaughtered animal even 
more. Through the expansion of by-products they were able benefit from supplementary 
revenue. In particular, the start of chilled beef production led to a significant increase in 
the value of exports. Indeed, the U.S. frigorificos were principally involved in the 
chilled beef trade, which was primarily developed by them in the River Plate. Chilled 
beef commanded a much greater price than frozen meat, thus providing a higher value 
product. Furthermore, their plants were mostly located near deep-water docking 
facilities, which allowed them to unload meat and by-products directly onto large 
transatlantic refrigerated ships and thereby reduce transhipment costs, that most Anglo- 
Argentinian frigorificos had to incur, given that they were located further up river. 
Secondly, the main American meat packing houses had built up an enormous business 
in the large U.S.A. market, building a ’meat trust', which was extremely profitable and 
slaughtered almost 90% of all cattle at Chicago.146 American meat packers were under 
significant pressure in the U.S.A. to dismantle the trust, especially in the 1890s and 
1900s following the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Despite legal constraints, 
the American packers managed to sustain their powerful alliance and in general 
continued operating as a trust, albeit with some modifications.147 Nevertheless, the 
increasing policy pressure to dismantle the trust in the U.S.A. persuaded the American
146 Mary Yeager analysed the development and operations of the meat trust in the U.S., while examining the role of the main 
Chicago meat packers in the late nineteenth century, in her book Competition and Regulation: The Development of 
Oligopoly in the Meat Packing Industry (Jai Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1981). The meat packing companies that 
participated in the trust were Armour & Co., Swift & Co., Nelson Morris and Hammond & Co., which slaughtered on 
average 87% of the total cattle brought to Chicago, the main market, in 1886-1890, as shown on p. 67.
147 Yeager, M., Competition and Regulation: The Development of Oligopoly in the Meat Packing Industry (Jai Press, 
Greenwich, Connecticut, 1981), pp. 178-190.
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meat packers to devise a new international supply strategy, which led to their 
establishment in the River Plate.
"They began to reassess the relationship between domestic and export markets and to consider
a new strategy to counter domestic difficulties. Sometime between 1906-1907, the packers
moved abroad to secure new sources of supply. Swift moved first into Argentina, followed
rapidly by his anxious rivals, who used the National Packing Co. to force a joint multinational 
,,148strategy.
Given that the American meat packers operating in the River Plate were trust members, 
they could endure losses if necessary by drawing funds from their large U.S. business. 
Indeed, Swift and the National Packing Company -the latter incorporated the trust 
members Swift, Armour and Morris- were able to maintain very low or even negative 
margins in their River Plate business for long periods of time, by subsidising their 
business from their large American base. In contrast, the majority of Anglo-Argentinian 
frigorificos, were mainly dependent on their River Plate export business and in some 
cases a U.K. wholesale and retail business. Therefore, their ability to draw significant 
funds from Europe was limited, especially since the U.S. meat packers were selling 
meat in the U.K. at largely depressed prices.
4.2.3 Emergence of Frieorifico Pools: Shifting the Supply Control from the 
‘Invisible’ Hand to Managerial Command
The 1910 price war enabled the U.S. meat packing houses to expand their exports of
chilled beef substantially, thereby crowding out the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos.
Indeed, competition for the dominance of the meat packing industry was intense until
end-1911. This led to friction, especially between the Anglo-Argentinian and U.S. meat
packing houses. Nevertheless, conflicts were resolved with the creation of pools starting
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in December 1911, which were cartels formed by the frigorificos to allocate shipment 
space on refrigerated boats. This benefited the meat packers, given that they could 
optimise their cargo volume. Thus, the meat packers coordinated and managed the 
supply of meat, thereby replacing the ‘invisible hand’ of market forces by the ‘visible 
hand’ of managerial control. Most importantly, the establishment of pools ensured that 
prices in the U.K. remained high due to supply controls, while in Argentina it avoided 
inflated cattle prices through restricted demand from meat packing houses. Hence, by 
maintaining stable cattle prices in Argentina and high selling prices in the U.K., the 
meat packers could maximise their profits, at least in periods when the pools were in 
place and running well. For perspective, the American meat packing houses had used 
pools extensively in the U.S.A., both internally, through the allocation of wagon space 
in trains, and externally by dividing export shipments to the U.K. market. Although 
agreements between Anglo-Argentinian meat packers existed prior to the 1911 pool, 
they were less effective, given that their arrangements seldomly included all frigorificos, 
as explained in a parliamentary enquiry in 1909:
"You say some slight attempt to regulate prices is made. What exactly do you mean ? - The
three oldest companies meet and talk of their business - the Sansinena Company, the River
Plate Fresh Meat Company and James Nelson and Sons ... The three companies meet together
once a week and discuss the situation and decide what price they ought to make among
themselves. I believe they adhere to that pretty closely, but inasmuch as the other seven South
149American companies are rarely consulted in the matter, I say they have no effective control."
Thus prior to the 1911 pool the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos already had the intention 
of devising an arrangement, as this would have ensured higher returns. Most 
importantly, after the establishment of the large U.S. meat packers, it was in the best 
interest of the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos to create a pool, as it 'froze' the expanding
148 Yeager, M., Competition and Regulation: The Development of Oligopoly in the Meat Packing Industry (Jai Press, 
Greenwich, Connecticut, 1981), pp. 178-190.
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market share of the American meat packing houses, when the pool functioned, while 
restoring profitability. In addition, the rising exports of chilled beef also placed a burden 
on frigorificos, given that chilled meat could only be maintained in good condition for 
forty days, before it had to be consumed. The journey time from the River Plate to the 
U.K. was about one month, leaving only ten days for distribution and consumption.150 
Price wars increased the cost burden of chilled beef because it could not be stored for 
long periods of time without being frozen down at a exuberant cost, especially due to 
the loss incurred in the price differences between the higher value chilled beef and lower 
priced frozen meat. Within this context, the first pool was set up in December 1911, 
which was a joint agreement that divided the total meat exports by frigorifico. The pool 
of 1911 provided the U.S. meat packing houses with a 41.35% share of exports, while 
the U.K. and Argentine frigorificos received a 40.15% and 18.5% share respectively.151
4.2.4 Regional Rivalry for Increased Scale and the Modernisation of Meat 
Packing in Uruguay
The 1911 pool agreement incorporated only frigorificos operating in Argentina. 
Therefore, Uruguay was excluded in the creation of the pool, due to the minor role that 
Uruguayan refrigerated meat exports played as a percentage of total River Plate 
frigorifico exports.152 Indeed, saladeros still represented an important, albeit declining, 
part of meat exports in Uruguay. Given that further market share gains in Argentina 
were constrained by the pool, it was in Uruguay where the meat packing houses fought 
to expand their chilled and frozen meat export business and obtain increasing economies 
of scale and scope. Prior to the formation of the pool, the only frigorifico operating in
149 Parliamentary Papers, Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into combinations in the meat trade, 
presented to both houses of Parliament, Cd. 4643, Minutes of Evidence, Questions 292-293, George Goodsir, Esq. 
(Messrs. Weddel & Co.) examined, London, 1909, p. 11-12.
150 Williman, J. C., Historia Economica del Uruguay (Vol. II, Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, 1994), p. 143.
151 Calvet, J., Un Siglo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (Carbap, Buenos Aires, 1977), p. 39.
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Uruguay at the time, namely La Frigorifica Uruguaya, was acquired by the Argentinian 
Sansinena meat packing company.153 Since 1904 it had been owned by domestic capital, 
primarily land owners and banking interests, and run by local management. The battle 
for control was severe, with both Swift and Sansinena bidding for La Frigorifica 
Uruguaya during the height of the price war in early 1911. Swift tried to buy the 
Uruguayan frigorifico, but was outbid by Sansinena. Nevertheless, Swift quickly 
followed Sansinena and entered the Uruguayan market by purchasing the Cibil saladero 
in Montevideo, while transforming it into a large frigorifico. Importantly, the Uruguayan 
government encouraged foreign capital participation in the industry by disbursing major 
tax and duty concessions to frigorificos in 1910.154 These were further enhanced by the 
Batlle administration in 1911, making meat packing plants exempt from export taxes, 
import duties on capital equipment and other minor state charges, thereby strongly 
fomenting a friendly investment climate for foreign capital participation in the meat 
packing industry.155 In fact, the expansion of frigorificos in Uruguay was enormous 
after the entrance of foreign capital in the industry, which is evidenced by the large 
increase in frozen and chilled meat exports, as can be seen in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Uruguayan Frozen and Chilled Meat Exports in Tons (1911-1914)
Year 1911 1912 1913 1914
Total Frozen and Chilled Bovine 
and Ovine Meat Exports (Tons)
10618 21843 49564 71837
Index (1911=100) 100 206 467 677
Source: Fournier, R., Estudio Economico de la Produccion de las Carnes del Rio de la Plata 
(Pena & Cia, Montevideo, 1936), appendix V, tables I & II, pp. 368-369.
152 Finch, H., A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (The MacMillan Press, London, 1981), p. 136.
153 Compania Sansinena de Cames Congeladas (Sansinena Frozen Meat Company), Report of the Directors and Statements of 
Account. Year ending 31 December 1911. presented to the Twentieth General Meeting (Buenos Aires, 1912).
154 Nahum, B., La Epoca Batllista 1905-1929 (Historia Uruguaya, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Tomo 6 , Montevideo, 
1986), pp. 92-93.
155 Barran, J.P., Nahum, B., La Civilizacion Ganadera Baio Battle (1905-19141 (Historia Rural del Uruguay Modemo, 
Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Volume VI, Montevideo, 1977), pp. 211-212.
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This robust expansion in frigorifico meat exports from the River Plate, which were not 
included in the 1911 Argentinian pool, put pressure on the arrangement. Indeed, one of 
the main reasons for the large meat packers to enter Uruguay was to expand their 
production capacity, increase their economies of scale and ensure effective control of 
Uruguayan supply, without affecting the Argentinian pool agreement. This indicates that 
regional rivalry was partly responsible for the modernisation of meat packing in 
Uruguay.
4.2.5 Resuming the Leadership Battle Through an Aggressive Price W ar 
Despite their significant expansion in Uruguay, the U.S. meat packing houses, which 
wanted to obtain an ever increasing share of River Plate meat exports, were not content 
with their 41.35% meat export allocation under the terms of the pool agreement. Thus 
the 1911 pool was short-lived and came to an end in 1913. U.S. meat packers aimed to 
expand their share of total River Plate meat expOorts and consequently launched an 
aggressive competitive initiative. As occurred prior to the 1911 pool arrangement, the 
U.S. meat packing plants augmented their shipments, thereby increasing the prices of 
cattle in Argentina and overstocking the U.K. market. This led to a severe price war. 
Having extended production facilities, La Blanca, owned by the National Packing 
Company, a joint firm of the Chicago trust companies Swift, Armour and Morris, 
wanted to have a larger meat export share. Indeed, the American meat packers wanted to 
ensure that their new plant would be operating at the ‘minimum efficient scale’, in order 
to maintain an overall cost advantage without cannibalising the business from their other 
frigorificos. In addition, they wanted to ensure high capacity utilisation and needed to 
generate significant ‘throughput’ in their expanded La Blanca plant. Therefore, La 
Blanca asked to have its meat export share increased by one-half: the request was not
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accepted by the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos and instead a 10% increase was 
proposed.156 However, La Blanca refused the counter-offer and started expanding its 
output, triggering a price war. The 1913 price war was particularly fierce, not just 
because of the American meat packers' goal to enlarge their share of exports to Britain, 
but also due to a new potentially lucrative business in exporting meat to the U.S. market. 
In 1913 the U.S. was modifying import duties for numerous products. Meat was placed
1 S7on the free list, thereby establishing a new outlet for River Plate cattle products. The 
first direct shipment of Argentine beef to New York, albeit on an experimental basis, 
took place in September 1913.158 However, meat exports to the U.S.A. did not become 
an important business for the River Plate. They were impeded during the First World 
War and the U.S. government imposed significant barriers to River Plate meat in the 
early 1920s, while banning them altogether in 1926.159
Table 4.2 indicates the extent of the decline in chilled beef prices in Britain and the 
increase in cattle prices in Buenos Aires after the collapse of the first pool in 1913. 
Additionally, the table shows that exports of American meat packing plants indexed 144 
in the first nine month of 1913 compared with the same period in 1912, while shipments 
of Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos declined slightly by 1%. This reflects the strategy of 
the U.S. meat packers to flood the market in order to gain a larger share of total sales 
and thus increase their economies of scale and ‘throughput’.
156 The Economist. London, Vol. LXXVD, No. 3647, July 19,1913, p. 119.
157 The Economist. London, Vol. LXXVII, No. 3670, December 27,1913, p. 1402.
158 The Times. 'Argentine Beef for New York - The First Shipment1, London, September 9,1913, p. 11, col. 5.
159 For an in-depth analysis of changing international trade regimes and U.S. trade restriction, see chapter 5.
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Table 4.2: Chilled Beef Prices in Britain, Cattle Prices in Buenos Aires and Shipments 
By Meat Packing Company Origin During and After the First Pool Agreement
Period During the First Pool 
(A)




Year 1912 1913 [(B)/(A)]
Meat Prices in the U.K. 
(Sept.)
3s. 6d. 3s. 2d. (90)
Cattle Prices in Buenos 
Aires (Sept.)
In Argentinian Paper 
Pesos
120 166 (138)












Source: Annual Report on Argentine Republic for the Year 1913, British Confidential Report from the Foreign Office, 
from Sir Reginald Tower, British Minister in Buenos Aires, to Sir Edward Grey, Doc. 53-54, 3563, received January 26, 
in Bourne, K., Watt, D.C., (gen. eds.), 'British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign 
Office Confidential Print', Latin America 1845-1914, Part I, Series D, Volume 9, p.312.
Similarly to the drastic increase in cattle prices in Argentina, the value of Uruguayan 
cattle continued its strongly ascending trend, also reaching extremely high prices in 
1913 and 1914. Specifically, prices paid by Swift in Uruguay per cattle head augmented 
from $21.94 (Uruguayan Paper Pesos) in January 1912 to $37.12 and $43.84 in January 
of 1913 and 1914 respectively, thus almost doubling in a two year period.160
The Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos were evidently not in favour of the price war, as 
their profitability declined and many were forced to endure losses in 1913, while the
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U.S. meat packers' share of exports was increasing. Indeed, the Sansinena's profit and 
loss account showed a loss of $997,484 (Argentinian Gold Pesos) in 1913 and it was 
consequently forced to cancel its dividend for the year, in contrast with a profit of 
$406,872 reported in 1912 and dividend payments of 10% and 6% on ordinary and 
preferred shares respectively.161 Likewise, the Smithfield and Argentine Meat Company 
was not profitable and its dividend was cancelled for 1913 after a 10% dividend 
payment in 1912, while James, Nelson & Sons' net profit declined sharply from £51,045 
in 1912 to £16,728 in 1913 and part of its 7% total dividend had to be paid out of the 
reserve fund.162 One exception was the Union Cold Storage Company (Vestey), whose 
rapidly expanding global business enabled it to continue reporting stronger profits in 
1913, despite a decrease in profitability from their River Plate operations. Global profits 
increased from £133,225 in 1912 to £143,586 in 1913, as the poor profitability achieved 
in the River Plate and U.K. operations was more than offset by extensive business 
interests in Australasia.163 This indicates that Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos that only 
had operations in the River Plate could not cross-subsidise operations with profits 
generated elsewhere.
As a consequence of the poor results achieved in the River Plate, the Anglo-Argentinian 
frigorificos requested help from the Argentinian, Uruguayan and British governments to 
defend them against the American frigorificos. Indeed, they asked the governments to 
set a limit on meat exports by frigorifico. They claimed that the large Chicago meat
160 Barran, J.P., Nahum, B., La Civilizacion Ganadera Baio Battle (1905-19141 (Historia Rural del Uruguay Modemo, 
Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Volume VI, Montevideo, 1977), p. 226.
161 Compania Sansinena de Carnes Congeladas (Sansinena Frozen Meat Company), Reports of the Directors and Statements 
o f Account. Years ending 31 December 1912 and 31 December 1913. presented to the Twentv-First and Twenty-Second 
General Meetings (Buenos Aires, 1913 and 1914).
162 Smithfield & Argentine Meat Company, Report of the Directors and Statement o f Account. Year ending 31 December 
1913. presented to the Twelfth General Meeting (London, 1914) and James, Nelson & Sons, Reports of the Directors and 
Statements of Account. Years ending 28 December 1912 and 27 December 1913. presented to the Twenty-Second and 
Twentv-Third General Meetings (London, 1913 and 1914).
163 The Union Cold Storage Company, Report of the Proceedings 1913. Seventeenth General Meeting (London July 28,1914).
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packers were using their robust economic power to dominate the industry in the River 
Plate, while through price wars they aimed at expanding their supremacy and control. 
However, the governments were only slightly sympathetic, while they did little to 
reverse the American meat packer's inroads.
4.2.6 Anglo-Argentinian Frisorificos Request State Support
The Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos asked the Argentinian government for support, 
while threatening to close their plants. Although the implications of the American meat 
trust were debated in parliament and a commission was appointed to examine its 
consequences, the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos received little state backing.164 In his 
1913 annual report, the British Minister in Buenos Aires, portrayed the negotiations 
with the Argentinian government as follows:
"At the end of May the three British companies asked me to represent to His Majesty's 
Government the expediency of supporting the Argentine Government and encouraging them to 
resist the growing power of the Beef Tmst. In June three British companies, in conjunction 
with the Sansinena and the Argentino Companies, approached the Minister of Agriculture and 
threatened, unless action were taken by the Argentine Government to protect them, to close 
their establishments and throw over 6,000 men out of work. I informed the Argentine 
Government on the 11 1^ of June that His Majesty's Government would watch with sympathetic 
concern any action which might be taken for the purpose of preventing the establishment of a 
monopoly in the meat export trade. Cabinet Councils were held on the question of Government 
action, but nothing was done, largely in consequence of the opinion of the cattle breeders, who 
were more satisfied with the high prices then ruling for live cattle."165
Indeed, the lack of support received by the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos reflects the 
powerful influence that cattle producers, in particular the large land-owners, had on the 
Argentinian government. In fact, numerous government officials were members and 
former directors of the influential Rural Society, so that policy-makers had an 
intertwined political relationship and thus were strong supporters of cattle producers
164 The Times reported on the meat trust debate and the designation o f a meat commission in 'Alleged Meat Trust in 
Argentina', July 4,1913, p. 17, col. 4 and 'Argentine Meat Commission Appointed', London, July 18,1914, p. 17, col. 4.
165 Annual Report on Argentine Republic for the Year 1913, British Confidential Report from the Foreign Office, from Sir 
Reginald Tower, British Minister in Buenos Aires, to Sir Edward Grey, Doc. 53-54, 3563, received January 26, in Bourne,
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interests. 166 Nevertheless, the government also had a detached interest in backing cattle 
producers, given that more fiscal resources could be derived from higher cattle prices. 
Specifically, tax revenue would increase, as the higher cattle prices augmented the 
profitability of cattle producers, which in turn increased consumption and the value of 
assets. This would translate into higher value added and property taxes, as well as 
import duty revenue. Thus, the higher the price of cattle, the greater the tax base. This 
was also a reason, albeit probably not the primary consideration, not to support the 
Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos. Although a small number of estancieros were also 
shareholders in frigorificos, the majority did not have investments in meat packing. 
Thus the government backed local cattle producers, which had the joint objective with 
the government to obtain the highest possible prices for cattle. This governmental stand 
was endorsed further by the response of the Argentine Agricultural Minister to the 
British Minister in Buenos Aires, in regards to the request for support, in the midst of 
the 1913 price war, for the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos. Indeed, the Minister of 
Agriculture insisted that a way to control the trust was to partly lift Foot and Mouth 
Disease restrictions, which had prevented cattle on the hoof exports to the U.K. since 
1900, by permitting cattle to be slaughtered on an island off the British mainland, where 
the meat and hides could be sanitised prior to their distribution in the U.K .167 This 
would have evidently led to severe competition between cattle on the hoof exporters and 
meat packing houses, thereby maximising cattle prices in Argentina, while minimising 
meat prices in the U.K. Most importantly, the resumption of cattle on the hoof 
shipments would have depressed the profitability of frigorificos and restrained pool 
arrangements. Despite the suggestion to resume cattle on the hoof exports by the
K., Watt, D.C., (gen. eds.), 'British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office 
Confidential Print1, Latin America 1845-1914, Part I, Series D, Volume 9, p. 312.
166 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), pp. 47-50.
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Argentinian government, British sanitary laws in regards to Foot and Mouth Disease 
were not amended. Thus hygiene restrictions remained in place and cattle on the hoof 
could not be exported to the U.K.
Another important factor in favour of the American meat packers was their relationship 
with fatteners. Indeed, cattle producers were divided in two groups, breeders and 
fatteners. Specifically, breeders would sell young animals, usually after they were six to 
eight months old, to the fatteners. Subsequently, the fatteners held cattle for between 
two and three years, before selling them to the frigorificos. Fatteners tended to have 
more fertile pasture, rich in alfalfa, which allowed cattle to gain weight rapidly. The 
division between fatteners and breeders was encouraged by the U.S. meat packers, 
whose aim was to obtain larger and heavier animals for chilled beef. Since the chilled 
beef business was developed strongly by the U.S. frigorificos, ever since they 
established themselves in the River Plate, they fostered this partition between cattle 
producers. Most importantly, American meat packers developed a strong relationship 
with the fatteners, who were mostly the larger landowners, especially by forward buying 
cattle directly from their estancias at above market prices. Thus the fatteners, who had a 
strong influence in the Rural Society and therefore in government, were firm supporters 
of the U.S. meat packing houses. In general, this close affiliation enabled the American 
frigorificos to create an alliance with fatteners, which in turn provided them with an
1 Z 'O
indirect influence in domestic policy formulation.
167 The Economist. London, Vol. LXXVU, No. 3647, July 19,1913, p. 119. Also see Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), pp. 62-63.
168 For foreign meat packing plants the alliance with fatteners represented a powerful force to influence domestic policy as 
explained in Olariaga De, N., El Ruralismo Areentino (Editorial El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 1943), pp. 154-155.
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The response of the Uruguayan government corresponded to that of the Argentinian. 
While the Uruguayan government acknowledged the dangers of the Chicago trust, it did 
not take steps to control frigorificos nor the meat trade in the 1910s, especially in light 
of the significant increases in cattle prices. Additionally, domestic policy had 
encouraged foreign capital participation in the meat packing industry to foster the 
establishment and improvement of frigorificos, with the goal to offer an alternative 
outlet to saladeros, which would increase the value of the trade. In this sense, American 
meat packers were not seen as a major threat.
Separately, the British government had voiced concern regarding the potential control of 
the British meat trade by the Chicago trust. 169 Nevertheless, little was done to support 
the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos. This was primarily traceable to the British fear of 
inflationary pressure, given that meat represented a significant part of the food 
purchases and hence was an important component of the foodstuffs basket index. Thus 
the British government's priority was to have the lowest possible meat prices in the U.K. 
market. Pools restricted meat supplies thereby maintaining prices at a high level. 
Furthermore, Britain advocated free trade and any protective measures which would 
have restricted or controlled imports would not have supported an open trade policy.
4.2.7 Repercussions of the Intense 1913 Price War and the Creation of a New Pool
The 1913 price war enabled the American meat packing houses to expand, while the 
Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos were forced to retract. Indeed, two of the longest 
established meat packing firms, namely The River Plate Fresh Meat Company and 
James Nelson and Sons, merged in 1914 to form the British and Argentine Meat
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Company.170 The frigorifico Las Palmas, a former subsidiary of James Nelson and Sons, 
was forced to close and the capital of the merged companies was increased in order to
171renovate the industrial plant of the River Plate Meat Company in Campana. 
Additionally, the Frigorifico Argentino was shut down and leased to the American firm 
Sulzberger & Sons.172 Following the intense price war between the American and 
Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos in 1913, a new pool was formed in 1914, before the start 
of the First World War. The new pool arrangement was concluded largely at the expense 
to Anglo-Argentinian meat packing plants: U.S. meat packing firms increased their 
share of meat exports to 58.5%, while reducing the British share to 29.64% and the 
Argentinian to around 11.8 6 % .173 Hence, the American meat packing houses had 
achieved their objective of obtaining a larger share of the export trade and therefore 
benefited from greater economies of scale and ‘throughput’. The share of the U.S. meat 
packers increased by 17.15 percentage points between the first pool in 1911 and the 
second in 1914, while the British and Argentinian frigorificos lost 10.51 and 6.64 
percentage points respectively. However, the largest relative share decline was the 
Argentinian, whose share of meat exports indexed 64 in the 1914 vs. the 1911 pool, in 
comparison with an index of 74 for the British, and 141 for the American meat 
packers. 174 For perspective, prior to the entrance of American meat packing houses, one 
Argentinian frigorifico alone, namely Sansinena, had a 18.1% export share of all chilled 
and frozen beef shipments in 1906.175 Chart 4.1 shows the rapid proportional increase of 
U.S. frigorificos in the River Plate meat export trade, from none before they arrived in
169 Report o f the Departmental Committee appointed to inquire into combinations in the meat trade, presented to both houses 
o f Parliament, Cd. 4643, London, 1909, p. 9-15.
170 River Plate Fresh Meat Company, S. Young. Memorandum sent to Shareholders (London, 28 March 1914) and James 
Nelson & Sons, P. Holmes. Memorandum sent to Shareholders (London, 22 January 1914).
171 Puiggros, R., Libre Emnresa o Nacionalizacion en la Industria de la Came (Editorial Argumentos, Buenos Aires, 1957), p. 
24.
172 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p.6 8 .
173 Calvet, J., Un Sielo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (Carbap, Buenos Aires, 1977), p.42.
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1907, to 41.35% in the pool agreement of 1911 and 58.5% in the one of 1914. 
Importantly, unlike the previous agreement, the 1914 pool embraced all River Plate 
frigorificos, including all packers in Argentina and Uruguay.
Chart 4.1: Allocation of River Plate Meat Exports by Packers Origin 










Sources: Calvet, J., Un Sielo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (Carbap, Buenos Aires, 1977), pp. 39 and 42.
4.2.8 The Overall Implications of the Pools and Price Wars
In retrospect, the pool arrangements were a cartel system, which rather than enabling 
demand and supply forces to determine a market equilibrium, fixed the supply of River
174 The index numbers only indicate a relative rise or decline in the export share figures. Given that chilled and frozen meat
exports grew sharply in 1900-1914 the nominal export values increased.
175 Calculated with data from The South American Journal. London, Volume LXIV, No. 6 , February 8 , 1908, p. 149.
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Plate meat through refrigerated shipment space allocation, thereby maintaining low 
cattle prices in the River Plate, while ensuring high prices for meat in the U.K. Thus, 
pools replaced the invisible hand of market forces and the meat packers controlled 
supply by coordinating the flows of meat and byproducts. Contrarily, price wars 
swamped the British market with River Plate meat from U.S. frigorificos, especially in 
the 1913 price war, thus having the opposite effect, which indicated dumping practices, 
although the American meat packers dismissed claims that they were selling under
17A • ■cost. The U.S. frigorificos were more efficient and benefited from greater economies 
of scope, as evidenced by their larger range of better quality products than their Anglo- 
Argentinian counterparts. In addition, they also gained from economies of scale 
generated by their large increase in exported volume. Therefore, it is contestable 
whether the American meat packers were only strongly undercutting competition or 
selling below their overall cost, given that they could draw funds from their large U.S. 
businesses. The Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos claimed that the American meat packing 
plants were selling under costs in 1913, as reported in The Economist:
"(In June 1913) the authorities were approached by six out of nine (Anglo-Argentinian) large 
meat companies for protection, these alleging that, 'owing to the burdensome conditions created 
by three other (United States) companies in the country preparing an absolute monopoly by 
selling Argentine meat in the English markets below costs price', they would be compelled to 
close their factories.177
In any case, in periods of price wars, American frigorificos in the River Plate suffered a 
drastic decline in their margins, thereby severely reducing their profitability. Hence, 
there were periods of cartel agreements, that restricted supply to the U.K., and stages of 
enormous supply expansion, that dumped meat onto the British market, heavily
176 Dumping is difficult to define, while it is complex to establish and classify as already explained in the early 1920s by 
Jacob Viner in Dumping: A Problem in International Trade (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1923), pp. 1-34, as 
well as more recently updated and expanded in Dale, R., Anti-dumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order (The MacMillan 
Press, London, 1980), pp. 8-17. Nevertheless, if  goods are sold under cost and thus a 'sale at prices unremunerative to the 
sellers' occurs, it can be regarded as dumping (see Viner, op. cit., p. 3).
177 The Economist. London, Vol. XCVI, No. 4149, March 3,1923, p. 489.
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depressing prices. As such it was an inter-frigorifico war, between the American meat 
packers that wanted to rapidly expand their share of the export meat market in order to 
benefit from greater economies of scale and the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos whose 
aim was to reverse or at least stop the advance of the U.S. meat packing houses, so as to 
maintain their scale and adequate ‘throughput’. Thus the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos, 
which were warning the Argentinian, British and Uruguayan governments as well as 
cattle producers in 1913 about the potential control of the U.S. trust, were trying to build 
up a separate trust that would include themselves and the Americans through the 
creation of a new pool arrangement, which as already mentioned was set-up in 1914. 
Nevertheless, the Anglo-Argentinian meat packing plants' resistance played an 
important role as a opposing force to the American frigorificosi thereby ensuring that 
the Chicago trust would not obtain total control of the River Plate meat packing 
industry. Thus the pool agreements represented an oligopoly between the large Anglo- 
Argentinian and U.S. frigorificos, rather than only a monopoly of the American meat 
packing houses.
Importantly, through rivalry the centralisation of the River Plate meat packing industry 
gradually increased, by displacing saladeros in the first instance and then by reducing 
the number of 'peripheral' frigorificos, who only accounted for a 'marginal' proportion of 
the meat export business. The latter was achieved through mergers or acquisitions of 
meat packing plants and their subsequent closure or amalgamation. Hence, the inter- 
frigorifico battle for leadership and control, which would translate into greater ‘scale 
and scope’, had a profound effect on the ownership structure of the River Plate meat 
packing industry. In addition, the opening up of the American market in 1913, further 
expanded the worldwide market for River Plate meat. This was particularly important
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for meat, given that the U.S.A. switched from being one of the main exporters 
throughout the nineteenth century, first with cured pork products and starting in the 
1870s with frozen beef, to an importer in the 1910s.178 Therefore, the American meat 
packing houses export business was declining due to a lack of surplus meat production 
in the U.S. market. Consequently, they needed new sources of supply to maintain their 
lucrative export business and thence their entrance to the River Plate. Although a 
significant proportion of meat was exported from the River Plate to the U.S.A., it 
remained very small if compared with exports to the large U.K. market or the American 
internal domestic trade. Whereas the U.S. meat packers had superior technology and 
logistics, the low price of River Plate cattle and hence meat, could offset the Anglo- 
Argentinian inferior quality and techniques. Thus the U.S. meat packing companies 
battle for control of the River Plate meat packing industry, was aimed at increasing their 
share of the global meat export trade by weakening the position of the Anglo- 
Argentinian competition in their main supply region and the British market. Indeed, the 
opening of the U.S. market for River Plate meat exemplified a change in the political / 
legal macroenvironment, while the decline in U.S. production epitomised an amendment 
in the technological / physical macroenvironment.179 These macroenvironmental 
modifications persuaded the American meat packers to change their pricing strategy, 
which led to the aggressive price war in 1913. As a result, the ability of Anglo- 
Argentinian frigorificos to draw on potentially large profits from their River Plate 
operations was reduced, while they were forced to focus overall resources and
178 American exports to the U.K. declined steadily until they became insignificant, decreasing from 120,880 tons in 1907 to 
305 tons in 1912 and to 73 tons in 1913, while the U.S.A. opened the market and allowed free imports of frozen and 
chilled meats in 1913, as depicted in the Review of the Frozen Meat Trade. Weddel & Co., London, No. 26,1913, p. 3 and 
10.
179 See Section 4.1 for an analysis of the Marketing Mix concept.
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management attention on preserving their core businesses. Moreover, the aggressive 
strategy also led to the further expansion of the American frigorificos meat export share. 
Although the 1914 pool also had the objective to export meat to the U.S. market in 
agreed proportions, the outbreak of the First World War hindered shipments to the 
U.S.A. due to the lack of transportation capacity. Indeed, during the war almost all the 
meat exported from the River Plate was consigned to the U.K and to the allied forces. 
Furthermore, due to the erratic demand generated by the war, combined with 
transatlantic shipment difficulties, the export allocations had strong variations and 
therefore only corresponded broadly to the 1914 pool agreement.
Overall, River Plate meat exports increased dramatically from the early twentieth 
century until the First World War, as can be seen in chart 4.2.
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Sources: See Appendix 24.
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The mtcr-frigorifico leadership contest and the battle for greater ‘scale and scope’ 
benefited cattle producers and River Plate governments alike, as prices and production 
capacity augmented sharply. Consequently, Argentinian and Uruguayan meat exports 
experienced enormous growth.
4.3 The First World War Boom (1914-1919)
4.3.1 Extraordinary Volume Gains and Price Increases Despite Allied Supply 
Control
As the First World War broke out, the demand for meat increased dramatically, given 
that war stricken Europe needed rations for its soldiers as well as food supplies for the 
population. This led to a large rise in canned and frozen meat exports from both 
Argentina and Uruguay. At the same time there was a significant decline in chilled meat 
exports, because war conditions required longer lasting produce. As chilled meat needed 
to be consumed within weeks, it was not suited for the war requirements. Indeed, 
shipping blockages and U.K. trans-shipments to the front hindered fast transportation. 
This combined with strategic long-term stockpiles in the U.K. increased the demand for 
meats that could be preserved for several months. The Allied Command sent missions to 
the River Plate to establish supply stations in Argentina and Uruguay. These missions 
arranged government contracts to secure meat supply for the war effort. But through the 
control of meat quantities and shipping capacity the buying commissions were also 
trying to regulate prices. Thus in theory the commissions served not only to ensure 
regular purchases and shipments, but also functioned as a monopolistic buyer, 
preventing competition. Hence, the invisible hand of market forces was taken over by 
the Allied Command that controlled supply. However, the war effort required much 
higher supplies than they had anticipated, thus prices rose to very high levels despite
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1 sotheir centralised buying process. Indeed, contracts were often underestimated, given 
that the average man in combat consumed much more meat than during peace time, 
while the domestic production of meat in Europe was severely affected by the war. As a 
result, agreements were largely increased over time, reflecting the much higher than 
expected demand from the allied forces.
Due to the war-time demand, River Plate meat exports grew significantly, as evidenced 
by the large increase in ovine and bovine meat exports volume of 40% from 1910-14 to
1 O l
1915-1919. The main surge was in canned meat. In addition, the escalating demand 
had an extreme accelerating impact on prices throughout the war. Indeed, prices of meat 
and cattle rose sharply, reaching all time highs in the late 1910s. By country, Uruguay 
had the most spectacular rise in volume and prices, given that the proliferation of 
frigorificos had just started in 1911, when foreign capital expanded the capacity for 
frozen and chilled meat by establishing new plants or acquiring and developing existing 
ones. On top of the purchase of la Frigorifica Uruguaya in 1911 by the Argentinian 
Sansinena group and the entrance of Swift shortly thereafter, Armour also started 
operations in Uruguay in 1917, buying the Frigorifico Artigas, which had been built 
with domestic capital in 1915.182 This led to a significant increase in the production 
capacity just before and in the beginning of the First World War. In addition, given that 
the Uruguayan chilled meat exports were not very developed, due to the late entrance of 
the American meat packers, the decline of the chilled beef business did not affect the 
cattle producers in Uruguay as much as in Argentina. The Uruguayan export volume 
grew strongly, with shipments of bovine and ovine meat indexing 163 in 1915-1919 vs.
180 Ruano Fournier, A., Estudio Economico de la Produccion de las Cames del Rio de la Plata (Pena y Cia Impresores, 
Montevideo, 1936), p. 164.
181 See Appendix 24 for data and Appendixes 20 and 22 for sources.
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1910-14, while in comparison with 1905-09 the volume augmented more than twofold 
with a strong 219 index (Base 1905-09 = 100) . 183 Prices of cattle in Uruguay rose 
proportionally even further, while more than doubling their value with an index of 253, 
when comparing the 1914-1920 average with the six years preceding the war, namely 
1908-1913 (Base 1908-1913 = 100) . 184 This enormous escalation in Uruguayan prices 
was also due to the capacity expansion of frigorificos vs. saladeros, in particular after 
1912, that created an increasingly higher value outlet for Uruguayan cattle. Indeed, as 
frigorificos absorbed more animals largely displacing saladeros, the value of cattle 
appreciated.
In Argentina, the meat volume and price increases during the First World War were less 
pronounced, but were still very significant. Specifically, meat export volume indexed 
135 in 1915-1919 vs. 1910-1914, while similarly to the Uruguayan case it more than 
doubled over the longer term, with an index of 222 in 1915-1919 vs. 1905-09.185 The 
lower short term increase during the war is traceable to the earlier establishment of 
American meat packing houses in Argentina, which augmented the frigorifico 
production capacity sooner than in Uruguay. Furthermore, average cattle prices rose 
sharply in Argentina, indexing 144 in 1919 vs. 1913.186 Cattle prices reversed 
temporarily in 1917, while then continuing their accelerating rate until 1920. Both 
Argentina and Uruguay experienced a short-lived reversal of the rising trend in animal 
prices in 1917 (in Uruguay in 1916 and 1917), but this brief deviation only caused a 
momentary drop, while it represented a blip in the upward direction of cattle prices.
182 Nahum, B., La Epoca Battlista 1905-1929 (Historia Uruguaya, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Tomo 6 , Montevideo, 
1986), pp. 93.
183 See Appendix 20 for data and sources.
184 Calculated with data from the 'Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay', Direccion General de 
Estadististica, 1932, p. 106. Prices based on bovine animals dispatched on the main market of Montevideo (La Tablada).
185 See Appendix 22 for data and sources.
186 Calculated with data from Liceaga, J., Las Carnes en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 50.
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Although cattle prices decreased in 1917, they were still higher than in the pre-war years 
in nominal t$rms.
4.3.2 Fri2orificos Increase Their Margins Generating Temporary Cattle Producer 
Dissatisfaction
The cattle price decline was unjustified, given that prices in London were increasing. 
Although part of the difference can be accounted for in higher transport and insurance 
costs, due to the large war risk involved in transatlantic shipping, the sharply higher 
London prices and clearly lower River Plate prices in 1917, suggests that meat packers 
benefited from extremely high earnings in this period. Indeed, the British and Argentine 
Meat Company reported a strong net profit of £445,513 in 1917 and paid total dividends
1 87of 121/2% on ordinary- and 8 / 2% on preference- shares. Similarly, the Sansinena 
Frozen Meat Company achieved exceptionally high profits of $3,464,223 (Argentinian 
Gold Pesos) and paid dividends of 50% (10% in cash and 40% in shares) per ordinary 
share and 6 % on preference shares. 188 Likewise, the balance that stood on the credit of 
the profit and loss account of the Smithfield and Argentine Meat Company was 
£124,354 in 1917 and a 5% dividend bonus was paid bringing the total dividend for the 
year to 15%.189
As regularly increasing cattle prices had created strong expectations in the River Plate, 
the 1917 temporary decline generated discontent among cattle producers and concerns 
were voiced by the Argentinian and Uruguayan governments. The dissatisfaction was 
further heightened due to the indignation of fatteners, given that the war effort 
demanded frozen and canned meat, which replaced chilled beef as the main frigorifico
187 British and Argentine Meat Company, Report of the Directors and Statement of Account. Year ending 31 December 1917 
(London, 1918).
188 Compania Sansinena de Carnes Congeladas (Sansinena Frozen Meat Company), Report of the Directors and Statements of 
Account. Year ending 31 December 1917. presented to the Twentv-Sixth General Meetings (Buenos Aires, 1918).
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export products during the First World War. Most importantly, the superior blood stock 
that fatteners had developed since the entrance of the U.S. meat packing houses for 
chilled beef exports, commanded a very low premium relative to inferior cattle during 
the war. Indeed, demand for premium animals declined, given that thin traditional cattle 
were preferred for canned or conserved meat. Although packers could not be held 
responsible for the type of meat demanded in Europe, they were criticised for the 
extremely high profits that they attained in 1915-1917, which were not just achieved 
through higher meat prices in the U.K., but also through margin gains at the expense of 
River Plate cattle producers. In Argentina, a number of discontent cattle producers put 
forward a plan for the expropriation of meat packing plants by the government, that 
would be financed through a bond issue subscribed by cattle producers, while the 
government asked frigorificos to explain the reasons for the low cattle prices and to 
suggest any action that could be taken to revert their decline.190 Similarly in Uruguay, 
the lower prices already in 1916, created dissatisfaction among cattle producers. This 
led to the denunciation of the meat trust by the pro-rural Blanco party due to alleged 
unfair treatment facing the Frigorifica Uruguaya, owned by the Argentinian Sansinena 
company.191 However, as cattle prices increased in 1918, thereby continuing their rising 
trend, complaints from cattle producers and policy makers quickly receded, while 
expropriation plans and trust denunciations faded away. At the same time, cattle 
producers continued to expand their output and increase their land holdings, driven by 
expectations of persistent strong growth and higher prices. Cattle prices continued to 
rise until the end of the First World War, thereby encouraging further investments by 
cattle producers. This boosted land prices as can be seen in table 4.3 on the next page.
189 Smithfield and Argentine Meat Company, Report of the Directors and Statement of Account, Year ending 31 December, 
1917 (London, 1918).
190 Hanson, S., Argentine Meat and the British Market (Stanford University Press, California, 1937), p. 205.
,91 Finch, H., A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (The MacMillan Press, London, 1981), p. 137.
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Table 4.3: Nominal Land Prices in Argentina 1901-1918
Period Average Argentinian 







Source: Calculated with figures of total rural real estate transactions in Argentina as well as total sales of land in 
hectares and value in Tomquist, E., The Economic Development of the Argentine Republic in the Last Fifty 
Years (Ernesto Tomquist & Co., Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 240.
4.3.3 Widespread Ramifications of the First World W ar on the River Plate 
Meat Packing Industry
Overall the First World War was a period of prosperity for both the meat packing plants
and cattle producers. Prices increased dramatically, driven by demand from the allied
troops. Frigorificos enlarged their capital, while they increased their shareholder value
by paying out handsome dividends as well as through sharply appreciating share prices.
After a very profitable 1916-18 period, meat packers continued to benefit from excellent
results in 1919. Specifically, the British and Argentine Meat Company reported profits
of £589,668 in 1919 and paid total dividends of \2Vi% on ordinary- and 8V2% on
preference- shares.192 Likewise, the Sansinena Frozen Meat Company's profits reached
almost 3 million Argentinian Gold Pesos (about £600,000) in 1919, while paying a
dividend of $20 gold (about £4) per share on ordinary shares and 6% on preference
192 British and Argentine Meat Company, Report of the Directors and Statement of Account. Year ending 31 December 1919 
(London, 1918).
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shares. 193 The Union Cold Storage Company (Vestey) continued its rapid global 
expansion, increasing earnings from £350,108 in 1918 to £368,586 in 1919 and to 
£539,110 in 1920, while paying dividends of 6 %,7% and 10% per share type each 
year.194 In 1919-20 the Union Cold Storage Company acquired the Blue Star Line, 
thereby controlling one of the largest shipping fleets with refrigeration capacity in the 
1920s, consisting of fifteen steamers.195 This enabled the company to integrate vertically 
its meat production and distribution activities further and continue creating greater 
economies of scale and scope.
Cattle producers also achieved high profitability, due to the sharp increase in cattle 
prices as well as higher volumes. For example, one of the large landowners, namely the 
Argentine Land and Investment Company showed a balance of £98,843 in the profit and 
loss account for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920 and paid high dividends of 20% on 
ordinary- and 10% on preference- shares for the year.196 However, all types of cattle 
producers enjoyed prosperity, even small breeders, given that meat packers purchased 
every kind of animal at high prices. Thus continued breed improvement was temporarily 
discouraged and postponed, while the extremely high prices and volume gains until 
1920, also averted major conflicts between meat packers and cattle producers. 
Additionally, the extremely high profitability achieved by frigorificos fostered a 
temporary cessation of the rivalry between the Anglo-Argentinian and American meat 
packers.
193 Sansinena Frozen Meat Company, Report of the Directors and Statement of Account. Year ending 31 December 1919. 
presented to the Twenty-Eighth General Meeting (Buenos Aires, 1920).
194 The Union Cold Storage Company, Report of the Proceedings 1922. presented to the Twenty-Sixth General Meeting 
(London, 1923).
195 The Union Cold Storage Company, Report o f the Proceedings 1918. Twenty-Second General Meeting (London, 1919).
196 The Argentine Land and Investment Company was one of the few Argentine landowners to be quoted in London. Data 
from its Report of the Directors and Statement of Accounts. Year ending 30 June 1920 (London 1920).
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4.4 Price Collapse and the Revaluation of Expectations in the Post First World 
War Recession (1920-1923)
After the First World War the demand for meat and cattle products collapsed, thereby
putting extreme downward pressure on prices. Specifically, cattle and byproduct prices
declined sharply, while the volume of exports decreased. This downturn was traceable
to a post-war recession in Europe, driven by a significant drop in consumer purchasing
power in the period right after the war, as the economy shifted back to peacetime
activities. Additionally, during the war the U.K. had accumulated large quantities of
frozen and canned meat stocks, which further reduced the requirement of imported
meat.197 As a consequence of the large stocks and suppressed post-war demand, prices
declined, only recuperating somewhat to pre-war levels in the mid-1920s. Indeed, cattle
prices tumbled in the early 1920s, more than halving in Uruguay, with an 1922-1923
index of 48 vs. the 1920 all time high average year, while in Argentina they indexed 53
in 1922-1923 vs. the 1919 record average year. 198 During the First World War the lack
of European meat supply as well as strengthened demand due to the war effort, had
boosted prices of meat in the mid- to late- 1910s to extremely high and hence
unsustainable levels. In the fervour of the First World War boom, the exceedingly high
prices had generated over-optimistic expectations with local cattle producers of never-
ending growth. Although the expectations proved to be unrealistic, they were
understandable, given that meat exports in volume and value had grown consistently
from the 1890s until the end of the First World War, albeit with volatility, while
nominal prices increased regularly and achieved exceptionally high levels during the
war. Thus when prices dropped sharply after 1920, due to the post-war recession, cattle
197 Ruano Fournier, A., Estudio Economico de la Produccion de las Carnes del Rio de la Plata (Pena y Cia Impresores, 
Montevideo, 1936), p .164.
198 Calculated with sources from 'Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay1, Direccion General de 
Estadististica, 1932, p. 106 for Uruguay and Liceaga, J., Las Cames en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos 
Aires, 1952), p. 50 for Argentina.
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producers were highly dissatisfied, creating the conditions for severe conflicts thereafter 
with meat packing plants and among each other.
As had occurred on previous occasions when animal prices declined, cattle producers 
appealed to the government for support, primarily through the Rural Society/Federation. 
However, the different circumstances of fatteners and breeders created friction between 
the two factions within the Rural Society/Federation. Indeed, fatteners were generally 
larger, risk-adverse landowners, which as a whole had greater capital reserves than the 
often smaller and more speculative breeders. Therefore, fatteners were better prepared to 
survive the crisis than breeders, who were primarily the small and medium size 
landowners. Breeders were the most affected by the post-war recession because they had 
extended their holdings, rented new land and increased their operating costs during the 
export peak war period. 199 In contrast, fatteners generally did not pay rent, while their 
operating costs had not increased and even if the prices of frigorificos were lower, it 
often just meant that their earnings would decline, but they would not face major 
economic hardship or bankruptcy.200 The desperation that indebted breeders faced, 
following the enormous price decline in the early 1920s, led them to demand state 
intervention against frigorificos. Fatteners proceeded more cautiously, given that they 
had developed a good relationship with frigorificos, while often obtaining above market 
prices for their quality cattle, which the meat packers purchased directly at their 
estancias. Although some frigorificos continued to be profitable during the crisis, 
overall their earnings had declined substantially due to the fall in prices. Sansinena 
Frozen Meat Company's profits fell from around $3,000,000 (Argentinian Gold Pesos)
199 Nahum, B., La Epoca Battlista 1905-1929 (Historia Uruguaya, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Tomo 6 , Montevideo, 
1986), p. 118.
200 Ibid.
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in 1917 and 1919 to $790,343 gold in 1922, while dividends decreased from 50% in 
1917 and $20 gold in 1919 to $ 6  gold per ordinary share, although the preference 
dividend remained at 6% .201 The Smithfield and Argentine Meat Company reported a 
trading profit of £118,036 for the 1922 year, but due to a negative balance of £356,625 
carried forward from 1921, which reflected adverse trading conditions, a debit balance 
of £234,589 remained in 1922, resulting in the cancellation of the dividend for the 
year.202 Whereas the Union Cold Storage Company reported higher earnings of 
£685,617 in 1922, this still represented a deceleration of its growth rate, given that 1922 
earnings only rose 6.1% vs. 1921, while they had increased 19.9% in 1921 when 
compared with 1920 and 46.3% in 1920 vs. 19 1 9 .203 For perspective, the Union Cold 
Storage Company acquired several large meat distributors in the U.K. and purchased the 
British and Argentine Meat Company in 1923, thereby continuing its global expansion, 
while contributing to the further concentration of the meat packing industry in the River 
Plate.204 This proved to be a shrewd strategy, given that the acquisitions took place 
when prices were low and the market was starting to recover. Moreover, the Union Cold 
Storage Company also managed to maintain its profitability, due to the increasing 
economies of scale and scope it had attained through vertical and horizontal expansion, 
primarily via acquisitions.
The demand for action against frigorificos was an attempt by some cattle producers to 
obtain a larger percentage of total net earnings attained in the entire international meat 
production and distribution chain. Thus the debate about the profit margins of
201 Sansinena Frozen Meat Company, Report of the Directors and Statement of Account. Year ending 31 December 1922. 
presented to the Thirtv-First General Meeting (Buenos Aires, 1923).
202 Smithfield and Argentine Meat Company, Report of the Directors and Statement of Account. Year ending 31 December 
1922 (London, 1923).
203 The Union Cold Storage Company, Report of the Proceedings 1922. presented to the Twentv-Sixth General Meeting 
(London, 1923).
204 The Union Cold Storage Company, Memorandum to Shareholders (London, 3 July 1923).
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frigorificos resurfaced, mainly through strong protest by breeders. The post-First World 
War slump marked an important turning point, given that it represented the most severe 
fall in prices since the late nineteenth century and hence a clear discontinuity of the 
constantly augmenting trend in the value of cattle. As the post-war downturn persisted 
in 1922, the calls for government intervention increased. Indeed, the post-war recession 
continued into 1923, despite minor improvements in cattle prices, as reported for 
Uruguay in The Economist:
"The report for 1922 ... shows that Uruguay's recovery from the post-war depression is delayed
by the lessened European demand for meat, which is her staple export ... The economic
conditions are sound, however, and the country will respond to any improvements in the
purchasing power of Europe. The only remedies yet actually adopted are the suspension of the
export duties on meat and cattle, and the organisation of the export of cattle to Spain ... The
slump has further lessened the demand for European pedigree stock, which fell off during the
205war because inferior animals were good enough for bully beef.' "
The slow recovery increased the severe dissatisfaction of cattle producers, which led to a 
significant increase in the number of landowners requesting action against meat 
packers, while only a small group of fatteners remained in favour of the status quo. Both 
the Argentinian and Uruguayan government enacted laws that attempted to counter­
balance the power of the meat packing plants and increase the profitability of cattle 
producers. In Uruguay, various policies were debated in 1923 which encompassed, 
among others, anti-trust bills and the establishment of a semi-public Uruguayan meat 
packing plant, namely the Frigorifico Nacional, with the objective to increase 
competition and thereby compel foreign frigorificos to increase prices offered for 
cattle. However, the law regarding the foundation of the Frigorifico Nacional was 
only authorised in 1928, after prolonged deliberation and significant lobbying from 
private frigorificos.
205 The Economist. London, Vol. XCVI, No. 4163, June 9,1923, p. 1293
206 Finch, H., A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (The MacMillan Press, London, 1981), p. 136-137.
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Importantly, the Argentinian government went a step further in trying to rapidly 
influence cattle prices and control meat packers margins by introducing several laws. 
Firstly, similar to the Uruguayan case, an Argentinian 1923 bill approved the acquisition 
or building of a national meat packing plant. Secondly and most importantly, in 1923 a 
minimum price law was introduced, which fixed cattle live-weight prices. Frigorificos 
were strongly opposed to the law, yet it was enacted in October 1923. Pricing was one 
of the components of supply control and therefore one of the tools to coordinate the 
flows of meat. Thus, the response of the frigorificos was to close down their plants and
907stop purchasing cattle from the day in which minimum price buying started. For 
perspective, the law tested the ability of the Argentinian government to take radical 
legislation against frigorificos in order to improve cattle prices. But the attempt failed 
given that Argentina was highly reliant on the large frigorificos for the export and 
distribution of meat and also by-products. Indeed, as meat packers did not resume cattle 
purchases, the government was forced to abandon the minimum price scheme three 
weeks after it had been enacted.208 The ordeal represented an enormous triumph for the 
frigorificos, while clearly demonstrating the limitations of domestic policy in enacting 
extreme measures against large foreign meat packers.
Although in 1924 cattle prices improved, as European demand for meat recovered, they 
did not reach the nominal war time levels in the mid 1920s, as can be seen in chart 4.3 
on the next page. In real terms the decline was even more drastic and the recovery more 
moderate. Nevertheless, the augmenting prices reduced the discontent of cattle 
producers and thus diminished the conflict with frigorificos.
207 The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 1664, October 26,1923, p. 971.
208 The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 1666, November 9,1923, pp. 1089-1097.
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Sources: 'Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay', Direccion General de Estadististica, 1932, p. 106 
for Uruguay and Liceaga, J., Las Carnes en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 50 and 
106 for Argentina. Uruguayan nominal prices based on bovine animals dispatched on the main market of Montevideo 
(La Tablada), while Argentinian nominal prices based on bovine animals dispatched on the main market of Buenos 
Aires (Liniers) in 1913-1923 and price of cattle bought in estancias in 1924-1930.
The post First World War recession was characterised by a drastic decline in cattle and 
meat prices, after reaching extremely high levels during the war. Although the post-war 
price collapse was primarily due to a significant reduction in demand triggered by a 
recession in Great Britain, the downturn affected cattle producers more than meat 
packers, given that the latter increased their margins at the expense of cattle producers, 
in an attempt to maintain overall profitability. From the early twentieth century until 
1920, cattle prices had grown consistently, albeit with volatility. Thus the decline at first 
caused severe dissatisfaction among cattle producers due to: (i) declining meat prices in 
the main U.K. market, (ii) an even greater reduction in prices for cattle producers due to
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higher frigorifico margins and (iii) the need for a severe revaluation of expectations after 
two decades of a rising trend in cattle prices. The revaluation of expectations seems to 
have occurred, given that cattle producers’ discontent and conflicts with frigorificos 
declined after a slight recovery in prices in the mid-1920s.
4.5 The Volume Record and Value Decline in Meat Exports (1924-1930)
After 1924 the export volume continued to grow, reaching all time high levels in the late 
1920s. Although cattle prices improved in 1924 behind stronger European demand and 
increased significantly in 1925 due to a renewed price war among frigorificos, they did 
not recapture their war time levels. Although in 1925 the pool was dissolved again and a 
price war followed which resulted in higher prices, the value per ton was still 
significantly lower than in the late 1910s. Thus a decline in the value of meat exports 
was apparent in the 1920s, given that nominal prices per ton decreased substantially. In 
real terms the prices were even lower. This reduced the attractiveness of meat, 
especially beef, after the early 1920s. Nevertheless, the value shortfall was partly offset 
by higher volume. Yet despite the significant increase in the export volume, the total 
export value was still lower in the mid- to late- 1920s than in the late 1910s, as can be 
seen in chart 4.4.
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One of the main factors that led to the decrease in the value per ton was the decline in 
British demand. Another element which had a significant negative impact on the volume 
and value of River Plate meat exports was a change in international trade regimes, 
starting, albeit gradually in the 1920s and consolidating in the 1930s, as will be analysed 
in chapter 5. However, in the 1920s, one of the principal contributors to the decrease in 
the value of exports was the British economic decline. Given that the U.K. was the main
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export market, any changes in the demand for meat in Britain, had a direct impact on the 
River Plate meat packing industry.
The U.K. market was declining, albeit slowly, while the purchasing power of British 
consumers was decreasing, as total economic activity receded. The deterioration of the 
British economy, that had an important impact on meat prices, was traceable to the 
downturn of industrial production in the U.K., given that Britain was failing to maintain 
industrial leadership, which was increasingly being taken over by the U.S.A. Although 
Britain was overtaken by the U.S.A. in per capita income terms in 1913, the Americans 
were already ahead in manufacturing labour productivity since 1875, while by the 1920s 
the U.S. output per worker as well as total factor productivity were more than double 
that of Britain and capital per worker indexed 173 vs. the U.K .209 Indeed, the British 
decline had already started, albeit slowly in the late nineteenth century, while the 
interwar period represented a significant second phase in the long term economic 
downturn of the U.K .210 Most importantly, the British economic upswing after the 
severe post-war recession in 1921-22 was feeble and unstable, while it was disrupted by 
numerous shocks, including the general strike in 1926 and the related coal walkout 
which lasted over half a year, thereby reverting the upswing, while industrial production 
declined by 5% .211 The industrial action in 1926 had a highly negative impact on the 
U.K. economy, which combined with the already weak recovery of the post-war
209 Edgerton, D.E.H., Science. Technology and the British Industrial 'Decline' 1870-1970 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1996), pp. 48-51.
210 Extensive literature exists on the British economic decline, including numerous works by D.H. Aldcroft, N.F.R. Crafts and 
D. Edgerton. A. Gamble has identified three main phases of the British decline, namely (i) 1880-1914, (ii) between the two 
wars and (iii) after 1945 in Britain in Decline (MacMillan, London, 1990), pp. 4-6 and 10-19. Additional contributions 
include Kirby, M.W., The Decline of British Economic Power since 1870 (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1981), in 
particular the chapter on the 1920s, pp. 24-56, Dintenfass, M., The Decline of Industrial Britain. 1870-1980 (Routledge, 
London, 1932), pp. 4-11, Heim, C.E., 'Interwar Responses to Regional Decline' in Elbaum, B. and Lazonick, W., The 
Decline of the British Economy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), pp. 240-265, that analyses various industries, while 
assessing the narrow range and regionalisation of export businesses in the U.K.
211 Richardson, H.W., 'The Role of Consumption in Interwar Fluctuations' in Aldcroft, D.H. and Fearon, P., British Economic 
Fluctuations 1790-1939 (Macmillan Press, London, 1972), pp. 161-162.
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recession and export sluggishness, led to an overall reduction in British purchasing 
power in the 1920s, as expressed by the British Minister in Buenos Aires:
"... that the British consumer is not the handful of rich people but the British working man; that,
if the British working man is out of job and earning no money, he must reduce his purchases of
meat and other food stuffs. The unhappy coal strike has proved abundantly what I said, which
was surely obvious. Including families, we now have five and six millions of people who have
had to reduce their standard of living. The result has been a glutted market and a fall in prices
... If the British' working man in large numbers remains indefinitely out of work the prices of
Argentine produce must fall and the prosperity and purchasing capacity of this country
212correspondingly diminish."
Although the U.K. recovered moderately in 1927 and a short period of increased 
economic activity followed, the early entrance of Argentina and Uruguay into the Great 
Depression reduced the effect of the British upswing in 1928-29. Moreover, the British 
repayment of the large foreign debt accumulated during the First World War, primarily 
to the U.S.A., represented a large financial burden, especially because German full 
reparation payments failed to materialise. Given that the overwhelming majority of 
River Plate meat was exported to the U.K., the decline in British purchasing power 
proved detrimental to the value of River Plate meat exports starting in the 1920s. 
Specifically, the reduction in purchasing power increased the elasticity of demand of 
meat in the U.K., while pushing the price equilibrium point lower, thereby decreasing its 
value.
4.5.1 The Battle for Leadershipin a Reorganised Competitive Environment: 
Renewed Price Wars and Consolidation of the Ownership Structure
After the First World War, a clear shift of power took place in the meat packing
industry. The battle for control and increased economies of scale and scope, was not
212 Sir Malcolm Robertson, British Minister, address to the British Chamber of Commerce Annual General Meeting on 17 
November 1926, The British Chamber of Commerce Monthly Journal. 'The Annual General Meeting', The British 
Chamber of Commerce in the Argentine Republic, Buenos Aires, Vol. VII, No.2, 26 November 1926, pp. 25-26.
213 During the First World War the U.K. accumulated a foreign debt of more than £1,300 millions, mainly from the United 
States. This was due to the high expenditure required for the war effort. For perspective, before 1914 the Government was 
spending about 8% of the national income, however during the height of the war it took around half of the total output of
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occurring anymore between the American and the Anglo-Argentinian meat packing 
plants, but rather among the large and small frigorificos. Specifically, the rise and very 
important expansion of the Union Cold Storage Company, a large British meat packing 
plant, counterbalanced the strength of the U.S. frigorificos. Indeed, the Union Cold 
Storage Company had grown significantly since the war. It operated numerous meat 
packing plants in South America, Australia and New Zealand, controlled a large 
proportion of cold storage and wholesale facilities in Britain and owned an enormous 
chain of 2353 retail butchers.214 The Union Cold Storage company (Vestey) became the 
world's largest and most comprehensive organisation in the combined meat production, 
shipping, distribution and retailing businesses. It was also the biggest shop company in 
the U.K. as well as the leading worldwide meat retailer.215 Moreover, it was active in 
cattle production, especially in Australia. The Union Cold Storage's earnings grew 
dramatically due to their spectacular global expansion, in particular after 1916, as can be 
seen in chart 4.5.
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Source: Reports o f Proceedings, The Union Cold Storage Company, London.
goods and services as explained in Feavearyear, Albert Sir, The Pound Sterling - A History of English Money (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1963), pp. 337-338 and 351.
214 Loosli, C. E., ’Brot- und Fleischpreise in Grossbritannien und der Versuch, angemessene Lebensmittelpreise 
durchzusetzen', Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv - Chronik und Archivalien. Kiel, 23. Band (1926 I), 1926, pp. 29-30.
215 The Union Cold Storage Company, Reports o f the Proceedings 1922 and 1925. presented to the Twenty-Sixth and Twenty- 
Ninth General Meetings (London, 1923 and 1926).
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Hence, the competitive microenvironment had changed substantially in the 1920s, given 
that the American frigorificos had to contend with a large and powerful British concern. 
Thus the aim of ultimate command of the industry by the American meat packers ceased 
to be a realistic proposition, due to the rise of a major British competitor, as explained 
by E.G. Jones:
"The large combine built up by the Vestey Brothers in the post-war period has deprived the 
Americans of any hope of ultimate success. But the rivalry between the companies continued to 
be intense."216
Indeed, the competition for leadership of the industry persisted, while the large meat 
packers gained export market shares and thus economies of scale at the expense of the 
smaller frigorificos. In Argentina and Uruguay, where the Union Cold Storage acquired 
the Uruguayan Liebig plant and transformed it into a frigorifico, the battle continued 
mainly between the British giant and the U.S. meat packing plants. The 1925 price war 
started because both Vestey and the American meat packers, in particular Swift, wanted 
a larger export share than agreed by the pool members. Vestey and Swift were building 
new plants and were demanding a larger export allocation to accommodate their 
expanded production capacity.217 They wanted to operate at their ‘minimum efficient 
scale’ and achieve a high ‘throughput’ for their new plants. In particular, the Vestey's 
group Union Cold Storage new frigorifico was considered one of the largest and most
7 1 0
advanced meat packing plants in the world. The result of the price war, which lasted
until 1927, was the elimination of marginal frigorificos. Specifically, the English and
01 0Dutch Company stopped production and closed down their frigorifico plant in 1925. 
Moreover, the Sansinena Company ceased exporting during the price war period and
216 Jones, E. G., 'The Argentine Refrigerated Meat Industry*, Economica. London, No. 26, June 1929, pp. 170-171.
217 The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 1739, April 3, 1925, p. 38 and The Times. London, January 21,1925, p. 
13, col. 1-2.
218 The Times. London, March 16,1927, p. 15, col. 5.
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closed its Uruguayan plant, thus concentrating mainly on the local Argentinian 
market.220 Although Sansinena resumed meat exports after 1927, it did so through the 
Smithfield & Argentine Company, which agreed to become their agent in Britain. In 
addition, in 1927 the management control of the River Plate British and Continental 
Meat Company was given to one of the large American frigorificos, namely Armour and 
Company.221 Hence, the new pool agreement reached in 1927 benefited the large meat 
packing plants, while reducing the participation of the smaller ones considerably and in 
particular the Argentinian frigorificos?22 Thus the ownership structure of the River 
Plate meat packing industry concentrated further. In Argentina, five main organisations 
prevailed in 1927, namely Swift, Armour, Wilson, Vestey and the alliance between 
Sansinena and the Smithfield & Argentine Company.223 In Uruguay, the concentration 
was even more pronounced, with three frigorificos, Swift, Armour and Vestey, 
controlling the meat export market. This led to the establishment of a Uruguayan state 
run meat packing plant in 1928, namely the Frigorifico Nacional. It was installed in the 
unused Sansinena plant, which had originally been the Frigorifica Uruguaya. 
Importantly, the Frigorifico Nacional not only competed in the export market, but also
00  Awas given the monopoly of the meat supply for the city of Montevideo. Its overall aim
219 The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 1745, May 15,1925, p. 27-29.
220 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 113.
221 The Times. 'An Argentine Agreement1, London, July 17,1927, p. 22, col. 4.
222 There is some discrepancy with the figures of the 1927 pool agreement and different authors provide varying percentages 
of total exports allocated to the meat packing plants by nationality. Specifically, P. Smith maintains that the American 
frigorificos allocation was reduced to 54.9%, while the British increased to 35.1% and the Argentinian declined to 10% in 
Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 113. In contrast, J. Calvet claims that the 
American allocation was increased to 69.91% and the British and Argentinian decreased to 20.09% and 10% respectively 
in Calvet, J., Un Siglo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (Carbap, Buenos Aires, 1977), p.45. Similarly, J.C. Williman 
asserts that the U.S. share increased to 69.9%, while the British and Argentinian share declined to 25.2% and 8% 
respectively in Historia Economica del Uruguay (Vol. n, Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, 1994), p. 279. Finally, R. 
Puiggros affirms that the allocations for the U.S. and British meat packing plants were 69.901% and 20.099% respectively, 
but declined for the Argentinian frigorificos to 10% in Libre Empresa o Nacionalizacion en la Industria de la Came 
(Editorial Argumentos, Buenos Aires, 1957), p. 92. Thus from the figures provided we can deduce that the Argentinian 
frigorificos export share allocation decreased, while based on evidence given in the literature we can extrapolate that larger 
meat packing plants augmented their export share allocation. However, differences remain regarding the precise allocation 
for American and British frigorificos in the 1927 pool agreement.
223 Hanson, S., Argentine Meat and the British Market (Stanford University Press, California, 1937), p. 251.
224 Malagraba Elichiri, J.P., Mi Vida. 68  Afios Ininterrumpidos en la Industria 1925-1993 (Impresos Vanni, Montevideo, 
1994), p. 98.
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was to reduce the dominance of foreign frigorificos in the Uruguayan market and 
counter-balance the power of concentration of the U.S. meat packing plants and Vestey, 
thereby ensuring higher prices and margins for producers.225
The reestablishment of the pool agreement in 1927 was received with dissatisfaction by 
cattle producers. Nevertheless, important protests and conflicts did not occur, due to the 
cattle producers' overall concern with the declining export market for meat. Indeed, in 
the mid- to late- 1920s, increasing market access restrictions were reducing the 
international market for River Plate meat exports. The U.S.A. banned meat imports 
from the River Plate and continental European countries were rapidly adopting 
protectionist policies. By the late 1920s, the River Plate became even more dependent 
on the British market for meat exports. This represented the beginning of a shift in trade 
regimes, moving away from 'free' market trade policies and towards bilateralism and 
control, as will be analysed in chapter 5.226 In the early 1930s the important U.K. market 
also placed restrictions on River Plate meat exports. Specifically, after the Ottawa 
Conference in 1932, in which Britain agreed to given preference to the Dominions, 
particularly Australia and New Zealand, strict quotas were placed on the River Plate 
meat exports to the U.K .227
4.6 Fighting for Greater Domestic Participation and Cooperative Frieorificosi A 
Response to the New Trade Regime and the Meat Packers Consolidated 
Oligopoly (1930-40)
The quotas imposed in the Ottawa Conference had strong implications for meat packers 
and cattle producers. Animals stocks were high and production capacity reflected the
225 Nahum, B., La Epoca Battlista 1905-1929 (Historia Uruguaya, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Tomo 6 , Montevideo, 
1986), p. 118.
226 See chapter 5 for a comprehensive analysis of the impact of changing international trade regimes on the River Plate meat 
packing industry and the domestic policy response.
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high volume 'throughput' of the 1920s. Given that international demand was limited by 
export quotas and cattle supply outstripped the export 'allowance', meat and animal 
prices declined even further. In addition, the slackened demand in the main British 
market, particularly in the early 1930s following the Great Depression, had already 
placed significant downward pressure on meat prices in the U.K.
Though both meat packers and cattle producers were at risk, the latter stood to lose the 
most, given that packers tended to pass the price decline onto cattle producers, while 
attempting to keep their profit in line with previous years. As can be seen in table 4.4, 
cattle producer profit declined strongly in the early 1930s, while meat packing houses 
increased their margins, in an attempt to maintain their profit value. Therefore, cattle 
producers were anxious to increase their profits by expanding exports and reducing meat 
packers earnings.
Table 4.4 - Profits of Major Ranches and Packing Houses, 1929-1934







Source: Smith, P.H., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, London, 1969), p. 142.
227 For a full examination of protectionist measures and their effect on River Plate meat exports, see chapter 5.
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The reduction in exports after the Great Depression, in addition to the quotas imposed 
following the Ottawa Conference, and the decline in margins, led to profound cattle 
producers discontent. They called upon the Rural Society and the government to take 
steps to increase the quotas or as a minimum secure that the quotas remained at the 
levels designated in the Ottawa conference. With this end in mind, the Argentinian 
government started negotiations with the U.K. The outcome was an accord known as the 
Roca-Runciman pact, in which Britain broadly agreed to maintain the quotas stipulated 
in the Ottawa conference agreement. The accords reached in the Roca-Runciman pact 
relating to meat export quotas were also applicable to Uruguay. Two resolutions of the 
Roca-Runciman pact had a significant impact on the modification of the ownership and 
market structure of the River Plate meat packing industry. Firstly, the pact formalised 
British control over the export quota allocation. Secondly, it stipulated that 15% of the 
export quota would be allocated to Argentinian frigorificos.
Already through the Ottawa Conference agreement the British gained direct control of 
the River Plate meat export quotas. Indeed, the U.K. Board of Trade began 
administrating British meat import licences.228 In the Roca-Runciman pact the British 
control was endorsed, given that the Argentinian government agreed with the U.K.'s 
licence administration. By constricting River Plate meat exports, the British government 
was apparently damaging the business of the U.K. meat packing plants in Argentina and 
Uruguay. However, the British frigorificos also had operations in the Dominions, where 
they were confronted with less competition from the U.S. meat packers. Indeed, the 
British frigorificos were more concerned that another River Plate meat war would break
228 "Licencias de Importation al Reino Unido" Anales de la Sociedad Rural Argentina. No. 10, October 1940, Buenos Aires, 
p. 785.
229 Gravil, R., The Anglo-Argentine Connection. 1900-1939 (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1985), p. 186.
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out in the 1930s, which would reduce their profitability and long-term market share. 
Through the firm control of import licences by the U.K. a further meat war was 
adverted, given that the U.S. meat packers could not increase their meat import shares in
• ' I ' J A
Britain, even if they would augment cattle purchases in the River Plate. Thus, 
through bilateralism and control in the 1930s, the British managed to prevent further 
business in-roads from the American frigorificos, while maximising the profitability of 
the U.K. meat packing houses. The Ottawa conference had institutionalised the meat 
packing pool and given the supply control to the U.K. Board of Trade. However, the 
River Plate cattle producers welcomed competition among frigorificos and preferred 
meat wars, as they led to higher cattle prices. Hence, they were concerned that the strict 
quotas, combined with the British control of import licenses that encouraged stability 
and a truce among frigorificos, would place strong downward pressure on cattle prices.
Although the Roca-Runciman agreement in 1933 represented a threshold in the 
government’s efforts to reverse the downturn of the Great Depression and to limit 
further losses in the meat sector, pressure from cattle producers to find a solution to the 
crisis had already started in 1931. Specifically, the Rural Society urged the government 
to take action and recommended the introduction of a comprehensive legislative 
programme for the sector. The Society insisted that all cattle producers, both fatteners 
and breeders, were suffering from the reduction in meat exports, which combined with 
the increasing margins of meat packers had generated a slump in cattle prices. Their aim 
was to ensure that the government would take measures to protect cattle producers from 
price and margin pressure offrigorificos. For this purpose the Rural Society produced a 
livestock defence plan, in which it recommended the introduction of a National Meat
230 ibid.
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Board and the formation of a cooperative frigorifico. This led to the passing of a law 
(No. 11747) in 1933 establishing both institutions.232 The legislation became to be 
known as the 'meat law' (ley de carnes) and its goal was to safeguard cattle producers 
from the low margins imposed by the meat packers. However, both projects were 
shelved shortly thereafter after the frigorificos closed their plants in protest. The 
objective of the National Meat Board was to regulate the market, while the aim of the 
cooperative meat packing house, which became the Corporacion Argentina de 
Productores de Carnes (CAP), was to increase cattle prices, especially for breeders, and 
thereby reduce the overall meat packers margins. The CAP was financed through the 
obligatory contribution of 1 Vi% of cattle producer's sales, of which 80% was for the 
CAP and 20% for the National Meat Board.234 Moreover, the 11747 law also 
established the creation of the National frigorifico for Buenos Aires. Although the ley de 
carnes was passed in 1933, the debates about the establishment of a national meat 
packing plant had already taken place in 1923, when a law was passed for its creation, 
combined with a minimum price law. As in the early 1920s, the large frigorificos were 
strongly opposed to the ley de carnes and presented their position to the Argentinian 
Congress in 1933, through a report that primarily highlighted the negative aspects of a 
cooperative meat packing house.235 The British Chamber of Commerce highlighted one 
of the arguments of the frigorificos:
"The old established meat concerns which are now collectively handling practically the whole 
of the country's meat export trade, have argued that the withdrawal from them of the 15 per
cent of the United Kingdom quota would impair the efficiency of their international marketing
■ ..236organisation.
231 "Ejecucion del Plan Organico de Defensa Ganadera", Sociedad Rural Argentina - Boletin de Divulgation. Buenos Aires, 
1932, pp. 5-13 and 20-37.
232 Anales de la Sociedad Rural Areentina. No. 11, November 1933, Buenos Aires, pp. 471-642.
233 See section 4.4 for a full analysis of the 1923 national frigorifico  and minimum prices law.
234 Carreras de las, A., Leeislacion v Politica de Carnes (Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, Buenos Aires, 
1989), p. 11.
235 "Nueva Ley de Cames - Presentacion de las Empresas Frigorificas ante el Congreso de la Nacion", Report to the 
Argentinian Senate, Buenos Aires, 6 September 1933.
236 "The Beef Export Trade", The British Chamber of Commerce Monthly Journal. Vol. XIII, No. 13, October 31,1933, p. 16.
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The large meat packing houses were primarily afraid of the upward pressure that 
cooperative frigorificos could place on cattle prices, which would have translated into a 
reduction of their margins. In addition, they feared being increasingly displaced by the 
national meat packing house for the supply of the domestic market, just as had occurred 
in Uruguay. Indeed, in Uruguay the Frigorifico Nacional was operational since 1929 and
'y'in
had the meat supply monopoly for the city of Montevideo. Thus, the repercussions of 
the Ottawa Conference and the Roca-Runciman agreement led mainly to the passing of 
a 'promotion of cattle production' law (fomento ganadero - Nr. 8858), with the aim to 
improve the quality of meat, which would enable Uruguay to be more competitive, 
within the assigned export quotas.
The CAP was foreseen in the Roca-Runciman pact. Specifically, the agreement 
stipulated that the quota negotiated for national frigorificos, namely the 15% of meat 
exports to the U.K., would be covered by the CAP.239 Nevertheless, the net quota for the 
CAP was 11%, given that two of the Argentinian meat packing plants already had an 
allotment of 4%. However, during the initial three years of the duration of the Roca- 
Runciman agreement, the CAP did not operate and the 11% quota was given to foreign 
meat packing plants.240 The lobbying in Congress by foreign frigorificos and their 
alliance with fatteners seemed to have paid off, given that the CAP quota was divided 
among themselves. This was strongly debated in the Argentinian Congress and was one 
of the elements that led to the intervention of Lisandro de la Torre as well as to the meat
237 Ruano Fournier, A., Estudio Economico de la Produccion de las Carnes del Rio de la Plata (Pena y Cia, Montevideo, 
1936), p. 186.
238 Mufloz Duran, R., "El Mercado de Carnes del Rio de la Plata", Banco de la Renublica Oriental del Uruguay. Montevideo, 
1966, p. 82.
239 Torres, G., "Funcion Social de la Ley de Carnes", Conference Proceedings, Colegio Libre de Estudios Superiores, 16 July 
1940, p. 29.
240 Calvet, J., Un Siglo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (Carbap, Buenos Aires, 1977), p. 50.
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packing plants investigations in the mid-1930s.241 Indeed, the Argentinian Congress as 
well as a joint Anglo-Argentinian governmental commission launched separate 
enquiries into the practices of frigorificos, amidst allegations of transfer pricing, over­
invoicing and profit concealment, in addition to discriminatory cattle pricing policies 
that favoured a confined group of large fatteners at the expense of smaller producers and 
breeders. The fierce debates in Parliament were led by Lisandro de la Torre, the 
representative of Santa Fe, a cattle producer and stringent defender of breeder interests. 
Whereas the dispute concentrated on the practices of frigorificos, in particular on their 
cattle pricing policy and high profit margins, the continuing decline of meat exports also 
played a role in the dissatisfaction of cattle producers. Indeed, in the 1920s the decline 
in cattle prices was partly offset by higher export volumes and a price war. In the early 
1930s, the Ottawa conference had reduced and fixed the export volume, while the 
British control of import licenses deterred price wars. Thus, cattle producers focused 
their discontent on the meat packing plants practices, while trying to increase their 
margins through higher cattle prices.
The Argentinian government persuaded the British authorities to organise a joint 
enquiry into the meat packing industry, as had been stipulated in the Roca-Runciman 
agreement. However, they were quickly faced with one main obstacle, the reluctancy of 
the meat packing plants to show their accounts. The British insisted that the 
Argentinian government did not have the right to force the meat packing plants to show 
their books, thereby creating enormous friction between the two governments.243 
Confronted with the inability of the Argentinian government to investigate the
241 Ibid.
242 Drosdoff, D., El Gobiemo de las Vacas n933-19561 Tratado Roca-Runciman (Ediciones La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1972), 
p. 51.
243 Ibid.
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frigorificos, the Senate started their own enquiry in 1934. This led to the much 
publicised and passionate debate de las e a r n e s t  The Senate investigation had the main 
purpose of determining the profitability of frigorificos and finding out the difference 
between the cattle prices obtained in Argentina and meat prices abroad, among other 
objectives, which included differences with Australian cattle prices.245 For this purpose 
it sent state accountants to examine the books of the large frigorificos. The Senate 
investigation committee had difficulty in obtaining the accounts from the meat packing 
plants, in particular from the frigorificos Anglo, Armour, La Blanca and Wilson.246 
However, the main incident that marked the investigations was the arrest of Mr. Richard 
Tootell, the president of the Frigorifico Anglo (Vestey). Specifically, Tootell denied 
investigators access to Anglo's books and insisted that they had been sent abroad, 
leading to his arrest. Anglo's books were later found in Argentina on board of a ship, the 
Norman Star, packed in disguised corned beef boxes, ready for shipment abroad.247 
Indeed, the accounts were being transported to Anglo's Fray Bentos plant in Uruguay, 
presumably to avoid auditing of the investigative commission. The outcome of the 
investigation, which included the books of Frigorifico Anglo found on the ship as well 
as other accounts handed over by other meat packers after the incident was compelling. 
Specifically, the findings highlighted the meat packers high profits, which 'were 
considerable and sometimes exuberant'.248 In addition, the findings highlighted the lack 
of transparency in the meat packers accounting methods, which often concealed costs
244 Roca J.A., Eduardo Roca (Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Intemacionales, Imprenta de los Buenos Ayres, Buenos 
Aires, 1995), p.67.
245 Olariaga de, N., El Ruralismo Areentino - Economia Ganadera (Editorial El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 1943), p. 239.
246 Puiggros, R., Libre Empresa o Nacionalizacion en la Industria de la Came (Editorial Argumentos, Buenos Aires, 1957), p.
147.
247 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 172.
248 Drosdoff, D., El Gobiemo de las Vacas (1933-1956) Tratado Roca-Runciman (Ediciones La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1972),
p. 65.
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through over-/under-invoicing techniques.249 Moreover, the frigorificos were also 
criticised for manipulating the classification of meats to their advantage.
De la Torre took the findings a step further and attacked the government, while accusing 
them of being an ally and protector of foreign meat packing plants as well as large 
fatteners, at the expense of breeders. In his conclusions, de la Torre also criticised the 
foreign meat packing plants for their monopolistic practices and vertical integration that 
allowed them to control prices. Furthermore, he insisted that the CAP should obtain 
the 15% quota provided for it in the Roca-Runciman agreement. The debate became 
more heated over time until its tragic ending on the 23 July 1935, when a Senator, Dr. 
Enzo Bordabehere, who was in the party of de la Torre and a close friend, was shot dead 
in the Senate. The Review of the River Plate described the episode as follows:
"The caustic debate on the Senate's meat trade investigation had a tragic interruption on
Tuesday when a Senator-elect was shot dead, a deputy wounded in the abdomen and the
Minister of Agriculture, Ing. Luis Duhau, painfully injured as the sequel to an extraordinary
bitter passage of words between Senator De la Torre and the Minister of Finance, Dr. Federico
Pinedo. It would appear that the Senator for Santa Fe accused the Finance Minister of
"insolence and cowardice" and that in the subsequent disturbance Ing. Duhau knocked Sr. De la
Torre off his feet, falling also himself in the act. The senator elect for the Province of Santa Fe,
Dr. Enzo Bordabehere, as a personal friend and party colleague o f Senator De la Torre hurried
to the scene of the scuffle when one of the spectators who, as a result of the overflow in the
visitors' gallery, was in the body of the house, opened fire with a revolver. Ramon Valdez Cora,
the individual accused of firing the shots, is a former police commissary, and it is related that
he approached the scene of the disturbance and took deliberate aim. The result was that Dr.
Bordabehere fell mortally wounded ... Dr. Mancini, a National Deputy, was wounded in the
251abdomen... Ing. Duhau was wounded in the hand by one of the bullets ...
But as if  this unprecedented tragedy in the Senate would not have been enough, the 
Argentinian Minister of Finance, Dr. Federico Pinedo challenged de la Torre to a duel,
249 Torre de la. L., Las Cames Areentinas v el Monopolio Extraniero (Artes Graficas, Buenos Aires, 1947), pp. 171-173.
250 Puiggros, R., Libre Emnresa o Nacionalizacion en la Industria de la Came (Editorial Argumentos, Buenos Aires, 1957), p. 
150-151.
251 "Shooting in the Senate", The Review of the River Plate. Volume LXXVIV, No. 2276, July 26,1935, p. 7.
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as a result of the accusations of "insolence and cowardice". They met on the morning of 
the 25 July 1935, both fired at a distance, but neither was hurt.252
With the death of Bordabehere and the subsequent Pinedo - De la Torre 'duel', the 
passionate debate de las carnes was brought to an end. Although the discussion initiated 
by de la Torre in the Senate did not translate into immediate results, it had an effect 
shortly after the end of the debate. Indeed, de la Torres' main goals: (a) to transfer the 
11% remaining of the quota assigned to Argentinian frigorificos to the CAP, (b) 
augment cattle prices while reducing the premium to fatteners and (c) increase the 
control of foreign meat packers, were achieved within a year of the conclusion of the 
debate. Specifically, differences between cattle prices in the main market of Liniers and 
prices paid for direct purchases from estancias narrowed after 1935, as can be seen in 
chart 4.6. Thus the premium paid to fatteners by buying directly from their estancias 
was reduced and even reverted, thereby benefiting breeders and small fatteners.
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Source: "Mercados y Precios del Ganado Vacuno", Banco Ganadero Argentino. Servicio de Investigaciones Economicas, 
Talleres Graficos Platt, Buenos Aires, 1966, Table 21, p. 57.
252 "Duel", The Review of the River Plate. Volume LXXVIV, No. 2276, July 26, 1935, p. 19.
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The increase in overall cattle prices and the rapid equalisation of the main market 
(Liniers) and estancia prices can be attributed to the start of operations of the CAP. 
Specifically, the CAP subcontracted its 11% quota (out of the 15% for Argentinian 
frigorificos) to the Sansinena and Smithfield & Argentine frigorificos, in order to enable 
the CAP to start trading immediately.253 The CAP transformed itself into one of 
Argentina's biggest cattle purchasers and also helped expand the market and augment 
animal prices.254 By the end of 1935, The Economist reported:
"The rise in meat prices during October (1935) is remarkable. The market value o f exports for
255the first ten months of 1935 is the highest obtained since 1929 ..."
The market was also helped by droughts in Australia, which placed upward pressure on 
prices, combined with the early British recovery from the Great Depression.
4.6.1 The Findings of the Joint Committee: Corroborating the De La Torre 
Debates
In late 1938, the report of the joint Anglo-Argentinian committee for the investigation of 
the River Plate meat trade was released. The report recognised that the meat business 
was fully dominated by a frigorifico pool that controlled cattle purchasing until the start 
of operations of the CAP. In addition, meat packers benefited from enormous profits, 
which were difficult to calculate or account for, due to the frigorifico's intrinsic transfer 
pricing and over-invoicing accounting techniques.
The committee indicated that the CAP represented the means to counterbalance the 
power of the large meat packers and reduce their strong profits, while ensuring higher
253 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 197.
254 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 198.
255 The Economist. Vol. CXXI, No. 4815, December 7,1935, p. 1127.
256 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 209.
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prices for cattle producers.257 The Economist reported the committee's findings as 
follows:
"Half a dozen private concerns (meat packing houses), which are so jealous of their rights to
conduct their operations with freedom and secrecy that they have refused to co-operate in this
inquiry which was set up for public purposes by the two Governments. In the circumstances,
the Committee can only present partial evidence for their conclusion that though profits of the
companies vary from year to year, there have been several years in which they have taken
advantage of the Argentine's producer's poor competitive position without passing on to the
British consumer any of the reduction in price thus exacted. It is, indeed, necessary for the
companies 'to realise that their opportunity to continue must be conditional on their being able
to satisfy the Governments in both countries that in their operations they are rendering service
of public value at no more than reasonable charge'; and the Committee recommends, as a first
step, the compulsory institution of a standardised form of accounts in which the companies
258shall make returns to the two Governments."
Finally, the Committee also recognised that fatteners were in a better position than 
breeders, due to the higher prices paid to large fatteners for cattle bought directly on 
their estancias. In synthesis, the Anglo-Argentinian Committee arrived at the same 
conclusion as the Senate investigative commission, the Rural Society and the Minister 
of Agriculture.259
The conflict between breeders and fatteners continued in 1938 and 1939, when the ever 
stronger CARBAP, the federation of regional associations, requested that breeders have 
more control over the activities of the Meat Board and the CAP, through majority voting 
and increased benefit participation. In addition, they urged the government to construct a 
national meat packing plant for the CAP and recommended the regionalisation of the 
Meat Board. In 1939-40 a plan was put forward for the government to buy the 
Compania Sansinena and other smaller meat packers so that they could become
9 AOfrigorificos under direct control of the CAP. However, it was not until the 1940s that
257 ibid.
258 The Economist. Vol. CXXXDI, No.4965, October 22,1938, pp. 162-163.
259 Drosdoff, D., El Gobiemo de las Vacas ('1933-1956') Tratado Roca-Runciman (Ediciones La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1972),
p. 108.
260 "Examen de las Propuestas de Compra", Anales de la Sociedad Rural Argentina. No. 10, October 1940, Buenos Aires, p. 
788.
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major legislation was passed that responded to the demand of the breeders, in particular 
the functioning of CAP controlled frigorificos.
Overall, in the 1930s, the Ottawa Conference and the subsequent Roca-Runciman 
agreement placed and then maintained market access restrictions to the key U.K. export 
market for River Plate meat. Although the supply control was placed in the hands of the 
U.K. Board of Trade, the foreign meat packers were still able to benefit from the very 
large economies of scale and scope that they had obtained in the 1910-20s consolidation 
phase of the ownership structure. Indeed, by the late 1920s the industry was dominated 
by a small group of firms which had formed a strong oligopoly. Given that meat wars 
were adverted in the 1930s by the U.K Board of Trade control, foreign meat packers 
proceeded to maximise their profitability, while maintaining their high market share 
levels steady.
Additionally, the Roca-Runciman pact triggered the first dependency arguments in 
Argentina and Uruguay, stressing that the River Plate was too dependent on foreign 
countries for the provision of export earnings and the supply of manufactured goods. 
Furthermore, the price decline of export commodities and increased protectionism were 
flagged as key issues for future economic growth and the entire free market based 
economy was put into question. However, the dependency arguments died down 
quickly, due to the strong influence that large cattle producers had in government, as 
well as Argentina's and Uruguay's fast economic recovery from the Great Depression, 
and improvements in cattle and agricultural prices. Nevertheless, the dependency 
arguments resurfaced in the 1940s, which led to import substitution industrialisation 
policies.
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4.7 The Rise of Peron and I.S.I.: Repercussions on the Ownership Structure
(1940-55)
The Second World War brought significant prosperity to the River Plate. Both 
Argentina and Uruguay benefited from strong agricultural and meat exports, at high 
prices, to war stricken Europe. Given that manufactured products were difficult to 
acquire during the war, and meat as well as agricultural prices were high, large reserves 
were accumulated. These significant reserves were instrumental in financing the 
succeeding import substitution industrialisation policy (ISI), which was increasingly 
vocalised in the early 1940s and fully implemented by the Peron administration after the 
war.
The large incomes obtained during the war enabled the governments of Argentina and
Uruguay to implement a subsidised pricing programme, while the CAP obtained
increasingly more funds to expand their group of meat packing plants. Subsidies were
introduced that guaranteed uniform cattle prices for producers, fixed at a minimum level
and financed through a compensation fund, in which frigorificos had to pay a fixed sum
1for every ton of exported meat. As a result of the subsidies as well as gradually 
increasing meat prices in the early 1940s, cattle producers also obtain higher prices for 
their animals. Similarly, in Uruguay a subsidy was paid to the meat packing houses and 
base cattle prices were fixed. During the war the CAP started operating an ever 
increasing number of their own meat packing plants. In 1941 the CAP bought numerous 
provincial frigorificos, which provided cattle producers with regional cooperative meat 
packing plants.
261 "Examen de las Propuestas de Compra", Anales de la Sociedad Rural Argentina. No. 10, October 1940, Buenos Aires, p. 
198.
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By the end of the Second World War, the Peron administration introduced a fully 
fledged ISI policy. Peron's import substitution industrialisation policy was not only 
financed through the reserves accumulated during the Second World War, in addition 
surplus was extracted from the agricultural and livestock sectors. As the reserves dried 
up in the early 1950s, Peron sought to obtain more funds from the livestock sector, by 
not only controlling the export trade, but also through direct state intervention. Thus in 
1950 the Argentinian government took state control a step further and through a new 
law (13.991) started intervening directly in the meat packing and cattle production 
industries. The National Meat Board became the Instituto Ganadero Argentino, which 
had the power to establish meat packing companies and trade in cattle. Taxes were also 
increased to cover the augmenting costs of state participation. The extreme intervention 
and tax increases of 3% of cattle sales, led to strong discontent of cattle producers and 
drastic conflicts with and within the government.264 In addition to state intervention, 
cattle producers suffered a severe drought in 1949-51, which left the industry in a 
serious crisis and with minimal cattle stock.265 This increased the dissatisfaction further 
and brought about heightened confrontations. In 1952, amidst strongly declining cattle 
production, cattle producer’s outrage and a tightening of fiscal discipline of the Peron 
administration after years of mismanagement and overspending, led to a moderate 
decline in government intervention. Although a 10% levy for 'agricultural research' was 
added to the 3% tax by the government in 1952, the National Meat Board 
responsibilities were transferred to the Secretary of Agriculture, thereby reducing the 
dissatisfaction of cattle producers. In 1954, the National Meat Board was transferred to
262 Bernhard, G., Comercio de Carnes en el Uruguay (Editores Aguilar e Irazabal, Montevideo, 1958), pp. 36-37.
263 Liceaga, J.V., Las Carnes en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 196.
264 Carreras de las, A., Legislacion v Politica de Carnes (Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, Buenos Aires, 
1989), p. 13.
265 Calvet, J., Un Sielo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (CARBAP, Buenos Aires, !977, p. 60.
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the Ministry of Commerce together with the Trade Promotion Institute external trade 
responsibilities.266
The long term implications of the ISI policy were profound, given that there was little 
incentive left to produce cattle, as margin declines in the livestock sector led to more 
profitable agricultural production. In addition, the export of meat was deterred by 
extremely high duties, unpropitious intervened exchange rates and governmental 
control. The ISI policy did not consider the long-term effect of 'over-extracting' surplus 
from the export sector. Although the extreme ISI policy is attributable to the fear of 
renewed trade restrictions after the Second World War, combined with inability to 
obtain industrial goods during the war, the policy was taken to an extreme. It was an 
over-reaction to the market access restrictions in the 1930s. The policy had a strong 
negative effect on the River Plate meat packing industry in the long term. Plant and 
equipment at the meat packing plants was mostly outdated and investment in the 
frigorificos was minimal. The 'over-extraction' of surplus from the export sector, did 
not allow cattle producers nor meat packers to obtain adequate returns to continue 
investing in the sector. It was often unremunerative to operate in the legitimate meat 
sector for cattle producers and meat packers. Through state intervention the profitability 
of the meat sector was depressed further, while it led to an escalation in inefficiency and 
bureaucracy.
4.7.1 Confusion and Contradictory Policies in Uruguay
The Uruguayan government changed their meat trade policy considerably in 1948, as a 
result of price differentials between meat exports to the U.K., which had been
266 Carreras de las, A., Legislation v Politica de Cames (Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, Buenos Aires,
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determined through large exporting contracts, and other international markets. Indeed, a 
livestock compensation fund was introduced, the fondo de compensacion.es ganaderas, 
by which cattle prices were fixed at the higher international market price, while beef 
prices for domestic consumption increased in order to pay for the difference. Given 
that the Frigorifico Nacional had the monopoly for the supply of the city of Montevideo, 
large private meat packers faced losses when exporting to the U.K. Thus, they were 
subsidised for British exports. However, instead of taking the difference between the 
international and the U.K. meat price, the subsidy was determined by the declared losses 
of the private frigorificos. These varied between meat packers, due to their different 
distribution systems and labour relations, as well as disparities in efficiency and 
productivity. Moreover, it was in the best interest offrigorificos to overstate their losses 
in order to maximise their subsidies. Indeed, all private frigorificos declared higher 
losses than the Frigorifico Nacional, which became the benchmark, while the Frigorifico 
Anglo (Vestey) had a significantly larger difference, supposedly due to longer travel 
distances and high transhipment costs.268 The decline in international meat prices in 
1949 and higher labour cost, represented major burdens for the livestock compensation
96Qfund, given that subsidies continued to be based on declared frigorifico losses. This 
led to the abolishment of the livestock compensation fund in 1950, although the system 
of subsidies continued until 1953.270
Uruguayan meat exports followed a similar trend than those from Argentina, as can be 
seen in appendixes 29 and 30. However, the system of subsidies seemed to have 
reversed the declining trend in Uruguayan meat exports temporarily in 1948-53,
1989), p. 13.
267 Bernhard, G., Comercio de Cames en el Uruguay (Editores Aguilar e Irazabal, Montevideo, 1958), pp. 44-47.
268 Finch, H., A Political Economy of Uruguay Since 1870 (The MacMillan Press, London, 1981), p. 144.
269 Ibid.
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although demand generated by the Korean war also played an important role. After the
7 7 1Second World War Uruguay started an import substitution industrialisation policy. 
However, it was a more moderate and gradual process than in Argentina. Nevertheless, 
the program relied partly on the surplus of the livestock and agricultural sector to 
support the industrialisation process. This was achieved through a system of 
differentiating exchange rates, taxation and trade controls. In addition, the Uruguayan 
working classes experienced strong real income growth after the war, driven by 
favourable labour legislation, in particular the creation of salary councils in the early 
1940s.272 The increase in overall purchasing power led to stronger meat consumption, 
which translated into a rise in the proportion of total production for the domestic market. 
After 1953 a severe shortage of cattle led to a decline in total meat production. Indeed, 
cattle stocks decreased significantly, due to highly attractive wheat prices, that 
encouraged a shift from livestock to cereal production. Thus an increasing amount of 
land was utilised for agriculture rather than for cattle production. Other factors also 
played a role in the shortage of cattle. To start with, a number of meat slaughtering 
houses opened on the border with Montevideo, thereby competing not just in the 
retailing of meat with the Frigorifico Nacional, who had the monopoly for the city, but 
also as wholesalers which supplied the city butchers with meat, within the 'black' 
market.274 Additionally, higher prices in Brazil, encouraged cattle on the hoof 
smuggling across the border. By the mid-1950s Uruguayan meat packing houses were 
operating with severe overcapacity and had enormous difficulty in maintaining a 
profitable business. Overall, Uruguay had confusing and contradictory policies, which
270 Ibid, p. 145.
271 Caetano, G., Rilla J., Historia Contemporanea del Uruguay (Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, 1994), p. 174.
272 Ibid, p. 163.
273 Mufloz Duran, R., "El Mercado de Carnes del Rio de la Plata", Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay. Montevideo, 
1966,p . 83.
274 Bernhard, G., Comercio de Carnes en el Uruguay (Editores Aguilar e Irazabal, Montevideo, 1958), p.148.
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tried to extract surplus from the meat sector to support ISI and at the same time 
subsidise meat packers and cattle producers, albeit with less than the total surplus 
extracted. The subsidies, controls and the monopoly granted for the city of Montevideo, 
created serious distortions in the meat sector, which in turn encouraged illegitimate 
cattle and meat trade, 'creative' accounting practices by packers, as well as disinvestment 
from livestock production to the more lucrative and less regulated agricultural sector.
4.8 Alternating Between State Intervention and Moderate Market Orientation: 
The Rise of the Nueva Industria Amidst a Schizophrenic Domestic Policy 
(1955-90)
4.8.1 The Uruguayan Ownership Structure: Finding the ‘Minimum Efficient 
Scale* Threshold in a Changing Policy Environment
In the mid-1950s, the River Plate meat packing industry was suffering from a lack of
cattle supply as well as a number of disincentives to invest in cattle production. Meat
packing plants were running with very high excess capacity and high labour costs, due
to large their large unionised workforce. In Uruguay, the continuous decline in cattle
supply for frigorificos, which were already operating with largely idle capacity, forced
the closure of all private frigorificos in Montevideo. Large foreign meat packers were
unable to reach ‘minimum efficient scale’ in their large plants because of their low
capacity utilisation and fixed costs. Thus, they did not manage to generate significant
economies of scale. As a result the Swift and Artigas companies stopped operating in
Uruguay in 1957, followed by Castro. The Review of the River Plate reported:
"The threatened closing down of the Artigas and Swift frigorificos in Uruguay became effective
on December 20 (1957) as a,result of labour troubles and insufficient cattle supplies ... but
apparently the latter will not involve any reduction in Uruguay's beef exporting capacity, since
the remaining packing plants are fully capable of dealing with the present reduced volume of
275shipments, and, indeed, should now operate on a more economic basis."
275 "Uruguayan 'Frigorificos' Close Down", The Review of the River Plate. Volume CXXII, No. 3312, December 31, 1957, p. 
24.
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As The Review of the River Plate indicated, the efficiency and profitability of 
frigorificos would have increased if excess capacity would have been reduced through 
the total closure of the American frigorificos and the Castro. However, in order to 
safeguard over 6000 jobs, the ownership of the former private frigorificos was 
transferred to the employees, under a new umbrella organisation called EFCSA 
(Establecimientos Frigorificos del Cerro S.A.).216 The only foreign frigorifico still 
operating in Uruguay was the Anglo (Vesteys) located in Fray Bentos, in the west of 
Uruguay. The industry thus continued operating at a very high cost.
In 1959 with a new Blanco government in power, traditionally a strong defender of
777cattle producer's interests, a new monetary and exchange reform law was passed. This 
legislation provided the basis for a more favourable exchange rate policy to encourage 
exports of agricultural and cattle products. An additional step taken by the government 
was to end the monopoly of the Frigorifico Nacional for the supply of the city of 
Montevideo. Nevertheless, authorised meat suppliers, the permisarios, officially still
7 7 8had to use the Frigorifico Nacional to slaughter their cattle. The Frigorifico Nacional 
suffered a severe decline in its Montevideo meat supply market share from 1958-64, due 
to the 'free' supply policy. Thereafter, the Frigorifico Nacional was once again given the 
supply monopoly for the city of Montevideo.279
Throughout the 1950-70s, the Frigorifico Nacional as well as the EFCSA plants 
remained highly inefficient, due to a combination of high personnel costs, idle capacity,
276 Mufioz Duran, R., "El Mercado de Carnes del Rio de la Plata", Banco de la Renublica Oriental del Uruguay. Montevideo, 
1966, p. 83.
277 Caetano, G., Rilla J., Historia Contemporanea del Uruguay (Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, 1994), p. 210.
278 Mufioz Duran, R., "Aspectos Basicos de la Industria de Carnes de Uruguay", Banco Central del Uruguay. Asesoria 
Economica y Estudios, Montevideo, 1974., pp. 42-43.
279 Finch, H., A Political Economy of Uruguay Since 1870 (The MacMillan Press, London, 1981), p. 148.
MODIFICATIONS IN THE OWNERSHIP STUCTURE AND THE GOVERNMENTS* RESPONSE 2 0 0
as a consequence of the lack of cattle supplies, and outdated machinery. In addition, the 
plants of the traditional large frigoriflcos were originally built in the early twentieth 
century to produce large quantities of chilled meat for export, which was now of 
secondary importance, rather than meat for the narrower domestic market. This led to 
the entrance of smaller, more efficient meat packers, some of which gradually became 
more sophisticated and started not only to produce for the local market, but also 
competing for the export business. The smaller frigoriflcos were privately owned and 
many progressively developed from local slaughterhouses around Montevideo, which 
often supplied the illegitimate market, to fully integrated refrigerated meat packing 
plants. They became to be known as the nueva industria (new industry), which were 
lured to the meat packing business by the advantageous tax and exchange rate policies 
that the frigoriflcos enjoyed. Indeed, the nueva industria benefited from legislation that
n Q A
was intended to make the high cost of the traditional frigoriflco industry profitable. 
Moreover, the nueva industria had a much lower cost base, due to their smaller plants, 
as well as less union pressure and thus reduced labour costs.281 Their lower fixed cost 
and capacity enabled them to achieve ‘minimum efficient scale’ at a low production 
threshold. They were also not constricted geographically and could set up their plant in 
the interior of the country, as well as purchase cattle in any region. Indeed, the nueva 
industria had more flexibility when purchasing cattle and they often paid higher prices 
for livestock. These competitive advantages enabled them to obtain large quantities of 
cattle for slaughter and thus gain business from the traditional large frigoriflcos, while 
increasing their economies of scale.
280 Calloia, F., "La Industria de la Came", Universidad de la Republica, Grupo Interdisciplinario, Institute) de Economia, 
March 1993, p. 7.
281 Ibid.
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However, until the mid-1960s, the nueva industria was highly fragmented. Although 
numerous slaughterhouses and frigoriflcos existed, it was necessary to "order the 
industrialisation and commercialisation of meats in order to safeguard the quality, 
healthiness and hygiene of meat exports." This led to the passing of a 'meat exporters 
registry' law in 1966. In order to be registered and thus participate in the export trade, a 
meat packing plant had to fulfil a number sanitary, manufacturing and legal conditions. 
Not only was this necessary to organise and control the industry, but the registry was 
also a means to ensure that new stringent international sanitary restrictions were met. 
Many of the meat packers of the nueva industria, which started production in the 1960s, 
quickly became leading Uruguayan meat exporters, including Frigoriflcos Canelones,
'S O T
Carrasco, Colonia and San Jacinto. In the 1960s and 1970s the nueva industria 
continued to increase their share of total slaughtering until they gained full control of the 
market in the late 1970s, as can be seen in table 4.5.
Table 4.5: % of Total Slaughters by Type of Frisorifico in Uruguay
Frigorifico Type 1953-57 1961 1970 1980
Traditional Frigoriflcos 100% 98% 33% 0%
Nueva Industria 0% 2% 67% 100%
Source: Calloia, F., "La Industria de la Came", Universidad de la Republica, Grupo Interdisciplinario, 
Instituto de Economia, March 1993, p. 8.
The traditional frigoriflcos continued to lose importance in the 1960-70s, as their 
efficiency kept declining. Indeed, their plants and equipment became even more 
obsolete, their production and management techniques were mostly outdated and they 
continued to retain a large expensive workforce. In addition, the nueva industria was
282 Mufloz Duran, R., "Aspectos Basicos de la Industria de Carnes de Uruguay", Banco Central del Uruguay. Asesoria 
Economica y Estudios, Montevideo, 1974., p. 47.
283 Interview with Dr. Barrios Mariezcurrena, Director, Frigorifico San Jacinto (Nirea), Montevideo, 2 April 1997.
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absorbing ever more cattle, which continued to be in low supply. The last remaining 
foreign traditional frigorifico in Uruguay, namely the Anglo (Vestey), was closed in
O A
1967 and the plant was first leased by the state and then expropriated. In 1969, the 
monopoly supply of the Frigorifico Nacional for the city of Montevideo was again taken 
away and the EFCSA was seized by the government after a long strike.
The Instituto Nacional de Came (INAC) was created in 1967 to organise the industry 
and export meat trade, as well as coordinate the domestic market. In 1970, a 
modernisation programme started with strong state support and special Interamerican 
Development Bank credits for the nueva industria. The objective of the programme 
was to improve the plant and machinery of the nueva industria further. However, the 
large investments left several frigorificosy many of which were already facing 
difficulties, in a delicate financial situation. This led to the intervention of the state in 
1971, in which the government took over the financial obligations of frigoriflcos and 
administered the price of livestock, while ensuring that payments were made to 
suppliers and wage-eamers.287 Through this intervention the state had indirect control of 
almost half of all frigorifico capacity in Uruguay. This law remained in place until 
1978, after which the industry was liberalised. In 1978 the Frigorifico Nacional was 
closed down by the state and the supply of meat was completely deregulated, including 
the city of Montevideo. Frigoriflcos that were in state hands were privatised and the 
state ceased interventions.
284 Finch, H., A Political Economy of Uruguay Since 1870 (The MacMillan Press, London, 1981), p. 149.
285 Mufloz Duran, R., "Aspectos Basicos de la Industria de Carnes de Uruguay", Banco Central del Urueuav. Asesoria
Economica y Estudios, Montevideo, 1974., p. 48.
286 Ibid, pp. 53-56.
287 Ibid, pp. 56-57.
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The deregulation of the industry had a profound effect on the meat packing industry. 
Cattle prices were set free and frigoriflcos were allowed to set up their plants in any part 
of the country without restrictions. In addition, the gradual, yet complete closure of 
the traditional frigoriflcos reduced the Uruguayan slaughtering capacity substantially. A
^OQ
segunda nueva industria (second new industry) emerged. Although many of 
frigoriflcos that started in the 1960s remained, albeit some with changed ownership, 
new meat packing plants were set up after the deregulation and many became important 
frigoriflcos, both for local supply and the export market. By the late 1970s many 
frigoriflcos had state of the art technology and adhered to stringent sanitary 
requirements. Despite improvements in technical and management methods, many 
frigoriflcos still faced financial hardship, which often led to ownership changes and 
significant restructuring.290 However, deregulation made the industry more efficient 
within an open market by the 1980s.
4.8.2 The Changes in Argentina’s Ownership Structure after the First Peron 
Government: Revised Capacity Requirements and the Growth of the 
Nueva Industria
In Argentina, the ousting of Peron in 1955 led to a new orientation of the meat trade. 
Indeed, in 1956 Argentina returned broadly to the original livestock defence law (11747) 
through a new law (8509). This legislation reestablished the National Meat Board, 
reintroduced private capital participation in the sector and reduced the cattle tax to 2.5%
9Q9(of which 60% was allocated for the CAP). Private capital participation was further 
encouraged in 1959, when the Frondizi administration decreed that the proportion of the
288 Calloia, F., "La Industria de la Came", Universidad de la Republica, Grupo Interdisciplinario, Institute) de Economia, 
March 1993, p. 8 .
289 Calloia, F., "La Industria de la Came", Universidad de la Republica, Grupo Interdisciplinario, Institute de Economia, 
March 1993, p. 8 .
290 Interview with Dr. Barrios Mariezcurrena, Director, Frigorifico San Jacinto (Nirea), Montevideo, 2 April 1997.
291 Calvet, J., Un Sielo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (CARBAP, Buenos Aires, 1977, p. 62.
MODIFICATIONS IN THE OWNERSHIP STUCTURE AND THE GOVERNMENTS’ RESPONSE 2 0 4
cattle tax allocated to the CAP, which by then had ten plants and was benefiting from 
the continuous flow of tax revenue, could only be used for investments in plant and
90^  • • •machinery. The aim of the law was to encourage renewed investments in large 
private frigoriflcos, who had been running their idle plants with only minimal capital 
expenditure, mainly for maintenance, since the outbreak of the Second World War. 
Investments were needed to adapt plants to stricter sanitary requirements as well as to 
improve production methods and enable new product manufacturing, such as cooked 
frozen meat. However, it continued to give the CAP a subsidy and thus an unfair 
advantage over other meat packers.
Despite the subsidies, numerous smaller frigoriflcos started to compete successfully 
with the CAP. Indeed, just as in Uruguay, the structure of the Argentinian meat packing 
industry changed significantly in the late 1950s and 1960s. The large traditional 
frigoriflcos were very inefficient, for similar reasons than in Uruguay, namely due to 
their large strongly unionised labour forces, lack of cattle supply and unused capacity.294 
They were unable to benefit from significant economies of scale, because they were not 
reaching ‘minimum efficiency scale’, due to overcapacity and high fixed costs. Thus, the 
nueva industria emerged, compromised of smaller frigoriflcos which were more 
efficient, from a technical, administrative and managerial point of view. The large 
traditional meat packers, which were not part of the CAP, had enormous difficulty in 
competing with the nueva industria. In addition to their 'operational' inefficiency, the 
large traditional frigoriflcos also had outdated and often obsolete equipment and plants.
292 Carreras de las, A., Leeislacion v Politica de Carnes (Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, Buenos Aires, 
1989), p. 13.
293 Ibid.
294 "Mercados y Precios del Ganado Vacuno", Banco Ganadero Areentino. Servicio de Investigaciones Economicas, Talleres 
Graficos Platt, Buenos Aires, 1966, pp. 37-38.
295 Ibid.
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Thus as the subsidy for large foreign frigoriflcos ceased between 1957 and 1959, they 
were primarily left with an unremunerative business.296 In the 1960s the nueva industria 
made increasing inroads into the traditional meat packers business until achieving 
leadership, as can be seen in chart 4.7.













1945-49 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74
^ T r a d i t i o n a l  Indust ry n N u e v a  Indus t r i a
Source: Calculated with data from Buxedas, M., La Industria Frigorifica en el Rio de la Plata (CLACSO, Buenos Aires, 1983), 
Table 52, p. 109. Does not include slaughterhouses producing for the domestic market.
In the 1960s, numerous traditional frigoriflcos closed, namely La Blanca in 1963 and 
Armour de La Plata in 1969. These frigoriflcos and Swift were taken over by DELTEC, 
an offshore holding company which was set up to proceed with an asset stripping 
operation.297 Most of DELTEC's production was gradually switched to Swift.298 The 
asset stripping exercise finished with the declared bankruptcy of Swift (DELTEC) in
296 Buxedas, M., La Industria Frigorifica en el Rio de la Plata (CLACSO, Buenos Aires, 1983), p. 108.
297 Buxedas, M., La Industria Frigorifica en el Rio de la Plata (CLACSO, Buenos Aires, 1983), p. 110.
298 Lozada, S.M., Swift. Deltec v Las Carnes Areentinas (Editorial El Coloquio, Buenos Aires, 1974), p. 54.
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1 9 7 1  299 ji^g represente(i the end of the era of large foreign meat packing plants, most 
of which had started operations in the early twentieth century, with very large, integrated 
and highly sophisticated frigoriflcos.300 Nevertheless, the Frigorifico Swift continued its 
operations through the intervention of the CAP and FASA, while the Frigorifico Wilson
-1A1
was sold, generating large deficits and then being taken over by the state.
The second Peron administration starting in 1973, proceeded to intervene in the meat 
packing industry. Once again the state was given the power to trade cattle, operate the 
industry and control foreign trade.302 The state administered the old Swift plant, FASA 
and the CAP, through which it achieved significant control of the industry. Overall, state 
intervention reduced meat production of the administered traditional plants even further, 
primarily due to poor administration and increased labour costs. In addition, due to the 
world oil crisis in 1973 international demand for meat declined significantly. These 
factors combined with domestic political turmoil had a negative impact on meat exports 
and cattle prices.
Starting in March 1976, under the military government in Argentina, the state controlled 
frigoriflcos were re-privatised, including Swift and FASA.303 In 1979 the CAP was 
dissolved and sold to the private sector through public auction, while cattle taxes were 
reduced, first to 1.5% and then to 1% of domestic cattle prices.304 This represented a 
major move away from interventionist policies and state administered frigoriflcos and 
towards private capital in the meat packing industry.
299 Ibid, pp. 12-42.
300 Chapter 3 analyses the emergence of frigoriflcos in the River Plate in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth- century.
301 Buxedas, M., La Industria Frigorifica en el Rio de la Plata (CLACSO, Buenos Aires, 1983), p. 110.
302 Carreras de las, A., Legislation v Politica de Cames (Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, Buenos Aires, 
1989), p. 14.
303 Buxedas, M., La Industria Frigorifica en el Rio de la Plata (CLACSO, Buenos Aires, 1983), p. 111.
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4.8.3 The Shift in the Ownership Structure. Policy Alternation and Variations in 
the Macro- /Micro-Environment: An Overall River Plate Perspective
From the mid-1950s until the 1980s Argentinian and Uruguayan domestic policy
alternated between state intervention and moderate market orientation. The frequent
shifts in policy orientation can be traced to persistent government changes, in particular
in Argentina, within an unsettled political environment driven by severe conflicts
between various interest groups. Employment and labour relations often played a more
important role than the efficiency of the meat packing industry. Despite the
schizophrenic domestic policy alternating between various degrees of moderate market
orientation to state intervention, the nueva industria managed to emerge in the 1960s
and grow substantially in 1960-70s, while quickly overtaking the traditional industry
and attaining a strong leadership position. Indeed, major changes occurred in the
structure of the industry in 1950-70 both in Argentina and Uruguay.
The deregulation in the late 1970s, facilitated the further development of the nueva 
industria in an freer economic environment. Although financial difficulties in the nueva 
industria were still evident in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the deregulation brought 
about significant increases in production efficiency, better technology, as well as 
improved manufacturing and management methods. By the 1980s the schizophrenic 
domestic policy of switching between state intervention and moderate market 
orientation had come to the end. The full deregulation of the industry allowed meat 
packers and cattle producers to operate efficiently, and in a sector driven primarily by 
market forces.
304 Carreras de las, A., Legislation v Politica de Carnes (Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, Buenos Aires, 
1989), p. 14.
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Modifications in the ownership structure of the meat packing industry in 1950-80 are 
traceable to numerous alterations in the macro- and micro-environment of firms, which 
in turn shaped the marketing mix and thus influenced the strategies of frigoriflcos.305 
The macroenvironment in the River Plate changed significantly after the Second World 
War, thereby discouraging investment in the traditional industry and leading to the 
closure of the large foreign meat packers, as well as to the rise of the nueva industria. 
Firstly, the political / legal environment became inward looking, while there was a shift 
in domestic policy from free market orientation towards restriction, regulation and 
intervention. In addition, unions and work councils encouraged by the governments 
became more powerful, while workers demanded higher salaries and better working 
conditions. Additionally, the international trade regime was closed even further, 
especially after the late-1950s, leaving a limited export market, as will be analysed in 
chapter 5. Secondly, the economic / demographic environment changed. The aim was to 
extract the surplus of the export sector, in particular agricultural and livestock 
production to support ISI policies, leading to higher taxation, exchange-rate differentials 
and direct state control over exports. As a result the legitimate market became highly 
unprofitable and thus an illegitimate trade emerged. This led to the rise of numerous 
slaughterhouses that developed into leaner and lower cost producing frigoriflcos, which 
became the nueva industria. Thirdly, the socio-cultural environment experienced an 
important transformation. As the proletariat gained more power and their purchasing 
capacity increased due to higher real wages, the local market for meat expanded 
dramatically. This combined with a limited export sector, due to surplus extraction and 
international market restrictions, forced frigoriflcos to concentrate more on the domestic 
market and less on exports, which was the traditional stronghold of the large foreign
305 See Section 4.1 for a detailed analysis of the marketing mix concept as well as an explanation of how changes in the
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meat packers. The technological / physical environment was affected, as large 
frigoriflcos did not have an incentive to invest in new technology, given that production 
for the local market required small and efficient packers rather than enormous plants 
primarily concentrating on exports. Large frigoriflcos also did not have an incentive to 
invest given that they were operating at low capacity and with poor profitability, while 
they had negative future expectations. Strict hygiene regulations also emerged, which 
combined with new export products, such as frozen cooked meat, required investment in 
plant and equipment. In addition, the physical environment changed, as unremunerative 
cattle production for the legitimate sector forced producers to sell on the grey market 
and increasingly concentrate on more profitable agricultural production.
On the microenvironmental front, there were too many suppliers for the domestic 
market, while the export market was restricted by numerous tariff barriers designed to 
extract surplus as well as maintain low legitimate domestic prices. Competition from the 
nueva industria was severe, due to their smaller size, lower labour costs and flexibility. 
In contrast, larger frigoriflcos were operating with enormous overheads, including 
expensive unionised labour. A new set of variables profoundly reshaped the marketing 
mix and thus the business and marketing strategy of meat packers. Large foreign 
frigoriflcos were particularly affected by the changes in the macro- and micro­
environment, which led to their withdrawal. In addition, many of the large traditional 
plants that remained were also gradually forced to cease operating. The nueva industria 
and especially the segunda nueva industria benefited from the modified macro- and 
micro-environmental factors, while utilising the reshaped marketing mix to formulate 
and implement a successful strategy.
macro- and micro-environment can shape the marketing mix and force shifts in company strategy.
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4.9 Renewed Foreign Capital Participation and Consolidation in the 1990s
Starting in the 1990s, the River Plate meat packing industry experienced a significant 
shift towards consolidation and renewed interest of foreign capital in the sector. This 
occurred first in Uruguay and since the mid-1990s also in Argentina. The main factors 
that led to the return of foreign capital participation in the industry as well as to greater 
consolidation were (i) the liberalisation policies enacted in the 1980-90s, (ii) the 
eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease, (iii) the creation of Mercosur which encouraged 
regional meat exports, and (iv) improvements in tax collection and regulatory 
enforcement. Uruguay implemented policies regarding these measures before Argentina 
and thus benefited from the rewards earlier. Indeed, Uruguay introduced a series of 
measures, including the legalisation of cattle on the hoof exports, a significant reduction 
in subsidised credits and a crackdown on tax evasion. As a result, numerous frigoriflcos 
were forced to close down, while some were temporarily taken over by the government 
and privatised soon thereafter. This reduced meat packers overcapacity significantly. In 
parallel, Uruguay managed to eradicate Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), after a 
widespread vaccination programme, thus allowing Uruguayan meat to be exported to 
countries in the non-FMD circuit.306 The eradication of FMD combined with the 
Uruguay Round (GATT) negotiations led to an important meat export quota for 
Uruguay in the U.S.A. Moreover, the formation of Mercosur fostered meat and cattle on 
the hoof exports to the regional market, in particular Brazil. Due to these developments, 
Uruguayan cattle producers, which for years had maintained and even reduced their 
cattle stock, started investing again in improved grazing fields and expanded their
^07herds. Cattle production increased, stock was replenished significantly and there were
306 For a full analysis of changing international trade regimes in the 1990s see chapter 5.
307 Some cattle producers started to use feedlots. Although the use of feedlots was growing in the mid-1990s, it represented a 
very small proportion of cattle sent to slaughter, especially in Uruguay. Productivity increases in cattle fattened per hectare 
were mainly due to improved grazing fields (praderas mejoradas).
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large gains in yields per hectare. Additionally, cattle producers reduced their stock 
turnaround, thereby supplying younger animals to frigoriflcos and maximising earnings 
per kilogram (carcass weight).
Importantly, the enlarged international market for Uruguayan meat, liberalisation 
policies and expectations of increased market access in the future, led to increasing 
interest by foreign capital in the industry. In Uruguay, three frigoriflcos were acquired 
by foreign meat packers. Specifically, Frigorifico Canelones was bought by the Chicago 
based firm 'Land 'O' Frost', the Frigorifico Colonia was purchased by the Argentinian 
Quickfood/Paty meat packer and the Frigorifico Montes was bought by a Chilean 
group.308 Despite these acquisitions and increasing foreign capital interest, in 1997 the 
meat packing industry was still overwhelmingly composed of family owned frigoriflcos, 
with primarily local capital, albeit with a smaller number of larger plants.
In the mid-1990s there was significant concentration among exporting meat packers in 
Uruguay, with 10 frigoriflcos accounting for over 80% of total meat exports.309 
However, this consolidation had not led to the establishment of pools or price fixing 
arrangements in the mid-1990s. Indeed, there were numerous obstacles that stood in the 
way of the formation of pools. To start with, the concentration of the industry had not 
reached oligopolistic proportions. It was difficult for frigoriflcos to agree on pricing and 
allocations, given that there were too many 'players and personalities' among competing 
firms. In addition, the concentration took place between exporting frigoriflcos that were 
authorised to export to the U.S.A. and / or the E.U. In the domestic and regional markets 
they faced strong competition from smaller frigoriflcos and slaughterhouses
308 Interview with Dr. Barrios M ariezcurrena, Director, Frigorifico San Jacinto (Nirea), M ontevideo, 2 April 1997.
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(mataderos), on top of cattle on the hoof exports, primarily to Brazil.310 Thus the market
^11remained very competitive and prices continued to be 'set by the market1. 
Nevertheless, in 1997 exporting frigoriflcos (E.U. / U.S.A. authorised) were gaining 
market share in the domestic and regional export markets. They benefited from higher 
meat prices in the E.U. and U.S. markets vs. lower domestic prices, and enjoyed larger 
economies of scale and scope. Indeed, they were better positioned to take advantage of 
by-products manufacturing and benefit from a reduction of cost per head slaughtered, 
providing that they could ensure a steady ‘throughput’. Additionally, the majority of 
exporting frigoriflcos had a well established domestic distribution system, in particular 
to supply the growing super- and hyper-market outlets. Despite these advantages the 
E.U./ U.S.A. exporting frigoriflcos were still unable to form pools in the mid-1990s due 
to the large number of plants operating in the market.
Frigoriflcos purchased most of their cattle directly from estancias, with or without 
consignatarios (middlemen), and often enjoyed a close relationship with certain 
fatteners. This was partly due to the sanitary regulations of the E.U., which did not allow 
purchases in cattle markets, in order to reduce the risk of the spread of diseases. In 
addition, frigoriflcos also tried to ensure a steady flow of inputs (cattle) in order to have 
adequate ‘throughput’. Despite their often good relationship with certain meat packers, 
producers were concerned about the consolidation of exporting frigoriflcos. In early 
1997, they strongly opposed a measure to allow frigoriflcos to trade a proportion of their
309 Data from Instituto Nacional de Carnes, Statistics, Montevideo, January / February 1997 vs. same period year ago.
310 Calloia, F., "La Industria de la Came", Universidad de la Republica, Grupo Interdisciplinario, Instituto de Economia, 
March 1993, p.24.
311 Interview with Dr. Barrios Mariezcurrena, Director, Frigorifico San Jacinto (Nirea), Montevideo, 2 April 1997.
312 This is the case in both Uruguay and Argentina. See Iriarte, I., "Comercializacion de Ganados y Cames", Camara 
Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, July 1995, pp. 52-53.
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export quotas among themselves.313 The meat packers argued that this would enable 
frigoriflcos to specialise in certain types of meat and cuts for specific export markets, 
and that they would therefore benefit from larger economies of scale and scope. In 
contrast, the producers were concerned that the concentration of export quotas would be 
used to put pressure on cattle prices. After some confrontations between meat packers 
and cattle producers, the National Meat Institute (INAC) approved the trading of export 
quotas among frigoriflcos, albeit with certain restrictions.314
In Argentina, foreign capital interest in meat packing and the consolidation of the 
industry began later than in Uruguay for two main reasons. Firstly, there was widespread 
tax evasion and it was only in 1996 that Argentina started a concerted effort to fight 
evasion by meat packers. Secondly, evidence of the eradication of FMD only emerged in 
the mid-1990s.
A major issue until mid-1996 was tax evasion in the Argentinian meat packing industry. 
Numerous plants were slaughtering most animals without trace - that is buying cattle, 
not declaring them and selling meat mainly in cash. Thereby the entire production and 
distribution chain avoided to pay VAT and other taxes, from the cattle producer to the 
frigorifico and even many butchers.315 Other frigoriflcos "rounded” the weight of 
animals downwards, in agreement with the producers, and thus declared a lower value
' W f kfor cattle purchased. These "roundings" reached very high proportions as a percentage 
of the total real weight. Controls by the tax authorities were often avoided through 
payoffs and sometimes by resorting to violence. Tax inspectors often faced 'physical'
313 El Pais. "INAC Autorizo Cesion de las Cuotas entre Frigoriflcos", Edicion Digital-Agro, 
http:\\www.diarioelpais.com\agro.htlm, Year II, No. 368, Thursday 20 March 1997.
314 Ibid.
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resistance from frigorifico employees that wanted to avoid layoffs due to plant
'i 1 n
shutdowns. Given the widespread tax evasion, frigoriflcos which operated according 
to the law often faced bankruptcy or as a minimum a significant reduction in 
profitability. "The black market is large. Tax evasion is disloyal competition."318 The 
complaints from legitimate frigoriflcos increased in 1996-97.
One of the largest tax evaders among meat packers was Jose Alberto Samid, which the 
tax authorities in mid-1996 accused of evading over US$ 88 million in taxes and being 
the head of an delinquent organisation that was set-up to keep 'fiscal resources' for 
themselves.319 However, despite the threats J.A. Samid had still not been cited to appear 
in court by mid-1997.320
In mid-1996, a series of measures were introduced by the Argentinian government to try 
to reduce tax evasion and end the blatantly disloyal competition among frigoriflcos. 
Specifically, the tax system was changed, whereby the tax burden was shifted from meat 
packers to cattle producers.
"Argentine Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo said changes in value-added tax on beef ... 
would wipe out tax evasion in the industry ... the burden of VAT collection now shifts from 
meat packers to cattlemen."321
The new laws were welcomed by cattle producers. "The president of Argentina's main 
lobby group (Rural Society) said (that) he supported the government's decision to shift
315 Iriarte, I., "Comercializacion de Ganados y Carnes", Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, July 1995, pp. 44- 
47.
316 Ibid, p. 47.
317 Iriarte, I., "Comercializacion de Ganados y Carnes", Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, July 1995, p. 47.
318 Interview with Luis Baumeule (nieto), Frigorifico Paty-Quickfood, Buenos Aires, 8 April 1997.
319 "Samid La Justicia es lo Mas Grande que Hay", La Nacion. 12 July 1997, section 5, p.6 .
320 Ibid.
321 Reuter News Service. Reuters Business Briefing, Buenos Aires, 21 May 1996.
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the burden of VAT collection from meat packers to cattlemen."322 To fight evasion and 
improve control, the government established a specialised office, the Oficina Nacional 
de Control Comercial Agropecuario in end-1996 with significant resources and political
323support.
By early 1997 the outlook for the industry in Argentina looked promising, given that the 
new export quota to the U.S.A. was approved, although shipments were only expected 
to start in end-1997. In addition, the government had taken measures to tackle tax 
evasion by meat packers, thereby reducing disloyal competition among frigoriflcos. 
Interest in the River Plate meat packing industry by foreign firms increased considerably 
and there were indications of heightened consolidation. Until then only one large 
frigorifico was in foreign hands, namely Swift, owned by the Campbell Soup 
Corporation of the U.S.A.324 In mid-1997 negotiations were taking place between U.S. 
meat packing firms and Argentinian frigoriflcos. Specifically, the acquisition of the 
Frigorifico Santa Elena by the American TMC Agroworld Corporation was 
imminent.325 In addition, Frigorifico Vizental & Co. was in talks with foreign and 
domestic companies, in order to negotiate a potential association or outright sale of the 
meat packing firm.326 The large domestic Macri Group was also considering the 
acquisition of Frigorifico Cocarsa in order to expand and diversify its food interests. 
Numerous other frigoriflcos were said to be in negotiations with foreign meat packers. 
Many frigoriflcos faced important financial constraints, especially in Argentina. Years
322 "Argentina: Argentine Farm Group Hails Meat Tax Change", Reuters News Service. Reuters Business Briefing, Buenos 
Aires, 21 Nay 1996.
323 La Nacion. 12 July 1997, section 7, p. 7.
324 Unilever (U.K.) also bought a brand of packed hamburgers, Goodmark, which was marketed primarily in the domestic 
market. However, Unilever did not acquire meat packing facilities. The production of the hamburgers was outsourced to an 
independent frigorifico.
325 La Nacion Line. "Hay Perspectivas de Nuevas Operaciones", Friday 20 June 1997, 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar\97\06\20\e04.htm.
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of battling against disloyal meat packers had placed a significant financial burden on 
legitimate frigoriflcos. Foreign meat packers interest can be traced to the poor financial 
state of many frigoriflcos, combined with a positive outlook for the industry, including 
expanded market access as well as significant possibilities to increase economies of 
scope and scale. Indeed, one of the ‘scale and scope’ opportunities was the export 
method of locally owned frigoriflcos, particularly when dealing with far away markets. 
In the mid-1990s most frigoriflcos exported meat on a FOB/CIF/CFR basis using a 
broker or trading house in foreign markets (i.e. an importing company or trading house 
in Germany and / or Holland for exports to the E.U.) Export prices had large 
fluctuations between contracts, trading houses and countries, even if they were operating 
in the same ’quota area' (i.e. E.U. or U.S.A.) and with equal or similar cuts. The trading 
companies acted as intermediaries and sold meat to other importers, wholesalers, super- 
and hyper- market chains as well as restaurants. Most of the time, the ’mark-up1 was not 
a fixed commission, but rather the highest possible price that the trading house could 
charge the next middleman, wholesaler, retailer or restaurant. Similarly, the trading 
house tried to obtain the lowest possible price from River Plate frigoriflcos. Since every 
intermediary placed a significant mark-up on the original export meat price, the 
frigoriflcos in Argentina or Uruguay were losing these major commissions. Frigoriflcos 
would have been able to increase their margins significantly if  they could have sold 
directly to super- and hyper-markets or restaurants in export markets.
Foreign meat packers could take advantage of ‘scale and scope’, because of their 
established distribution and marketing networks in their home markets (i.e. U.S. meat 
packers in the U.S.A.) Thus they could circumvent trading houses and middlemen. By
327 Interview with Dr. Barrios Mariezcurrena, Director, Frigorifico San Jacinto (Nirea), Montevideo, 2 April 1997.
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acquiring an Argentinian frigorifico, a U.S. meat packer could increase their profit 
margin to a much higher level than that of a locally owned frigorifico for exports to the 
U.S.A. One way around this for locally owned frigoriflcos would have been to open 
sales and marketing offices in key foreign markets that would import and sell directly to 
retailers or restaurants. But the cost of running such an office could be prohibitive 
unless the frigorifico could sell a very large volume in the foreign market. Hence, this 
was only an option for domestically owned frigoriflcos that could obtain a large share of 
the export quota for a country or region (i.e. E.U. /U.S.A.) In contrast, for a foreign meat 
packer (i.e. from the U.S.A.) any exports from a subsidiary in the River Plate to the 
U.S.A., represents additional volume on top of their domestic U.S. business. Therefore, 
foreign meat packers could take advantage of higher margins, even if the export volume 
from the River Plate was relatively small. River Plate frigoriflcos were not restricted so 
much by their slaughtering capacity, but rather by the quotas imposed for exports to the 
important E.U. / U.S.A. markets. In the regional markets, which did not have quotas for 
River Plate meat (principally Brazil and Chile), opening import and sales offices was a 
profitable proposition. Indeed, Quickfood / Frigorifico San Jacinto (Argentina) opened 
offices in Santiago de Chile and Sao Paulo (Brazil).328 Thus an acquisition of a 
frigorifico in the River Plate was a very good proposition for U.S. meat packers, given 
that they were able to take advantage of ‘scale and scope’, as long as they could obtain a 
sizeable share of the meat export tariff quota to the U.S.A.
In mid-1997 an acceleration of foreign joint ventures and acquisitions of Argentinian 
and Uruguayan frigoriflcos was taking place. The increased foreign capital participation 
and important acquisitions led to a new wave of consolidation of the River Plate meat
328 Interview with Luis Baumeule (nieto), Frigorifico Paty-Quickfood, Buenos Aires, 8 April 1997.
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packing industry. Cattle producers were concerned that just like in the 1900-30s period, 
this consolidation would reduce their bargaining power and lead to a reduction in prices.
"Carpab (Confederation de Asociaciones Rurales de Buenos Aires y  La Pampa) is concerned 
that ... the opening of new markets will not reach cattle producers equitably and fear that a 
concentration of the industry in the hands of strong external investors will leave producers
329unprotected."
Nevertheless, the cattle producers concerns did not result in any policy responses. 
Foreign investment and M&A activities in the River Plate meat packing industry were 
expected to continue. Therefore, a further concentration of meat exports among a 
reduced number of frigoriflcos seemed inevitable. As a result, a small number of meat 
packers, many of them with foreign capital participation, might be able to control a 
growing share of the export market and thus increase their bargaining power by the late 
1990s. Whether the consolidation of the industry would reach oligopolistic proportions, 
with frigoriflcos setting up pools, while putting strong pressure on cattle prices, 
remained to be seen. From a mid-1997 perspective, such an extreme scenario seemed 
unlikely in the short or medium term.
4.10 Conclusion
The ownership structure of the River Plate meat packing industry underwent important 
modifications from the late nineteenth century until the 1990s. To start with, foreign 
capital involvement beginning in the late nineteenth century had a profound effect on 
the ownership structure of the industry. As frigoriflcos displaced saladeros, the industry 
switched from local to largely foreign hands. The most notable change was the entrance 
of the large American meat packing companies in the early twentieth century. Indeed, 
the shift to foreign ownership intensified as U.S. meat packers started to invest heavily
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in the River Plate. The objective of the American meat packers was to achieve 
leadership and ultimately control of the River Plate meat packing industry, in order to 
maximise their ‘scale and scope’. To achieve this objective, they expanded their market 
share rapidly through price wars. Specifically, in the 1910s the U.S .frigoriflcos started a 
series of price wars by increasing cattle prices in the River Plate and reducing meat 
prices in the U.K. Through this expansive strategy they were able to obtain an ever 
increasing share of the meat export trade, at the expense of the Anglo-Argentinian 
frigoriflcos. The American meat packers wanted to attain ever greater economies of 
scale and scope, as well as sufficient ‘throughput’ for their large frigorifico plants that 
they were setting up in the River Plate. Importantly, the American meat packers had 
superior technology and knowhow than their Anglo-Argentinian counterparts, at least 
until the 1920s, in terms of improved production and management techniques. They had 
significant first mover advantages, which they acquired through their extensive 
experience in the large domestic U.S. market and their meat export business to the U.K. 
As such they were the first large scale producers and exporters chilled beef, while they 
continued the enlargement of by-products in the River Plate. The U.S. meat packers (i) 
enjoyed technological advantages, (ii) were more efficient, (iii) possessed better 
production and logistics knowhow, (iv) exported a larger range of quality products and 
thus benefited from larger economies of scope, and (v) gained from economies of scale 
generated by the significant increase in their export volume. However, they also had vast 
international resources at their disposal. They could draw funds from their strong U.S. 
businesses to invest heavily in the River Plate and finance expensive leadership battles. 
Indeed, their strong financial base enabled them to fund price wars and if necessary sell 
at or below costs. During price wars, U.S. meat packers in the River Plate were able to
329 La Nacion Line. "Hay Perspectivas de Nuevas Operaciones", Friday 20 June 1997,
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endure much lower margins and even a lack of profitability, while Anglo-Argentinian 
frigorificos often were forced to suffer severe losses. Therefore, the Anglo-Argentinian 
frigoriflcos were in a difficult position and needed support to counterbalance the strong 
technical and principally capital resources of the American meat packers. Although they 
requested assistance from the River Plate and U.K. governments in times of price wars, 
none offered significant support. Indeed, Britain was concerned that higher meat prices 
could trigger inflationary pressures in the U.K., while the Argentinian and Uruguayan 
governments, which defended the cattle producers interests, were content with cattle 
price increases during meat wars.
Price wars were resolved through pool arrangements, which divided meat export shares 
by frigorificos. Pool agreements were a cartel system, in that they confined the supply of 
River Plate meat by allocating refrigerated shipment space by frigorifico, thereby 
ensuring high meat prices in Britain. Most importantly, pools were a supply control 
system set-up by meat packers that clearly replaced the ‘invisible hand’ of market forces 
with the visible hand of management. Although the market generated the demand for 
meat, the meat packers took control of the supply (production and distribution). They 
not only arranged the shipment of meat to Europe, but also coordinated the purchases of 
cattle in the River Plate.
In periods of price wars, meat was dumped on the U.K. market, in particular during the 
1913 price war, consequently reducing meat prices in Britain and increasing cattle prices 
in the River Plate. In each renewed pool agreement, which followed an intense price 
war, the U.S. meat packers managed to obtain a larger share of meat exports. While the
http://www.lanacion.com.ar\97\06\20\e04.htm.
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American meat packers utilised meat wars to expand their share of the export market, 
the Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos resorted to pool agreements to "freeze" the advance 
of the U.S. competitors and regain profitability, at least temporarily. The Anglo- 
Argentinian resistance ensured that the Chicago trust would not obtain full control of the 
River Plate meat packing industry, while the pool agreements typified an oligopoly 
rather than a sole monopoly of the U.S .frigorificos.
The aggressive expansion of the American meat packers in the River Plate represented a 
defence strategy, given that their meat exports from North America to the key U.K. 
market were declining sharply and the opening of the meat trade to the U.S.A. was 
thought to be imminent in the late 1900s, whereas free access for imported meat was 
granted in 1913. The opening of the U.S. market exemplified a modification in the 
political / legal macroenvironment, while the reduction in cattle production in the 
U.S.A. depicted an amendment in the technological / physical macroenvironment. The 
American meat packing plants did not want to lose their lucrative export business to the 
U.K. market, as demand increasingly outstripped supply in the U.S.A., thereby severely 
constricting production for export. In addition, they planned to take advantage of the 
potentially growing River Plate meat exports to the U.S.A., while shielding it from their 
Anglo-Argentinian competitors. Therefore, the macroenvironmental changes 
encouraged the American meat packers to amend their marketing mix, especially their 
pricing strategy, resulting in intense price wars. As a result, the Anglo-Argentinian 
frigorificos were severely restricted and were unable to benefit from surplus resources of 
their River Plate and British operations.
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Rivalry among frigorificos contributed to the increasing centralisation of the River Plate 
meat packing industry, given that first saladeros and then smaller frigorificos could not 
compete with the large meat packers, in particular in times of meat wars. Thus saladeros 
and ’peripheral’ frigorificos were increasingly superseded and displaced by large meat 
packers. Indeed, saladeros and marginal frigorificos were often acquired by or merged 
with the larger frigorificos, while thereafter they were closed down or integrated, 
thereby further extending the centralisation of the industry. This consolidation enabled 
the large meat packers to expand their economies of scale and scope, while ensuring 
sufficient ‘throughput’ for their extensive plants. Through the concentration of the 
industry, via acquisitions offrigorificos and their subsequent integration or closure, the 
plants of the large meat packers managed to operate at their ‘minimum efficient scale’, 
which gave them a significant cost advantage over smaller frigorificos. This in turn 
forced other frigorificos to close or sell their plants, which led to a further concentration 
of the industry in the hands of the larger meat packers. The amalgamation of frigorificos 
and the subsequent consolidation continued throughout the 1910s-20s, resulting in a 
handful of foreign meat packers controlling the industry.
During the First World War prices of meat and cattle increased sharply due to the large 
food requirements for the war effort. Indeed, the First World War was a period of 
extreme prosperity for all cattle producers, while meat packers profited proportionally 
even more, given that they only passed on some of the increase in meat prices to cattle 
producers, thereby enjoying higher margins. Cattle producers invested heavily to 
increase their production capacity, especially breeders, with the expectation of continued 
high cattle prices and strong exports. By the end of the war, the River Plate meat 
packing industry had experienced two decades of exceptional growth with a constantly
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increasing trend in cattle prices and increasing meat exports, both in value and volume. 
Although conflicts between cattle producers and meat packing plants had occurred, 
especially in periods when cattle prices declined temporarily, overall these were 
resolved quickly and did not result in any major action against frigorificos until the 
1920s.
After the First World War the demand for meat contracted and as a result cattle prices 
tumbled, while exports declined sharply. As Europe returned to peacetime activities, it 
entered into a severe post-war recession, while the consumer purchasing power 
declined. In addition, large stocks of frozen and canned meat in the U.K. further 
restricted the demand for imported meat. The post war recession exemplified a turning 
point and represented a clear discontinuity of the rising trend in cattle prices and 
augmenting exports since the early twentieth century. Cattle producers were extremely 
dissatisfied with the reduction in prices and demanded major action from governments. 
Both the Argentinian and Uruguayan governments enacted laws to counteract the power 
of the increasingly centralised meat packing industry, in particular anti-trust legislation, 
the establishments of state-run frigorificos and the minimum price bill passed by 
Argentina. However, the minimum price law backfired as foreign meat packers closed 
their plants in protest. As a result minimum prices were abolished, which demonstrated 
the power of the few foreign frigorificos, which controlled the industry and thus the 
production as well as distribution of meat. Nevertheless, cattle producer dissatisfaction 
declined after 1924 as prices improved due to a resurgence in European demand.
A significant power shift took place within the River Plate meat packing industry after 
the First World War. Indeed, the American meat packers were faced with the Union
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Cold Storage Company (Vestey), a British concern, which had emerged as an important 
global competitor. Hence, the U.S. meat packers goal of ultimate command of the 
industry faded away, while the leadership battle was not fought any longer between the 
Anglo-Argentinian and American meat packers, but rather between the large and small 
frigorificos. The Union Cold Storage Company had achieved such ‘scale and scope’ that 
it was able to compete at least on the same or even a superior basis with its American 
counterparts. The 1925 price war confirmed the power switch within the industry, given 
that it was started because both the large British Vestey and American Swift concerns 
wanted to increase their meat export share allocation to utilise their newly expanded 
production capacity. Vestey and Swift wanted their new plants to operate at ‘minimum 
capacity scale’, while ensuring significant ‘throughput’. As a result of the 1925 price 
war, a number of ‘marginal’ frigorificos closed down or reduced their production and 
distribution, while others were incorporated into the larger meat packers. Thus the main 
beneficiaries of the renewed pool agreement of 1927 were the large meat packers at the 
expense of the smaller frigorificos. In 1927, five main meat packers remained in 
Argentina and three in Uruguay (all of which also operated in Argentina). In order to 
counterbalance the power of the very few foreign meat packers in Uruguay, the 
government decided to establish the Frigorifico Nacional in 1928. The aim was to 
reduce the dominance of foreign frigorificos and ensure higher prices for cattle.
Whereas the renewed pool agreement in 1927 was not welcomed by cattle producers, 
major conflicts did not take place, given that producers were concerned with the overall 
decline of the export market. By the late 1920s several countries had banned River Plate 
meat imports altogether or established significant protectionist policies. Following the 
Ottawa Conference in 1932, even the U.K. placed strict quotas on River Plate meat
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exports to Britain. The Roca-Runciman agreement managed to avoid a further 
significant decline in the export quotas, but meat exports to the important British market 
were limited to a fixed low amount. In addition, the reduction in demand following the 
Great Depression had reduced meat and cattle prices considerably. This had severe 
consequences for River Plate meat packers and cattle producers, given that animal 
stocks were high and the production capacity was based on the strong volume of the 
1920s.
The lower meat export volumes which led to depressed cattle prices, generated severe 
discontent among cattle producers, in particular breeders. Specifically, breeders were 
suffering from extremely low prices, given that first meat packers and then fatteners 
increased their margins, at the expense of breeders, in order to maintain their overall 
profitability with lower prices. Notwithstanding the depressed prices and export 
volumes, frigorificos continued to benefit from strong profitability. Given that the 
British Board of Trade started administering the meat import licences in the U.K., 
further price wars were adverted. Indeed, the Ottawa Conference had institutionalised 
the meat packing pool. As a result, meat packers could put significant pressure on cattle 
prices to maximise their returns within their export quota. As the breeder and small 
fattener prices did not recover significantly in the mid-1930s, despite a considerable 
upturn in the British economy, an important dispute emerged. The De la Torre 
parliamentary debates were aimed at defending breeder interests and reducing meat 
packer and large fattener margins. Despite the tragic ending of the De la Torre frantic 
debacle, some concessions were achieved, in particular the Argentinian control of the 
export quotas and the formation of the CAP. Whereas cattle producers benefited from
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higher prices and increased margins in the mid- to late- 1930s, the overall value and 
volume levels of meat remained constricted by export quotas.
During the Second World War Argentina and Uruguay managed to accumulate 
significant international reserves, as a result of the strong demand from war stricken 
Europe. Following the war, an extreme I.S.I. policy was implemented, financed by the 
accumulated reserves as well as through excessive surplus extraction from the meat and 
agricultural sectors. Importantly, the I.S.I. policy was taken to an extreme. Cattle 
producers were faced with extremely low prices and they did not have an incentive to 
produce, as their profitability declined and many had to face losses. Certain cattle 
producers started operating in the ‘grey market’ and others switched to more profitable 
crop production. Cattle stocks reached extremely low levels and meat production 
declined. Large foreign meat packing plants were operating with large excess capacity, 
an expensive workforce, and outdated plant and equipment. The lack of cattle and the 
large meat packers unremunerative operations led to their withdrawal first from 
Uruguay and then from Argentina. Moreover, frigorificos were forced to contend with a 
schizophrenic domestic policy, which was alternating between state intervention and 
moderate market orientation. Amidst this chaotic domestic policy, the nueva industria 
emerged, which was comprised of small and efficient frigorificos.
Both the Argentinian and Uruguayan meat packing industry suffered significantly from 
severe state intervention and exaggerated 'surplus extraction' after the Second World 
War, particularly in the late 1940s, early 1950s and 1970s. Interventionist policies 
remained in place throughout the period until the late 1970s, albeit with intervals of
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greater market orientation. These enabled the rise of the nueva industria, especially in 
the late 1950s and 1960s.
As a whole, the industry moved from large meat packers operated by TNCs, which 
gradually reduced their operations in the 1950s and ended up in the hands of the workers 
and the state, to small efficient frigorificos that by the 1970s produced the 
overwhelming majority of meat among industrial plants. Efficiency improvements 
occurred with the rise of the nueva industria in the 1960s. The nueva industria gradually 
increased their share of the market, while the traditional, large and inefficient meat 
packing plants share declined. Indeed, the nueva industria took advantage of the 
inefficiency of the traditional frigorificos. Large meat packers were far away from 
operating at their ‘minimum efficient scale’ because of their low capacity utilisation and 
fixed costs. As a result, they did not manage to generate significant economies of scale 
and scope, while they had low ‘throughput’. In contrast, the nueva industria had smaller 
plants and thus much lower fixed costs, which enabled them to achieve ‘minimum 
efficient scale’ at a low production threshold. By the 1970s, the segunda nueva industria 
had overtaken the traditional meat packers and was leading the market, after a short 
period of state intervention. Following a full liberalisation programme, by the 1980s 
efficient frigorificos were operating in an economic environment driven by market 
forces.
The shift from traditional frigorificos to the nueva industria can be attributed to various 
changes in the macro- and micro- environment, that formed the marketing mix and the 
strategies of meat packers. Following the Second World War, the considerable 
macroenvironmental changes that took place led to the departure of the large foreign
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meat packers and fostered the ascend of the nueva industria. Firstly, the political / legal 
environment became inward looking and domestic policy moved away from a free 
market orientation, and towards intervention and control. Moreover, the power of the 
unions increased, thus employment and worker demands became priorities in policy 
formulation, often superseding any regards for market forces and efficiency. 
Importantly, the international trade regime was closed even more, particularly after the 
1950s, thereby reducing market access and thus limiting the export market further. 
Secondly, the economic / demographic environment changed. The I.S.I. policy of 
extreme surplus extraction, which reduced and even eliminated incentives for cattle 
production in the legitimate sector, led to the emergence of a ‘grey’ market. This 
encouraged the proliferation of numerous lower cost producing slaughterhouses, which 
eventually became the nueva industria. Thirdly, the socio-cultural environment 
experienced an important transformation. The local market for meat expanded 
significantly, as the proletariat gained strength and the rising wages of workers 
translated into stronger purchasing power. Given that the export sector was restricted 
due to surplus extraction and foreign market access limitations, frigorificos were 
obliged to shift focus from the limited export market, which was the traditional 
stronghold of the foreign meat packers, towards the domestic market. Fourthly, the 
technological / physical environment changed, given that the large meat packers were 
discouraged to invest because of their low capacity utilisation and poor profitability. 
Indeed, the domestic market demanded small and efficient frigorificos instead of large 
plants for exports. Moreover, stringent hygiene regulations also emerged that in addition 
to new export products, like frozen cooked meat, required investment in plant and 
equipment. Finally, the physical environment changed, given that the poor profitability
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achieved in the legitimate sector encouraged cattle producers to supply the ‘grey’ 
market, while also shifting into more advantageous agricultural production.
From a microenvironmental point of view, the domestic market had too many suppliers 
and the export market was restrained through high tariff barriers, which were devised to 
extract surplus and sustain low legitimate domestic meat prices. The nueva industria 
represented severe competition for the traditional frigorificos, given that it had lower 
labour and fixed costs vs. the large overheads and expensive unionised labour of the 
large packers. The marketing mix and therefore the business and marketing strategies of 
meat packers were profoundly reshaped by changes in the micro- and macro­
environment. The foreign meat packers were affected the most by the significant 
changes in the environmental variables, which led to their subsequent withdrawal from 
the River Plate. Even the traditional frigorificos that remained, gradually stopped 
operating. The nueva industria and the segunda nueva industria benefited from the 
changes in the micro- and macro- environment, and managed to compose and 
implement advantageous strategies as part of a reformulated marketing mix.
In the 1990s there was renewed foreign capital participation and heightened ownership 
concentration in the meat packing industry. This can be traced to the following factors. 
Firstly, the liberalisation policies enacted in the 1980-90s enabled the industry to 
function primarily based on market forces. Secondly, the eradication of FMD opened the 
non-FMD circuit for River Plate meat exports, especially the North American and Asian 
markets. Thirdly, the creation of Mercosur fostered regional meat exports, primarily to 
Brazil and Chile. Finally, the improvements in tax and regulatory enforcement 
encouraged operations in the legitimate sector. As a result, the market became ‘freer’
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and ‘ordered’, which combined with larger volumes and reduced capacity, enabled meat 
packers to benefit from economies of scale and scope. This was one of the driving 
forces behind the consolidation of the industry in the 1990s, especially in Uruguay. The 
‘scale and scope’ opportunities also attracted heightened foreign capital interest. 
Specifically, one of the advantages for foreign meat packers is that they can benefit from 
additional volume, especially for exports to their home market, without the 
intermediaries high commissions that local frigorificos usually have to face. From a 
mid-1997 perspective, further consolidation seemed inevitable in the late 1990s, while 
increased foreign capital participation was also likely, especially if the fundamental 
micro- and macro- environmental parameters remained in place. However, whether the 
consolidation of the industry would reach oligopolistic proportions and this would 
translate into strong pressure on cattle prices remained to be seen, but seemed unlikely 
in the short- to medium- term.
Overall, in the twentieth century, a ‘full circle’ has taken place in the ownership 
structure of the River Plate meat packing industry. Specifically, the industry shifted 
from local ownership until the 1900s to primarily foreign ownership from the 1900s 
until the Second World War. Then the industry went through a period of intervention 
and state control after the Second World War. The large foreign meat packers left the 
industry, while in parallel smaller locally owned frigorificos started to emerge. The 
nueva industria gradually achieved leadership until taking over command in the late 
1970s, leaving the industry in the hands of overwhelmingly domestic capital. In the 
1990s, renewed foreign investment has been taking place, albeit slowly, which indicates 
that there is a shift towards greater foreign capital participation in the industry once 
again.
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5. CHANGING INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIMES AND THE DOMESTIC
POLICY REACTION
5.1 Introduction
So far in the thesis we have seen how two main factors, namely technological 
innovation and modifications in the ownership structure, have contributed significantly 
to the growth of the River Plate meat packing industry, particularly until the end of the 
Second World War. However, the expansion of the industry would not have been 
possible without ‘free’ trade. Indeed, until the 1920s most markets for River Plate meat 
remained open, with the exception of the U.S.A., and meat exports did not face major 
trade restrictions. Most importantly, Great Britain, the largest importer of meat in the 
world at the time, maintained an open trade policy throughout the expansionary period 
of the River Plate meat packing industry. ‘Free’ trade represented a crucial precondition 
for the continuous growth of the industry. However, in the late 1920s significant trade 
restrictions regarding meat imports started to emerge throughout Continental Europe, 
which mainly limited the amount of meat that could be imported. The movement 
towards protectionism intensified and in the early 1930s, following the Great 
Depression, even the United Kingdom started imposing significant restrictions on River 
Plate meat imports. This marked the end of an era for River Plate meat, given that ‘free’ 
trade was the main pillar in order for the meat packing industry to prosper. It also 
represented a shift in trade regimes in the 1930s, from open markets and the ‘free’ 
movement of goods, towards ‘bilateralism and control’. In this context, the chapter will 
analyse the following main themes, (i) the effect of the new trade regime on the River 
Plate meat packing industry and its development, (ii) the reaction of domestic 
policymakers and cattle producers, (iii) attempts to liberalise trade policy and (iv)
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whether and to what extent trade regimes have shifted back towards ‘free trade’ in the 
1990s. In order to enhance the analysis of the impact of changing international trade 
regimes, the chapter will make use of the staple theory, and of P.R. Krugman’s and J.A. 
Brander’s writings on trade strategy, in particular the ‘new thinking’ about trade policy. 
The staple theory has been applied in chapter 3 to analyse the rise as well as phenomenal 
expansion of the River Plate meat packing industry in the late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth- century. In this chapter, through the staple theory the thesis will assess 
whether the River Plate meat packing industry entered into a ‘staple trap’ starting in the 
late 1920s.330 To recapitulate, the staple theory has a dynamic component, by which 
alterations in the environment can reduce the significance of the staple. The staple could 
be depleted if it was a limited resource or new products could make it redundant. 
Moreover, domestic policy and variations in international markets might diminish the 
significance of the staple. As such, shifts in trade regimes or changes in demand could 
affect the growth of the staple. Additionally, institutional changes and the ability of 
landowners to influence policy could also determine the viability and strength of a 
staple.
The analysis of changing international trade regimes, as well as the establishment and 
consolidation of the ‘staple trap’ can be sub-divided into five distinctive periods, namely 
(i) first signs of the ‘staple trap’ (1920s), (ii) bilateralism and control: the establishment 
of the ‘staple trap’ (1930-1939), (iii) emergence of I.S.I. and inward looking policies: 
the consolidation of the ‘staple trap’ (1940-55), (iv) renewed trade barriers (1955-1990), 
and (v) growth and export expansion (1990s).
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Along with the staple theory, P.R. Krugman’s and J.A. Brander’s ‘new thinking’ 
regarding trade policy will be applied to the analysis. In addition, the chapter will draw 
on their discussions about the strategic trade game played by national governments, as 
well as the interaction and retaliation between states or state groupings.331 Paul R. 
Krugman has written extensively about trade policy in many publications.332 Krugman’s 
‘new thinking’ about trade policy is based on the overall assumption that “the economic 
analysis on which the classical case for free trade was based is beginning to look 
increasingly unrealistic.”333 According to Krugman, this is due to the increasing 
complexity of markets, in particular trade between international markets. In addition, he 
insists that the understanding and analysis of how markets operate has become more 
sophisticated. He identifies three factors that explain a current shift in trade policy 
analysis.
To start with, he points to the growing importance of international trade. The expansion 
in trade has led to interrelated international markets and global competitors. In this 
respect, two key issues have arisen, namely ‘market power and excessive rates of return’ 
as well as the importance of ‘innovation and technological change’ in trade policy 
analysis and formulation.334 One of the concerns is that many industries have
See chapter 3, section 3.1 for a detailed analysis and explanation of the staple theory and the ‘staple trap’.
Krugman, P.R., “New Thinking about Trade Policy” and Brander, J.A., “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial 
Policy” and in Krugman, P.R. (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1992), pp. 1-45 and pp. 257-281. In addition, see Krugman, P.R., ‘Tree Trade and Protectionism’ in The 
Age of Diminished Expectations (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994, pp. 123-135 and “The Political 
Economy of Trade Policy” in Krugman’s textbook International Economics - Theory and Policy (Harper Collins, New 
York, New York, 1994), especially pp. 238-241.
P.R. Krugman’s publications about trade policy include: (ed.) Strategic Trade Policy and New International Economics
(The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992), Rethinking International Trade (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1990), the chapter on “Free Trade and Protectionism” in The Age of Diminished Expectations (The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994, pp. 123-135, the chapters “Does Third World Growth Hurt First World 
Prosperity” and “The Illusion of Conflict in International Trade” in Pop Internationalism (The MIT Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 1996), pp. 49-84, and a general chapter on “The Political Economy o f Trade Policy” in Krugman’s 
textbook International Economics - Theory and Policy (Harper Collins, New York, New York, 1994), pp. 227-274. 
Krugman, P.R. (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1992), p. 3.
Ibid, p. 6.
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consolidated internationally and often a handful of corporations control certain 
industries or even full sectors of the economy. Thus these few corporations could 
become excessively dominant and could increase prices as well as generate extremely 
high profits. Krugman’s main point is that governments could use trade policies ‘to 
promote their firms in these industries’ so that they could then compete in the 
international market.335 Another important element is innovation and technological 
spillovers, which might occur from certain industries or sectors to others. If foreign 
governments would protect or subsidise industries, in which the technological 
‘spillover’ effect is significant, then local firms might suffer due to a reduction in the 
‘spillover’ effect in the domestic market.
A second factor is the change in the character of trade, which defies classical trade 
theory. Specifically, classical theory considers that nations can benefit from their 
differences and utilise their comparative advantage in the production of certain goods 
that are most suitable to their specific characteristics. Thus countries can trade primarily 
in goods in which they have particular advantages or strengths. However, Krugman 
argues that since the Second World War an increasing number of goods traded do not 
reflect comparative advantages, but rather are due to “arbitrary and temporary 
advantages resulting from economies of scale, shifting leads in close technological races 
... (and) cumulative advantages of experience.” Indeed, Krugman emphasises that a 
large part of international trade is due to ‘national advantages that are created by
Krugm an, P.R. (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and New  International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge,
M assachusetts, 1992), p. 6.
Ibid, pp. 7-8.
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historical circumstance’ and large scale production, in addition to technological changes 
and innovation.337
Finally, the third factor relates to new tools in economic analysis coming from other 
fields of economics that have modified the classical assumptions regarding trade policy. 
In particular, the traditional viewpoint that markets are close to being ‘perfectly 
competitive’. Many industries are composed of a few powerful firms which form 
international oligopolies, thus operating in ‘imperfectly competitive markets’. 
Overall, trade policy analysis has become more sophisticated, while international trade 
has clearly turned more complex.
Krugman points out that the market provides a decentralised method of allocating 
resources and that most economists are confident that this decentralised system is very 
effective. Classical theory regards domestic and international markets as similar and 
thus encourages the application of laisser faire economics to both. Even if certain 
nations do not practice ‘free trade’ conventional theory would still emphasise that other 
countries would adjust production accordingly. If for example a country subsidises 
exports of a certain commodity, then world prices for that product would fall and this in 
turn would encourage less production of that commodity in the ‘free trade’ countries. 
Thus, conventional theory supports ‘free trade’, even when other nations do not have 
‘free trade’.
Krugman, P.R., “Free Trade and Protectionism” in Pop Internationalism (The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 
1996), p. 131. Also see Krugman, P.R., Rethinking International Trade (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990), 
pp. 1-22 and 93-105.
Krugman, P.R. (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and New International Economics (The M IT Press, Cambridge,
M assachusetts, 1992), p. 9.
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“The combination of a changing character of trade and a growing sophistication of theory 
undercuts this way of justifying free trade. We are forced to recognize that industries that 
account for much of world trade are not at all well described by the supply and demand 
analysis that lies behind the assertion that markets are best left to themselves. As we have seen, 
much of trade appears to require an explanation in terms of economies of scale, learning 
curves, and the dynamics of innovation - all phenomena incompatible with the kind of 
idealizations under which free trade is always the best policy. Economists refer to such 
phenomena as “market imperfections”, a term that in itself conveys the presumption that these 
are marginal to a system that approaches ideal performance fairly closely. In reality, however, it 
may be that imperfections are the rule rather than the exception.”339
5.1.1 Towards an Activist Trade Policy
Krugman suggests some new approaches to trade policy. In Particular, he encourages an 
‘activist’ trade policy, by which governments might favour certain strategic industries or 
sectors. By applying an ‘activist’ trade policy, a nation could benefit from a greater 
share of “rent” and larger “external economies”. Krugman’s definition of ‘rent’ is a 
“payment to an input higher than what that input could earn in an alternative use.”340 For 
example, “rent” could be larger profits in an industry or sector vs. others with the same 
level of risk, or better salaries that labour with similar skills would attain in a particular 
industry or sector in comparison with others.341 Krugman argues that governments can 
raise national income, as long as trade policy is used to foster any sectors that offer 
significant “rents”, which in turn would increase the share of “rent” of a particular 
country. He emphasises that key trading sectors often benefit from economies of scale 
and significant experience, thereby making it very difficult for new entrants to reduce 
the large “rents” of these sectors.
“Once we begin to believe that substantial amounts of rent are really out there, it becomes 
possible at least in principle for trade policy to be used as a way to secure more rent for a 
country ... subsidies or protection can in fact be used to increase a country’s share of rent in a 
way that it raises national income at other countries’ expense.”342
339 Krugman, P.R. (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1992), p. 12.
340 Ibid.
341 Ibid.
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An ‘activist’ trade policy could also generate significant “external economies”. Many 
corporations or even entire industries might benefit from the activities of other firms, 
even if they operate in other industries. Cross-fertilisation could occur, such as the 
dissemination of know-how or the transfer of trained management or newly skilled 
labour from one industry to another. External economies have become particularly 
important to trade policy, because of the increasing role played by technological 
innovation in international competitiveness. Thus, “external economies” in addition to 
“rents” could be used as rationales to support certain industries or sectors over others.
Krugman argues that a government can use protection, subsidies or fiscal incentives to 
favour and encourage certain industries or sectors in order to maximise the share of 
“rent” and “external economies” for the nation.
Whereas he recognises that various industries compete for resources within countries 
and that promoting specific sectors will often undermine other ones, he points out that 
this is not important if  the promotion or protection of certain sectors can increase 
national income. In addition, he is highly sceptical regarding the classical viewpoint that 
strategic sectors cannot exist, at least not for a long time, because the higher yield would 
be competed away quickly. On the contrary, Krugman emphasises that “there may be 
‘strategic’ sectors after all ... (and that) the extreme pro-free-trade position ... has 
become untenable.”343
Ibid, p. 13.
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5.1.2. Problems and Limitations of Strategic Trade Policy
Although in principle the ‘new thinking’ about trade policy seems to be a valid 
contribution and presents a good argument for policy ‘targeting’ towards certain ‘high 
yielding’ sectors, it also has serious limitations, especially regarding the difficulty in 
identifying strategic sectors as well as potential ‘distortions’ in the implementation 
process. Krugman acknowledges that numerous “questions” remain to be answered and 
that strategic trade policy might be difficult to implement. “There is ... a large gap 
between showing that free trade is not perfect and arguing for any particular 
alternative.”344
Krugman’s first concern is whether strategic sectors can be identified. Although the 
concepts of “rent” and “external economies” can be applied and they are conceptually 
straight forward, they remain difficult to measure. To start with, “rent” can often be 
confused with quality differences. For example, if  sectors that require highly skilled 
labour are promoted and then grow, “without increasing the number of highly skilled 
workers (then it) can lead to increased unemployment among the less skilled ... 
(Furthermore) proposals for a national policy of targeting sectors that yield high value- 
added per worker ... are misguided when ... high-value simply reflects high input.”345
In addition, there could be a measurement error when calculating the rates of return of 
highly yielding industries, because only the successful companies are taken into 
consideration and the failures might be ignored. Similarly, only existing companies 
might benefit from a ‘windfall’ due to a sudden increase in demand or technological
Krugman, P.R. (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge,
M assachusetts, 1992), p. 15.
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innovation in a particular industry, while newcomers to the industry might not be able to 
share the higher yield. When it comes to “external economies”, Krugman points out that 
it is very difficult to measure ‘spillovers’ between companies or industries.
Nevertheless, Krugman insists that despite these ‘measurement shortcomings’ strategic 
sectors can still be identified, but he remains vague about the selection process.
“The point is ... that identifying strategic sectors is not a simple matter of looking at profit rates 
and wage rates over the past five years, it instead requires careful and detailed analysis ... What 
we need for trade policy of course is forward-looking assessments ... At this point the only way 
to make such assessments is to combine detailed knowledge of the industries with heavy 
reliance on guesswork ... What we have to conclude, then, is that identifying strategic sectors is 
not something we know how to do with any confidence.”346
Even if  a government can identify strategic industries or sectors, then there is the 
problem of pursuing the right policy to foster these sectors. Given that the ‘strategic 
sectors’ are often competing with other industries for limited resources, it might be that 
by fostering one sector, others will suffer. For example, subsidies to one sector might 
have to be paid out of the ‘surplus’ of another, through higher taxes or they might drive 
salaries up, especially of skilled workers due to the greater available resources to the 
strategic sector, which might be expanding. Furthermore, it is difficult to forecast the 
reaction of global competition. A subsidy in one country for a sector might trigger a 
worldwide price war and thus reduce the profitability for the sector or it could induce a 
reduction in production in international markets, which could then increase the 
profitability of the sector.347
“It is very difficult to determine on purely theoretical grounds which outcome will actually 
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Finally, there is the problem of objectivity and the response from other governments. 
Krugman points out that interest groups might be tempted to use the ‘new thinking’ 
about trade policy as a means to lobby for protectionism, subsidies or more funding for 
the sectors they are supporting, even if objectively governments would not have 
identified those sectors as ‘strategic’.349 Additionally, other governments might respond 
to protectionist measures or subsidies to strategic sectors. Indeed, depending on the 
position of a country a ‘strategic trade policy’ might strengthen or weaken the 
bargaining power in the international markets.
5.1.3 James Brander’s Rationales for Strategic Trade Policy
James Brander builds on Paul Krugman’s “new thinking” about trade policy and 
actually proposes bullish rationales in favour of strategic trade policy. Although, 
overall, his proposals are similar to those put forward by Krugman, Brander clearly 
advocates an interventionist trade policy, albeit only under specific circumstances. Just 
like Krugman, Brander insists that it is utopian to view all markets as perfectly 
competitive and that there are numerous industries which generate extremely high 
profits due to their oligopolistic nature. These ‘above-normal’ or excess profits or 
“rents” are significantly over what the company owners would need as a minimum 
incentive to continue running the business.351 In addition, “rents” can also accrue to the 
company’s employees, through high salaries, which are much greater than what the 
minimum necessary payment would be to ensure that they stay with the company. 
Brander argues that as the economic objective of trade policy should be to maximise
349 P.R. Krugman also emphasises the dangers of interest group politics impacting trade policy, in particular the
encouragement of protectionism in his ‘Free Trade and Protectionism’ chapter in The Age of Diminished Expectations
(The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994, pp. 123 and 134.
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national welfare, it is in a government’s best interest to try to grab as much of these 
profits as possible, by supporting domestic firms to obtain a larger proportion of the 
international “rents”, through the implementation of a favourable trade policy.
To achieve the goal of global profit or “rent” share maximisation, he proposes to use 
‘profit shifting subsidies’ and protectionist measures (primarily import duties and 
quotas) for certain ‘selected’ industries.
Firstly, Brander suggests that through subsidies international profits can be shifted from 
foreign to domestic companies. His arguments rely mostly on highly debatable 
expectations regarding the response of foreign firms to subsidies for domestic 
companies. He states that it is highly probable that foreign firms will contract their 
output if faced with the threat of subsidies, primarily because they increase the domestic 
firm’s “rent”.
“... There are two effects of the subsidy. One effect is the apparent cost saving, which is really 
just a transfer ... the second effect... because subsidised costs make it credible or believable (to 
the rival) that the domestic firm will expand, the rival’s best response is to contract and this in 
itself raises the domestic firm’s profit by an additional amount. This second effect is sometimes 
called the “strategic” effect because it owes its existence to the nature of the strategic game 
played by firms. It implies that profits to the domestic firm rise by more than the amount of the 
subsidy.”352
However, responses from foreign firms to subsidies for domestic companies are usually 
unpredictable and vary enormously between companies and industries, as well as on the 
domestic firm’s use of the subsidy, in addition to the potentially retaliatory responses 
from foreign governments. Brander recognises some of the limitations of his rational for
Brander, J.A., “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy” in Krugman, P.R. (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and 
New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992), pp. 23-46. For perspective, Brander was 
one of the pioneers of the new school of strategic trade thinkers, which advocates a novel approach to tackling trade policy.
Ibid, p. 26.
Ibid, p. 29.
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subsidies and that the responses from foreign rivals and governments might be 
unpredictable.
“As is normally the case with economic theory, the simplified environment that is assured in 
order to make an argument clear or to isolate a particular economic effect is not the 
environment encountered by real policymakers. The real environment is much more 
complicated ... The point is that government action can alter the strategic game played by 
foreign and domestic firms. In profitable markets domestic firms are made better off if foreign 
firms can be induced to contract (or expand more slowly) than they otherwise would.”353
Secondly and in addition to subsidies, Brander points out that protectionist policies 
(mainly import duties and quotas) can also lead to a higher share of global “rent” for 
domestic firms operating in strategic sectors. Although protectionism is often concerned 
with import-competing industries and is often used to protect infant industries, it can 
also be applied as a tool to promote exports.354 Brander argues that protectionism can 
help domestic industries by providing larger economies of scale (especially if  the 
domestic market is large) and enable companies to ‘learn by doing’ while ‘moving down 
the learning curve’ .355 These companies can also export their products thereby gaining 
further economies of scale and generating more profits. However, he also recognises 
that protectionism can be very negative for consumers because they tend to have a less 
competitive domestic market. Furthermore, protectionism might make local companies 
inefficient and uncompetitive in the world market. This could in the long term be 
detrimental in obtaining a larger scale of international “rents”.
Although Brander’s argument for ‘profit-shifting subsidies’ and protection for certain 
industries seem to have some foundation, they also have numerous limitations. Not 
least, the difficulty in selecting the ‘targeted’ industries for the strategic trade policy and
353 Brander, J.A., “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy” in Krugman, P.R. (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and 
New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992), p. 30.
354 Ibid, p. 31.
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIMES AND THE DOMESTIC POLICY REACTION 2 4 3
the unpredictable responses of foreign governments. Both Krugman and Brander 
recognise some of the limitations of the ‘new thinking’ about trade policy. However, 
despite these shortcomings, the “new thinking” school has a plausible argument, which 
is that in imperfectly competitive industries, subsidies and protectionist measures might 
help increase the share of worldwide “rent” for certain industries. Thus in specific cases, 
the classical trade theory should be reassessed and the orthodox ‘total free trade’ 
argument questioned.
5.1.4. The ‘Interaction & Retaliation’ Process of Governments
One of the most important factors in the potential success of strategic trade theory is the 
reaction of foreign governments to national subsidies or protectionist measures. Brander 
analyses the interaction and retaliation process of governments in respect to trade policy 
by utilising numerous elements of game theory.
Governments are unlikely to be mere observers and not react to any changes in trade 
policy in other countries. Indeed, governments tend to play a ‘strategic game’ to try to 
maximise their country’s welfare. Each country or game player may influence the 
outcome of trade policy depending on their and the rival government’s action. There are 
mainly three possible policy outcomes, namely (i) that one nation protects or subsidises 
the home market and the other countries do not retaliate, thereby enabling the firms of 
that nation to have a competitive advantage, (ii) that all nations protect or subsidise the 
home market and therefore most companies are not very successful in export markets, 
and (iii) that nations reach an agreement to avoid protectionist measures or subsidies
Ibid, p. 33.
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIMES AND THE DOMESTIC POLICY REACTION 2 4 4
and thus the countries all gain from export markets, which enables all of them to be 
better off, than if they all protected their home market.356
Brander proposes a theoretical structure to show the outcomes that varying trade policy 
scenarios might have on national welfare. He illustrates the different scenarios through a 
‘payoff matrix’, shown below.
Table 5.1: Payoff Matrix of Different Trade Policy Scenarios
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate A 400 , E 400 A 50 , E 500
Defect A 500 , E 50 A 100, E 100
Source: Brander, J.A., “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy” in Krugman, P.R. (ed), Strategic 
Trade Policy and New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992), p. 37.
“Suppose that there are two countries called ... A and E. Each country has access to an 
interventionist policy that is in the national interest but that reduces the welfare of the other 
country. Cooperating means refraining from using the policy, defecting means adopting the 
policy ... The first element in each small box represents the payoff to country A, the second 
element represents the payoff to E. Along the top, country E’s strategies are listed. Thus if both 
countries defect from the cooperative noninterventionist policy, each country gets a return of 
100. If country A defects, and the other country does not, then A gets a return of 500 and 
country E gets only a small net benefit of 50 from this industry. If neither country defects, each 
country gets a net benefit of 400 ... The actual numbers are not important. What is important 
are the relative magnitudes. These relative magnitudes reflect a common situation in 
international policy making. Unilateral predatory policy is attractive if the other country is 
passive, but mutual nonintervention would give the highest combined return, in this case 
800.”357
Based on the theoretical structure shown above, it is highly likely that governments 
would both decide to intervene if they were only able to take a decision once. Then they
358would be faced with what in game theory is known as the “prisoner’s dilemma”. 
Although both countries would gain more by keeping their markets open, it would be 
difficult to find a solution to the gridlock. “The problem of choosing subsidy levels in 
the profit-shifting context has a structure similar to the prisoner’s dilemma. It really
Brander, J.A., “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy” in Krugman, P.R. (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and
New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992), p. 37.
Ibid, pp. 37-38.
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does not matter whether the other country has a strategic subsidy or not, the best
'X 5Qresponse for either country is to use a subsidy also.” The gains are substantially
greater if the other country does not have a subsidy. However, trade policy is not set in
stone. Negotiations between countries occur again and again. “In effect the prisoner’s
dilemma game is repeated indefinitely. Repetitions of the decisions make the game
much more complicated in that relatively complex strategies become possible.” A
country could use different strategies, either always cooperate or never cooperate or only
1
cooperate if the rival cooperated last time. The latter is what is referred to as the “tit 
for tat” strategy. “Tit for tat” strategies have been very successful, given that they punish 
rivals if they do not cooperate. There are two main inherent problems with “tit for tat” 
strategies. Firstly, the issue of complex negotiations in various policy areas, which often 
provide a blurry picture of trade policy, given that countries might “offset” a subsidy or 
protection in one sector for another or exchange one favourable policy (i.e. better 
conditions for a foreign country’s firm(s) in the domestic market) for another. Thus, for 
a “tit for tat” strategy to be successful it must be clear which policy corresponds to “tit” 
and which one to “tat”. Secondly “tit for tat” strategies work primarily in a unilateral 
context. It is particularly difficult to utilise “tit-for-tat” strategies in a multilateral 
context, unless dealing with negotiations between trading blocks, in which case each 
trading block would be the equivalent to a country, but only if  the trading blocks act 
unilaterally. Finally, Brander concludes that the “tit-for-tat” policies are successful in 
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“My only point is that it is at least possible to put forward a sensible case for interventionist 
policy in a world of policy interaction between governments. Furthermore, such a policy should 
shy away from predatory first strikes but might reasonably have a retaliatory role.”363
However, in an ever more complex international trade environment, where unilateral 
and multilateral negotiations occur between countries, trading blocks and within the 
framework of international organisations (i.e. the W.T.O.), all of which sometimes 
overlap, it can be difficult to elaborate and decipher “tit for tat” strategies. Nevertheless, 
if  ‘transparent’ strategies can be devised, Brander’s approach of using “tit for tat” as a 
retaliatory tool could prove useful.
Overall, the chapter will utilise the ‘new thinking’ about trade policy put forward by 
Krugman and Brander, to examine whether the governments of Argentina and Uruguay 
have adopted an ‘activist trade policy’ for the River Plate meat packing industry, and 
their attempts to maintain or increase the international ‘rent’ and ‘external economies’ 
derived from the industry, particularly in the 1990s. In addition, the thesis will analyse 
the interaction and retaliation process between governments in regards to the River Plate 
meat packing industry, concentrating on identifying broad shifts between ‘cooperative’ 
vs. ‘non-cooperative’ stands, as well as prolonged periods when governments were 
faced with a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. As such, the analysis is not interested in specific ‘tit- 
for-tat’ strategies, but rather in examining general trends and periods of cooperation or 
defection between the Argentinian and Uruguayan governments, and their trading 
partners.
Brander, J.A., “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy” in Krugman, P.R. (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and 
New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992), p. 41.
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5.2 The Emergence of Protectionism in the 1920s; ’The First Signs of a ’Staple 
Trap1
Throughout the nineteenth century until the 1920s, the River Plate meat packing 
industry benefited from a ‘free’ trade regime. River Plate meat could be exported 
without major restrictions to markets around the world, with the exception of the U.S.A. 
Importantly, the U.K. market, which imported the overwhelming majority of world meat 
exports remained ‘open’. However, by the 1920s numerous countries began imposing 
restrictions on River Plate meat. This symbolised the beginning of a protectionist wave, 
which would have severe consequences for the River Plate meat packing industry.
To start with, continental European markets, which had begun to purchase River Plate 
meat in larger quantities in the 1920s, particularly Belgium, France, Germany, Holland 
and Italy, imposed increased tariff and non-tariff barriers, thereby reducing this small 
but significant outlet for Argentinian and Uruguayan meat exports substantially. In 1924 
the German government passed a bill which restricted the imports of frozen meat to
120,000 tons per year.364 Germany limited trade further in 1928 by reducing meat 
imports first to 100,000 and later to 50,000 tons.365 Additionally, in 1927 France started 
imposing a duty of 5 9'A centimes per kilo (up from a low 25 centimes) on imported 
frozen meat from countries that had a commercial treaty with France, which included 
Argentina and Uruguay. In 1928, France's duty was increased further, thereby forcing 
the already falling frozen meat imports due to the 1927 tariff to decline to insignificant
Brander, J.A., “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy” in Krugman, P.R. (ed), Strategic Trade Policy and 
New International Economics (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992), pp. 44-45.
Review o f the Frozen Meat Trade. Weddel & Co., London, No. 38, 1925, pp. 12-13.
The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 1895, March 30,1928, p. 17.
Review of the Chilled and Frozen Meat Trade. Weddel & Co., London, N o.39 ,1926, p. 14 and No. 40,1927, p. 7.
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levels.367 Italy introduced severe restrictions on frozen meat in 1927, which included 
strict sanitary inspections and regulations that classified frozen meat, while not allowing 
retail outlets to sell both fresh and frozen meat together, thereby rigorously constraining 
its trade.368 In 1926 Holland imposed a 5 cents (Dutch) per kilo duty on frozen meat 
imports.369 The U.S.A., a growing market for meat, imposed significant tariff barriers 
for meat already in the early 1920s and prohibited River Plate chilled and frozen meat 
imports in 1926 claiming to fear that Foot and Mouth Disease would be introduced to 
the U.S.A., through potentially contaminated meats.370 For perspective, in 1913 the 
Underwood Tariff Act eliminated U.S. import duties for meat and by 1915 a small, yet 
growing River Plate meat import business had developed, but it was interrupted by the 
First World War.371 While Argentina and Uruguay expected to export substantially more 
meat to the U.S.A. after the war, the potentially favourable prospects were obstructed by 
the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922 that re-established customs duties.372 Most 
importantly, the meat import ban in 1926 put an end to any remaining expectations of 
exporting River Plate meat to the promising U.S. market. The embargo was strongly 
favoured by American cattle producers, concerned that River Plate imports might reduce 
U.S. meat prices. Nevertheless, Australia, New Zealand and Canada remained outside of 
the embargo, given that they were Foot and Mouth Disease free, which led to increased 
Australasian meat exports to the U.S.A. thereafter. This occurred although 
Australasian meat was less price competitive. The Review of the River Plate 
characterised the trade restrictions that the meat packing industry faced as follows:
367 The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 1895, March 30, 1928, p. 17.
368 Review of the Chilled and Frozen Meat Trade. Weddel & Co., London, No. 40,1927, p. 8 .
369 Review of the Chilled and Frozen Meat Trade. Weddel & Co., London, N o.39 ,1926, p. 14.
370 Peterson, H.F., Argentina and the United States 1810-1960 (State University of New York, University Publishers, New
York, 1964), p. 352.
371 Peffer, E.L., 'Foot-and-Mouth Disease in United States Policy', Food Research Institute Studies. Stanford, California, Vol.
in, No. 2, May 1962, p. 142.
372 Ibid.
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"Germany, France, Italy, and even Belgium, far from offering hopes of wider markets, are, 
through one cause or another, tending rather to limit meat imports than to increase them, while 
the United States, which is nowadays admitted to be Argentina's greatest potential market, 
gives every sign of wishing to enforce heavy protective discrimination against Argentine as 
compared with home-fed meat."374
The increasing market access restrictions in continental Europe and the U.S.A. reduced 
the ability of the River Plate to diversify its export markets for meat and increased its 
dependence on the declining British market in the mid- to late- 1920s. This represented 
an early sign of the development of the staple trap as well as a major threat to cattle 
producers and the entire River Plate meat packing industry.
Even the important 'free’ trade status with the British market was under threat in the 
mid-1920s, given that the U.K. government was being pressured by British farmers and 
the Empire, in particular Australia and New Zealand, to reduce meat imports from the 
River Plate. In addition, the British government was investigating the implications of 
imported meat from Foot and Mouth Disease infected countries, which included 
Argentina and Uruguay, and was debating whether to levy import duties for River Plate 
meat.376 Furthermore, in the context of the U.S. import ban, the main concern of River 
Plate cattle producers was that the U.K. would follow suit and impose severe restrictions 
on Argentinian and Uruguayan meat, in particular strict sanitary regulations in regards to
New Zealand Meat Producers Board. Sixth Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, Wellington, 1928, pp. 19-20.
The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 1895, March 30,1928, p. 7.
See chapter 3, section 3.1 for a definition and application of the staple theory, as well as section 5.1 for an explanation of 
the ‘staple trap’. As explained, the staple theory has a dynamic aspect, in that amendments in the environment can reduce 
the importance of a staple, thus epitomising a ‘staple trap’. Some reasons which can trigger a ‘staple trap’ are: (a) that the 
staple becomes obsolete due to new technology, (b) that international demand declines or supply increases, (c) that 
changes occur in the international trade regime or (d) that the cost of production abroad decreases.
Liceaga, J., Las Carnes en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 107-108. Moreover, in 1925 a 
British Parliamentary Report was commissioned in light of an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in the U.K., which also 
analysed general movement restrictions and precautions against introduction o f disease, including the importation of 
animals, hay and straw as well as animal products. Report o f the Departmental Committee appointed to consider the 
Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease which occurred in 1923-24, presented to Parliament, Cd. 2350, London, 1925, pp. 
57- 65.
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Foot and Mouth Disease.377 The U.K. remained the main market for meat, which bought 
the overwhelming majority of River Plate meat exports.
5.2.1 The Response of Cattle Producers to the Advent of Changing International 
Trade Regimes (1920s)
In order to promote trade openness and avoid meat import restrictions in Britain, the
Rural Society started a campaign in favour of British trade that consisted in encouraging
the purchase of imported goods from those countries that were buyers of Argentinian
exports. The newly adopted slogan of the Rural Society, namely t>uy from those who
buy from us', was aimed at improving commercial relations with Britain.378 Specifically,
during the First World War River Plate trade with the United States increased, as war
stricken Europe was unable to provide the necessary manufactured goods that Argentina
and Uruguay needed. After the First World War, British exports endured a marked and
persistent decline in their competitiveness, thereby increasing the unbalanced trade
relationship with the U.K .379 Indeed, the River Plate was purchasing ever more
industrial products from the U.S.A., while exporting most of its primary goods to the
U.K. Hence, a triangular trade relationship developed which continued throughout the
1920s. Thus the new campaign had the objective to correct this unbalanced trade
relationship by purchasing more manufactured goods from Britain and thereby
encourage stronger ties as well as continued free trade with the U.K. Most importantly,
the underlining implication of the slogan was that Argentina would create a strong and
The concern regarding potential meat import restrictions to the key British market due to Foot and Mouth Disease sanitary 
regulations led to a strong debate in the U.K. among the various interest groups, in particular British farmers and the 
Argentinian government, representing River Plate cattle producers interests. J.E. Richelet defended the Argentinian 
position, while emphasising the important role that British capital played in the River Plate and arguing in favour of free 
trade as well as minimum sanitary restrictions based on scientific evidence, in his book The Argentine Meat Trade (Ste. 
Industrielle d'Imprimerie, Paris, 1929), pp. 37-58 and 151-287.
Richelet, J.E., The Argentine Meat Trade (Ste. Industrielle d'Imprimerie, Paris, 1929), pp. 57-58.
Tulchin, J.S., Argentina and the Untied States - A Conflicted Relationship (Twayne Publishers, Boston, 1990), pp. 47-50.
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closed economic link with Britain, while alienating the U.S.A .380 Moreover, the motto 
was also developed to decrease the potentially detrimental impact of the Foot and Mouth 
Disease debate in Britain, while expressing the Argentinian cattle producers resentment 
with the U.S. ban. In 1929, the D'Abemon Pact was signed to ensure improved 
collaboration with the U.K. The accord established reciprocal credits of one hundred 
million pesos, by which Argentina would buy railroad equipment from Britain, while
-501
the U.K. would purchase cereals as well as other products from Argentina. However, 
the D'Abemon Pact was favourable to Britain, given that the goods acquired by the U.K. 
were included in existing trade, while the products bought by Argentina were 
incremental to existing trade.382 Thus the agreement was devised to reduce the British 
trade deficit with Argentina, while partly balancing the triangular trade relationship, 
which was favouring the U.S.A. Indeed, Britain was losing significant ‘rent’ from the 
trade triangle that had developed, while the U.S.A. was gaining from this relationship. 
Argentina was eager to ensure that the U.K. government maintain a ‘cooperative’ stand, 
to safeguard the British market from potential closure or restrictions for River Plate 
meat, that would in turn reduce Argentina’s ‘rent’. Therefore, Argentina also 
‘cooperated’, even though the agreement benefited Britain. River Plate meat exports 
remained dependent on the declining British market, due to increasing market access 
restrictions in the continental Europe and the meat import ban in the U.S.A.
5.2.2 Other Factors That Exemplified the First Signs of the ’Staple Trap*
Although the gradual shift in the international trade regime away from 'free' trade 
starting in the mid-1920s, combined with a decrease in meat prices per ton and the
Roca, E., Julio A. Roca Oil (Imprenta de los Buenos Ayres, Buenos Aires, 1995), p. 50. 
The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 1971, September 13,1929, pp. 13-15.
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overall decline of the British economy, epitomised early signs of a staple trap, other 
factors that followed the post-First World War recession also reflected the reduced 
attractiveness of meat as a staple in the River Plate. To start with, the 'multiplier 
accelerator mechanism' reached a saturation point in the 1920s, as the forward, 
backward and fiscal linkages derived from the meat staple in the River Plate approached
'J O '5
maturity. Specifically, forward linkages reached their peak with the production of 
premium chilled meat. Whereas chilled beef exemplified the height of meat quality once 
its production process was perfected, it also represented the apogee of a series of 
successive value added improvements in finished goods derived from the meat staple. 
Hence, the value added augmentation series reached a high point, while the meat 
product improvement chain approached a plateau in the 1920s. Indeed, the product 
could hardly be improved further and if so only through marginal advancements in the 
production, handling and refrigeration process, which would lead to just minor 
improvements in the appearance and taste of meat.384 In addition, the by-product range 
and quality was maximised, while the animal was being utilised to the fullest. Similarly, 
the efficiency of production, marketing and distribution was fully developed in the mid- 
1920s, given that the exceptional management know-how of the large transnational meat 
packing corporations, in particular the large U.S. firms and the Vestey's concern, could 
only be minimally bettered through minor improvements vs. the very significant 
advances experienced in the 1900-20 period. Likewise, backward linkages gained from 
the meat staple also achieved maturity. Most land in Argentina and Uruguay was being 
utilised, while further production capacity growth through expanded land availability
382 Gravil, R., The Anglo-Argentine Connection. 1900-39 (Westview Press, Boulder, 1985), pp. 166-167.
383 See chapter 3, section 3.1 for an analysis of the staple theory and the ‘multiplier accelerator mechanism’.
384 The maximisation of efficiency in production, distribution, marketing and logistics o f the frigorificos in the 1920s is 
analysed in a series of articles in The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 1738, March 27, 1925, pp. 13-43. In 
particular, the report on The Smithfield and Argentine Meat Company entitled 'A Brief History o f the Zarate Works - Now
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was minimal.385 Similarly, the railway network connections within the region had 
expanded substantially by the mid-1920s. Therefore, increasing production and 
efficiency gains from further railway expansion were limited, when compared with the 
enormous gains that it provided in the late nineteenth- and early-twentieth century. 
Indeed, the railways experienced strong growth from the late nineteenth century until the 
First World War. Although the war temporarily hindered its extension, the railways 
expanded much slower in the 1920-30s, as can be seen in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Length of Railway Lines in Argentina (in Km) 1896-1936
Year 1896 1910 1914 1925 1936
Km 14462 27714 34534 35753 41000
Source: Cuccorese, H. J., Historia de los Ferrocarriles en la Argentina (Ediciones Macchi, Buenos Aires, 1969), pp. 132-139.
As the railway transportation system kept expanding further into the interior of 
Argentina and Uruguay in the early twentieth century, it furnished an ever increasing 
network to supply cattle in a fast and efficient manner from remote areas to the urban 
centres. This provided frigorificos with a constantly increasing supply and thus 
encouraged the growth of the industry. Moreover, as the amounts of cattle supplied to 
frigorificos increased so did their output, thereby encouraging an important linkage, 
namely the expansion of refrigerated shipping lines, in particular from the River Plate to 
the U.K. Although these 'transportation' linkages grew and helped develop the meat
a Model of Efficiency in Food Animal Utilization' examines the 'maximum efficiency' levels achieved by this major meat 
packing plant.
See section 3.4 for an analysis of the vent-for-surplus attained in the River Plate and its implications for the meat packing 
industry, in particular in the late nineteenth century. For perspective, vent-for-surplus is applied in this thesis in the context 
of H. Myint's theory of international trade and growth in the Third World, evaluated in his book The Economics of the 
Developing Countries (Hutchinson, London, 1984), pp. 32-56, as well as in his article entitled 'The "Classical Theory" of 
International Trade and the Underdeveloped Countries' in The Economic Journal. June 1958, Vol. LXVIII, No. 270, pp. 
317-337. In addition, a further examination of the theory is provided in R. Findlay's and M. Lundahl's paper 'Natural 
Resources, "Vent for Surplus" and the Staple Theory: Trade and Growth with an Endogenous Land Frontier', Columbia 
University, Department of Economics, New York, January 1992, Discussion Paper Series No. 585, pp. 5-11 and 22-36.
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packing industry, their expansion slowed in the 1920s, as the railway covered an ever 
increasing interior network and shipping lines expanded their journeys to the River 
Plate. Furthermore, by the mid-1920s the vast majority of cattle were of superior breed 
and their quality could hardly be improved further. Indeed, the strong demand for the 
highly valued 'chilled steers', that were fat cattle and ideally suited for chilled meat 
production, encouraged extensive cross-breeding, displacing the traditional criollo 
animal. Given that animals could hardly be bettered further, the backward linkages 
related to widespread breeding improvements were exhausted. Thus the supply and 
demand side responses became weaker and the 'multiplier accelerator mechanism' 
reached saturation in the mid-1920s. This represented yet another sign of the 
development of a 'staple trap'.
Moreover, the comparative locational advantage that the River Plate had enjoyed vs. 
Australasia eroded, given that technological innovation enabled the shipment of chilled 
beef from Australia and New Zealand to the U.K. market. Specifically, Australia and 
New Zealand had been unable to ship chilled meat to Britain because of the long 
journey to the important U.K. market, which did not allow chilled meat to arrive in time 
for consumption. Therefore both countries exported mainly frozen meat. However, in 
the mid-1920s through the utilisation of faster refrigerated vessels chilled meat could 
arrive in Britain in time for consumption. 386 The Imperial Economic Committee 
sustained that the greater prices obtained in the U.K. for chilled rather than frozen meat 
might be sufficient to cover the additional expenses for the higher transportation costs
The British Chamber of Commerce Monthly Journal. ‘Fast Transport of Australian Chilled B eef, The British Chamber of 
Commerce in the Argentine Republic, Buenos Aires, Vol. VII, No. 2 ,26  November 1926, pp. 20-21.
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from Australia and New Zealand. 387 Nevertheless, due to the additional shipping costs 
combined with the lack of quality bred cattle in Australia and New Zealand, large scale 
chilled meat exports did not materialise in the 1920s. However, the comparative 
advantage had declined in the long term. This exemplified an additional indication of a 
‘staple trap’ development.
Overall, despite the record volume of River Plate meat exports achieved in the mid- to 
late- 1920s, the first signs of a 'staple trap' were already apparent starting in the early 
1920s, while they gradually increased until the late 1920s. By 1929 the 'staple trap' 
intensified further, as Argentina and Uruguay entered the Great Depression early and the 
already low meat prices declined even more.
5.3 Bilateralism and Control: The Establishment of the Staple Trap (1930-19391
5.3.1 The Impact of the Ottawa Conference and the Roca-Runciman Agreement
The Great Depression came early to the River Plate and in the beginning of the 1930s 
the already low meat and cattle prices continued their declining trend. This combined 
with increased protectionism in Europe had a strong effect on meat exports and 
represented the beginning of a strong crisis in accessing international markets for the 
River Plate meat packing industry. Most importantly and in addition to the severe 
restrictions in Continental European countries, the U.K. also started to impose trade 
barriers on River Plate meat after the Ottawa Conference in 1932. Indeed, following the 
Ottawa Conference, River Plate meat exports were maintained at the very low post 
Great Depression levels, due to strict quantity quotas.
Report o f the Imperial Economic Committee on Marketing and Preparing for Market of Foodstuffs Produced in the 
Overseas Parts of the Empire, Second Report - Meat, presented to Parliament, Cd. 2499, London, 1925, pp. 31-32.
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Meat packers and cattle ranchers were threatened by the market access limitations that 
the Ottawa Conference placed on Argentina and Uruguay. The conference was designed 
to create a type of common market between the Commonwealth countries and Britain. 
Specifically, in the Ottawa Conference, Britain's objective was to create a joint market 
between United Kingdom and the Dominions, while establishing strong trade barriers to 
the outside world. Indeed, the general concept was that the U.K. would import primary 
products principally from the Commonwealth and in return the Commonwealth states 
would buy manufactured goods from Britain. Importantly, the promise made to 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, was that Britain would place strict quotas on non- 
Commonwealth countries and only buy meat from Argentina and Uruguay at their mid- 
1931 to mid-1932 volume base. This represented a major threat to Argentina and 
Uruguay, given that the 1931-32 figures were the lowest export volumes that they had 
experienced in almost a decade. Specifically, Argentina's meat producers had seen their 
volume drop over 25% from 1929 to 1932, due to lower world demand for beef, which 
also reduced prices. This also lowered the net peso sales of estancieros, which declined 
by up to 40% between 1929 and 1932.388 Similarly, in Uruguay chilled exports declined 
40% between 1930 and 1932.389 Furthermore, restrictions on frozen beef, an export 
stronghold of Australia, were constrained even further. Specifically, in regards to frozen 
meat, the Ottawa agreement required that every three months only a certain percentage 
of the amount supplied in the equivalent quarter of the base year could be exported. 
Indeed, a gradual declining quota scale was introduced, which eventually only 
represented 65% of the already low base level for frozen meat.390 However, chilled beef 
would remain at 100% of the base year. The base year percentage of the respective
388 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 139.
389 Finch, H., A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (The MacMillan Press, London, 1981), p. 136.
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quarters for frozen meat from 1933 to mid-1934 were divided into quotas as shown in 
table 5.3 This applied to both Argentina and Uruguay.
Table 5.3: Ottawa Conference Quota as a % of Base Year Quarter (Jan.1933-Jul.1934)
Quarters Frozen Mutton and 
Lamb (%)
Frozen Beef in 
Carcasses and Boned 
Meat (%)
Chilled Beef (%)
1st Quarter 1933 90 90 100
2nd Quarter 1933 85 85 100
3rd Quarter 1933 80 80 100
4 th Quarter 1933 75 75 100
1st Quarter 1934 70 70 100
2nd Quarter 1934 65 65 100
Source: The Review of the River Plate. Volume LXXIII, No. 2134, November 4, 1932, p.21.
As can be seen in table 5.4, the export volume of the full 1931-1932 period declined 
dramatically in comparison with 1926-30 average, particularly frozen bovine meat 
exports. This combined with gradually decreasing quotas in 1933-34 to 65% of the low 
base year for frozen ovine and bovine meat, placed a strong burden on the meat packing 
houses and cattle producers, as meat export volumes reached even lower levels.
Table 5.4: 1931-32 River Plate Meat Exports (F&C) Index vs. the 1926-30 Average
1931-32 Export Volume Index vs. the 1926-30 Average [1926-30 = 100]
Argentina Uruguay Total River Plate
Frozen Ovine 99 55 89
Frozen Bovine 37 60 44
Chilled Bovine 91 103 92
Sources: See Appendixes 20-23.
Hanson, S., Argentine Meat and the British Market (Stanford University Press, California, 1938), p.267.
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Importantly, the 1932 Ottawa conference exemplified one of the largest market access 
crises of the Argentinian and Uruguayan meat packing industry. Indeed, as the U.K. was 
the most important market for Argentinian meat exports, the Ottawa agreement 
represented a large risk of continued export reductions and therefore a further decline in 
foreign exchange reserves, while threatening to worsen the already negative River Plate 
balance of payments. Most importantly, although the Ottawa agreement translated into a 
significant reduction in ‘rent’ for Argentina and Uruguay, both countries maintained 
their ‘cooperative’ stand and tried to sustain quotas at their current level. Nevertheless, 
the Ottawa conference represented a change in British-River Plate trade relations, given 
that the U.K. started reducing her overall ‘cooperative’ stand, with the aim to maximise 
‘rent’ within the confinements of Commonwealth states.
The Ottawa Conference quotas had a shock effect on meat packers and producers alike. 
Specifically, the production capacity levels were in line with the strong, albeit volatile, 
export volume levels experienced in the 1920s, cattle stocks were high, given that 
ranchers expected export volumes and prices to increase in a ‘free’ international trade 
environment. The strict Ottawa quotas, pushed animal prices down even further, as 
cattle were in oversupply and the export volume was limited due to the newly inflicted 
quotas. Specifically, cattle prices halved from their 1929 peak to the lowest point in 
early 1933.
Moreover, the decline in exports in the early 1930s combined with the introduction of 
quotas after the Ottawa Conference and the decrease in cattle producers margins, 
generated strong discontent among cattle producers, who once again voiced their
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concern and anger in the Rural Society meetings and to the government. The 
Argentinian government was concerned due to the establishment of quotas for meat and 
was pressured to increase or at least maintain the export quotas at the levels agreed in 
the Ottawa Conference. This led to a long negotiation process between the British and 
Argentinian governments, which resulted in a special agreement known as the Roca- 
Runciman pact. In Uruguay, the Rural Federation also placed strong pressure on the 
government to keep export quotas. The dispositions of the Roca-Runciman pact in 
regards to export quotas also applied to Uruguay.
The Argentine Rural Society demanded immediate diplomatic action and urged the 
government to speed up negotiations with British authorities.391 Following 
consultations, the government responded by sending a high level government team to 
the U.K. in order to attempt to obtain an agreement with the British government. The 
team of negotiators was headed by Vice-President Julio A. Roca, the son of a former 
President and a key member of the Rural Society. Roca had a clear agenda, which 
consisted of two main mandates.392 To start with, he would attempt to maintain 
Argentina's share of the British market, by keeping chilled beef on the free list and 
ensure that restrictions in excess of those specified in the Ottawa Conference were not 
applied. The Argentinian government was well aware that it was extremely unlikely that 
the negotiations could modify the Ottawa Conference agreements, as expressed by the 
Argentinian Ambassador in London:
"Rural Society Demands Action", The Review of the River Plate. Volume LXXIII, No. 2131, October 14. 1932, p. 9.
Drosdoff, D., El Gobiemo de las Vacas 11933-1956) Tratado Roca-Runciman (Ediciones La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1972), 
pp. 30-35.
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"It is puerile to think that a negotiation of the Argeninian government will be able to alter the 
agreements of Ottawa. We must secure solutions and understandings within the latitude that 
these agreements allow."393
Roca's second priority was to reduce the control of foreign meat packing houses over the 
meat trade in Argentina. The British team of negotiators, headed by the president of the 
Board of Trade, Walter Runciman, had three main priorities towards Argentina. Their 
aim was to unblock £11 million which were held in Argentina, due to stringent 
exchange controls, while expanding the market for British manufactured products and at 
the same time try to protect British farmers, while staying within the Ottawa conference 
agreement. Additionally, Great Britain wanted to ensure Argentina would not default on 
their large foreign debt. Despite taking months to negotiate, a pact was finally signed in 
May 1933, which became known as the Roca-Runciman agreement. In the pact, Britain 
agreed to maintain the quotas allowed through the Ottawa conference and within it to 
permit a quota of 15% for domestic non-profit meat packing houses funded by the 
Argentine government.394 However, two of the Argentinian meat packing plants were 
already incorporated in the quota, thereby leaving only 1 1 % of the allotment to new 
plants.395 The outcome of the Roca Runciman pact applied to Uruguay as well, which 
was included in the Argentine pact.396 In a separate agreement the U.K. offered 
Argentina a £10 million credit, the Roca Funding Loan, to improve the Argentinean 
monetary structure, which contributed to the post-depression recovery. Specifically, the 
Roca Funding Loan enabled the remittance of British blocked funds and an orderly state 
debt-conversion programme through lower denominated bond issues, while this in turn
393 Letter from Argentinian Ambassador Malbran in London to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 10 October 1932, Archive of 
the Argentinian Embassy in London. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Letter Book 297, Notes from 15/3/1932 
to 29/3/1933, London.
394 Puiggros, R., Libre Empresa o Nacionalizacion en la Industria de la Came (Editorial Argumentos, Buenos Aires, 1957), p. 
112.
395 Smith, P., Politics and Beef in Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 144.
396 Finch, H., Historia Economica del Uruguay Contemporaneo (Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1980), p. 142.
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strengthened the government's economic action plan (plan de accion economica). The 
Roca-Runciman agreement was initially valid for three years, until 1936.
The negotiations achieved to maintain the River Plate meat quotas. Indeed, the export 
volumes of the Ottawa base year minus the lowering scale agreed for frozen ovine and 
bovine meat were sustained. Thus the agreement ensured that the quota for frozen 
bovine and ovine meat would not be reduced further. In addition, the Roca-Runciman 
agreement helped Argentinian monetary stability, supported by the Roca Funding Loan. 
Although the chilled beef quota was maintained at the Ottawa base year volume, Great 
Britain reserved the right to reduce this quota by a further 10%, as explained in the first 
article, clause 2 of the Roca-Runciman treaty:
"The Government of the United Kingdom will not reduce the imports o f chilled beef from 
Argentina to an amount more than ten per cent below the quantity imported during the year 
ended the thirtieth day of June, 1932, unless the imports of chilled beef (other than reasonable 
shipments of an experimental nature) or of frozen meat into the United Kingdom from all 
producing countries (including those which are part of the British Commonwealth of Nations) 
are also reduced by a percentage equal to the percentage of the reduction of Argentine chilled 
beef below 90 per cent of the quantity imported in the corresponding quarter of the year ended 
thirtieth day of June 1932. "398
Whereas following the agreement chilled beef shipments were reduced by 10%, they 
remained stable thereafter on a high level, unlike frozen River Plate meat exports, in 
particular frozen beef. Frozen meat exports suffered a significant decrease in the late 
1920s and again in the aftermath of the Great Depression, while they remained at a very 
low level until the late 1930s, due to the strict meat quotas imposed in the Ottawa 
Conference, as can be seen in chart 5.1. Furthermore, the allusion to experimental
397 Alhadeff, P., Dependency Historiography and Objections to the Roca Pact in Abel, C. and Lewis, C. Latin America. 
Economic Imperialism and the State (The Athlone Press, London, 1985), pp. 368-377. Also see The British Chamber of
Commerce in The Argentine Republic Journal. Volume XIII, No. 13, October 31, 1933, pp. 16-17.
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shipments o f chilled meat was intended as a means to continue developing and 
perfecting the technology to transport chilled beef from Australia to the U.K. market. 
Although potential Australasian chilled beef exports to Britain were seen as a strong 
competitive threat and became a concern to River Plate cattle producers, large scale 
chilled shipments from Australasia did not materialise.399
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Sources: See Appendixes 20-25.
Importantly, the Ottawa conference facilitated British control of River Plate meat export 
quotas, given that the U.K. Board of Trade started administering the import licences.400 
The British influence was further consolidated by the Roca-Runciman agreement, 
because it corroborated the control of the U.K. through the concurrence of the 
Argentinian government.
"The New Anglo-Argentine Commercial Treaty", The Review o f the River Plate. Volume LXXIV, No. 2160, May 5, 1933, 
P-17.
Marifio, O., "Competencia Australiana a las Cames Bovinas Argentinas", Anales de la Sociedad Rural Argentina. No. 4, 
April 1933, Buenos Aires, pp. 177-187.
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5.3.2 Struggling with the New Trade Regime: Conflicts. Severe Discontent 
and a Fragmented Domestic Policy Response
In the first three years after the Roca-Runciman agreement, cattle prices were low due to
oversupply, despite stable exports of chilled meat. This is traceable to the production
cycle, by which it took some years before the cattle supply could be reduced, especially
since two successive events forced exports down, namely the Great Depression and
shortly thereafter the Ottawa Conference. However, since 1930 the largest export
decline was of frozen meat, especially frozen beef, which did not require high quality
animals. In contrast, for chilled beef exports, meat packers needed superior cattle, which
were produced by fatteners. Thus, cattle producers that supplied poorer quality animals
endured losses, while fatteners which produced superior cattle for chilled beef business
continued to benefit from a strong business.401 Whereas the Rural Society represented
all cattle producers, it was overwhelmingly controlled by the fatteners. To improve the
balance of power, breeders created a series of alliances, mainly through the creation of
associations. One of the largest and most active breeder groups was CARBAP,
established in 1932, which incorporated numerous associations of the provinces of
Buenos Aires and La Pampa.402 CARBAP was often in conflict with the Rural Society
and represented a strong force that defended breeders interests. As can be seen in chart
5.2 the River Plate meat export volume declined substantially in the early- to mid- 
1930s. This can be attributed to the effect of the Great Depression and especially to the 
Ottawa Conference after 1932.
"Licencias de Importation al Reino Unido" Anales de la Sociedad Rural Argentina. No. 10, October 1940, Buenos Aires, 
p. 785.
Drosdoff, D., El Gobiemo de las Vacas (1933-1956) Tratado Roca-Runciman (Ediciones La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1972), 
p.49.
The breeders group was called the Confederation of Rural Associations of the Province of Buenos Aires and La Pampa 
(Confederation de Asociaciones Rurales de Buenos Aires y La Pampa - CARBAP). Smith, P., Politics and Beef in 
Argentina (Columbia University Press, New York, 1969), p. 154.
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Chart 5.2: River Plate Meat Exports in Tons (5-Year Moving Averages) 
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Sources: See Appendixes 20-25.
5.3.3 Extended Trade Concessions and Restrictions: Their Benefits and 
Disadvantages
In 1936 the Roca-Runciman agreement expired and it was replaced with the Le Breton- 
Eden pact. It represented almost a continuation of the Roca-Runciman agreement as the 
quotas were kept at circa identical levels. However, the new pact had two main 
amendments. Firstly, the Argentinian government was given full control of the export 
quotas and the National Meat Board was given the task of distributing the quotas.403 
Secondly, the United Kingdom introduced an import duty equivalent to $33 Argentinian 
Paper Pesos for chilled meat, $27.43 pesos for frozen meat and $7.02 for conserved 
meat.404 The new tax was equal to 21.5% of the product value.405 In order to avoid cattle 
producer discontent, the import duty was split into three, 1/3 was paid by the cattle
"Cuota de Exportation" Anales de la Sociedad Rural Argentina. No. 10, October 1940, Buenos Aires, p. 783.
Liceaga, J.V., Las Cames en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 189.
Drosdoff, D., El Gobiemo de las Vacas ('1933-1956’) Tratado Roca-Runciman (Ediciones La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1972), 
p. 91.
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producers, 1/3 by the frigorificos and 1/3 by the government. But higher prices helped in 
reducing complaints from cattle producers, as explained in The Economist:
"The new Anglo-Argentinian Trade Treaty ... was received here with mixed feelings. The 
Argentine stockbreeders, as was expected, were particularly disappointed. The meat clauses 
were generally regretted as calculated to reduce mutual trade between the two countries ... The 
Treaty, while far from giving universal satisfaction, is felt to be much less unfavourable to 
Argentina than was expected. Had the Treaty been published six months ago when the 
Argentine economic outlook was dark and depressing, more complaints would probably been 
heard." 406
As cattle prices continued at a high level in 1937 and the economy rebounded, the 
Argentinian payment of 1/3 of the British import duty was abolished. Similarly to 
Argentina, in Uruguay 'the general economic position continued to improve' in 1937 and 
'the all-important livestock industry was in good condition'.407 Despite the economic 
upsurge and a the temporary stabilisation of meat exports in the late 1930s, the Ottawa 
Conference had a significant negative impact on Argentinian and Uruguayan meat 
exports. The River Plate global meat export market share declined sharply in the 1930s, 
decreasing 11.6% points, from 60.5% in 1926-30 to 48.9% in 1934-38. Conversely, 
Australia and New Zealand augmented their global export market shares by 7.7% and 
5.8% points to 15.5% and 17.9% respectively, in 1934-38 vs. 1926-30. Thus the Ottawa 
Conference objective of granting preferences to the Dominions in meat exports was 
clearly achieved. This is depicted in chart 5.3, which shows a sharp rise in the 
Australasian global meat export market shares, mainly at the expense of the River Plate, 
which suffered a severe decline.
The Economist. Vol. CXXV, No. 4870, December 26,1936, p. 636.
The Economist. Trade Supplement, No. 10, October 30, 1937, p.4.
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Chart 5.3: Meat Global Export Market Shares - By Country / Region (%) 
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Sources: See Appendix 12 as well as Section 2.2 for calculation and estimation methods.
5.4 Emergence of I.S.I. and Inward Looking Policies: The Consolidation of the 
‘Staple Trap’ (1940-55)
5.4.1 The Impact of the Second World War on the River Plate Meat Packing 
Industry
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the River Plate meat packing industry 
experienced strong growth, while cattle producers benefited from larger volumes and 
increased prices, as the war increased demand for meat products in Europe. The British 
government concluded a series of contracts with the Argentinian and Uruguayan 
governments for the supply of primarily conserved and canned meat, in addition to war 
rations for the Allied forces. Specifically, the first contracts were agreed with Argentina
1926-30 1934-38
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and Uruguay shortly after Britain declared war to Germany in September 1939.408 
Contracts were of short duration, usually valid for one year, after which they were 
renewed. Meat war supplies needed to be preserved for a long time (i.e. several months), 
while cargo space needed to be minimised. Thus deboned frozen or conserved meat was 
preferred, as well as ready-to-eat rations. War rations were composed of a mix of meat, 
broth and vegetables.409
Argentina and Uruguay profited enormously during the war, by providing agricultural 
products at high prices. Additionally, manufactured goods were difficult to obtain, given 
that the key suppliers, the U.K. and the United States were producing for the war 
machine. Hence, Argentinian and Uruguayan income augmented, while little was being 
spent on manufactured products, thereby increasing reserves dramatically during the 
war. The strong reserves accumulated during the Second World War were crucial in 
financing the subsequent move towards import substitution industrialisation (I.S.I.). 
Throughout the war governmental contracts continued, while the upward trend in meat 
prices was sustained.
During the second world war the political power started shifting from the land owning 
elite to the control of an ever increasing autonomous state. In this context, there was a 
change in ideology, while a group of economists called for greater industrialisation, 
stronger protectionism and increased government control. Hence, a policy of state 
corporatism emerged, aimed at establishing self-sufficiency in the River Plate. The
408 In Uruguay the first contract started in November 1939, as explained in Bernhard, G., Comercio de Carnes en el Uruguay 
(Editores Aguilar e Irazabal, Montevideo, 1958), pp. 36-37. In Argentina contracts were already agreed in September 
1939, as analysed in Puiggros, R., Libre Empresa o Nacionalizacion en la Industria de la Came (Editorial Argumentos, 
Buenos Aires, 1957), p. 182.
409 Malagraba Elichiri, J.P., Mi Vida - 68 Afios en la Industria (Impresos Vanni, Montevideo, 1993), p. 77.
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beginning of this strategy can be traced to the Pinedo plan in Argentina, which was 
recommended in 1940 and outlined the creation of a small industrial base that would 
become a minor wheel of the economy.410 Until the military coup of 1943, the large 
cattle producers lobbied the government to maintain only limited protectionism and 
succeeded in convincing the state to keep the industrialisation process to a minimum. 
However, after the 1943 coup, the role of the state passed from being a defender of the 
large land owners interests to becoming ever more autonomous. The government had 
the goal to establish a considerable industrial base and augment protectionism. A 
government entity called the Consejo Nacional de Postguerra (National Postwar 
Council), led by the then Vice-President Juan Peron, played a key role in formulating a 
post-war vision, which would prove to be key in the subsequent developments of the 
Peron government. The proposal outlined three main orientations for the Argentinian 
policy in the post-war years, namely: "a) to support those activities that are already 
consolidated, b) to suppress those which, at the end of the war, yield before a superior 
competition from abroad and c) to replace the latter with new industries that have 
reasonable prospects".411
When Peron came to power in 1946, he implemented the nationalistic and inward 
looking economic strategies, which had been increasingly vocalised since the early- to 
mid- 1940s. This led to a stringent import substitution industrialisation policy in 
Argentina in the late 1940s, which was also implemented later, albeit more moderately, 
in Uruguay. Importantly, import substitution was financed with the strong reserves 
accumulated during the Second World War in the beginning stages and through the
Waisman, C.H., Reversal of Development in Argentina (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1987), p.131.
Ibid, p. 134.
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surplus of the agricultural sector. Hence, the import substitution industrialisation 
policies in the River Plate after the Second World War obstructed meat exports, due to 
the introduction of very high taxes, export duties and differentiating exchange rate 
schemes.
5.4.2 Peron and British Post-War Economic Policy
By the end of the Second World War, Great Britain had accumulated strong debts due to 
the expensive war effort. The United Kingdom needed to find means to deblock 
millions of pounds, which represented primarily Argentinian exports that had not been 
paid during the war. By 1946, the accumulated Sterling held on Argentine account 
amounted to £130 million.412 In addition, the United Kingdom had to find a way to 
finance future purchases of much needed foodstuffs, in particular beef, from Argentina. 
After vigorous and difficult negotiations, a new pact was signed in September 1946, 
namely the Miranda-Eady agreement. In the pact, the United Kingdom agreed to 
"purchase the exportable surplus from Argentina for four years, after providing a reserve 
for sales by the Argentine Government to other markets."413 Moreover, the agreement 
enabled Argentina to utilise part of the pounds accumulated in Great Britain to repatriate 
Argentine Sterling debt or to repay British investments in Argentina, in addition to 
cancelling a Sterling debt with Brazil414 However, the Sterling debt reduction was not a 
new phenomenon, given that Argentina had been decreasing her foreign debt since the 
early 1940s and thus the clause allowing gradual Sterling debt repatriation merely 
enabled further reductions.415 The most important clause of the agreement, within the
"Argentine's Sterling Balances", The Economist. Vol. CLI, No. 5378, September 21,1946, p. 465.
"Anglo-Argentine Agreement", The Review of the River Plate. Volume Cl, No. 2858, September 20,1946, p. 16.
Idem.
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provisions for the repayments of British investments, was the stipulation that an 
Argentine company, either controlled by the state or with private participation, would 
purchase the British owned railway companies in Argentina.416 In February 1947, the 
Argentinian government purchased the assets of the British railways operating in 
Argentina for £150 million 417 Although the acquisition of the railways did not represent 
an outstanding business proposition, it enabled Argentina to utilise the blocked Sterling 
funds. Britain, on the other hand, was eager to divest from the railways, as explained by 
J. Tulchin:
"The British saw the profitability of the railways declining and, with the impending expiration 
of the Mitre Law in 1947, which protected their interests, they were increasingly anxious to get 
rid of the properties. Sale to the Argentine government in return for blocked sterling deposits 
accumulated during the war seemed to the British to be a very good deal indeed."418
In Uruguay, the post war blocked Sterling credit with Britain was £18 million, and as in 
Argentina, the Uruguayan blocked funds were utilised to nationalise the railways in 
1949.419 Also in the Uruguayan case, the railway purchase was only beneficial because it 
allowed the utilisation of blocked Sterling, given that the railway equipment was mostly 
outdated and the business was declining.
A commercial agreement was signed with Great Britain in 1948, the Los Andes pact, in 
which the U.K. agreed to purchase fixed quantities of meat and agricultural goods, while 
Argentina would obtain various products, including coal and steel from Great Britain.420 
This was followed up by an important bilateral treaty with Great Britain in 1949, in 
which various products would be traded for five years. Specifically, meat and
416 "Anglo-Argentine Agreement", The Review of the River Plate. Volume Cl, No. 2858, September 20, 1946, pp. 16-17.
417 "The Sale o f the Railways", The Review of the River Plate. Volume CII, No. 2879, February 14,1947, pp. 15-19.
418 Tulchin, J. S., Argentina and the United States - A Conflicted Relationship (Twayne Publishers, Boston, 1990), p. 89.
419 Caetano, G., Rilla, J., Historia contemporanea del Uruguay (Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, 1994), p. 174.
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agricultural goods would be exchanged for fuel, iron, steel, chemical and industrial 
products for a total of £250 million.421 Bilateralism with the U.K. continued throughout 
the Peron administration, until his overthrow in 1955.422 By the early 1950s, the U.S.A. 
had emerged as an important meat export market for River Plate meat, while Britain's 
position as the predominant global meat importer was gradually diminishing. Although 
Harold Peterson exaggeratedly claims that 'by 1952 Americans were eating twice as 
much Argentine meat as the English', it is a fact that consumption of River Plate beef 
had increased substantially in the U.S.A .423 Indeed, the U.K.'s worldwide meat import 
distribution shares had dropped from 82.2% in 1934-38 to 68.7% in 1948-52, while the 
North American shares increased from 3.4% to 10.3% in the same period.424
5.4.3 The Peron Era: 'Killing the Milche Cow1 Through Crippling I.S.I. Policies
In 1947 Peron introduced a Trade Promotion Institute, the Instituto Argentino de 
Promocion de Intercambio (IAPI). The IAPI was a state organisation that monopolised 
the Argentinian foreign trade. Through the state control of foreign trade, the IAPI was 
able to absorb a 'rent differential' from the agricultural and cattle production sector, 
which in turn was instrumental in financing the industrialisation process.425 The 
Peronists voiced their interest in the IAPI as follows: "These enormous sums of money 
... which did not reach the coffers of the State, but were retained by important national 
and international firms, enjoying enormous profits out of commercial disposal of
420 Conil Paz, A., Ferrari, G., Argentina's Foreign Policy. 1930-1962 (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 
1966), p. 161.
421 Conil Paz, A., Ferrari, G., Areentina's Foreign Policy. 1930-1962 (Universtiy of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 
1966), p. 163.
422 Drosdoff, D., El Gobiemo de las Vacas (1933-1956') Tratado Roca-Runciman (Ediciones La Bastilla, Buenos Aires, 1972),
p. 135.
423 Peterson, H.F., Argentina and the United States (University Publishers, New York, 1964), p. 478.
424 For sources see appendix 13 and see section 2.3 for calculation and estimation methods of worldwide meat import
distribution shares.
425 Sukup, V., El Peronismo v la Economia Mundial (Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, Buenos Aires, 1992), p.52.
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exportable farm products, are today resources of the State and will serve in great 
measure to finance the undertakings of the Five-Year (Peronist) Plan."426
Peron's import substitution industrialisation policy was financed through the reserves 
accumulated during the Second World War and by extracting surplus from the 
agricultural and livestock sectors. In the early 1950s, the Peron administration started to 
run out of reserves. In order to enlarge the funds extracted from the livestock sector, the 
government took a further step and started intervening directly in meat packing and 
cattle production. For this purpose the National Meat Board was renamed Instituto 
Ganadero Argentino and given the power to establish meat packing companies and 
trade cattle. In addition, taxes were increased further. As a result, cattle producer 
discontent increased and severe conflicts arose with the government, in addition to 
divisions within the government itself.427 By 1952 cattle production had decreased to 
alarmingly low levels, due to state intervention as well as a drought428 Although 
intervention declined moderately in 1952, it was only in 1954 that the National Meat 
Board was finally moved to the Ministry of Commerce, which also assumed the IAPI 
foreign trade functions 429
Despite these changes, Peron's policies had severely crippled the meat sector and further 
consolidated the staple trap in the 1950s. Meat exports declined substantially, while the 
continuous surplus extraction from livestock left Argentina with too little cattle to 
supply export markets. As pointed out by Louise Peffer:
426 "I.A.P.I. and the Plan", The Review of the River Plate. Volume CH. No. 2879, February 14, 1947, pp. 9-11.
427 Carreras de las, A., Legislation v Politica de Carnes (Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, Buenos Aires, 
1989), p. 13.
428 Calvet, J., Un Sielo Frio en la Ganaderia Argentina (CARBAP, Buenos Aires, 1977), p. 60.
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"Beginning with 1950, Argentina's meat problem was not the absence of market outlets but a 
shortage of meat. The cause of the shortage was a combination of drought and producer resistance
to the Peron plan to make the agricultural and livestock sectors of the economy pay for an
430ambitious program of industrialisation".
Total River Plate meat exports decreased further in the early 1950s, reaching levels 
below the expansionary phase of the meat sector in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, as can be seen in chart 5.4. This evidenced the consolidation of the staple trap.
Chart 5.4: River Plate Meat Exports in Tons (5-Year Moving Averages) 
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Sources: See Appendixes 20-23.
Linkages derived from the livestock sector had occurred to the rest of the economy, in
particular the industrial sector. In addition, final demand linkages also took place,
Carreras de las, A., Legislation v Politica de Carnes (Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, Buenos Aires, 
1989), p. 13.
Peffer, E. L., "Foot-and- Mouth Disease in United States Policy", Food Research Institute Studies. Vol. Ill, No. 2, Stanford, 
May 1962, p. 168.
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through increased domestic meat consumption, driven by rising real wages, especially of 
the working classes. Specifically, the amount of beef consumed domestically augmented 
dramatically during the Peron administration, as can be seen in chart 5.5.
Chart 5.5: Argentinian Bovine Meat Produced for Domestic Consumption 












1934-1936 1937-1939 1940-1942 1943-1945 1946-1948 1949-1951 1952-1954
Source: Boletin Mensual de Estadistica, Republica Argentina, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Buenos Aires, 
January 1956, p. 18 and 1949-1950, p. 165. Excluding meat for industrial use (not fit for human consumption).
Although linkages had occurred to other sectors, this was done at a huge long-term 
expense, which in turn caused the further consolidation o f the ‘staple trap’. Indeed, an 
extreme financial burden was placed on the livestock sector, through very high taxation 
and export duties, varying exchange rate policies, as well as due to inefficient and costly 
state intervention. Indeed, the Peron administration had extracted so much surplus from 
the livestock sector, that instead of 'the milche cow' it was starting to 'kill the milking 
cow'. In the long term, the implications were severe. The incentive to produce cattle had
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been eroded by a sharp decline in producers margins. Moreover, there was a strong 
disincentive to export, due to high duties, unfavourable intervened exchange rates and 
state trade control. This also represented an indirect subsidy for domestic consumers, as 
it maintained meat prices lower within the domestic market, thereby reducing 
inflationary pressures. Specifically the export discouragement ensured that an ever 
greater proportion of meat production was diverted for domestic consumption, as can be 
seen in chart 5.6.













■  % o f  Total Bovine Meat Production for Local Consumption □  % o f Total Bovine Meat Production for Export
Source: Calculated with data from Boletin Mensual de Estadistica, Republica Argentina, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y 
Censos, Buenos Aires, January 1956, p. 18 and 1949-1950, p. 165.
5.4.4 The Overall Repercussions of Post-Second World W ar Domestic Policies and 
Its Lone-Term Effect on the River Plate Meat Packing Industry
Despite having a fairly open international meat export market in the late 1940s and early
1950s, Argentina and Uruguay stifled cattle and meat producers due to severe state
1934-1936 1937-1939 1940-1942 1943-1945 1946-1948 1949-1951 1952-1954
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intervention and strict fiscal burdens. Although Uruguay attempted to maintain 
remunerative cattle prices for the livestock sector with subsidies, it still failed in 
augmenting production considerably for export, due to severely distorting policies, 
which hindered market forces. More attractive substitutes, such as wheat production, 
smuggling or operating in the black market, reduced cattle stocks for frigorificos in both 
Argentina and Uruguay. Government controls and severe intervention rather than 
encouraging production, fostered destocking and illegitimate trade. Meat exports, which 
had experienced a significant decline after the Great Depression, because of trade 
restrictions and quotas, decreased further in the mid-1950s due to the government's 
mismanagement of the meat sector.
The import substitution industrialisation policies, which started to be voiced in the 
1930s and were implemented in the 1940s, represented a clear overreaction to the 
market access restrictions. Indeed, Argentina and Uruguay responded to changing 
international trade regimes by shifting the emphasis of traditional exports, including 
meat, to a strategy that emphasised development within their respective countries. The 
policy change neglected exports, while it 'over-extracted' surplus from the export sector. 
This overreaction is traceable to the fear of renewed export restrictions after the end of 
World War II and the lack of industrial goods availability during the war. However, the 
severe I.S.I. policy was taken to an extreme and had a large negative effect on the meat 
packing industry in the long-term. Investment in the industry declined substantially, 
thereby neglecting improvements needed in outdated plant and machinery. Indeed, by 
maximising the surplus derived from traditional exports, governments failed to let meat 
packers and cattle producers obtain enough returns in order to ensure significant
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investment in the export sector. So much surplus was extracted from livestock and meat 
production, that it became unremunerative to produce in the legitimately meat sector, 
while state intervention reduced profitability and increased inefficiency. As a result the 
River Plate global meat market share decreased further, reaching its lowest level since 
the late nineteenth century, as can be seen in chart 5.7.
Chart 5.7: River Plate Meat Export Market Share (Volume - %)
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For sources see Appendixes 1, 2, 4 and 5. For calculation and estimation methods see Section 2.3.
Most importantly, the policies that stifled the livestock and meat production sectors, 
including severe taxation, high export duties and varying exchange rate schemes, 
remained largely in place for over forty decades thereafter, as the program of import 
substitution industrialisation continued. Despite minor attempts to reduce the ‘export 
extraction’ from the livestock sector since the 1950s, it was only in the 1980s that a 
significant process of openness started to take place.431
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When considering the ‘new thinking’ about trade policy, it is evident that I.S.I. was not 
aimed at increasing international ‘rent’ for certain strategic sectors as part of an activist 
trade policy. Rather the goal of the I.S.I. policy was to increase ‘rent’ and ‘external 
economies’ within the confinements of the domestic market for the entire industrial 
sector. Thus, the severe ‘protectionist measures’ were not enacted to provide certain 
domestic firms or industries with a competitive advantage in foreign markets, but to 
encourage overall import substitution and foster a broad range of industrial firms in the 
domestic market. As such the ‘strategic trade policy’ consisted in maximising the 
extraction of ‘surplus’ from the export sector to finance the growth of domestic industry, 
with the ultimate aim of becoming self-sufficient in industrial goods.
Until the mid-1940s, Argentina and Uruguay had benefited from trade with major 
international partners in a broadly ‘outward looking’ and ‘cooperative’ approach. 
However, following the implementation of I.S.I., trade played a diminishing role in an 
increasingly ‘inward looking’ and ‘non-cooperative’ policy formulation. Although the 
U.K., the U.S.A. and Continental European countries placed restrictions on River Plate 
meat imports starting in the 1920s, Argentina and Uruguay still had a sizeable meat 
export business in the 1930s, which grew significantly during the Second World War. 
Cooperation continued in the 1930-40s, in particular with the key U.K. market, although 
the ‘rent’ potential for Argentina and Uruguay had been reduced in the 1930s due to the 
Ottawa Conference quotas. The implementation of the extreme I.S.I. policy in the mid- 
1940s led to a ‘non-cooperative’ stand, while Argentina and Uruguay were increasingly 
faced with a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. Whereas the I.S.I. measures can be attributed to an
Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires. "La Politica Aranceleria y el Comercio Exterior", Comercio Exterior, Ciclo de 
Conferencias, Buenos Aires, 1990.
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over-reaction to the threat of renewed protectionism after the war and the lack of 
availability of industrial goods during the war, as has been analysed, the severe policy 
nevertheless resulted in a trade relations gridlock. Following the post-Second World 
War reconstruction, the gridlock became increasingly evident. Despite moderate efforts 
to find a solution to this overall ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, it remained broadly in place, in 
parallel with the continued ‘inward looking’ I.S.I. policies, albeit with periods of limited 
trade liberalisation and some cooperation.
5.5 Renewed Trade Barriers: Restrictions. Quotas and Subsidies in Major World 
Markets (1955-90)
In 1955-90, market access restrictions for River Plate meat increased in key 
international markets. Indeed, the U.S.A. maintained its ban on chilled and frozen meat 
from the River Plate, while even extending it temporarily to cooked beef, citing 
concerns regarding the spread of Foot and Mouth Disease. This had severe implications, 
given that the U.S. market had grown significantly and by the late 1950s had become an 
important importer of meat. Additionally, it also affected River Plate exports to other 
countries, as many followed the U.S. ban and adopted similar restrictions. The British 
market, which had been the major international buyer of River Plate meat, declined in 
importance. In parallel, the formation of the European Economic Community and 
subsequent creation of the Common Agricultural Policy, limited market access for River 
Plate meat, while also competing with subsidised meat exports in other international 
markets. The combination of these factors placed a notable strain on the River Plate 
meat packing industry.
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5.5.1 The U.S. Foot and Mouth Disease Embargo and Strict Sanitary 
Constraints
Foot and Mouth Disease or aftosa, as it is known in Spanish, is a contagious viral illness 
that affects cattle and other animals. Importantly, the Foot and Mouth Disease (F.M.D.) 
virus survives in the marrow of the bones, in the glands and in the blood of the large 
blood vessels of dead animals. Contrarily, the virus does not survive in the muscles, 
because they undergo acidification in the maturing process after slaughtering, which 
eliminates it. Additionally, the virus dies, when meat is cooked at temperatures above 
80°C. Hence, only if the glands, bone marrow or large blood vessels are exported chilled 
from a region where F.M.D. exists to an area which is free of the disease, is there is a 
risk of spreading the virus. This is why many countries have strict sanitary regulations, 
when importing meat from F.M.D. infected countries. Until the early 1990s there were 
certain regions in the River Plate where F.M.D. existed.
Overall, there are two main import regimes that countries that have F.M.D. have been 
obliged to follow, namely the "zero risk" model and the "minimum risk" regime.330 
Specifically, the "zero risk" model requires that countries exporting from a Foot and 
Mouth Disease infected area, must cook meats to kill the virus before they are exported. 
The "minimum risk" model admits meats from Foot and Mouth Disease countries, as 
long as meat remains at temperatures just over freezing point 72 hours prior to 
deboning. This enables meat to undergo a self-acidification process prior to shipping the 
deboned meat. However, the "zero risk" model is really a misnomer, given that there is 
always a risk that the virus might enter a country in another manner than through the
The ‘minimum risk’ and ‘zero risk’ hypothesis was formulated and put forward by Alberto de las Carreras in numerous 
publications and conference presentations. A. de las Carreras most comprehensive book regarding FMD is La Aftosa en la 
Argentina. Un Desafio Competitivo (Editorial Hemisferio Sur, Buenos Aires, 1993).
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imported meat itself. Hence, the "zero risk" model can only hold true for actual meat 
imports, as the virus can come into a country by other means, such as for example the 
traffic of other imported goods, people and migrant birds.331 Thus "zero risk" as such is 
not attainable, which suggests that this strict regime has been used mainly as a non-tariff 
barrier.
Trade restrictions due to Foot and Mouth Disease date back to 1900, when imports of 
life cattle from the River Plate were prohibited in the United Kingdom.332 This, 
however, did not pose a major threat to the export of meat. On the contrary, it led to a 
faster development of meat packing plants in the River Plate area, which in turn 
increased productivity, augmented value added production and cut costs. In the late 
1920s, the U.S.A. introduced new sanitary restrictions, which prohibited the import of 
River Plate meat to the U.S.A. However, as in the 1920s the major market for meat was 
the U.K., which absorbed almost all the world’s meat exports, the U.S. embargo did not 
affect River Plate meat exports substantially at the time. Nevertheless, after the Second 
World War the purchasing power of the U.S. population increased considerably and 
with it meat consumption expanded, while by the mid- to late- 1950s the U.S.A. became 
an important market for meat. This led to a strong increase in U.S. meat imports, as 
local production did not manage to expand at the same rate as demand.
In the mid 1950s the River Plate cattle stocks began to be partly replenished, after a 
severe decline in the early 1950s, due to interventionist policies coupled with an 
extreme drought, as analysed in the previous section. Indeed, in the mid-1950s,
331 Carreras de las, A., "La Fiebre Aftosa y el Comercio Mundial de Carnes", Organization Panamericana de la Salud:
Reunion Hemispherica de Animales v Productos de Qrieen Animal. F. 3, Buenos Aires, October 16,1978, p. 6 .
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increasing quantities of cured beef started being exported to the growing U.S. market. 
Cured meat portions were beef cuts of around a pound of weight to which 4% salt was 
added and they were ripened for three days at 4°C. By 1958 cured beef exports began 
to represent an important business for the River Plate meat packing industry. However, 
in 1959 the U.S.A. banned cured beef imports from the River Plate, citing concerns of a 
potential F.M.D. contamination risk. As explained by E. Louise Peffer:
"The U.S. Department of Agriculture undertook a study of the survival of the F.M.D. virus in 
cured meat ... Tests demonstrated that infective F.M.D. virus survived in the lymph nodes of 
salt-cured meat for at least 50 days when the meat was prepared in a manner similar to that 
used for the imported cured meat... Argentine scientists were invited to Plum Island to see the 
experiments and the methods by which they were conducted. The report of technicians upon 
their return was that the experiments had not been made in accordance with practices followed 
by Argentina and hence did not represent Argentine conditions."334
Although River Plate cured beef was banned in the U.S.A., corned beef and canned 
meat exports were still allowed. However, the value of corned beef and canned meat 
was much lower and the market for these products was small. The River Plate meat 
packing industry and the governments of Argentina and Uruguay were very concerned 
about the F.M.D. embargo, given that cured beef exports had been a significant 
business. The Argentinian authorities claimed that the U.S. government was placing 
non-tariff barriers on River Plate meat exports. Importantly, they argued that cooked 
meats could be imported into the U.S.A. without risk, in addition to fresh and cured 
meat from vaccinated animals and ovine meat from Tierra del Fuego.336
Liceaga, J., Las Cames en la Economia Argentina (Editorial Raigal, Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 22.
Peffer, E. L., "Foot-and- Mouth Disease in United States Policy", Food Research Institute Studies. Vol. HI, No. 2, Stanford, 
May 1962, p. 168.
Plum Island was a U.S. laboratory that studied foreign animal diseases. Ibid, pp. 169-170.
The Review of the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 3364, June 9,1959, p. 18.
Alemann, R.T., Recordando a Kennedy (Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1996), p. 44.
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It was not until a meeting between the Argentinian Economic Minister, Dr. Roberto T. 
Alemann and the President of the U.S.A., John F. Kennedy took place in May 1961, that 
the dispute over cooked meat imports started to be resolved. The meeting had a 
profound effect on U.S. - Argentinian relations and led to an agreement regarding the 
partial lifting of the U.S. meat ban, as reported in the Review of the River Plate:
"What appears to be a new development is indicated in the press reports of the Minister of 
Economy’s meeting with Mr. Kennedy where it is mentioned that the President had listened 
sympathetically to a statement of the Argentine case for the lifting of the U.S. ban on imports of 
salted beef from this country. The ban, it will be recalled, was imposed two years ago on the 
grounds that the product might be a source of foot-and-mouth infection; its effect was to cut 
Argentina off from a market which was said to be building up to a total o f some 60m. Dollars 
per year. It should not be difficult to devise and enforce a set of regulations that would give the 
U.S. sanitary authorities the assurance they are entitled to regarding the condition of the salted 
beef shipped from this end, and so prepare the way for a resumption of the trade."337
Indeed, Dr. Alemann had requested that a commission study the risk of F.M.D. and that 
any trade restrictions be based on scientific evidence. The goal was to remove the issue 
from the political sphere and obtain an objective analysis. Dr. Roberto T. Alemann gave 
the following account of his successful meeting with John F. Kennedy:
"(The President) aware of my request, invited me to create a special commission, led by a 
scientist to study the problem of the transmission of F.M.D. in cooked meats, which we 
disputed, and they included in their 'zero risk' sanitary policy for meat imports from countries 
with F.M.D.. Kennedy indicated to Goodwin (the President's assistant) in our presence that he 
should form a commission with representatives of the White House, the State Department and 
the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Commerce to find a scientific solution to the dispute. 
Impossible to imagine a more expeditious procedure to guide a solution that came to an end 
after arduous negotiations and scientific investigations. Its consequence was that Argentinian 
frigorificos were able to place cooked meats without a second cooking in the United States, 
which would have removed all selling possibilities. Since 1963 (to 1996) more than one 
thousand seven hundred million dollars of cooked meats have been exported to the United 
States, at the same time Brazil and Uruguay have joined the business with equal conditions and 
won over other markets."338
The matter was passed on to a joint scientific committee, which discovered that the 
F.M.D. virus dies when meat is cooked. Indeed, through scientific investigation a
The Review o f the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 3424, M ay 31 ,1961 , p. 7.
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solution was found that enabled River Plate cooked meats to be exported to the U.S.A. 
In October 1962, the U.S. Department of Agriculture officially approved cooked meat 
imports from F.M.D. affected regions. This ruling has remained in place since then and 
has enabled countries with F.M.D. to export cooked meats to the U.S. market. After the 
ruling, Argentina and to a lesser extent Uruguay, produced and exported large quantities 
of cooked meats to the U.S.A. Nevertheless, chilled meat, which has superior taste and 
texture than cooked meat was still not permitted into the U.S.A. from countries with 
F.M.D. Numerous other countries followed the U.S. "zero risk" policy, in particular 
Canada and Japan, and only widened their imports from F.M.D. countries to cooked 
meats.
Hence the River Plate had a major competitive disadvantage when accessing the large 
and growing North American market. In contrast, Australia and New Zealand benefited 
strongly from the increasing demand in the U.S.A., given that they were F.M.D. free. In 
the United Kingdom, which was the major market for River Plate meat exports, demand 
started to decline. Consequently, in the 1950s-60s, Australia and New Zealand increased 
their meat exports considerably, due to their access to the growing U.S. market, while 
exports of Argentina and Uruguay declined, given that import demand in the U.K. 
decreased. In addition to having access to the U.S.A. market with chilled and frozen 
meat, Australia and New Zealand also exported to the European Community, especially 
the U.K., which was in the F.M.D. area. As a result, they were also able to benefit from 
the declining, yet important British market, on top of the growing U.S. business.
Alemann, R.T., Recordando a Kennedy (Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1996), pp. 45-46. Translated from 
Spanish.
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The trade barriers imposed by the U.S.A. had devastating consequences for River Plate 
meat. Although following stringent negotiations cooked meat exports to the U.S.A. were 
allowed once again, starting in the early 1960s, high value chilled and frozen meat 
exports were still banned. As the American market was growing, the restrictions in the 
U.S.A. constrained Argentinian and Uruguayan meat exports significantly throughout 
1960s-80s. Another important factor that limited the growth of the River Plate meat 
packing industry was the formation of the European Economic Community and the 
establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy.
5.5.2 European Economic Community Production. Export Subsidies and Import 
Quotas
In 1957 the formation of the European Economic Community (E.C.C.) and the 
subsequent creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.), had a very negative 
impact on River Plate meat exports.339 Through the C.A.P. farmers obtained ever 
increasing production subsidies for the majority of the agricultural goods and livestock 
production. In the early 1960s, the Argentinian and Uruguayan governments were 
concerned that River Plate meat exports to the E.E.C. would decline, due to increased 
production in the countries of the E.E.C. Already in 1962, a significant decline was 
predicted, given that production would be stimulated in the E.E.C. by the establishment 
of meat prices that would be ‘well above world prices’ .340 However, during the 1960s,
E.C.C. countries experienced strong economic growth, which in turn led to an 
expansion of food imports and especially meat, as living standards increased and 
demand for meat augmented. By the end of the 1960s the then six members, imported
Mufioz Duran, R., "Aspectos Basicos de la Industria de Carnes de Uruguay", Banco Central del Uruguay. Asesoria 
Economica y Estudios, Montevideo, 1974., pp. 84-91.
The Review o f the River Plate. Buenos Aires, No. 3480, December 2 1 ,1961 , pp. 445-446.
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roughly as much meat as the U.S.A. This short period of strong European demand for 
meat imports benefited the River Plate. However, by the end of the 1960s the E.E.C. 
became a meat exporter, thanks to high agricultural protectionism and subsidies.341
In 1967, the U.K. prohibited meat imports, after a F.M.D. outbreak. This had serious 
repercussions for the River Plate, as the U.K. still represented an important, albeit 
declining, market for meat exports. In 1968 Britain allowed meat imports again, but 
imposed stricter hygiene controls and regulations. The regulations were broadly as 
follows: (i) only boneless chilled bovine meat would be allowed to be imported from
F.M.D. infected countries, with the exception of giblets which had to be cooked, (ii) 
imports of ovine meat from countries with endemic F.M.D. were prohibited and (iii) 
nations with sporadic outbreaks of F.M.D. could continue to import meat in accordance 
with previous conditions.342 These hygienic regulations ensured safe imports of meat 
from F.M.D. areas, based on sound scientific findings. In 1977, the E.E.C. adopted 
similar sanitary and hygiene regulations for meat imports. Thus the British / E.E.C. 
sanitary regulations corresponded to the "minimum risk" model. For perspective, since 
1968 the United Kingdom has been buying meat from F.M.D. infected countries, under 
the "minimum risk" regime. From 1968 to 1992 more than half a million tons of South 
American beef have been imported by Britain and since 1968 Foot and Mouth Disease 
has not been imported into the U.K .343
The E.E.C. policy became increasingly protectionist and in 1964 started regulating meat 
imports, while after the energy crisis in 1972 meat imports were restricted even further
Carreras de las, A., "Past, Present and Future of the International Meat Trade", American Meat Science Association. 
Reciprocal Meat Conference Proceedings, Volume 42,1989, p. 120.
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and the E.E.C. began exporting subsidised meat.344 Hence, starting in the early 1970s 
the E.E.C. was not only subsidising livestock and agricultural production, but also 
exporting subsidised meats. Additionally, strict import quotas were placed on meat from 
outside the E.E.C. In 1972 the E.E.C. was enlarged to nine members, also incorporating 
the important British market as well as Denmark and Ireland. Most importantly, 
subsidised meat exports grew to such levels that the E.E.C. became the largest meat 
exporter in the world in the 1970s and this leadership was expanded further in the 
1980s-90s. The E.E.C. / E.U. global meat market share increased from a high 33.1% in 
1968-72 to an even higher 46.3% in 1988-92, as shown in chart 5.8 on the next page.
Idem, p. 22.
Carreras de las, A., "International Trade Update", AMI Convention. Orlando, 9 October, 1992, p. 2.
Carreras de las, A., El Comercio de Ganados v Carnes en Argentina (Editorial Hemisferio Sur, Buenos Aires, 1986), p. 
114.
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Chart 5.8: Meat Global Export Volume Market Share - By Country / Region (%)
Beef and Sheepmeat - Average Yearly Periods 1968-72 and 1988-92
1968-72
Other River Plate














Sources: See Appendix 12 as well as Section 2.3 for calculation and estimation methods.
However, exports from the E.E.C. / E.U. meat were only possible thanks to subsidies.345 
This is why when the supply of Latin American meat increased in countries which were 
traditional buyers of E.U. meat, such as the North African and the Middle Eastern 
nations, subsidies were augmented to ensure that the E.U. production could be placed at 
lower prices, which in turn distorted the world market.346 These ‘subsidy driven’ price 
distortions occurred especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a result of the
Calloia, F., "La Industria de la Came", Grupo Interdisciplinario de Economia de la Energia (Instituto de Economia, 
Universidad de la Republica, Montevideo, March 1993), p. 28.
Ibid.
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strong subsidies, the cost of the C.A.P. continued to rise throughout the 1970s-80s and 
even in the early 1990s. Specifically, the C.A.P. budgetary expenditure reached over 73 
Billion ECU in 1994, as can be seen in table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Budgetary Expenditure on the E.U. Common Agricultural Policy, 1991-94
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994
E.U. Budget 
(in ECU Millions)
53,823.1 58,857.0 65,522.6 73,303.0
Net Cost of the C.A.P. per 
head in the E.U. (in ECU)
92.4 95.2 103.3 106.5
Source: European Commission. "The Agricultural Situation in the Community" 
(Office for Official Publications o f the EC, Brussels, 1994), p. T/88.
Overall, the E.E.C. ovine and bovine meat production augmented significantly since the 
creation of the C.A.P. Indeed, extremely high farming and export subsidies helped the
E.E.C. to achieve phenomenal growth in meat production in the 1950-80s, as can be 
seen in chart 5.9.
Chart 5.9: E.E.C. (12) Production of Beef and Sheepmeat 
5-Year Moving Averages (1951-1985)
55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85
Sources: Please see Appendix 31.
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Not only did the E.E.C. / E.U. subsidised production epitomise an unfair competitive 
advantage for European producers, but in addition it distorted prices in the world 
market. Moreover and most importantly, export subsidies put strong downward pressure 
on River Plate meat export prices and volume, given that the E.C. / E.U. was competing 
with Argentina and Uruguay as well as other countries with F.M.D. in many 
international markets. Indeed, two price corridors existed, one for meat exports from 
countries with F.M.D. and one for nations without F.M.D.
5.5.3 The General Consequences of the U.S. and E.E.C. / E.U. Trade Restrictions 
The F.M.D. restrictions in the U.S.A. led to the development of two price areas in the 
1950s: (i) the F.M.D. block, comprising the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
Japan, and (ii) the non-F.M.D. block, including South American and European 
countries. Significant price differences developed between the two blocks, especially in 
the mid- to late-1960s when prices were 25% higher in the first block than the 
second.347 Price differences between the two blocks continued to be high and were 
significantly in favour of the non-F.M.D. circuit throughout the 1970-90s. Even in 1992 
major price differentials still remained in favour of the non-F.M.D. circuit, as shown in 
table 5.6.
Carreras de las, A., La Aftosa en la Argentina. Un Desafio Competitive) (Editorial Hemisferio Sur, Buenos Aires, 1993), p. 
1 2 .
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Table 5.6: Prices of Beef Cuts in the F.M.D. and non-F.M.D. Circuits (US$ - 1992)
F.M.D. Circuit Non-F.M.D. Circuit Index of 
Avg. Prices 
F.M.D.=T00
Price Ranges High Low Average High Low Average
Bovine Deboned 
Meat (Industrial)
1800 1400 1600 3000 2700 2850 178
Six Cuts of Frozen 
Backsides
2900 2700 2800 7000 6500 6750 241
Hilton (Chilled) vs. 
U.S. Chilled*
8600 10000 116
Source: Mufloz Duran, R., "Mercado Aftosico Versus Mercado No Aftosico", Seminar Proceedings, COSALFA International 
Seminar, Montevideo, March 18, 1993. (*) Hilton cuts do not exist in the non-F.M.D. circuit. Chilled cuts 
from cattle fed on grain in the U.S.A.are used as a proxy: prices are above US$ 10.000.
The higher prices for the non-F.M.D. block are traceable to the increase in demand in 
the U.S., Canadian and lately the Japanese markets, as the supply of chilled meat 
remained limited to countries without F.M.D., primarily Australia and New Zealand. In 
contrast, the F.M.D. circuit lower prices can be attributed to the increase in production 
and subsidised exports from the E.E.C. / E.U. to other key markets, which forced prices 
lower.
From the 1950s to the 1980s the E.E.C., U.S.A., Australia and New Zealand increased 
meat production substantially, while River Plate production remained flat, as can be 
seen in chart 5.10. Whereas the increase in the E.E.C. reflects the significant rise in 
production and export subsidies, the augmentation in Australia, New Zealand and the 
U.S.A. is traceable to their protective non-F.M.D. zone, which maintained higher prices.
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Chart 5.10: Meat Production in the EEC. USA, Australia, N.Z. and the River Plate 
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Sources: Please see Appendix 31.
In addition to artificial price corridors generated by very high E.E.C. / E.U. subsidies 
and F.M.D. sanitary restrictions in U.S.A., Argentinian and Uruguayan meat exports 
were also strongly hindered by other non-tariff barriers. Although, non-tariff barriers for 
meat exports include voluntary restrictions, subsidies and anti-dumping policies, as well 
as sanitary regulations, quotas were the main constraint for the River Plate meat 
industry, as they restricted the import quantities into key markets. In the early 1990s 
there were three quotas for meat exports to the E.U., namely the G.A.T.T., Hilton and 
the manufacturing quota. Specifically, the G.A.T.T. quota covered 53.000 tons of frozen 
ovine meat only, while it only had an import duty of 20% and was exonerated of internal 
taxes.348 However, signatory countries competed for this quota. The Hilton quota 
consisted of different quantities for the U.S.A., Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
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New Zealand and Uruguay, while Argentina had a total of 28.000 tons.349 The Hilton 
quota was the most important, as it was composed primarily o f quality meats cuts of 
high value. Furthermore, the manufacturing quotas covered exports for industrial use 
and quantities varied from year to year. However, some countries were compensated 
with an additional Hilton quota if they did not utilise the manufacturing quota.
The effect of the increase in tariff and non-tariff barriers, combined with strict sanitary 
restrictions had a strong impact on River Plate meat exports. This combined with higher 
production in Australasia, the E.E.C. / E.U. and the U.S.A. pushed the global meat 
export market share of the River Plate down sharply, as can be seen in chart 5.11. In 














Sources: See Appendix 12 as well as Section 2.3 for calculation and estimation methods.
Baumeule, L., "El Proteccionismo Agricola y el GATT: Incidencias en el Comercio Exterior de Carnes Argentinas" 
(Thesis, Universidad de San Andres, Buenos Aires, 1994), p. 11.
349 Ibid, pp. 11-12.
.11: Meat Global Export Volume Market Share - By Country / Region (%) 
Beef and Sheepmeat - Average Yearly Periods Between 1909-1992
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Overall, regarding the ‘new thinking’ about trade policy, the renewed trade restrictions 
imposed by the U.S.A. and E.E.C. / E.U. for River Plate meat exports in the 1955-90, 
can be partially explained by a general ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, which remained broadly in 
place after the 1950s, despite periods of moderate liberalisation and some cooperation. 
Indeed, Argentina and Uruguay continued their I.S.I. policies, thereby restricting 
imports, especially industrial goods from their key trading partners. Although the E.E.C. 
and the U.S.A. both had strong farming lobbies, and the E.E.C. wanted to be 
increasingly self-sufficient in agricultural and livestock products, the fact that Argentina 
and Uruguay hindered industrial product imports did not help to support the easing of 
restrictions for River Plate meat exports to the E.E.C. and U.S.A. Indeed, the River Plate 
and the countries of the E.E.C. as well as the U.S.A. were reluctant to cooperate to open 
their respective markets and thus increase trade among themselves. This resulted in a 
general ‘inward looking’ and ‘non-cooperative’ stand, and represented a continuation of 
an overall gridlock that had started in the aftermath of the Second World War. This 
broad ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ remained in place until the 1990s, when increased 
‘cooperation’ and negotiations, as part of the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round, led to a 
renewed openness in trade relations.
5.6 Renewed Growth and Export Expansion in the 1990s
Since the early 1990s a clear shift has occurred in international trade regimes towards 
greater openness and a reduction in market access restrictions. This has marked the 
beginning of a new era, with declining trade barriers for River Plate meat and significant 
export growth. Indeed, River Plate meat exports rose strongly in the early to mid-1990s, 
particularly in Uruguay, and were expected to continue on this growing trend. There are
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three main factors that have driven the export expansion. Firstly and most importantly, 
the results of the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round and the subsequent formation of the W.T.O. 
as well as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Secondly, the 
eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Uruguay and more recently in Argentina. 
Thirdly, the formation of Mercosur, which facilitates meat exports to regional markets 
without trade restrictions. The combination of these elements has been instrumental in 
generating strong export growth and in giving a new impetus to the River Plate meat 
packing industry.
5.6.1 The G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round , the S.P.S. and the Establishment of the 
W.T.O.: Crucial World Trade Changes to Relaunch the River Plate Meat 
Packing Industry
The G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round has led to a renewed openness in international trade, 
albeit with gradual and modest concessions.350 Following prolonged negotiations during 
the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1993, a number of specific agreements were 
reached to liberalise international trade. This was considered by many as the last attempt 
to try to reach widespread multilateral accords to reduce trade restrictions, as well as to 
revive the ailing and increasingly impotent G.A.T.T. In addition, the aim was to ensure 
that the agreements reached would be honoured. Thus the Uruguay Round also called 
for a new organisation to succeed the G.A.T.T., which would have more powers to 
enforce trade agreements and settle international disputes. The G.A.T.T. Uruguay 
Round had a large geographical spread. It included a much greater number of countries 
with a significantly higher representation from developing nations than previous
G.A.T.T. rounds.
For a comprehensive history of the GATT rounds and a in-depth examination o f the Uruguay Round and its impact on 
River Plate exports see Carrier, E., La Rueda Uruguay del GATT (Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 
1994), pp. 15-39.
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In regards to the liberalisation of the international meat trade, the Uruguay Round 
negotiations resulted in several multilateral agreements to reduce trade barriers, which 
industrialised countries must implement over a six year period ending in the years 
2000/2001 and developing countries over ten years.351 To start with, countries that 
participated in the Uruguay Round will have to change non-tariff barriers into tariff 
measures - mainly import duties.352 Thus quantity quotas and other forms of non-tariff 
barriers, such as minimum import prices and discriminatory import licensing will be 
eliminated, among member states.353 However, tariff quotas are permitted, by which a 
limited quantity of meat imported by a particular country has lower duties. As part of the 
Uruguay Round agreements, the tariff barriers on agricultural products were agreed to 
be reduced by an average of 36% for developed countries and 24% for developing 
countries.354 Although meat exports over the tariff quota are allowed, the import duties 
outside of the tariff quota remain stubbornly high. Nevertheless, signatory countries are 
committed to increasing tariff quotas and to reducing import duties over time. In 
markets, such as the U.S.A., where the ‘out of tariff quota’ duties are not prohibitively 
high, River Plate meat exports over the tariff quota are already taking place - mainly 
from Uruguay.
Moreover, in the Uruguay Round, countries agreed to reduce meat export subsidies. 
The E.U., by far the largest exporter of subsidised beef, has committed itself to 
restructuring the Common Agricultural Policy (C.A.P.), which should also lead to a
351 Mufloz Duran, R., Resultados en el Sector Came Bovina de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT (Comision Sectorial para el 
Mercosur, Montevideo, April 1995), p.7.
352 World Trade Organization. “Summary of the Results of the Uruguay Round in the Meat Sector”, WTO, Geneva, February 
1995, pp. 6-10. Also see GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round. "Final Act Embodying the Results 
o f the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh" (GATT, Geneva, 1994), p.46.
353 Ibid.
354 "Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations", G.A.T.T. Newsletter (NUR 080, Geneva, 14 Dec. 1993), p. 8 .
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drop in producer subsidies and intervention stock levels. Whereas the C.A.P. reforms 
have already led to a decline in E.U. subsidised exports and intervention stocks, efforts 
have been hindered lately by the B.S.E. crisis.
Another important outcome of the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round is the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (S.P.S.), which is aimed at avoiding the use of 
unjustified sanitary restrictions for protectionist purposes. The S.P.S. provides a 
multilateral forum that can be called upon to settle arbitrary sanitary measures, 
especially those that lack a strong scientific basis.357
“Because sanitary and phytosanitary measures can easily restrict trade, G.A.T.T. member 
governments have long been concerned about the need for clearer rules regarding their use. As 
die results of the Uruguay Round will reduce the incidence of other barriers to trade, 
governments have become more concerned that sanitary and phytosanitary measures might 
increasingly be used for protectionist purposes. The S.P.S. Agreement closes this potential 
loophole. It sets out clearer and more detailed rights and obligations for food safety and animal 
and plant health measures which affect trade. Countries will be permitted to impose only those 
requirements which are needed to protect health and which are based on scientific principles ... 
The S.P.S. Agreement allows countries to give food safety, animal and plant health priority 
over trade, provided there is a demonstrable scientific basis for their food safety and health 
requirement.”358
The S.P.S. Agreement also accepts the concept of regionalisation when considering 
areas with diseases. Specifically, before the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round, the political 
geographical borders of a country were used to determine whether that nation could 
export meat and under which conditions, regardless of the size - geographical extension 
- of the country. In many cases, a large region of a nation, which could easily fit into one 
or several smaller countries, was free of diseases, but meat exports from these areas
Ibid, p. 10. Also see World Trade Qreanization. “Summary of the Results of the Uruguay Round in the Meat Sector”, 
WTO, Geneva, February 1995, p .l l .
For an analysis of the impact of the BSE crisis on the River Plate meat packing industry see section 5.X.
Mision Permanente de la Republica Argentina. “La Argentina y La Ronda Uruguay”, Geneva, April 1994, p.4.
GATT. “Understanding the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures”, GATT 
Secretariat, Geneva, XI-1994), pp. 5 and 10. For an analysis of the SPS Agreement also see Carreras de las, Sanitary 
Barriers in International Trade of Animal Products (International Meat Secretariat, Paris, 1995, pp. 2-4.
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were restricted because of an outbreak of a disease in another, often remote region 
within the same country. Under the new regulations, certain regions that are disease-free 
may export meat under the same sanitary conditions of disease-free nations, even if in 
another area of the same country the disease is still present. The S.P.S. Agreement has 
strong implications for countries with diseases such as F.M.D. Indeed, it enables them to 
challenge trade restrictions based on scientific evidence as well as export from certain 
regions within their country that are F.M.D. free.
“The implementation of the ‘disease free zone’ concept of the S.P.S. Agreement are likely, over 
time, to reduce the existing price differential between international prices in the F.M.D.-free 
(Pacific) region and those in the F.M.D.-affected (Atlantic) zone.”359
Furthermore, as part of the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round, member countries agreed to set­
up a World Trade Organization (W.T.O.) starting operations in 1995. The aim was to 
establish an organisation with more powers that would be able to enforce the rules of the 
former G.A.T.T., in addition to the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round, including 
the S.P.S. For this purpose, the W.T.O. has much stronger ‘trade dispute resolution 
procedures’ than the G.A.T.T., while it is able to act as a type of impartial international 
court to solve disagreements and force member countries to comply with the W.T.O. 
rules and agreements reached.
“In case of a trade dispute, the W.T.O.’s dispute settlement procedures will encourage the 
governments involved to find a mutually acceptable bilateral solution. If the governments 
cannot solve their dispute, they can choose to follow any of several means of dispute 
settlement, including good offices, conciliation, mediation and arbitration. Alternatively, a 
government can request that an impartial panel of trade experts be established to hear all sides 
of the dispute and to make recommendations ... If the panel concludes that a country is 
violating its obligations under an agreement attached to the W.T.O. Agreement, normally it will 
recommend that the country take such action as necessary to bring its measure into conformity 
with its obligations ...”360
World Trade Organization. “The International Markets for Meat 1995-96”, WTO, Geneva, November 1996, p.26.
GATT. “Understanding the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures”, GATT 
Secretariat, Geneva, XI-1994), p. 11.
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The agreements reached during the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round negotiations, including the 
S.P.S. and the establishment of the W.T.O., have already expanded market access and 
are bound to continue reducing trade barriers, albeit gradually.
5.6.2 The Importance of the F.M.D.-Free Status and the Contribution of 
Mercosur to the Expansion of River Plate Meat Exports
Another key driving force that is contributing to the renewed export expansion, is the
eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease (F.M.D.) from Uruguay and Argentina. A
concerted effort started in 1987 to eliminate F.M.D. from Argentina and Uruguay,
whose cornerstone was a widespread vaccination programme. Uruguay managed to
eradicate F.M.D. in 1991.
“In Uruguay, F.M.D. was eliminated in 1991, but vaccination against the disease continued 
until June 1994. Since June 1995, following one year without an outbreak after vaccination 
ceased, Uruguay has been recognised as free of F.M.D.”361
In Argentina progress was also made, but F.M.D. was only eradicated nationally in 
1994, although the Patagonia region had been F.M.D. free. Indeed, the last occurrence of
F.M.D. in Argentina was in April 1994.362 The elimination of the disease enables 
exports to the non-F.M.D. circuit.
The U.S.A. established a new import quota of 20,000 tons of fresh meat each for 
Argentina and Uruguay. Shipments of meat from Uruguay to the U.S. market started in 
November 1995. Argentina is expected to commence meat exports to the U.S.A. in 
August 1997.364 Although proportionately a 20,000 tons tariff quota is much more
361 International Meat Secretariat. Newsletter No. 129, Paris, 29 September 1995, p. 3.
362 The Economist Intelligence Unit. Argentina Country Report, 2nd Quarter 1995, p. 20.
363 World Trade Organization. “The International Markets for Meat 1995-96”, WTO, Geneva, November 1996, p.26.
364 La Nacion. 12 July 1997, section 2, p. 7.
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significant for Uruguay, given its smaller size, than for Argentina, the mere 
authorisation to export to the U.S.A. provides two crucial export building possibilities. 
Firstly, it enables Argentina and Uruguay to export meat to the U.S.A. over the tariff 
quota. The out-of-quota tariff for beef imports to the U.S.A. is a relatively low 31.1% 
and will be gradually reduced to 26.4% by the year 2000/2001, in accordance with the 
U.S. commitments during the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round negotiations.365 Secondly, the 
U.S. meat import clearance for Argentina and Uruguay can also be used as a powerful 
negotiation tool with other important import markets in the F.M.D.-free circuit. Indeed, 
given that the U.S. sanitary regulations are among the most stringent in the world, other 
countries in the non-F.M.D. circuit will find it extremely difficult to justify import 
restrictions based on F.M.D. criteria, especially in light of the W.T.O. regulations. 
Negotiations are already taking place for meat exports to Japan, principally from 
Argentina. Moreover, Uruguay is in talks with Canada about a potential fresh meat 
import quota if  4,000 tons, which could even reach 10,000 tons in the medium term.366 
Other markets which are expected to start importing River Plate chilled and frozen meat 
include Mexico and South Korea. Thus well beyond the 20,000 tons tariff quota each for 
Argentina and Uruguay, the mere opening of the U.S. market represents a excellent 
growth opportunity for River Plate meat exports.
One of the limiting factors that could have a ‘negative value effect’ on River Plate meat 
exports to countries in the non-F.M.D. circuit is consumer taste differentiation. 
Specifically, the U.S. and Japanese consumers are accustomed to eating beef that comes 
from cattle fattened in feedlots and fed mainly on grains. U.S. beef is obtained primarily
365 World Trade Organization. “Summary o f the Results of the Uruguay Round in the Meat Sector”, WTO, Geneva, February
1995, p. 25.
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from animals fattened in feedlots. It has a greater grease content, as well as a different 
taste and texture - often referred to as ‘marbleised’ meat (came marmolada) - than 
River Plate meat obtained from grass fed cattle. Japanese consumers also prefer the U.S. 
type beef and this facilitates meat imports from the U.S.A. Nevertheless, the key 
question remains whether the meat preference is just a substitutable consumer habit or 
an unchangeable cultural taste differentiation. At the moment almost all River Plate 
fresh meat exported to the U.S.A. is not composed of high quality cuts, but mainly 
trimmings (about 80%). These are often used for the production of hamburgers and 
manufactured type meats. Thus meat exports to the U.S.A. command lower prices (up to 
two-thirds lower U.S. Dollar per ton prices) than the ‘rump & loin’ and other high 
quality meat cuts, which are exported to the E.U.368 Australasia, which produces mainly 
grass fed meat, has been partially able to increase the export of better quality cuts to the 
U.S.A. and Asia, albeit in small quantities. This indicates that some substitution seems 
possible.
“... It is not to be excluded that substitution also exists at the high quality end of the market
between grain fed cuts from the United States and grass fed cuts from Argentina and Uruguay
... In both countries there might be scope for the development of a feed lot industry, based on
369market requirements in North America and Japan.”
Cattle production in feed lots is starting in Argentina and to a lesser extend in Uruguay, 
but to date it remains small. In addition to the agreements stemming from the
G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round as well as the F.M.D. free status, another important factor that 
is contributing to export growth is the opening of regional markets. Specifically, the 
formation of Mercosur has facilitated meat exports from Argentina and Uruguay to
366 Interview w ith Roberto Mufioz Duran, M ontevideo, 1 April 1997.
367 Mufioz Duran, R., Cambios en las Corrientes Comerciales de Came Bovina en el Mercado Intemacional para los Anos 90” 
(Banco Central del Uruguay, Departamento de Investigaciones Economicas, Montevideo, April 1990), p. 14.
368 Interview with Dr. Barrios Mariezcurrena, Director, Frigorifico San Jacinto (Nirea), Montevideo, 2 April 1997.
369 Boonekamp, L., “Implications for the World Beef Trade of the Changing Foot and Mouth Disease Status in Latin
America”, International Meat Secretariat Newsletter, No. 130,14 October 1995, pp.2-3
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neighbouring countries, primarily Brazil and Chile (the latter became an ‘associate’ 
member of Mercosur). In particular, buoyant demand in Brazil, following the 
implementation of the Real economic plan, has led to a significant rise in meat 
consumption, which in turn absorbed an increasing quantity of meat imports. However, 
Brazil is a very volatile market and radical changes in demand have often led to periods 
of overcapacity in the River Plate meat packing industry, particularly in times of 
economic contraction.371 In any case, growing River Plate meat exports to other 
international markets are expected to more than offset any potential downturn in 
demand from Brazil.
5.6.3 The Combined Export Expansionary Effect and Positive Prospects
Overall, the agreements reached as a result o f the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round 
negotiations, including the S.P.S. and the formation of the W.T.O., in addition to the 
eradication of F.M.D. and increased regional trade, have created a combined export 
expansionary effect. This expansionary effect has led to increased meat exports to 
markets other than the U.S.A., the E.U. and Mercosur, such as Israel. Indeed, exports 
have grown substantially, especially in Uruguay, as a result of the accumulated benefits 
of these factors, as can be seen in table 5.7.
Iriarte, Ignacio, “Comercializacion de Ganados y Carnes”, Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, July 1995, pp. 
70-72.
Interview w ith Dr. Barrios M ariezcurrena, Director, Frigorifico San Jacinto (Nirea), M ontevideo, 2 April 1997.
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1992 71.321 100 296.407 100
1993 61.913 87 280.455 95
1994 96.124 135 376.187 127
1995 90.824 127 516.580 174
1996 140.031 196 466.379 157
1997* 189.410 266 398.100 134
♦Notes: The 1997 figure for Uruguay is annualised volume data from 01JAN97 to 13JUL97 only 
and for Argentina is annualised volume data from 01JAN97 to 31MAR97 only.
Data: Uruguayan figures are based on loaded freight weight in tons.
Argentinian figures are based on carcass weight with bone in tons.
Sources: Uruguay - Instituto Nacional de Carnes
Argentina - Direccion de Mercados Ganaderos
Uruguay has achieved higher export growth than Argentina, primarily due to the earlier 
eradication of F.M.D. Importantly, Argentina is expected to follow suit and increase 
exports significantly with the start of fresh meat shipments to the U.S.A. in August 
1997.
From a mid-1997 perspective, the prospects for River Plate meat export growth look 
positive, but the export expansion is expected to be gradual. The Asian markets are 
considered to be those with the greatest potential, in particular Japan and South Korea, 
which are expected to be ‘opened’ for River Plate meat due to the Argentinian and 
Uruguayan F.M.D. free status. This despite sluggish overall demand in Japan 
reflecting stagnant economic conditions and a potential downturn in South Korea. In 
parallel, negotiations to increase the tariff quotas of the U.S.A. and the E.U. are 
expected to continue. However, the recent opening of the U.S. market and the B.S.E.
Mufioz Duran, R., Resultados en el Sector Came Bovina de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT (Comision Sectorial para el 
Mercosur, Montevideo, April 1995), p. 17.
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crisis affecting the E.U. are hindering further increases in tariff quotas in the short­
term.373 Nevertheless, the clearly growing trend in River Plate meat exports is expected 
to continue, and the outlook for further market access concessions, especially in the 
medium- and long- term, is positive.
Argentina and Uruguay might also benefit from a reduction in Australian and New 
Zealand exports. Indeed, River Plate meat competes mainly with Australasian exports in 
the non-F.M.D. circuit. Although cattle prices have declined substantially in Australia, 
this is not attributed yet to increasing River Plate exports, given that to date only 
Uruguay has exported to the F.M.D. free circuit and the volumes are small. Rather 
Australia has suffered from drought and an appreciating Australian Dollar, which led to 
a reduction in exports and cattle stocks.374 Argentina and Uruguay are expected to be 
able to export over their quota to the U.S.A., to make up for the shortfall of meat exports 
from other countries, primarily Australia.375 Therefore, the River Plate will take over, at 
least temporarily, some of the Australasian tariff quota allocation in the U.S.A. Thus, if 
the declining trend in Australasian exports continues, then the outlook for River Plate
'\*7  f .
meat looks even more positive.
“ ... The regionalization principle and on the sanitary and phytosanitary measures will be the 
catalyst for major changes in the structure of world beef trade in the years to come. The change 
is unlikely to be rapid, but over the medium term the inclusion in the dynamic Pacific beef 
market of major low cost beef producers from Latin America is going to change competitive 
positions. Beef producers in Australia and New Zealand, which produce a similar type of beef 
than do Latin American producers, will be hurt first ... Depending on the substitution 
possibilities between high quality grass fed beef from Latin America and grain fed beef from 
the United States, U.S. beef producers and exporters may also be affected.”377
For an analysis of the effect of the BSE crisis on River Plate meat exports to the E.U., see section 5.X (next section).
World Trade Organization. “The International Markets for Meat 1995-96”, WTO, Geneva, November 1996, p. 34.
Reuter News Service, Reuter Business Briefing, Buenos Aires, 14 June 1996.
Interview with Luis Baumeule (nieto), Frigorifico Paty-Quickfood, Buenos Aires, 8 April 1997.
Boonekamp, L., “Implications for the World Beef Trade of the Changing Foot and Mouth Disease Status in Latin 
America”, International Meat Secretariat Newsletter, No. 130,14 October 1995, pp.2-3
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Argentinian government officials were euphoric about the prospects of meat exports. 
The Secretary of Agriculture, Felipe Sola, predicted a doubling of Argentinian meat 
exports by the year 2000, once ‘access is gained to the Japanese and Korean markets’.378 
Whereas this target might be too aggressive, it still reflects a clear expectation of strong 
export growth. This positive outlook is shared in Uruguay. “We firmly believe that since 
last year (1994) we have entered into a stimulant phase for the bovine meat trade of 
Uruguay ... The prospects are positive.”379 Additionally, outside observers of the River 
Plate meat trade, such as the W.T.O. are also cautiously optimistic about the outlook of 
the Argentinian and Uruguayan meat exports.
“The Uruguayan beef industry is set on an expansion course for the years to come, mainly 
driven by favourable prospects on some export markets ... Argentina’s export could increase 
significantly provided that other countries, particularly in Asia, follow suit in recognising 
Argentina as a F.M.D.-ffee region.”380
Beyond any short-term export gains, the positive expectations reflect the perception of 
major change, which should result in sustained growth for the Argentinian and 
Uruguayan meat packing industry. Indeed, an important underlying shift has been 
occurring towards a new era of long-term trade ‘openness’ and significant expansion of 
River Plate meat exports, albeit gradually. This shift characterises a change in trade 
regimes towards freer trade. It supersedes an era of protectionism and major trade 
barriers for River Plate meat exports, which started in the late 1920s and consolidated in 
the aftermath of the Great Depression. Indeed, a full cycle has taken place, from ‘free’ 
trade until the 1930s, to ‘bilateralism and control’ (1930s-1990s) and to renewed ‘free 
trade and liberalisation’ in the 1990s.
378 Reuter News Service, Reuter Business Briefing, Buenos Aires, 6 June 1996.
379 Mufioz Duran, R., Resultados en el Sector Came Bovina de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT (Comision Sectorial para el
Mercosur, Montevideo, April 1995), p .l. (Translated from Spanish).
380 World Trade Organization. “The International Markets for Meat 1995-96” , WTO, Geneva, November 1996, pp. 22 and 26.
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5.6.4 The B.S.E. Crisis and Its Effect on River Plate Meat Exports
Already in early 1994, there was growing concern among European consumers that 
B.S.E. (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) or ‘mad cow’ disease, that affects cattle, 
could be transmitted to human beings. As a result, beef consumption decreased 11% in
i o i
Britain and between 20-25% in Germany. After a comprehensive public relations and 
advertising campaign, as well as new E.U. rulings on beef exports, consumption 
improved again in mid-1994. European demand increased in 1995 vs. the lower 1994 
figures and was slightly higher when compared with 1993.382 However, consumer 
confidence was shattered once again in March 1996 after the British government 
announced that there could be a link between B.S.E. and the human equivalent 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. After the announcement, consumption fell sharply, 26% m
Britain, 15% in France, 35% in Germany and 45% in Italy (May 1996 figures vs. year 
ago).384 This was one of the most severe periods of crisis of the European beef industry, 
with meat and cattle prices collapsing to extremely low levels. The crisis triggered a 
major increase in intervention purchases and led to much greater E.U. intervention 
stocks. As a result, it reverted the gains and important efforts made by the E.U. to
i o r
reduce intervention stocks, which in 1995 had almost reached a level of zero.
In the beginning of the B.S.E. crisis the River Plate meat packers were optimistic, given 
that they expected demand for ‘B.S.E. free’ and grass fed beef to increase significantly 
in Europe.386 B.S.E. is linked to the use of animal waste, particularly meat and bone 
meal stemming from sheep with Scrapie (a similar disease that affects sheep, but that is
381 World Trade Organization. “The International Markets for Meat 1994-95”, WTO, Geneva, February 1995, pp. 17-18.
382 Ibid, p. 19.
383 World Trade Organization. “The International Markets for Meat 1995-96”, WTO, Geneva, November 1996, p. 13.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid, pp. 4 and 14.
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not believed to affect human beings directly), as well as cattle with B.S.E., in the 
production of concentrated feedstuffs for cattle. Thus, it was assumed that consumers 
would have preferred River Plate beef, which is derived primarily from extensively 
produced and grass fed cattle, and comes from a region which has never had a reported 
case of either Scrapie or B.S.E.387 The River Plate meat packers expected that demand 
for ‘free range, grass fed and B.S.E.-free beef would increase and that this would have 
translated into higher prices. However, European consumers did not discriminate 
between the origin of beef. Rather they reduced their consumption across the board on 
all types of beef, due to a general decrease in consumer confidence. Thus prices of River 
Plate beef in the EU declined sharply. The high value Hilton quota prices, which is 
composed of exceptional quality meat cuts, decreased from around US$10,000-11,000 
to US$ 6,000 per ton.388
The response of Argentina and Uruguay was to launch a strong public relations and 
advertising campaign in the E.U. Specifically, the Uruguayan President made a series of 
speeches in Europe, including a keynote address at the U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (F.A.O.) in Rome, in which he emphasised that Uruguay was free of
OOQ
B.S.E. In parallel the ‘Uruguay Natural Beef advertising and promotional campaign 
was stepped up. Argentina launched a strong publicity campaign in Europe, 
concentrating efforts in Germany, which is the largest E.U. market for Argentinian 
beef.390 The objective of the campaign was to:
386 Interview with Dr. Barrios Mariezcurrena, Director, Frigorifico San Jacinto (Nirea), Montevideo, 2 April 1997.
387 For an analysis of BSE risk factors in Argentina, see a comprehensive report by Dr. B. Can6, et al, “Argentina BSE Free” 
on the internet website: http://www.mecon.ar/agricultura/azulcara.htm.
388 Interview with Dr. Barrios Mariezcurrena, Director, Frigorifico San Jacinto (Nirea), Montevideo, 2 April 1997. Also see 
World Trade Oreanization. “The International Markets for Meat 1995-96”, WTO, Geneva, November 1996, p.22.
389 Reuter News Service, Reuter Business Briefing, Rome, 27 May 1996.
390 Reuter News Service, Reuter Business Briefing (AE London), 14 June 1996, from Agra Europe (London), 19 April 1996.
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highlight that its cattle are free of disease and to persuade consumers to look for Argentine 
b eef... The campaign will also explain that Argentine cattle are range-free and do not consume 
animal entrails ... All Argentine beef and products entering Europe will now carry labels that 
state they are disease-free.”391
In addition, Argentina created internet web-sites to promote Argentina ‘B.S.E.-Free’ 
beef and to electronically publish scientific reports that analysed the risk of B.S.E. in 
Argentina.392 Moreover, due to the B.S.E. crisis, requests for enlargements of the Hilton 
quota for exports to the E.U. were postponed.
"Argentina, along with a number of other third countries, also concedes that with the declining 
sales of beef not only in the U.K. but in all of Europe, the time is, probably not ripe to seek 
immediate W.T.O. action or to press for an increase of its annual (Hilton) quota ... to the 
E.U."393
In late 1996, the B.S.E. crisis was gradually overcome. Demand for beef recuperated 
again, after a series of measures were enacted, including a British beef export ban to 
other E.U. countries, as well as a widespread initiative to slaughter and incinerate cattle 
from infected herds. Despite the measures, consumption remained about a tenth below 
the 1995 figures.394 Although intervention purchases declined in the first half of 1997, 
intervention stocks were still significant, albeit declining in mid-1997. They were 
expected to continue on a downward trend. Hilton quota beef prices also recovered, 
increasing to around US$8,000 per ton by end-1996, but were still below the pre-B.S.E. 
crisis levels.395
Although the worst of the B.S.E. crisis was over in 1997, it highlighted the importance 
for the River Plate meat packing industry to diversify exports to numerous markets.
Ibid.
See Internet web-sites: http://www.mecon.ar/agricultura/azulcara.htm and http://www.mecon.ar/invest/beef/meata.htm.
Reuter News Service, Reuter Business Briefing (AE Brussels), 7 June 1996, from Agra Europe (London), 12 April 1996.
World Trade Organization. “The International Markets for Meat 1995-96”, WTO, Geneva, November 1996, p. 14 and 22. 
Also see Mufioz Duran, R , “Informe Sobre el Mercado de Came Bovina de la Comunidad Europea en lo que Va del Ano
1996”, INAC, 11 November 1996, pp. 8-9.
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Expected high value market ‘openings’ in Asia, particularly Japan, combined with 
pending approvals to export to Canada and Mexico, should enable Argentinian and 
Uruguayan meat packers to offset potential downfalls in the value of exports, through 
market diversification.
5.6.5 Adopting an Activist Trade Policy for the River Plate Meat Packing 
Industry in the 1990s
Both Argentina and Uruguay have identified the meat packing industry as a key sector
for export growth. The respective governments have negotiated intensively, as part of
the Uruguay Round, to reduce trade barriers for River Plate meat and discourage ‘unfair’
competition from subsidised exports. These negotiations, which started to gain
momentum in the early 1990s are continuing, in order to ensure an ever increasing
international market for River Plate meat. This is clearly part of a new ‘activist’ trade
policy, whose objective is not only to ‘open’ new markets, such as Canada, Mexico and
Japan, but also to gain further access for River Plate meat in the E.U. and the U.S.A.,
while continuing to insist on lower export and producer subsidies, primarily in the E.U.
The export sector, which had been neglected since the introduction of extreme I.S.I. 
measures by the Peron administration in the mid-1940s, has become of utmost 
importance again in the 1990s. Argentina and Uruguay underwent radical reforms in the 
early 1990s to open up the domestic market to foreign competition. Import duties were 
reduced significantly and anti-inflationary / currency stabilisation programmes enacted. 
The measures led to an influx of imported goods, particularly industrial products. As a 
result, local industry has suffered as domestic companies were often unable to compete
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with larger foreign firms, given that many had become inefficient, their plants were 
outdated and their products were of a relatively poor quality. In synthesis, I.S.I. policies 
had shielded many of the domestic industrial firms from stringent global competition. 
Additionally, the stabilisation programmes led to a major increase in demand for foreign 
products. Consequently, imports rose drastically and the trade balance of Argentina and 
Uruguay deteriorated significantly in the early 1990s. Although Uruguay had a healthy 
balance of payments, mainly due to its relatively large financial services sector, the trade 
deficit remained stubbornly high. Thus, as a counterweight, it became important for 
Argentina and Uruguay to expand exports and to identify sectors for export 
development.
Overall, the strong liberalisation and stabilisation measures enacted in the early 1990s, 
represent a shift from an ‘inward looking’ policy, broadly based on an I.S.I. strategy 
since the mid-1940s, to an ‘outward looking’ policy that tries to incorporate Argentina 
and Uruguay into an increasingly globalised economy in the 1990s. Trade strategies play 
a growing role in the ‘outward looking’ policy formulation.
When considering Paul R. Krugman’s ‘new thinking’ about trade policy and James 
Brander’s rationales for strategic trade policy, it is evident that in the 1990s both the 
Argentinian and Uruguayan governments have formulated a strong activist trade policy, 
containing certain aspects of their theory. The thesis is not suggesting that Argentinian 
and Uruguayan policy makers were directly influenced by Krugman’s and Brander’s 
ideas, but rather that there are certain elements of their concepts that were incorporated 
in trade policy. For perspective, Krugman suggests that governments should favour
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certain strategic industries, which might enable countries to benefit from a greater share 
of ‘rent’ and larger ‘external economies’, while Brander goes further and proposes that 
‘profit shifting subsidies’ and ‘protectionist measures’ should be used as trade policy 
tools to achieve these goals.396 In this respect, Argentina and Uruguay have identified 
the meat packing industry as a ‘strategic’ sector in which the international share of ‘rent’ 
can be expanded, albeit gradually. Additionally, the ‘external economies’ of the meat 
packing industry are large. They include the important generation of economies of scale 
and ‘throughput’ for frigorificos, as analysed in chapter 4, and benefits related to cattle 
producers productivity gains. Indeed, cattle producers have been ‘moving down the
397learning curve’, while increasing yields per hectare and expanding feedlots.
Importantly, ‘protectionist measures’ are in place in Argentina and Uruguay. 
Specifically, Argentina has a bound rate of duty of 35% on bovine and sheepmeat, while 
Uruguay has a 55% tariff on beef and 60% on sheepmeat, the latter will be gradually 
reduced to 35% by 2004.398 The import duties are part of a strategic trade policy to 
enable the generation of economies of scale, ‘throughput’ and ‘external economies’ in 
the meat packing industry, by hindering potential imports of highly subsidised meat, 
such as E.U. beef. These ‘protectionist measures’ have been very effective, given that 
virtually no meat is imported to Argentina and Uruguay. On the subsidies front, 
Argentina and Uruguay agreed, as part of the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round negotiations, not 
to use export subsidies.399 As counterweight measures, the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round 
agreements stipulate that developed countries, including the E.U., must at least reduce
396 See section 5.1 for a comprehensive analysis of “new thinking” about international trade.
397 Iriarte, Ignacio, “Comercializacion de Ganados y Carnes”, Camara Argentina de Consignatarios de Ganado, July 1995, pp. 
70-72.
398 World Trade Organization. “Summary of the Results of the Uruguay Round in the Meat Sector”, WTO, Geneva, February
1995, p. 27 and 30.
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subsidised exports by 21% in volume and 36% in total budgetary outlays over 1995- 
2001, and that Australia and New Zealand will not be permitted to use export 
subsidies.400
Argentina and Uruguay faced the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ starting in the mid-1940s, as 
policies based on I.S.I. fostered strong protectionist measures and extreme surplus 
extraction from the export sector. This in turn led to a ‘non-cooperative’ stand and a 
broad ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, which generally remained in place until the early 1990s, 
albeit with periods of limited trade liberalisation and some cooperation. From a 
‘strategic trade policy’ point of view, the opening of the Argentinian and Uruguayan 
market marks a renewed willingness to cooperate with its international trading partners. 
It allows foreign countries access to the domestic market for their goods. Thus the 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ which Argentina and Uruguay faced during the ‘non-cooperative’ 
period since the mid-1940s has turned into a ‘cooperative’ approach in the 1990s. This 
new ‘cooperative’ stand has resulted in concessions from key trading partners, including 
increased market access for River Plate meat. Indeed, since Argentina and Uruguay 
cooperated, the overall response of foreign countries has been to cooperate as well.
Although ‘tit-for-tat’ strategies have been used in the negotiations to seek cooperation 
from other countries, their importance in the 1990s has diminished for two main 
reasons. Firstly, after the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round, country to country unilateral 
negotiations have become increasingly intermingled with multilateral talks, while some 
overlapping also occurs with negotiations between trade blocks. This has led to ever
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more complex trade negotiations and it has therefore become more difficult to 
implement and sometimes even identify ‘tit-for-tat’ strategies. Secondly and most 
importantly, the creation of the W.T.O. dispute resolution procedure, which acts as an 
independent ‘international trade tribunal’, has coerced many countries to cooperate. The 
mere threat of the potential to take a dispute to the W.T.O., often encourages 
agreements. Frequently, ‘compensation exchanges’ have been used to settle disputes, by 
which market access in one sector of a country has been exchanged as compensation for 
another in a different country or trade block. The Argentinian and Uruguayan 
government’s new activist trade policy is concentrating on opening new markets by 
using the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round agreements, including the S.P.S., as a basis for 
cooperative negotiations, while keeping the W.T.O. as a dispute resolution provider of 
last resort. Uruguay is in negotiations with Canada and Mexico, while Argentina is 
expected to enter the Japanese and Korean market in the short-term, as well as trying to 
‘open’ China.401 In addition, the pressure for more market access in the E.U. is 
continuing, although it has been temporarily put on hold, pending a further easing of the 
B.S.E. crisis.402 Linked to this is the demand for further reductions or the elimination of 
subsidised meat exports, particularly from the E.U. This seems increasingly realistic 
given that E.U. intervention purchases renewed their declining trend. These combined 
negotiations coupled with an expected new round of multilateral W.T.O. sponsored 
agricultural talks in 1999/2000, are forecasted to continue expanding market access for 
River Plate meat. The activist trade policy to date has been successful, but additional 
market access and further cooperation will be needed to ensure a greater share of ‘rent’ 
for the River Plate meat packing industry in the longer-term.
La Nacion. 12 July 1997, section 2, p. 7 and Interview with Roberto Mufioz Duran, Montevideo, 1 April 1997.
Reuter News Service, Reuter Business Briefing (AE Brussels), 7 June 1996, from Agra Europe (London), 12 April 1996.
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5.7 Conclusion
Although the first signs of the ‘staple trap’ were already apparent in the 1920s, the 
conclusive establishment of the ‘staple trap’ occurred in the 1930s. Demand and supply 
side responses derived from the staple declined substantially after the Great Depression, 
while the Ottawa Conference worsened the downturn. Indeed, through bilateralism and 
control the already decreasing post-depression export volumes were fixed at a very low 
base, thereby severely limiting the strength of the staple. Given that the U.S. market was 
closed and the majority of the European countries had placed severe restrictions on meat 
imports, the River Plate was forced to manage with the limited export volume of the 
restricted, yet extremely important British market. The Ottawa Conference represented a 
modification in British-River Plate trade relations, as the U.K. began decreasing her 
general ‘cooperative’ position, while trying to enlarge ‘rent’ within the limitations of the 
Commonwealth states. Whereas the Ottawa Conference translated into a notable decline 
in ‘rent’, Argentina and Uruguay maintained a ‘cooperative’ stand, while trying to 
‘freeze’ quotas. Indeed, the domestic policy concern was to ensure that the export quotas 
would not be limited further, which was broadly achieved through the Roca-Runciman 
agreement.
The Second World War brought a brief respite and strong demand from war stricken 
Europe ensured an increase in meat exports. However, these were confined by 
government contracts. After the war most international markets were willing to purchase 
River Plate meat. Yet, Argentina and Uruguay were unable to supply large quantities of 
meat. Not only had cattle stocks diminished, but the domestic market had also grown 
significantly. Indeed, through the implementation of an extreme I.S.I. policy, the state
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extracted the surplus of the livestock and agricultural sectors to finance industrialisation, 
by levying very high taxes, export duties, utilising differentiating exchange rates and 
intervening directly in the trade of primary products as well as the meat packing 
industry. However, the I.S.I. policy was taken to an extreme, as the governments 
overreacted to trade restrictions prior to the war and lack of supplies of industrialised 
products during the war. Cattle producers did not have an incentive to produce, while 
they often suffered from a lack of profitability. As a result, some cattle producers started 
operating in the ‘grey’ market and many switched to more lucrative crop production. 
Thus the state was not milking the ‘milche cow’ in order to finance I.S.I., but was rather 
‘killing the milking cow’. Through this extreme domestic policy the ‘staple trap’ was 
consolidated. Although strong linkages to the industrial sector occurred, they were 
short-lived, as the export sector was unable to support such a strong surplus extraction 
in the long-term. The extreme I.S.I. policy was not part of an activist trade policy to 
enlarge the international ‘rent’ for specific strategic sectors. Instead the objective of the
I.S.I. policy was to expand ‘rent’ and ‘external economies’ for all the industrial sector in 
the domestic economy. As such it was an ‘inward looking’ strategy that utilised the 
surplus extraction of the export sector to build a broadly based domestic industry. 
Indeed, the aim of the ‘protectionist measures’ was not to provide certain domestic firms 
or industries with a competitive advantage in foreign markets, but to encourage the 
development of the entire industrial sector, with the goal of becoming self-sufficient 
domestically. After the mid-1940s, Argentina and Uruguay were increasingly confronted 
with a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, given that the non-cooperative and ‘inward looking’ 
position led to a gridlock in trade relations.
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In the mid- to late- 1950s, a moderate liberalisation programme, helped recuperate some 
lost ground, as production increased and meat exports to the U.S.A. and Europe 
expanded. However, in the late-1950s the U.S.A. placed renewed trade restrictions on 
River Plate meat based on F.M.D. sanitary controls. After intense negotiations, in 
particular by the Argentinian Minister of Economics at the time, Dr. Roberto Alemann, 
the U.S.A. partially lifted the embargo in the early 1960s and allowed salted meat 
exports. Nevertheless, chilled and frozen meat from the River Plate was still not allowed 
to be exported to the U.S.A. In addition to the F.M.D. constraints in the U.S. market, the 
formation of the European Community and particularly the Common Agricultural Policy 
(C.A.P.) led to more trade restrictions and lowered the value of River Plate meat 
exports. The C.A.P. started subsidising producers and E.E.C. meat exports, thereby 
putting severe pressure on meat prices and cannibalising the meat export business in 
traditional River Plate markets. Most importantly, River Plate meat exports to the E.E.C. 
were limited significantly through a quota system, while prices in the F.M.D. corridor 
declined sharply. River Plate meat exports continued to be restricted throughout the 
1960-80s, through severe tariff and non-tariff barriers, including quotas, import duties 
and F.M.D. regulations.
Whereas there were some moderate attempts to search for a solution to the ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’, overall it remained in place in 1955-90, despite periods of increased 
liberalisation and cooperation. Argentina and Uruguay maintained their I.S.I. policies 
and thus impeded imports, particularly of industrial products. This in turn did not 
encourage trading partners to reduce barriers for River Plate meat. Indeed, in general 
terms, the River Plate as well as the E.E.C. and the U.S.A. were disinclined to cooperate
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIMES AND THE DOMESTIC POLICY REACTION 3 ^ 7
and to substantially diminish their respective trade restrictions in order to ‘open’ their 
markets and expand trade between themselves. The consequences of this ‘non- 
cooperative’ and ‘inward-looking’ position was that the gridlock in trade relations and 
thus the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ which had developed in the mid-1940s persisted in 
general terms until the early 1990s.
Since the early 1990s, a shift in international trade regimes has taken place towards 
increased trade ‘openness’. It marks the beginning of a new era with greater market 
access for River Plate meat and significant export growth, while it supersedes an epoch 
of protectionism and major trade restrictions that commenced in the late 1920s. Most 
importantly, a full cycle has taken place, from ‘free’ trade until the 1920s, to 
‘bilateralism and control’ (1930s-1990s), and back to renewed ‘free trade and 
liberalisation’ in the 1990s.
River Plate meat exports have increased sharply in the early- to mid-1990s, particularly 
in Uruguay, while they are predicted to expand further. The renewed meat export growth 
can be attributed to: (i) the outcome of the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round negotiations and 
the creation of the W.T.O. as well as the S.P.S. agreement, (ii) the eradication of
F.M.D., which enables exports to the non-F.M.D. circuit and (iii) the formation of 
Mercosur that has resulted in greater regional meat exports. The accumulated benefits of 
these factors have led to a combined expansionary effect. Indeed, River Plate meat 
exports have increased significantly, not just to the U.S.A., the E.U., albeit with 
temporary difficulties due to the B.S.E. crisis, and Mercosur, but also to other markets. 
As a result of the expanded number of markets, River Plate meat exports benefit from
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greater diversification. This has proven to be of utmost importance in light of the 
significant decline in E.U. demand following the B.S.E. crisis.
Although the export sector had been neglected since the implementation of extreme
I.S.I. policies in the aftermath of the Second World War, in the 1990s it has become of 
crucial significance again. Argentina and Uruguay enacted fundamental reforms which 
opened their market to foreign competition and liberalised their trade policy, while 
establishing anti-inflationary / currency stabilisation programmes. Thus, I.S.I. policies 
were faded out and import restrictions, primarily import duties, were reduced to a 
minimum. This represented a major change from an ‘inward looking’ policy with a 
broadly ‘uncooperative’ stand, characterised by I.S.I., to an ‘outward looking’ approach, 
that embraced the ‘global economy’ of the 1990s. In addition, it also demonstrated that 
Argentina and Uruguay were willing to ‘cooperate’ with their trading partners. The 
‘cooperative’ position has led to major concessions from trading partners, not least 
greater market access for River Plate meat, as they have responded by cooperating as 
well. Consequently, they no longer face the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ as the gridlock in trade 
negotiations has faded, due to the broadly ‘cooperative’ and ‘outward looking’ stand.
Following the implementation of the reforms in the 1990s, Argentina and Uruguay 
needed to increase exports and recognise sectors that had potential for export expansion. 
In this respect, they have identified meat packing as a ‘strategic sector’ in which the 
international share of ‘rent’ can be increased, and have thus adopted an activist trade 
policy for the industry. Indeed, they have maintained ‘protectionist measures’ for the 
sector to impede imports of greatly subsidised meat and enable economies of scale and
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‘external economies’. Whereas Argentina and Uruguay agreed not to use subsidies 
following the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round negotiations, as counterweight measures, the 
E.U. has committed to significantly reduce their high subsidies, while Australia and 
New Zealand will not be allowed to use subsidies either. In addition, as part of the new 
activist trade policy, the Argentinian and Uruguayan governments are seeking to ‘open’ 
new markets for River Plate meat, through ‘cooperative’ negotiations based on the
G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round agreements, while the W.T.O. is utilised as a trade dispute 
resolution provider of last recourse. Both Argentina and Uruguay are expected to ‘open’ 
several new markets soon for River Plate meat. In addition, they continue to maintain 
the pressure to enlarge access in major markets and reduce subsidies, particularly in the
E.U. From a mid-1997 point of view, the numerous negotiations taking place, in 
addition to a potential new round of W.T.O. agricultural talks in 1999/2000, are 
expected to enlarge market access for River Plate meat. Meanwhile, the River Plate 
meat packing industry’s share of international ‘rent’ continues to grow. However, it 




The thesis has analysed the impact of technological innovation, modifications in the 
ownership structure and changing international trade regimes on the River Plate meat 
packing industry. The combination of these factors as well as domestic policy were 
interrelated and jointly influenced the progression of the meat packing industry. 
Whereas the decline of the industry was principally due to changing international trade 
regimes, other factors also induced and affected the process, thereby accelerating the 
descent of the River Plate meat packing industry starting in the late 1920s. Similarly, the 
combined effect of these elements is also bringing about a move back towards renewed 
growth of the industry in the mid-1990s. As such, the rise, subsequent decline and latest 
expansion of the industry was driven by a series of factors and reasons that were 
interconnected, incited each other and ultimately influenced the development of the 
River Plate meat packing industry.
To start with, the rise of the industry was driven principally by technological innovation. 
However, other factors were also crucial in facilitating the expansion of the industry. In 
particular, domestic policy, an ‘open’ international trade regime, the modernisation of 
cattle production and foreign investment, played a major role in the growth of the 
industry. By applying the staple theory, the thesis has shown that numerous supply and 
demand side responses as well as spread effects occurred that enabled the rise of the 
industry. Some of these responses were related to technological innovation, while others 
were crucial effects, such as a supporting domestic policy environment.
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The demand side responses included consequential forward and backward linkages.
Specifically, the principal forward linkage was the progressive amelioration in
production and conservation methods, which allowed successive improvements in the
quality of meat and enabled the expansion of the byproduct range. The production
technologies and facilities advanced, from the colonial estancia, to the saladero, to the
Liebig plant, and finally to the frigorifico. Another forward linkage that was
indispensable was the development of transatlantic shipping routes from the River Plate
to exports markets. Moreover, the development of a transportation network in the River
Plate, initially of waterways and then through the building of the railways, represented a
significant backward linkage that greatly improved the movement of cattle from
estancias to the meat packing plants. Finally, the export of high quality chilled meat
required another major backward linkage, namely the breeding and refinement of cattle.
In addition to the forward and backward linkages, there were some spread effects, which
were fundamental for the rise of the industry, including crucial domestic policy and
institutional factors. It would have been very difficult for the industry to develop without
a proper legal framework and the establishment of property rights.
There were also vital supply side responses, such as the transfer of technology, capital 
and management know-how. Technology transfer was needed to produce meat extract as 
well as frozen and chilled meat. Moreover, management know-how was required, not 
just to operate complex machinery, but also in relation to logistics and marketing 
expertise. Finally, foreign capital was needed to finance the expensive extraction and 
refrigeration machinery.
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Thus the rise of the industry can be ascribed to an aggregation of demand and supply
side responses, as well as spread effects, which had an impact on each other and were
interdependent. The accumulating and intensifying demand and supply side responses
led to the development of a ‘multiplier accelerator mechanism’, whereby the more
powerful the linkages, the more the industry would expand and this in turn would
generate additional linkages. During this process, the value added of the meat staple
grew, progressively shifting from sun dried meat, to tasajo, to meat extract and cooked
packaged meat, to frozen mutton, to frozen beef and finally to chilled beef.
Increasing foreign capital participation in the meat packing industry brought about 
remarkable changes in the ownership structure. Whereas frigorificos started to displace 
saladeros in the late nineteenth century, this process was significantly accelerated with 
the entrance of the large U.S. meat packers in the early twentieth century. The goal of 
the American meat packers was to increase their economies of scale and scope, by 
maximising their market share. Through a series of price wars they obtained an ever 
greater share of the market. This ultimately led to the U.S. packer’s leadership and 
control of the industry. The greater share enabled them to generate abundant 
‘throughput’ and surpass the ‘minimum efficient scale’ for their immense plants. Price 
wars were stopped through pool agreements, in which meat export shares were divided 
among frigorificos. Through pools, meat packers took over the ‘invisible hand’ of 
market forces by controlling supply. Although the visible hand of management 
coordinated supply, numerous price wars disrupted the process. In each successive price 
war the U.S. meat packers gained market share and consolidated the industry further.
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In the first phase of consolidation until the 1920s, the American packers gained share at
the expense of Anglo-Argentinian frigorificos. Until the 1920s, the Argentinian and
Uruguayan governments were unwilling to take major action. Meat wars were not
discouraged, as they resulted in higher cattle prices. It was only following the post First
World War recession, that governments started to voice concern about the consolidation
of the industry. Indeed, the post war recession typified a breaking point in the increasing
trend of cattle prices and expanding exports since the early twentieth century. As a
result, cattle producers urged the government to take action. Whereas domestic policy
responded by passing numerous anti-trust laws and legislation to establish state run
frigorificos, these laws were not immediately implemented. Meat packers had developed
a special relationship with fatteners, by providing higher prices for cattle and other
advantages to them, while in return meat packers obtained a powerful voice in domestic
policy. The meat packers were able to continue with the consolidation of the industry
without major resistance and by the mid-1920s the industry had reached extreme
oligopolistic dimensions.
Moreover, following the First World War an important alteration in the power struggle 
and rivalry between frigorificos occurred. The ascent of the British Vestey group in the 
1920s, which expanded into one of the largest global meat packers, represented a major 
challenge for the American frigorificos. As a result, the leadership battle did not occur 
any longer between the American and Anglo-Argentinian meat packers. Instead, the 
battle took place between the large and small frigorificos. Domestic policy in Uruguay 
reacted to the extreme consolidation of the industry by establishing the Frigorifico 
National, a state run meat packing plant. The aim was to reduce the power of foreign 
meat packers and ensure higher prices for cattle producers. In Argentina, the alliance
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with fatteners led to more political infighting, and public frigorificos did not start
functioning until the late 1930s.
Whereas the export volume of River Plate meat reached record levels in the late 1920s, 
the first signs of the ‘staple trap’ were evident. Notwithstanding the increase in volume, 
the actual value of exports declined significantly, while several European countries 
severely restricted River Plate meat imports in the mid to late 1920s. The combination 
of the reduction in the value of exports, increased protectionism and the outbreak of the 
Great Depression were detrimental for the industry. In the 1930s, the establishment of 
the ‘staple trap’ took place, when following the Ottawa Conference, Britain also 
imposed strict quotas for River Plate meat. As a result, the demand and supply side 
responses derived from the meat staple decreased significantly, while the ‘multiplier 
accelerator mechanism’ reached saturation. Although the Roca-Runciman agreement 
avoided a further substantial decline in quotas, it fixed meat exports at the low levels of 
the early 1930s. In general, the international trade regime shifted from ‘free’ trade to 
bilateralism and control in the 1930s. Moreover, the Ottawa Conference depicted an 
alteration in British and River Plate trade relations, given that Britain started reducing 
her overall ‘cooperative’ stand, while seeking to expand ‘rent’ inside the Empire. Yet, in 
the 1930s, Argentina and Uruguay retained their ‘cooperative’ position, despite the 
remarkable decline in ‘rent’ that they suffered.
The reduction in meat exports in the 1930s following the Great Depression and the 
Ottawa Conference, resulted in a sharp fall in cattle prices. However, in Argentina 
breeders suffered the most from the cattle price decline, because both meat packers and 
fatteners increased their margins to sustain their profitability, despite lower prices.
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Whereas demand for meat in the major U.K. market recovered in the mid-193Os,
breeders continued to suffer from low cattle prices. This led to the infamous De la Torre
parliamentary debates, whose aim was to increase breeder prices. The intense and tragic
De la Torre scuffles managed to weaken the alliance between meat packers and
fatteners. The parliamentary debates ended with the creation of the C.A.P. public
frigorificos, combined with the control of export quotas by the Argentinian and
Uruguayan governments. As a result, in the second half of the 1930s, cattle producers,
especially breeders, enjoyed higher prices.
The Second World War represented a positive interval for the meat packing industry, 
given that demand for River Plate meat from war stricken Europe rose significantly. 
Argentina and Uruguay were able to accumulate substantial reserves. After the war, an 
extreme I.S.I. policy was implemented, funded through the reserves and exaggerated 
surplus extraction from the livestock sector. Whereas following the war, the major 
international markets were ready to buy from the River Plate, Argentina and Uruguay 
were incapable of providing large amounts of meat. This can be traced primarily to the 
decline in cattle stocks as a consequence of I.S.I. policies. Indeed, so much surplus was 
extracted from the livestock sector that it became unprofitable to produce cattle in the 
legitimate market. As a consequence of this extreme policy, the ‘staple trap’ was 
consolidated. Whereas strong linkages took place, especially to the industrial sector, 
they did not last, given that the excessive extraction from the export sector was not 
sustainable in the long run. As such, the extreme I.S.I. policy did not correspond to an 
activist trade policy to increase the international ‘rent’ for certain strategic sectors, but 
was a method of diverting large funds to rapidly build a domestic industrial apparatus.
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This inward-looking and non-cooperative stand resulted in a gridlock in trade relations,
and both Argentina and Uruguay encountered a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.
Insufficient cattle stocks as well as state intervention and control, reduced the 
profitability of the large foreign meat packers substantially, given that they were 
operating with excess capacity and very high fixed costs. Furthermore, domestic policy 
became ‘schizophrenic’, varying between state intervention and moderate market 
orientation. In this intricate domestic policy environment, small and efficient meat 
packers surfaced, leading to the rise of the nueva industria.
Whereas state intervention was most notable in the late 1940s and early 1950s, overall 
‘intervention and control’ policies continued until the late 1970s, albeit with intervals of 
increased market orientation. The ownership structure changed as the large foreign 
packers gradually ceased operating in the 1950s. Most of these plants were taken over 
by the workers and the state. As such, state intervention created substantial distortions, 
given that large outdated plants remained in operation despite being highly inefficient. 
In the 1960s smaller and leaner frigorificos started to emerge, whose lower capacity 
threshold enabled them to make significant inroads into the traditional packers’ 
business. They were able to achieve ‘minimum efficient scale’ due to their small size, 
while also benefiting from lower labour and plant costs. The nueva industria 
progressively expanded their market share. Subsequently, the segunda nueva industria 
took over leadership in the 1970s.
Beginning in the late 1950s, the U.S.A. imposed even stricter F.M.D. sanitary 
restrictions on River Plate meat. It was only after arduous negotiations, that the embargo
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was partially lifted and salted meat exports from the River Plate were permitted to the
U.S.A. However, the ban for higher value chilled and frozen meat exports to the U.S.
market continued. Moreover, the creation of the European Community as well as the
Common Agricultural Policy also contributed to export hindrances. Specifically, the
E.C. started to subsidise producers and meat exports, while it limited River Plate meat 
imports through strict quotas. In addition, the E.C. competed with River Plate exports to 
other international markets with subsidised meat. Consequently, meat prices in the
F.M.D. corridor dropped significantly and River Plate exports declined in both volume 
and value terms.
Overall, the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ that had developed in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, prevailed until the 1990s. Given that Argentina and Uruguay retained their
I.S.I. policies, they were restricting imports into their markets. Therefore, trading 
partners were also reluctant to reduce their trade barriers for River Plate meat. Thus 
overall the River Plate, the E.C. and the U.S.A. were hesitant to cooperate to open their 
respective markets. This non-cooperative and ‘inward looking’ stand led to a broad 
gridlock in trade relations.
In the 1990s, River Plate meat packing is experiencing a renaissance, as the industry is 
gradually entering a new era of growth. Indeed, meat exports have expanded 
substantially, especially in Uruguay, driven by increased trade openness, market 
liberalisation and disease control. Within this context, a number of elements have 
fostered renewed growth in the industry. Firstly, the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round 
negotiations, the creation of the W.T.O. and the S.P.S. agreement contributed to ‘freer’ 
overall trade. Secondly, Argentina and Uruguay eradicated F.M.D., which enabled River
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Plate meat exports to the non-F.M.D. circuit, especially to the U.S.A. and major Asian
markets. This has led to the lifting of the U.S. embargo for chilled and frozen meat, as
well as the establishment of a 20,000 tons quota for each Argentina and Uruguay.
Thirdly, the establishment of Mercosur has fostered regional meat exports, particularly
to Brazil and Chile. Fourthly, the liberalisation policies established in the 1980-90s
encouraged the industry to function in an economic environment driven by market
forces. Finally, the tax and regulatory enforcement has been improved, thereby
encouraging legitimate market transactions. The accumulated advantages of these
elements have led to a combined expansionary effect. River Plate meat exports have
grown substantially to an enlarged number of markets. Therefore, exports have been
diversified and the potential effect of a downturn in any particular market has been
reduced. The B.S.E. crisis in Europe has shown how important diversification can be in
order to counterbalance sudden downward demand fluctuations.
Within the freer and more ordered market environment of the 1990s, there is renewed 
foreign capital interest and consolidation in the industry. Meat packers are able to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope in a liberalised market with higher volumes 
and lower capacity. As a result the industry is consolidating.
Following a considerable disregard for the export sector since the introduction of 
extreme I.S.I. policies in the mid-1940s, it has started to play a consequential role again 
in the 1990s. As part of a comprehensive liberalisation programme, both Argentina and 
Uruguay have abolished I.S.I. policies, decreased import duties substantially, opened 
their markets and implemented monetary stabilisation programmes. Thus Argentina and 
Uruguay have substantially modified their trade and economic policy, moving from an
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inward looking and uncooperative approach, to an outward looking and cooperative
position. This cooperative stand has brought about positive gestures and compromises
from trading partners, including greater market access for Argentinian and Uruguayan
meat. Given that the River Plate and the trading partners are cooperating, and have
adopted an outward looking approach, the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ has languished.
Argentina and Uruguay have identified the meat packing industry as a strategic sector 
that has strong export growth potential, and in which the share of ‘international rent’ 
and ‘external economies’ can be enlarged. As such, they have adopted an ‘activist trade 
policy’ for the industry, while maintaining protectionist measures in order to prevent 
unfair competition from subsidised foreign meat in the domestic market and allow the 
sector to benefit from economies of scale. Moreover, Argentina and Uruguay are 
striving to increase access for River Plate meat in foreign markets, within a cooperative 
framework that utilises the G.A.T.T. Uruguay Round agreements as a basis for 
negotiations.
Overall, in the twentieth century, a full cycle has taken place in the River Plate meat 
packing industry, moving from a ‘free’ international trade regime until the late 1920s, to 
a period of ‘bilateralism and control’ and back to ‘free trade and liberalisation’ in the 
1990s. Likewise, the ownership structure of the River Plate meat packing industry 
shifted from local ownership until the late nineteenth century to mainly foreign 
ownership from the 1900s until the mid-1940s. Thereafter, the foreign meat packers 
withdrew from the River Plate and large frigorificos were taken over by the workers and 
the state. This led to a period of state intervention and control. With the emergence and 
growth of the nueva industria in the 1960-70s, the industry shifted back to local
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ownership. In the 1990s, there is renewed foreign capital interest and participation in the
industry. In parallel, domestic policy shifted, from laissez faire economic policies until
the end of the Second World War, to import substitution industrialisation, combined
with control and intervention from the mid-1940s until the late 1980s. In the 1990s,
there is a return to market oriented policies and liberalisation.
The cycle is corroborated by the theories applied in the thesis. Firstly, through the staple 
theory, the thesis has shown how meat was key in generating important demand and 
supply side responses until the 1920s. Following the first signs of the ‘staple trap’ in the 
1920s, it was established in the 1930s, while it consolidated in the 1940-60s. In the 
1990s the meat packing industry is flourishing again. Similarly, Chandler’s ‘scale and 
scope’ has demonstrated the importance of reaching ‘minimum efficient scale’ and 
significant ‘throughput’ in order to benefit from economies of scale and scope. This was 
achieved until the 1940s, but then the capacity threshold declined, and more efficient 
plants became the driving force of the industry. Indeed, economies of scale and scope 
were less important within an industry that had large overcapacity, substantial market 
distortions and reduced export volumes, broadly from the mid-1940s until the 1980s. 
However, in the 1990s, ‘scale and scope’ has gained in relevance again, as liberalisation 
policies and a ‘freer’ international trade regime enables the industry to operate in an 
environment driven by market forces, and market access to foreign markets is 
expanding. Finally, when considering the ‘new thinking’ about trade policy, Argentina 
and Uruguay maintained a broadly cooperative and outward looking position until the 
mid-1940s. Thereafter, the implementation of I.S.I. policies led to an inward looking 
and non-cooperative stand, and they faced a broad ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ until the 1990s. 
After enacting a widespread trade liberalisation programme and opening up their
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markets to foreign competition in the 1990s, they no longer face the ‘prisoner’s
dilemma’, as the renewed outward looking and cooperative approach has led to
concessions from trading partners, including greater market access for meat. In addition,
Argentina and Uruguay have established an ‘activist trade policy’ for the meat packing
industry.
As a whole, the connections between the factors that impacted the River Plate meat 
packing industry are evidenced by similar trends and their resembling cycles in the 
evolution of the industry, which demonstrates their closely knight interrelations. Indeed, 
technological innovation, modifications in the ownership structure and changing 
international trade regimes, as well as domestic policy factors, influenced and drove 
each other into certain directions, that in turn determined the fate of the River Plate meat 
packing industry.
Growth prospects look promising for the River Plate meat packing industry from a mid- 
1997 perspective. Domestic policy is predicted to remain favourable to the industry and 
liberalisation is likely to continue, while tax and regulatory enforcement is expected to 
be strengthened further. Whereas consolidation is inevitable, it seems unlikely that the 
ownership structure of the industry will reach extreme oligopolistic proportions in the 
short- to medium- term, that would put significant downward pressure on prices. From a 
trade standpoint, Argentina and Uruguay are foreseen to ‘open’ several markets for 
River Plate meat and to continue insisting on lower subsidies in the E.U., as well as 
greater quotas in North America and Europe. However, it is not clear whether 
substantial increases in market access can be obtained in the long-run. If the W.T.O. 
agricultural talks proceed as expected in 1999/2000 and are successful, they could act as
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a springboard for further significant reductions in trade barriers in the new millennium.
The outcome will depend primarily on whether the ‘freer’ international trade regime and
the pace of trade liberalisation can be maintained in the years to come.
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(188) 408.9 (73) 195.0 (48) (35) 325.2 (167) (58) 98.4 (30) (18) 67.8 (69) (12) 140.4 (207) (25)
Chilled Sheepmeat 
Frozen Sheepmeat 










(113) 49.5 (64) 51.5 (104) (66) 27.4 (53) (35) 6.3 (23) (8) 2.4 (38) (3) 1.9 (79) (2)
Other Prepared (b)
Canned (b)










































Total C.&F. Beef, O. Prep, and Canned (< 319.4 (51) 627.3 (196) 484.7 (77) 283.6 (59) (45) 439.2 (155) (70) 216.6 (49) (35) 166.3 (77) (27) 246.6 (148) (39)














(457) 54.4 (55) 53.5 (98) (54) 102.0 (191) (103) 90.0 (88) (90) 54.3 (60) (55) 89.4 (165) (90)
Chilled Sheepmeat 
Frozen Sheepmeat










(823) 7.7 (35) 8.0 (104) (36) 11.8 (147) (53) 14.8 (126) (67) 10.9 (74) (49) 10.9 (100) (49)
Other Prepared (b)
Canned (b)









































Total C.&F. Beef, 0 .  Prep, and Canned (< 68.6 (50) 136.3 (199) 93.9 (69) 72.2 (77) (53) 107.4 (149) (79) 100.0 (93) (73) 66.8 (67) (49) 100.8 (151) (74)
















(206) 463.3 (70) 248.5 (54) (38) 427.2 (172) (65) 188.4 (44) (29) 122.1 (65) (19) 229.8 (188) (35)
Chilled Sheepmeat 
Frozen Sheepmeat 













57.2 (57) 59.5 (104) (60) 39.2 (66) (39) 21.1 (54) (21) 13.3 (63) (13) 12.8 (96) (13)
Other Prepared (b)
Canned (b)




































(113) 128.2 (107) (121) 111.0 (87) (105) (d)
Total C.&F. Beef, 0 .  Prep, and Canned (< 388.0 (51) 763.6 (197) 578.6 (76) 355.8 (61) (47) 546.6 (154) 0 2 ) 316.6 (58) (41) 233.2 (74) (31) 229.8 (99) (30)
TOTAL 459.4 (53) 863.6 (188) 635.8 (74) 415.3 (65) (48) 585.8 (141) (68) 337.7 (58) (39) 246.5 (73) (29) 360.2 (146) (42)
W ORLD EXPORTS fc)
Total Chilled and Frozen Beef (c)
Total Chilled and Frozen Sheep (c)
Total Other Prepared and Canned (d)













































































TOTAL 879.4 (62) 1427.5 (162) 1300.0 (91) 1266.0 (97) (89) 4004.1 (316) (281) 7136.1 (178) (500) 7474.6 (105) (524) 7798.9 (104) (546)
1909-13: 'law—t o l Yraitnfc of Apkalranl
1994-3S rad 1949-32: * Train Yaratoak', Food a 
1909-72: 'Traia Yawto*', Food rad 
1999-90: 'Tnda Yaraba*'. Faod rad 
1991-92: 'Tnda Yaaitoek', Food rad 
1993-94: 'Traia YaMtak'. Food aad
rfAgrta***, Kara. 1929, taMa U9-140, pp. 419-423.
low. 19*7, hUm  70-71, pp. 460-479.
1939, taklra 7 - l a r i  12-13, pp. 33-33 aad 63 
Koran, 1972, r i b  9-10, 16 rad 19, pp.36-33 ,31-34 rad 
Koran, 1990, taUra 13-14, 20 aad 2). pp.60-64 ,73-76 rad 91-93. 
Koran, 1993, tabfaa 13-14, »  rad 23, pp.30-34 ,43-46 rad 31-33. 
Koran, 1994. taUaa 13-14, 2D and 23, pp.30-34 ,43-46 aad 31-33.
(a) Far Ui^wy fca 1909-13 pariod in aa avaraga afoatf 1*10-13.
(b) la 1909-13 rad 1926-30 'Ofear Pr^arad aad Caarad' Ktvar Phan
la 1969-72, 1999-92, 1993 *  1994 'Oftar Piagarad1 an 'Utm, <
(c) lacdadaa '<Mar P i^ in l  rad C iw l ia 1909-13 aad 1936-3a
(d) Ib 1909-13, 1936-30 aad 6h 1994 Dabii n '(Mar Praparad aad Caaad' 
(a) 'CUUed aad Fncaa Barf1 ptaa* Tattl (Mar Piapaiid tadCaraad1 b aa
aakadaraMad, vbaftar ar an b  aM0K a
d brio *a ‘Odllad aad Fia





































vs. Prev. vs. Base 
Period) Period)
Total Chilled and Frozen Beef (c) 51.4% -4.1% 55.5% 4.1% 56.0% 0.5% 38.2% -17.8% -17.3% 16.0% -22.2% -39.5% 2.2% -13.8% -53.3% 1.4% -0.7% -54.1% 2.9% 1.4% -52.6%
Total Chilled and Frozen Sheep (c) 26.6% 0.5% 26.1% -0.5% 14.1% -12.0% 13.7% -0.4% -12.4% 3.8% -9.9% -22.3% 0.7% -3.1% -25.4% 0.3% -0.4% -25.9% 0.2% -0.1% -25.9%
Total Other Prepared and Canned (d) (d) (d) 34.5% 34.5% 23.3% -11.1% 23.3% 9.1% -14.2% 9.1% 6.8% -2.3% 6.8% 0.0% -6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total C.&F. Beef, 0 .  Prep, and Canned (< 51.4% -4.1% 55.5% 4.1% 51.0% -4.5% 31.9% -19.2% -23.6% 13.4% -18.5% -42.1% 3.5% -9.9% -52.1 % 2.5% -0.9% -53.0% 3.5% 1.0% -52.0%
TOTAL 44.1% -5.3% 49.4% 5.3% 41.1% -8.3% 26.5% -14.6% -22.9% 11.7% -14.8% -37.7% 3.1% -8.5% -46.3% 2.3% -0.9% -47.1% 3.2% 0.9% -46.2%
URUGUAY fa)
Total Chilled and Frozen Beef (c) 11.1% -1.0% 12.1% 1.0% 7.5% -4.6% 10.5% 3.0% -1.6% 5.0% -5.5% -7.0% 2.0% -3.0% -10.1% 1.2% -0.8% -10.9% 1.8% 0.7% -10.2%
Total Chilled and Frozen Sheepmeat (c) 1.0% -6.4% 7.5% 6.4% 2.2% -5.3% 2.1% -0.1% -5.3% 1.6% -0.5% -5.8% 1.7% 0.1% -5.8% 1.3% -0.4% -6.2% 1.3% 0.0% -6.2%
Total Other Prepared and Canned (d) (d) (d) 18.0% 18.0% 4.9% -13.0% 4.9% 0.4% -4.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.1% 0.6% 0.6% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% -0.6% 0.0%
Total C.&F. Beef, 0 .  Prep, and Canned (< 11.1% -1.0% 12.1% 1.0% 9.9% -2.2% 8.1% -1.8% -4.0% 3.3% -4.8% -8.8% 1.6% -1.7% -10.5% 1.0% -0.6% -11.1% 1.4% 0.4% -10.6%
TOTAL 8.1% -3.0% 11.1% 3.0% 7.8% -3.3% 6.3% -1.5% -4.8% 3.0% -3.4% -8.1% 1.6% -1.4% -9.5% 1.0% -0.6% -10.1% 1.4% 0.4% -9.7%
RIVER PLATE
Total Chilled and Frozen Beef (c) 62.5% -5.1% 67.6% 5.1% 63.5% -4.1% 48.7% -14.7% -18.9% 21.0% -27.7% -46.5% 4.2% -16.9% -63.4% 2.6% -1.6% -65.0% 4.7% 2.1% -62.9%
Total Chilled and Frozen Sheep (c) 27.6% -6.0% 33.6% 6.0% 16.3% -17.3% 15.8% -0.5% -17.8% 5.5% -10.4% -28.2% 2.4% -3.0% -31.2% 1.6% -0.9% -32.1% 1.5% 0.0% -32.1%
Total Other Prepared and Canned (d) (d) (d) 52.4% 52.4% 28.2% -24.2% 28.2% 9.5% -18.7% 9.5% 7.4% -2.1% 7.4% 5.8% -1.6% 5.8% 0.0% -5.8% 0.0%
Total C.&F. Beef, O. Prep, and Canned (« 62.5% -5.1% 67.6% 5.1% 60.9% -6.7% 40.0% -20.9% -27.6% 16.6% -23.3% -50.9% 5.0% -11.6% -62.5% 3.5% -1.5% -64.1% 3.3% -0.2% -64.3%
TOTAL 52.2% -8.3% 60.5% 8.3% 48.9% -11.6% 32.8% -16.1% -27.7% 14.6% -18.2% -45.9% 4.7% -9.9% -55.8% 3.3% -1.4% -57.2% 4.6% 1.3% -55.9%
1909-13: ' International Yearbook o f Agricultural Statistics', Institute o f Agriculture, Rome, 1929, tables 139-140, pp. 416-423.
1926-30: 'Imerastioosl Y evbook o f Agricultural Statistics1, In titu le  o f Agriculture, Rome, 1947, tables 70-71, pp. 460-479.
1934-38 and 1948-32: ' Trade Yearbook*, Food sod Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1939, tables 7- 8 and 12-13, pp. 32-33 and 62-66. 
1968-72: 'T rade Yearbook', Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1972, tables 9-10, 16 and 19, pp.26-33 ,31-34 and 63-67.
1988-90: 'T rade Yearbook', Food and Agriculture Organizatkai, Rome, 1990, tables 13-14, 20 and 23, pp.60-64 ,75-76 and 81-83.
1991-92: 'T rade Yearbook', Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. 1993, tables 13-14, 20 and 23, pp.30-34 ,45-46 and 51-33.
1993-94: 'T rade Yearbook’, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1994, tables 13-14, 20 and 23, pp.30-34 ,43-46 and 51-53.
Notes:
(a) For Uruguay the 1909-13 period is an avenge o f  only 1910-13.
(b) In 1909-13 and 1926-30 'Other Prepared and Canned' River Plate exports are mosdy beef, while iheepm ev is insignificant. Thereafter it includes all r
In 1968-72, 1988-92, 1993 St 1994 'O ther Prepared' are 'M eat, dried, railed or smoked, whether or not in airtight containers'.
(c) Includes 'Other Prepared and Canned' in 1909-13 and 1926-30.
(d) In 1909-13, 1926-30 and die 1994 Eatimaie 'O ther Prepared and Canned' are included into the 'Chilled and Frozen' categories.
(e) 'Chilled and Frozen B eef plus* Total Other Prepared and Canned' is used as a proxy for total beef exports.
Appendix 3 - R iver P late M eat Exports (In  Tons') 1875-1914
1875 182$ 1877 1878 1879 1875-79 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884
URUGUAY
Tasajo 22552 22728 32965 23449 101694 33073 27852 34026 34793 45760
Conserved Meat* 1675 2744 516 880 5815 3608 5864 4615 2415
Meat Extract* 372 431 369 1172 469 336 564 498 464
Conserved Tongues*
Frozen Ovine Meat 
Frozen Bovine Meat 
Chilled Bovine Meat 






Frozen Ovine Meat 
Frozen Bovine Meat 
Chilled Bovine Meat 






Frozen Ovine Meat 
Frozen Bovine Meat 







Frozen Ovine Meat 
Frozen Bovine Meat 
Chilled Bovine Meat 






Frozen Ovine Meat 
Frozen Bovine Meat 
Chilled Bovine Meat 






Frozen Ovine Meat 
Frozen Bovine Meat 













































































































































































































































IK S 1886 18S7 1888 1889
32332 43038 28576 49506 38077
2649 3607 371 330 185





























































































































































































1890 1821 1822 1893 1894
38268 33599 39807 43876 55813
184 132 147 22
821 712 523 487 649
39273 34311 40462 44510 56484
43481 39635 44699 41151 42838
474 2877 7040 2179 658
188 195 260 99 85
716
20414 23278 25436 25041 36486
663 74 284 2778 267
65220 66059 77719 71248 81050
81749 73234 84506 85027 98651
658 2877 7172 2326 680
1009 907 783 586 734
716
20414 23278 25436 25041 36486
663 74 284 2778 267
104493 100370 118181 115758 137534
1910 1911 1912 1913 1914
52257 53305 38250 25554 11096
2155 6880 6880 6880 6880
666 281 281 281 281
824 477 477 477 477
3670 2937 1501 2429
9399 7681 20342 49564 69408
68971 71561 67731 82756 90571
9442 12120 8824 3910 2377
12082 15413 17699 12574 13087
1523 516 612 799 431
948 714 632 440 503
75102 85916 70175 45928 58688
245267 297738 317620 332054 328278
8441 15096 25231 34175 40690
352805 427512 440793 429880 444055
61699 65425 47074 29464 13473
14237 22293 24579 19454 19967
2189 797 893 1080 712
1772 1191 1109 917 980
78772 88853 71676 45928 61117
254666 305419 337962 381618 397686
8441 15096 25231 34175 40690











































Sources: Uruguay 1833-S3: Barren, J.P . and Nahum, B ,  Historic R un t del Uruguay Mondcrno 1831-18S3 (Volume l/Z.Edkvones de la  Banda Oriental. Manaevideo. 1967), Appendix Table No. 9.
Uruguay 1886-94: Barren. J.P . and Nahum, B.,Hiatoria Rural del Uruguay Mondcmo 1886-94 (Volume 2,Edicicmes de la  Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1968), Appendix Table No 11.
Uruguay 1893-1904: Barren. J.P . and Nalarm. B .  Historic Rural del Uruguay Mondenro 1895-1904 (Volume 3, Edicicuea de In Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1973), Appendix Table No. 11.
Uruguay 1904-14: Ruano Fournier, A ., Eatudio Ecooomico de la Piuduccioo de lea Carnes del Rio de la Plata (ltnpreaotea Pena y Cia. Montevideo, 1936). pp. 368-372.
Uruguay 1905-1914 for items with (*): Direccion General de Estadistica, Atarario EatadjatRn de la Republics Oriental del Uruguay 1915 I t  1916 (lngrrada Juan J. Dotnalechs, Montevideo, 1918 and 1917). pp. 214-217 and 573-574.
Argentine 1875-1914: Direccion Genera] de Estadistica de la Nacion, Mimiterio de Hacienda de la Republics Argentina, Extracto Estadisnco de la Republics Argentine 1915 (Campania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, Buenos Aires. 1916), pp. 58-73.
* 1905 calculated from 1901-05 average figures, while 1905-09 and 1910-14 are avenge yearly figures for die period.
Appendix 4 - British M eat Imports bv Type 1890-94 and 1900-1904 P. 352
British Meat Imports (in Cwt.)
1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1890-94
Beef Salted 274726 247759 275394 200514 242311 1240704
- of which other than U.S. 11674 12691 7685 12587 7191 51828
Beef Fresh 1854593 1920511 2079637 1808051 2104094 9766886
Meat U numerated 103881 113357 150573 177509 189757 735077
Preserved Otherwise: Beef 551098 526711 567991 385727 291056 2322583
Preserved Otherwise: Mutt' 78409 92597 68412 83882 112928 436228
Mutton Fresh 1656419 1662994 1699966 1971500 2295065 9285944
- of which Argentina 435084 436358 471128 515611 585728 2443909
TOTAL 4519126 4563929 4841973 4627183 5235211 23787422
British Meat Imports fin Tons)
1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1890-94
Beef Salted Total 13957 12587 13991 10187 12310 63031
- of which other than U.S. 593 645 390 639 365 2633
Beef Fresh 94219 97567 105652 91854 106894 496186
Meat Unumerated 5277 5759 7650 9018 9640 37344
Preserved Otherwise: Beef 27997 26758 28856 19596 14786 117994
Preserved Otherwise: Mutt' 3983 4704 3476 4261 5737 22162
Mutton Fresh 84151 84485 86363 100158 116596 471753
- of which Argentina 22104 22168 23935 26195 29757 124158
TOTAL 229585 231861 245986 235074 265964 1208469
British Meat Imports fin Cwt.)
1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1900-04
Beef Salted 192934 204396 153574 178692 144304 873900
- of which other than U.S. 7605 12396 9680 8516 9024 47221
Beef Fresh 4128130 4508746 3707387 4159606 4367322 20871191
- of which Argentina 412262 771929 923748 1152211 1675271 4935421
Mutton Fresh 3392850 3608229 3659599 4016622 3494782 18172082
- of which Argentina 1114795 1271654 1352501 1485770 1422397 6647117
Meat Unumerated 530688 610271 655023 663261 631012 3090255
Preserved Otherwise: Beef 518029 464727 577956 472615 556918 2590245
Preserved Otherwise: Mutt' 64462 64884 85496 49154 37257 301253
TOTAL 8827093 9461253 8839035 9539950 9231595 45898926
British Meat Imports fin Tons)
1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1900-04
Beef Salted 9802 10384 7802 9078 7331 44397
- of which other than U.S. 386 630 492 433 458 2399
Beef Fresh 209721 229057 188346 211320 221872 1060316
- of which Argentina 20944 39216 46929 58536 85109 250734
Mutton Fresh 172367 183308 185918 204056 177545 923194
- of which Argentina 56635 64604 68711 75481 72262 337693
Meat Unumerated 26960 31004 33277 33696 32057 156994
Preserved Otherwise: Beef 26317 23609 29362 24010 28293 131592
Preserved Otherwise: Mutt' 3275 3296 4343 2497 1893 15305
TOTAL 448442 480659 449048 484657 468991 2331797.021
Sources:
1890-91: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K.(Eyre and Spottiswoode. London, December 1892), pp. 18-19. 
1892-94: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K.(Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, December 1894), pp. 18-19. 
1900-01: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K.(Wyman and Sons, London, December 1902), pp. 18-23. 
1902-04: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K.(Wyman ans Sons, London, December 1904), pp. 34-39.
Calculation of Tons based on Weights and Measures in Inglis, R.M.G., The Express Universal Decimal Coinage Reckoner (The University Press, Glasgow, 1969).
Appendix 5 - River Plate Global Meat Market Share Estimates (1890-94 and 1900-1904) - Tons P. 353
U.K. Salted Beef Imports 
- of which other than U.S.
Total U.K. Meat Imports
Total U.K. Meat Imports Minus
U.K. Beef Salted Imports other than U.S. (A)
Total River Plate Tasajo Exports (B)
(A)+(B)

















River Plate Global Meat Market Share (Volume) 
(C) / [(A) + (B)] 35.4% | 39.6% Sources: (i) See Appendix 4 
(ii) See Appendix 3
Appendix 6 - British Meat Imports by Type 1890-94 and 1900-1904 (Value £) P. 354
1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1890-94
Beef Salted 381734 356022 388588 278997 342814 1748155
- of which other than U.S. 22822 21204 12641 22253 10071 88991
Beef Fresh 3923015 4038487 4413148 3830596 4213671 20418917
Meat Unumerated 227572 255898 344945 399912 410724 1639051
Preserved Otherwise: Beef 1424419 1210293 1339094 961731 813698 5749235
Preserved Otherwise: Mutton 181482 220737 139202 154818 195166 891405
Mutton Fresh 3447776 3282001 3447102 3873863 4341227 18391969
- of which Argentina 822486 791011 866581 959299 958649 4398026
TOTAL 9585998 9363438 10072079 9499917 10317300 48838732
1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1900-04
Beef Salted 256418 267356 244002 245605 187288 1200669
- of which other than U.S. 11597 20429 16719 13312 14190 76247
Beef Fresh 8162848 8906839 7905064 8366141 8080257 41421149
- of which Argentina 667298 1218246 1723652 2053669 2482704 8145569
Mutton Fresh 5841566 6598080 6914911 7826062 6861531 34042150
- of which Argentina 1689078 1950599 2273027 2603931 2491210 11007845
Meat Unumerated 982169 1120447 1199110 1206052 1164012 5671790
Preserved Otherwise: Beef 1457322 1289893 1710383 1511846 1611693 7581137
Preserved Otherwise: Mutton 150973 168143 206562 106328 88708 720714
TOTAL 16851296 18350758 18180032 19262034 17993489 90637609
Sources:
1890-91: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K.(Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, December 1892), pp. 18-19. 
1892-94: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K.(Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, December 1894), pp. 18-19. 
1900-01: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K.(Wyman and Sons, London, December 1902), pp. 18-23. 
1902-04: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K.(Wyman ans Sons, London, December 1904), pp. 34-39.
Appen d ix  7  - R iy e r P la te  M eat E x p o rts  (V alue - £) P. 355
1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1890-94 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1900-04
URUGUAY
Tasajo 817872 744894 866170 1026809 1216809 4672553 1285532 1041064 1272979 1206170 744468 5550213
Conserved Meat 7872 0 6809 7447 851 22979 8511 12128 17021 34255 123830 195745
Meat Extract 356809 454255 391489 362979 483191 2048723 280638 259787 302553 271702 290638 1405319
Conserved Tongues 37872 34468 40213 31489 37660 181702
Frozen Ovine Meat
Frozen Bovine Meat 213 213
Chilled Bovine Meat
TOTAL MEAT URUGUAY 1182553 1199149 1264468 1397234 1700851 6744255 1612553 1347447 1632766 1543617 1196809 7333191
ARGENTINA
Tasajo 776449 707709 813589 816495 905644 4019886 392769 571320 525288 305956 276177 2071510
Conserved Meat 8464 51374 125714 38905 12948 237406 27873 18793 32620 74237 48187 201710
Meat Extract 74431 77273 103352 39300 26665 321020 45717 86030 117598 137535 82180 469060
Conserved Tongues 35537 35537 40510 40391 32969 28165 37557 179592
Frozen Ovine Meat 324029 369493 403750 397471 369863 1864606 895431 1000203 1270993 1240468 1406605 5813700
Frozen Bovine Meat 10522 1171 4503 44103 2460 62759 487888 890962 1389253 1617452 1939356 6324910
Chilled Bovine Meat
TOTAL MEAT ARGENTIN 1193895 1207020 1450908 1336273 1353118 6541214 1890189 2607699 3368720 3403812 3790061 15060481
R IV ER  PLATE
Tasajo 1594322 1452603 1679759 1843303 2122453 8692440 1678301 1612384 1798266 1512126 1020645 7621723
Conserved Meat 16337 51374 132523 46352 13799 260385 36384 30921 49641 108492 172016 397454
Meat Extract 431239 531528 494841 402278 509857 2369743 326356 345817 420152 409237 372818 1874379
Conserved Tongues 35537 35537 78382 74860 73182 59654 75216 361294
Frozen Ovine Meat 324029 369493 403750 397471 369863 1864606 895431 1000203 1270993 1240468 1406605 5813700
Frozen Bovine Meat 10522 1171 4503 44103 2460 62759 487888 890962 1389253 1617452 1939569 6325123
Chilled Bovine Meat
TOTAL RIVER PLATE 2376448 2406169 2715376 2733507 3053969 13285470 3502742 3955146 5001486 4947429 4986869 22393673
Sources: Uruguay 1890-94: Barran, J.P . and Nahum, B.,Historia Rural del Uruguay Mondemo 1886-94 (Volume 2,Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo,1968), Appendix Table No. 11.
Uruguay 1900-04: Barran, J.P . and Nahum, B.,Historia Rural del Uruguay Mondemo 1893-1904 (Volume 3, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1973), Appendix Table No. 11.
Argentina 1890-1904: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nation, Ministerio de Hacienda, Extracto Estadistico 1913 (Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, Buenos Aires, 1916), pp. 38-73.
Exchange Rates: Argentina: £1 =  3.04 Gold Pesos
Uruguay: £1 =  4.70 Uruguayan Dollars
Appendix 8 - River Plate Global Meat Market Share Estimates (1890-94 and 1900-1904) - Value (£) P. 356
U.K. Salted Beef Imports 
- of which other than U.S.
Total U.K. Meat Imports
Total U.K. Meat Imports Minus
U.K. Beef Salted Imports other than U.S. (A)
Total River Plate Tasajo Exports (B)
(A)+(B)
Total River Plate Exports (C)
River Plate Global Meat Market Share (Value) 









| 23.1%] | 22.8%]
Sources: (i) See Appendix 6.
(ii) See Appendix 7.
Appendix 9 - British Meat Imports from the River Plate (Value - £1 & Global Value Share 
Chilled and Frozen Bovine and Ovine Meat
P. 357
URUGUAY
1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1909-13 1926 m i 1928 1929 1930 1926-30 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1934-38
Beef Chilled 0 0 0 0 56064 56064 1531343 717738 1456834 2075707 2197906 7979528 937456 907452 839141 1046813 1046274 4777136
Beef Frozen 175149 202645 88543 323800 650752 1440889 615586 585486 498833 455945 746689 2902539 63800 78018 62610 94434 134511 433373
Total Beef
Mutton Chilled and Frozen 
Lamb Chilled and Frozen


















Total Mutton & Lamb 78573 141667 109724 89719 288793 708476 838462 811274 1102047 1060784 1185334 4997901 335213 337892 330824 447597 455558 1907084
TOTAL URUGUAY 
ARGENTINA
253722 344312 198267 413519 995609 2205429 2985391 2114498 3057714 3592436 4129929 15879968 1336469 1323362 1232575 1588844 1636343 7117593
Beef Chilled 3351245 4950326 5902818 7280473 9729374 31214236 21091201 21893115 22260448 22275517 20253818 107774099 11695034 11529888 12001446 13449779 13772817 62448964
Beef Frozen 3382328 3306658 3339268 4164607 3085628 17278489 3363314 3462464 2034600 2417364 2072645 13350387 153758 159524 172338 199506 288742 973868
Total Beef
Mutton Chilled and Frozen 
Lamb Chilled and Frozen


















Total Mutton & Lamb 2024889 2322454 2896589 2773005 1908225 11925162 3638362 4235364 4672781 4771176 4115597 21433280 2312952 2121758 2310793 2381854 2437629 11564986
TOTAL ARGENTINA 
RIVER PLATE
8758462 10579438 12138675 14218085 14723227 60417887 28092877 29590943 28967829 29464057 26442060 142557766 14161744 13811170 14484577 16031139 16499188 74987818
Beef Chilled 3351245 4950326 5902818 7280473 9785438 31270300 22622544 22610853 23717282 24351224 22451724 115753627 12632490 12437340 12840587 14496592 14819091 67226100
Beef Frozen 3557477 3509303 3427811 4488407 3736380 18719378 3978900 4047950 2533433 2873309 2819334 16252926 217558 237542 234948 293940 423253 1407241
Total Beef
Mutton Chilled and Frozen 
Lamb Chilled and Frozen


















Total Mutton & Lamb 2103462 2464121 3006313 2862724 2197018 12633638 4476824 5046638 5774828 5831960 5300931 26431181 2648165 2459650 2641617 2829451 2893187 13472070
TOTAL RIVER PLATE 9012184 10923750 12336942 14631604 15718836 62623316 31078268 31705441 32025543 33056493 30571989 158437734 15498213 15134532 15717152 17619983 18135531 82105411
TOTAL U.K. IMPORTS
Beef Chilled 5266327 6022798 6304482 7293473 9785438 34672518 22679943 22811949 24531574 25236627 23735409 118995502 13811605 13959754 14550882 17057627 17671681 77051549
Beef Frozen 4877074 5581198 4809097 6344963 6278793 27891125 7909208 6591282 6250278 6071478 6311992 33134238 2715936 2349045 1906076 2658831 2637889 12267777
Total Beef
Mutton Chilled and Frozen 
Lamb Chilled and Frozen


















Total Mutton & Lamb 7362894 9446176 9296767 9293512 10583930 45983279 17599297 17427077 19342428 18948964 19656081 92973847 17546454 17390328 17242591 18911309 19204168 90294850
TOTAL U.K. IMPORTS* 17506295 21050172 20410346 22931948 26648161 108546922 48188448 46830308 50124280 50257069 49703482 245103587 34073995 33699127 33699549 38627767 39513738 179614176
RIVER PLATE SHARE (°k\
Beef Chilled 63.6% 82.2% 93.6% 99.8% 100.0% 90.2% 99.7% 99.1% 96.7% 96.5% 94.6% 97.3% 91.5% 89.1% 88.2% 85.0% 83.9% 87.2%
Beef Frozen 72.9% 62.9% 71.3% 70.7% 59.5% 67.1% 50.3% 61.4% 40.5% 47.3% 44.7% 49.1% 8.0% 10.1% 12.3% 11.1% 16.0% 11.5%
Total Beef
Mutton Chilled and Frozen 
Lamb Chilled and Frozen


















Total Mutton & Lamb 28.6% 26.1% 32.3% 30.8% 20.8% 27.5% 25.4% 29.0% 29.9% 30.8% 27.0% 28.4% 15.1% 14.1% 15.3% 15.0% 15.1% 14.9%
TOTAL RIVER PLATE SHARE 51.5% 51.9% 60.4% 63.8% 59.0% 57.7% 64.5% 67.7% 63.9% 65.8% 61.5% 64.6% 45.5% 44.9% 46.6% 45.6% 45.9% 45.7%
Sources: 1909-11: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K. (Gyre and Spottiswoode, London, December 1911), pp. 34-43. * Chilled & Frozen Bovine and Ovine meat only.
1912-13: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K. (Gyre and Spottiswoode, London, December 1914), pp. 34-43.
1926-27: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K. (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, December 1928), pp. 12-15.
1928-30: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K. (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, December 1930), pp. 11-14.
1934-35: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K. (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, December 1936), pp. 15-20.
1936-38: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K. (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, December 1938), pp. 15-20.
Appendix 10 - British Meat Imports from the River Plate (Value - £) & Global Value Share
Chilled and Frozen Bovine and Ovine Meat
P. 358
1948 1949 1950 1951 1252 1948-52
URUGUAY £ £ £ £ £ £
Beef Chilled* 872796 4236732 3973601 1406303 747463 11236895
Beef Frozen* 76887 30794 828879 697467 9511 1643538
Total Chilled and Frozen Beef 
Mutton Chilled and Frozen—
949683 4267526 4802480 2103770 756974 12880433
Lamb Chilled and Frozen 114110 74265 530647 81454 80289 880765
Total Chil. & Froz. Mutton & Lamt 114110 74265 530647 81454 80289 880765
TOTAL URUGUAY 1063793 4341791 5333127 2185224 837263 13761198
ARGENTINA
Beef Chilled* 11697257 19843614 15491035 6059931 7786943 60878780
Beef Frozen* 2013124 1532407 2095091 535262 274516 6450400
Total Chilled and Frozen Beef 13710381 21376021 17586126 6595193 8061459 67329180
Mutton Chilled and Frozen 684597 1060654 932931 382469 1633123 4693774
Lamb Chilled and Frozen 4745081 4804243 3717383 2178003 4183064 19627774
Total Chil. & Froz. Mutton & Lamt 5429678 5864897 4650314 2560472 5816187 24321548
TOTAL ARGENTINA 19140059 27240918 22236440 9155665 13877646 91650728
TOTAL RIVER PLATE
Beef Chilled* 12570053 24080346 19464636 7466234 8534406 72115675
Beef Frozen* 2090011 1563201 2923970 1232729 284027 8093938
Total Chilled and Frozen Beef 14660064 25643547 22388606 8698963 8818433 80209613
Mutton Chilled and Frozen— 684597 1060654 932931 382469 1633123 4693774
Lamb Chilled and Frozen 4859191 4878508 4248030 2259457 4263353 20508539
Total Chil. & Froz. Mutton & Lamt 5543788 5939162 5180961 2641926 5896476 25202313
TOTAL RIVER PLATE 20203852 31582709 27569567 11340889 14714909 105411926
TOTAL U.K. IMPORTS
Beef Chilled* 21664655 30012473 26354867 13473890 13673498 105179383
Beef Frozen* 6262853 3152089 4890549 2890282 1000453 18196226
Total Chilled and Frozen Beef 27927508 33164562 31245416 16364172 14673951 123375609
Mutton Chilled and Frozen 5652277 6036698 8356976 3859932 8621950 32527833
Lamb Chilled and Frozen 28863279 30989257 33993547 26295861 36473586 156615530
Total Chil. & Froz. Mutton & Lamt 34515556 37025955 42350523 30155793 45095536 189143363
TOTAL U.K. IMPORTS* 62443064 70190517 73595939 46519965 59769487 312518972
RIVER PLATE VALUE SHARE (%)
Beef Chilled* 58.0% 80.2% 73.9% 55.4% 62.4% 68 .6 %
Beef Frozen* 33.4% 49.6% 59.8% 42.7% 28.4% 44.5%
Total Chilled and Frozen Beef 52.5% 77.3% 71.7% 53.2% 60.1% 65.0%
Mutton Chilled and Frozen — 12.1% 17.6% 11.2 % 9.9% 18.9% 14.4%
Lamb Chilled and Frozen 16.8% 15.7% 12.5% 8 .6 % 11.7% 13.1%
Total Chil. & Froz. Mutton & Lamt 16.1% 16.0% 12.2 % 8 .8 % 13.1% 13.3%
TOTAL RIVER PLATE SHARE 32.4% 45.0% 37.5% 24.4% 24.6% 33.7%
Sources: 1948-50: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K. (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, December 1950), pp. 14-21.
1951-52: Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation of the U.K. (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, December 1953), pp. 15-22.
* In 1948-52 divided into two frozen categories, namely: (i) fore and hind quarters [placed under chilled] and (ii) boned and boneless [placed under frozen] (Chilled excli 
— Excluding Uruguay in 1948-50.
* Chilled & Frozen Bovine and Ovine meat only.
Appendix 11 - River Plate and World Meat Exports Value (Thousands of USD) & Global Value Share (1968-72 & 1988-92) P. 359
Chilled and Frozen Bovine and Ovine Meat
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1968-72 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1988-92
URUGUAY
Total Chilled and Frozen Bovine Mea 







































Total Chilled and Frozen Bovine Mea 






































TOTAL RIVER PLATE 
Total Chilled and Frozen Bovine Mea 







































Total Chilled and Frozen Bovine Mea 






































RIVER PLATE VALUE SHARE (%) 
Total Chilled and Frozen Bovine Mea 

























TOTAL RIVER PLATE SHARE 12.4% 15.6% 14.6% 12.4% 17.1% 14.7% 3.4% 4.2% 4.4% 3.5% 3.0% 3.7%
Sources: 1968-72: 'Trade Yearbook', Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1973, tables 9-10.
1988-90: 'Trade ’ 'The International Market for Meat', GATT, Geneva, 1994, tables 10-11.
1991-92: 'Trade Yearbook', Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1993, tables 13-14.
Appendix 12 - M eat Export Volumes (In OOP's tons) and P. 360
Global M eat Export M arket Shares ( % )  Average Yearly Periods between 1909-1992
1909-13 1920-30 1934-38 1948-52 1968-72 1988-92
Meat Exports COOOs Tons)
Argentina 388.1 705.0 534.2 335.1 468.5 222.9
Uruguay 71.3 158.6 101.6 80.2 119.2 114.8
River Plate 459.4 863.6 635.8 415.3 587.7 337.7
Australia 144.4 111.7 201.5 172.4 503.1 879.7
New Zealand 123.7 172.6 232.9 323.0 601.4 695.6
U.S. 35.0 9.3 7.5 10.3 141.3 433.6
World 879.4 1427.5 1300.0 1266.0 4004.1 7136.1
- of which the countries of
the European Community* 46.4 155.6 1323.4 3302.4
Global Meat Export Market Shares (%)
Argentina 44.1% 49.4% 41.1% 26.5% 11.7% 3.1%
Uruguay 8 .1% 11.1% 7.8% 6.3% 3.0% 1 .6 %
River Plate 52.2% 60.5% 48.9% 32.8% 14.7% 4.7%
Australia 16.4% 7.8% 15.5% 13.6% 12.6 % 12.3%
New Zealand 14.1% 12.1% 17.9% 25.5% 15.0% 9.7%
U.S. 4.0% 0 .6 % 0 .6 % 0 .8 % 3.5% 6 .1%
Other 13.3% 18.9% 17.1% 27.3% 54.2% 67.1%
- of which the countries of
the European Community* 3.6% 12.3% 33.1% 46.3%
Sources:
1909-13: 'International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics', Institute of Agriculture, Rome, 1929, tables 139-140, pp. 416-425.
1926-30: 'International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics', Institute of Agriculture. Rome, 1947, tables 70-71, pp. 460-479.
1934-38 and 1948-52: ' Trade Yearbook', Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1959, tables 7- 8 and 12-13, pp. 52-55 and 62-66. 
1968-72: 'Trade Yearbook', Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1972, tables 9-10, 16 and 19, pp.26-33 ,51-54 and 63-67. 
1988-90: 'Trade Yearbook', Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1990, tables 13-14, 20 and 23, pp.60-64 ,75-76 and 81-83. 
1991-92: 'Trade Yearbook', Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, 1993, tables 13-14, 20 and 23, pp.30-34 ,45-46 and 51-53.
Notes:
Beef and Shcepmeat only. For detailed notes please see Appendix 1 and 2.
* Excludes Greece, Spain and Portugal. Excludes East Germany except in 1934-38 and 1991-92.
Appendix 13 - Meat Import Distribution Volumes (In OOP's tons) and P. 361
Global M eat Im port D istribution Shares (%)  Average Y early Periods between 1909-92
Meat Imports f000s Tons'*
1909-13 1926-30 1934-38 1948-52 1968-72 1988-92
U.K. 683.3 938.8 981.7 788.6 1192.9 772.6
France 4.1 54.1 27.8 14.5 127.1 578.4
Germany* 24.6 114.8 30.1 24.7 290.0 460.6
Italy 6.9 60.5 26.7 25.1 321.1 518.4
USA 16.5 44.9 35.0 111.8 774.2 924.6
Canada 3.7 2.4 5.3 6.7 96.6 174.2
Japan 0.0 18.8 13.4 0.9 160.3 482.7
Others 123.4 168.3 74.0 175.7 1020.8 3076.8
World 862.6 1402.7 1194.0 1148.0 3982.8 6988.3
Global Meat Import Distribution Shares (%)
U.K. 79.2% 66.9% 82.2% 68.7% 29.9% 11.1%
France 0.5% 3.9% 2.3% 1.3% 3.2% 8.3%
Germany* 2.9% 8 .2 % 2.5% 2 .2 % 7.3% 6 .6 %
Italy 0 .8 % 4.3% 2 .2 % 2 .2 % 8.1% 7.4%
USA 1.9% 3.2% 2.9% 9.7% 19.4% 13.2%
Canada 0.4% 0 .2 % 0.4% 0 .6 % 2.4% 2.5%
Japan 0 .0 % 1.3% 1.1% 0 .1% 4.0% 6.9%
Others 14.3% 12.0 % 6 .2 % 15.3% 25.6% 44.0%
Sourcei:
1909-13: ’International Yearbook o f  Agricultural S tatistics ', Institute o f  A griculture, Rom e, 1929, tables 139-140, pp. 416-425.
1926-30: 'International Yearbook o f  Agricultural Statistics’, Institute o f  A griculture, Rom e, 1947, tables 70-71, pp. 460-479.
1934-38 and 1948-32: 1 T rade  Y earbook', Food and A griculture O rganization, Rom e, 1939, ta b id  7 - 8 and 12-13, pp. 32-33 and 62-66. 
1968-72: 'T rade  Y earbook ', Food and A griculture O rganization, Rom e, 1972, ta b id  9 -1 0 ,1 6  and 19, pp .26-33 ,31-34 and 63-67. 
1988-90: 'T rade  Y earbook ', Food and A griculture Organization, Rom e, 1990, tables 13-14, 20  and 23, pp.60-64 ,73-76 and 81-83. 
1991-92: 'T rade  Y earbook1, Food and A griculture Organization, Rom e, 1993, ta b id  13-14, 20  and 23 , pp.30-34 ,43-46 and 51-33.
N o td :
Beef and Sheepmeat only. For detailed n o td  please see Appendix 1 and 2.
’ E x clu d d  G u t G erm any except in  1934-38 and 1991-92.
APPENDIX 14
P. 362
Productos resultantes de la industrializacion de an bovino 
antes y despues de 1903
7 i E B P  ;, fo
Ti 1 1 t r u t ■ ' • i
TASAJO ( p o a ta a  y manta*) CUEROS .S E B O .C P A S A .IIA S IH A  DE HUESOS
LE H G U A 3. -
Lo que se obtenia de la industrializacion de un bovino, en el Uruguay, antes de 1903
furna
H10ADOS , C0RAZ0NE3 1H TE S T IM 0S  , VEJ IG A , BAZO, PARCREAS, OLARDULAS 
T 1 3 0 L D E S , P IT U IT A R IA .O V A R IO S ,C U A J  0 .C U E R 0 A 3  DS C U IT A S H A .P E P S  I  
H A .PARC HES PARA TA M B 0R E3.A D R E N A LIM A  .E T C  .________________________
HA H IH A  DE HUES 0 ,  H U E 30S  A C R A N E L, 3 0 T 0 N E 3  , CEKELOS , C E P IL L 0 8  DE 
DIEI/TES, P I  CHAS, P I  PAS .P E IN E 3 ,  DADOS, AROS , AG W A S  DS C RO SHET,DE­
CADES , B O Q U lL ia S , O a u ^ A C E IT K 'D S ' P A IA s T fc T C .
Lo que se obtiene de la industrialization de un bovino, en la actualidad
CARNE COHCKLADA I  EKPRLADA. C ARSE EK LATAS .EXTRA CTCS , CUSROS . 
C R A 3 A .0 L E 0 .3 E B 0 . B3T2AR IRA , 3 A B O S , Y 2L A S , A3TAS , PEZUllAS , CERDA . 
HA-RLSl DE &ARWB .3AHCRE 3 s 6 i  . VSRdA3 . P e In E S  , BR0CHA3 B T C .
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Appendix 15: Argentine Meat Exports By Type 
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Appendix 19: World Import Distribution Shares (%) 
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Appendix 20 - Uruguayan Meat Exports (Volume in Tons) 1900-1929
Bovine & Ovine Meat, Conserved Meat & Tongues and M eat Extract
P. 368
URUGUAY 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909
Tasajo 57546 46599 42616 56981 59384 43743 48751 45772 44948 48460
Conserved Meat* 201 284 398 803 2909 3067 2155 2155 2155 2155
Meat Extract* 579 678 790 709 759 734 667 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Conserved Tongues*# 890 811 943 739 883 809 825 824 824 824
Frozen Ovine Meat 291 1039 3509 2320 4359
Frozen Bovine Meat 13 2400 710 5472 6914 5681
Chilled Bovine Meat
TOTAL URUGUAY 59216 48372 44747 59232 63948 51044 54147 58398 57827 62145
URUGUAY 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
Tasajo 52257 53305 38250 25554 11096 5335 4180 7545 6786 7881
Conserved Meat* 2155 6880 6880 6880 6880 6880 20752 40804 71982 57064
Meat Extract* 6 6 6 281 281 281 281 281 2 1 0 436 680 735
Conserved Tongues*# 824 477 477 477 477 477 279 365 248 740
Frozen Ovine Meat 3670 2937 1501 2429 3541 3669 2082 2582 7909
Frozen Bovine Meat 9399 7681 20342 49564 69408 95248 63289 68276 48193 79837
Chilled Bovine Meat 2328 8183 3573 4
TOTAL URUGUAY 68971 71561 67731 82756 90571 114090 100562 123081 130471 154170
URUGUAY 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
Tasajo 12480 10680 2 2 2 2 0 20371 14480 11897 10293 9970 10247 5158
Conserved Meat* 4765 4499 18368 20595 8158 12606 12812 20397 26475 32611
Meat Extract* 479 141 490 725 332 363 421 573 609 853
Conserved Tongues*# 350 304 507 573 442 721 449 478 534 556
Frozen Ovine Meat 3936 7332 8935 15653 15611 10278 22829 23631 14055 22292
Frozen Bovine Meat 95024 57921 34339 84403 90098 94613 96013 93045 40314 39598
Chilled Bovine Meat 2581 15333 40317 35769 30742 39551 30623 15135 33680 37126
TOTAL URUGUAY 119615 96210 125176 178089 159863 170029 173440 163229 125914 138194
Sources:
1853-1885: Barran, J .P . and Nahum, B .,H istoria Rural del Uruguay M ondemo 1851-1885 (Volume l/2,Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, M ontevideo,1967), Appendix Table No. 9.
1886-1894: Barran, J .P . and Nahum, B .,H istoria Rural del Uruguay Mondemo 1886-94 (Volume 2,Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, M ontevideo,1968), Appendix Table No. 11.
1895-1904: Barran, J .P . and Nahum, B .,H istoria Rural del Uruguay Mondemo 1895-1904 (Volume 3, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1973), Appendix Table No. 11.
1904-1914: Ruano Fournier, A ., Estudio Economico de la Produccion de las Carnes del Rio de la Plata (Impresores Pena y C ia, M ontevideo,1936), pp. 368-372.
1905-1914 for items with (*): Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1915 A  1916 (Imprenta Juan J. Domaleche, Montevideo, 1918 and 1917), pp. 214-217 and 573-574. 
1916: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1916 (Imprenta Juan J. Domaleche, Montevideo, 1918), pp. 581-583.
1917-1919: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1919 (Imprenta Arduinottnos, Montevideo, 1921), pp. 566-570.
1920-1921: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1921 (Imprenta Nacional, M ontevideo,1923), pp. 373-375.
1922-1924: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1924 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1926), pp., 267-269.
1925-1929: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1929 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo,1930), pp. 395-397.
* 1905 calculated from 1901-05 average figures, while 1905-09 and 1910-14 are average yearly figures for the period.
H 'Conserved Tongues' do not include frozen tongues.
Appendix 21 - Uruguayan Meat Exports (Volume in Tons) 1930-1954 P. 369
Bovine & Ovine Meat, Conserved Meat & Tongues and Meat Extract
URUGUAY 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Tasajo 3129 1500 228 590 1392 2010 154 26 2565
Conserved Meat 34438 28894 20148 27229 32138 43744 31705 34251 22244 23661
Meat Extract 947 925 658 658 786 1024 1536 609 810 670
Conserved Tongues 919 603 484 582 602 543 528 949 654 470
Frozen Ovine Meat 28261 18385 6176 9660 8099 7196 6708 8141 8582 11157
Frozen Bovine Meat 67168 42253 38917 29311 22855 26290 15365 30468 40640 35973
Chilled Bovine Meat . 44582 39601 26583 29385 27855 25372 26076 31746 25337 18829
TOTAL URUGUAY 179444 132161 93194 97415 93727 106179 82072 106190 98267 93325
URUGUAY 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
Tasajo 1818 1566 654 1159 3121 5435 8398 6890 2704 1367
Conserved Meat 28635 34650 29325 36849 17904 12890 27184 16015 15914 15212
Meat Extract 550 1444 87 1617 790 1611 2997 1442 2546 386
Conserved Tongues# 445 394 634 1458 2021 2336 933 1414 2058
Frozen Ovine Meat 12987 6102 5038 10617 10819 7692 9685 5179 3354 6502
Frozen Bovine Meat 48861 46810 33296 25353 21185 27109 30869 6309 36252 65135
Conserves & Meat Stews 3079 25669 31084 31273 4690 182 1
Chilled Bovine Meat
TOTAL URUGUAY 93296 90966 71479 101898 86361 88031 86159 36950 62185 90660
URUGUAY 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Tasajo 1155 1395 1032 1587 400
Conserved Meat 21771 12670 9265 13389 21930
Meat Extract 707 400 375 524 521
Conserved Tongues# 2602 3332 2395 1532 1193
Frozen Ovine Meat 13014 4857 12028 6517 6871
Frozen Bovine Meat 62429 62202 43311 42340 45120
Chilled Bovine Meat
TOTAL URUGUAY 101678 84856 68406 65889 76035
Sources:
1930: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1930 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1932), pp. 394-397.
1931-1932: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1931-32 and 1933 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 193S), pp. 300-303.
1933-1934: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1934 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1936), pp. 374-375.
1935: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1935 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1936), pp. 375-377.
1936-1939: Direccion General de Estadistica, Sintesis Estadistica, Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1940 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1940), p. 128.
1940-1943: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1941-43 (Volume II, Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1947), pp. 23-27 and 41-43.
1944-1954: Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1950-1954 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1954), p. H-4.
H 'Conserved Tongues' include frozen tongues after 1944.
Appendix 22 - Argentinian Meat Exports (Volume in Tons) 1900-1929 P. 370
Bovine & Ovine Meat, Conserved Meat & Tongues and Meat Extract
ARGENTINA 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909
Tasajo* 16449 24296 22304 12991 11726 25288 4650 10649 6650 11622
Conserved Meat 1405 946 1644 3742 2429 2488 1259 1595 1727 6390
Meat Extract 115 217 296 347 207 435 421 896 690 1351
Conserved Tongues 681 679 554 473 631 519 304 757 874 1201
Frozen Ovine Meat 56412 63013 80073 78149 88616 78351 67388 69785 78846 66495
Frozen Bovine Meat 24590 44904 70018 81520 97744 152857 153809 138222 174563 209435
Chilled Bovine Meat 





ARGENTINA 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
Tasajo* 9442 12120 8824 3910 2377 213 1120 7613 2779 7984
Conserved Meat 12082 15413 17699 12574 13087 31944 44569 100784 191000 124276
Meat Extract 1523 516 612 799 431 372 653 640 1108 815
Conserved Tongues 948 714 632 440 503 570 628 1369 1787 1978
Frozen Ovine Meat 75102 85916 70175 45928 58688 35035 51318 39820 50415 56759
Frozen Bovine Meat 245267 297738 317620 332054 328278 351036 411547 355842 494069 398251
Chilled Bovine Meat 8441 15096 25231 34175 40690 11703 16153 38995 1545 2480
TOTAL ARGENTINA 352805 427512 440793 429880 444055 430872 525988 545063 742703 592543
ARGENTINA 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
Tasajo* 2529 2656 6063 4724 15565 13698 9474 8292 4858 343
Conserved Meat 14047 15920 36720 80123 81438 67381 61130 61504 66836 69072
Meat Extract 159 97 1071 1552 1601 1374 1117 1087 1281 1675
Conserved Tongues 1060 651 698 907 1250 815 521 665 473 423
Frozen Ovine Meat 55541 65825 81694 81096 83603 91888 67229 83126 77614 80548
Frozen Bovine Meat 365623 241372 158259 215315 368373 296635 226739 236420 124685 121711
Chilled Bovine Meat 50681 148386 246806 326888 364204 372473 430728 466669 383078 357960
TOTAL ARGENTINA 489640 474907 531311 710605 916034 844264 796938 857763 658825 631732
Sources:
1900-1915: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Ministerio de Hacienda de la Republica Argentina, Extracto Estadistico de la Republica Argentina 1915 (Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, Buenos Aires, 1916), pp. 58-73. 
1916-1917: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1917 (Imprenta Mercatali, Buenos Aires, 1920), pp. 456-457 and 462-466.
1918-1920: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1918-1920 (L.J. Rosso y Cia, Buenos Aires, 1922), pp. 620-621 and 628-634.
1921-1923: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1921-1923 (G. Kraft, Buenos Aires, 1924), pp. 646-648 and 655-661.
1924-1926: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1926 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1927), pp. 479-480 and 487-494.
1927-1929: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1929 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1931), pp. 570-571 and 573-575.
* 'Tasajo' include other salted meat (bovine and porcine) in 1916-1922.
Appendix 23 - Argentinian Meat Exports (Volume in Tons) 1930-54 P. 371
Bovine & Ovine Meat, Conserved Meat & Tongues and Meat Extract
ARGENTINA 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Tasajo* 155 25 4 1926 4394 5382 3831 5722 4878 4187
Conserved Meat 62420 55078 44175 54997 61056 67122 72508 76292 74254 82518
Meat Extract 1682 1197 1315 1660 1529 1756 2916 2190 1704 2271
Conserved Tongues 423 427 512 1402 1988 2163 2600 2428 2235 1857
Frozen Ovine Meat — 80360 83043 70631 62649 48658 49881 50035 51661 47623 54772
Frozen Bovine Meat# 98748 83681 36660 31549 31584 30651 39651 92113 102731 464073
Chilled Bovine Meat 345525 352227 370634 350046 349644 348531 357473 349481 342426
TOTAL ARGENTINA 589313 575678 523931 504229 498853 505486 529014 579887 575851 609678
ARGENTINA 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
Tasajo* 1829 1831 1492 1346 1287 1163 1219
Conserved Meat 79908 133313 112840 94571 134667 65064 79122 101300 71900 44500
Meat Extract 2270 4567 2256 3232 3552 2539 3216 1700 1700 1600
Conserved Tongues 2609 2664 2648 3268 3072 2437 2141 3200 1000 300
Frozen Ovine M e a t- 61815 49845 80329 96646 108520 100918 125020 135500 79900 67000
Frozen Bovine Meat# 373534 376993 376007 296819 295737 176187 227024 338000 277400 317800
Chilled Bovine Meat
TOTAL ARGENTINA 521965 569213 575572 495882 546835 348308 437742 579700 431900 431200
ARGENTINA 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Tasajo 6391 5787 2234 2871
Conserved Meat 73700 97831 56372 58293 73510
Meat Extract 3900 2734 2003 1595 1510
Conserved Tongues 200 79 225 16 632
Frozen Ovine Meat 41300 24741 43983 50574 58737
Frozen Bovine Meat# 170300 109857 96808 112771 104732
Chilled Bovine Meat
TOTAL ARGENTINAA 289400 241633 205178 225483 241992
Sources:
1930-1932: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1932 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1933), pp. 614-620.
1933-1933: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1933 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1936), pp. 609-616.
1936: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1937 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1938), pp. 610-620.
1937-1938: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1938 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1939), pp. 386-393.
1939-1940: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1940 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1941), pp. 361-370.
1941-1942: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1942 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1943), pp. 347-337.
1943-1944: Ministerio del Interior, Consejo Nacional de Estadistica y Censos de la Nacion, El Comercio Exterior Argentine en 1944 y su comparacion con el de 1943, Informe No. 100 (Guillermo Kraft, Buenos Aires, 1943), pp. 39-60. 
1945-1946: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1945-1946 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1948), pp. 4-10.
1947-1930: Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos, Direccion General del Servicio Estadistico Nacional, Sintesis Estadistica Mensual de la Republica Argentina, Enero 1932 (Guillermo Kraft, Buenos Aires, 1932), p. 60.
1931-1954: Secretaria de Estado de Hacienda, Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Comercio Exterior 1931-1934 (Guillermo Kraft, Buenos Aires, 1959),
Codes 14-1 to 19-3. 20-1 to 20-3, 23-1 to 23-2, 26-1 to 26-2, 26-3, 28-1 to 28-2, 28-4, 32-1 to 32-2, , pp. 3-18.
1947-1930 figures rounded to the hundredth ton (figure remains in tons).
# After 1939 'F rozen Bovine Meat' includes chilled bovine meat.
* 'Tasajo' includes other salted bovine meat from 1932-1946 and 1931-34.
■“1951-1954 Excludes frozen meat for manufacture.
-A f te r  1932 'Frozen Ovine Meat' also includes chilled ovine meat.
Appendix 24 - River Plate Meat Exports (Volume in Tons) 1900-1929 P. 372
Bovine & Ovine Meat, Conserved Meat & Tongues and Meat Extract
RIVER PLATE 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909
Tasajo 73995 70895 64920 69972 71110 69031 53401 56421 51598 60082
Conserved M eat 1606 1230 2042 4545 5338 5555 3414 3750 3882 8545
M eat Extract 694 895 1086 1056 966 1169 1088 1562 1356 2017
Conserved Tongues 1571 1490 1497 1 2 1 2 1514 1328 1129 1581 1698 2025
Frozen Ovine M eat 56412 63013 80073 78149 88616 78642 68427 73294 81166 70854
Frozen Bovine M eat 24590 44904 70018 81520 97757 155257 154519 143694 181477 215116
Chilled Bovine Meat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6252 1222
TOTAL RIVER PLATE 158868 182426 219636 236454 265301 310982 281978 280302 327429 359862
RIVER PLATE 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
Tasajo 61699 65425 47074 29464 13473 5548 5300 15158 9565 15865
C onserved M eat 14237 22293 24579 19454 19967 38824 65321 141588 262982 181340
M eat Extract 2189 797 893 1080 712 653 863 1076 1788 1550
Conserved Tongues 1772 1191 1109 917 980 1047 907 1734 2035 2718
Frozen Ovine M eat 78772 88853 71676 45928 61117 38576 54987 41902 52997 64668
Frozen Bovine M eat 254666 305419 337962 381618 397686 446284 474836 424118 542262 478088
Chilled Bovine M eat 8441 15096 25231 34175 40690 14031 24336 42568 1545 2484
TO TAL R IV ER PLATE 421776 499073 508524 512636 534626 544962 626550 668144 873174 746713
RIVER PLATE 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 192? 1929
T asajo 15009 13336 28283 25095 30045 25595 19767 18262 15105 5501
C onserved M eat 18812 20419 55088 100718 89596 79987 73942 81901 93311 101683
M eat Extract 638 238 1561 2277 1933 1737 1538 1660 1890 2528
Conserved Tongues 1410 955 1205 1480 1692 1536 970 1143 1007 979
Frozen Ovine M eat 59477 73157 90629 96749 99214 102166 90058 106757 91669 102840
Frozen Bovine M eat 460647 299293 192598 299718 458471 391248 322752 329465 164999 161309
Chilled Bovine M eat 53262 163719 287123 362657 394946 412024 461351 481804 416758 395086
TO TAL RIVER PLATE 609255
Sources & Notes:
See Appendixes 20 and 22.
571117 656487 888694 1075897 1014293 970378 1020992 784739 769926
Appendix 25 - River Plate Meat Exports (Volume in Tons) 1930-54
Bovine & Ovine Meat, Conserved Meat & Tongues and Meat Extract
P. 373
R IV E R  PL A T E 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
T asajo 3284 1525 232 2516 5786 7392 3985 5748 4878 6752
C onserved M eat 96858 83972 64323 82226 93194 110866 104213 110543 96498 106179
M eat E xtract 2629 2 1 2 2 1973 2318 2315 2780 4452 2799 2514 2941
C onserved Tongues 1342 1030 996 1984 2590 2706 3128 3377 2889 2327
F rozen  O vine M eat 108621 101428 76807 72309 56757 57077 56743 59802 56205 65929
F rozen  B ovine M eat 165916 125934 75577 60860 54439 56941 55016 122581 143371 500046
C hilled  Bovine M eat 390107 391828 397217 379431 377499 373903 383549 381227 367763 18829
T O T A L  R IV E R  PL A T E 768757 707839 617125 601644 592580 611665 611086 686077 674118 703003
R IV E R  PL A T E 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
T asajo 3647 - 3397 2146 2505 4408 6598 9617 6890 2704 1367
C onserved M eat 108543 167963 142165 131420 152571 77954 106306 117315 87814 59712
M eat E xtract 2820 6011 2343 4849 4342 4150 6213 3142 4246 1986
C onserved Tongues 3054 3058 2648 3902 4530 4458 4477 4133 2414 2358
F rozen  O vine M eat 74802 55947 85367 107263 119339 108610 134705 140679 83254 73502
F rozen  Bovine M eat 422395 423803 409303 322172 316922 203296 257893 344309 313652 382935
C onserves &  M eat Stews* 0 3079 25669 31084 31273 4690 182 1
C hilled Bovine M eat
T O T A L  R IV E R  PL A T E 615261 660179 647051 597780 633196 436339 523901 616650 494085 521860
R IV E R  P L A T E 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
T asajo 1155 7786 6819 3821 3271
C onserved M eat 95471 110501 65637 71682 95440
M eat E xtract 4607 3134 2378 2119 2031
C onserved Tongues 2802 3411 2620 1548 1825
F rozen  O vine M eat 54314 29598 56011 57091 65608
F rozen  Bovine M eat 232729 172059 140119 155111 149852
C hilled Bovine M eat
T O T A L  R IV E R  PL A T E 391078 326489 273584 291372 318027
Sources & Notes:
See A ppendix  21 &  23 
















Appendix 26 - Uruguayan Meat Exports (Value Pesos $1 1900-1931
Bovine & Ovine Meat, Conserved Meat & Tongues and Meat Extract
1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908
6042 4893 4475 5983 5669 3499 3886 3662 3596
40 57 80 161 582 614 56 217 332
1319 1221 1422 1277 1366 1318 1720 1047 975
178 162 189 148 177 162 189 141 132
1 144 103 328 415
7579 6333 6166 7569 7795 5737 5954 5395 5450
1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
4264 3050 2044 2663 1334 1045 1886 1697 1970
945 567 1126 1152 4791 5811 15505 27353 21684
988 541 526 407 120 504 1046 1632 1765
126 150 85 48 163 191 250 170 507
176 90 413 743 844 500 620 1898
461 1220 2974 9023 21907 15189 12972 9157 15169
675 2291 714 1
6960 5618 6755 13706 29733 25875 32873 40629 42994
1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
5555 5093 3620 2974 2691 2429 2541 1339 782
6980 7826 3100 4790 4888 4079 5295 6522 6892
1178 1740 797 872 1058 1555 1556 2166 2289
347 392 302 443 303 528 432 450 745
2144 3757 3747 2467 5164 3770 2642 4700 5844
6524 16306 17118 17976 16945 12298 6331 6524 11916
8063 7154 6148 7910 5842 2213 5360 6293 8038
30791 42268 34832 37432 36891 26872 24157 27994 36506
Sources:
1900: Barran, J.P . and Nahum, B.,Historia Rural del Uruguay Monderno 1895-1904 (Volume 3, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, Montevideo, 1973), Appendix Table No. 11. 
1901-1910: Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Priental del Uruguay 1909-1910 (Juan Domaleche, 1914), pp. 148-149.
1911-1912: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1913 & 1914 (Francisco Arduino, Montevideo, 1916), pp. 167-170.
1913-1914: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1915 (Francisco Arduino, Montevideo, 1917), pp. 213-216.
1915-1916: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1916 (Imprenta Juan J. Domaleche, Montevideo,1918), pp. 581-583.
1917-1919: Direccion General de Estadistica, A n u a r io  Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1919 (Imprenta Arduinottnos, Montevideo, 1921), pp. 566-570.
1920-1921: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1921 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1923), pp. 373-375.
1922-1924: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1924 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1926), pp. 267-269.
1925-1929: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1929 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1930), pp. 395-397.
1930: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1930 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1932), pp. 394-397.
1931: Direccion General de Estadistica, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 1931-32 and 1933 (Imprenta Nacional, Montevideo, 1935), pp. 500-503.
* Includes all types o f frozen meats in 1904-10.
0  'Conserved Tongues' do not include frozen tongues.
Appendix 27 - Argentinian Meat Exports (Value Gold Pesos $1 1900-1931
Bovine & Ovine Meat, Conserved Meat & Tongues and Meat Extract
P. 375
ARGENTINA 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
Tasajo* 1980 2879 2647 1542 1392 3738 597 1178 773 1325 1033
Conserved Meat 140 95 164 374 243 249 126 159 173 639 1208
Meat Extract 230 434 593 693 414 871 842 1792 1380 2703 3047
Conserved Tongues# 204 204 166 142 189 156 91 227 262 360 284
Frozen Ovine Meat 4513 5041 6406 6252 7089 6268 5391 5583 6308 5320 6008
Frozen Bovine Meat 2459 4490 7002 8152 9774 15286 15381 13822 17456 20943 24527
Chilled Bovine Meat 625 122 844
TOTAL ARGENTINA 9526 13143 16978 17155 19101 26568 22428 22761 26977 31412 36951
ARGENTINA 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Tasajo* 1662 1401 658 568 51 268 2108 963 2679 921 863
Conserved Meat 1541 1770 1257 1309 3194 4457 36681 92854 70168 5429 4524
Meat Extract 1031 1224 1598 863 743 1306 2496 2898 1447 185 117
Conserved Tongues# 214 189 132 151 171 119 956 863 1126 557 494
Frozen Ovine Meat 6873 5614 3674 4695 6306 9468 7834 12366 17149 14357 15853
Frozen Bovine Meat 29774 31762 33205 32828 73717 93010 77316 142110 145626 95684 60104
Chilled Bovine Meat 1509 2523 3417 4068 2458 3651 8940 370 854 13263 36148
TOTAL ARGENTINA 42604 44483 43941 44482 86640 112279 136331 252424 239049 130396 118103
ARGENTINA 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931
Tasajo* 1137 1181 4289 3660 2478 1818 1133 94 40 6
Conserved Meat 10030 14199 21131 16536 14984 14631 15213 16493 16651 13545
Meat Extract 1641 2642 2333 1708 1722 1577 2127 2550 2550 1813
Conserved Tongues# 326 258 405 226 155 183 379 330 312 438
Frozen Ovine Meat 9165 14702 19471 21399 10276 12743 14567 14090 14409 13859
Frozen Bovine Meat 20692 31204 54824 47555 34331 30949 20139 21084 17713 13899
Chilled Bovine Meat 32386 56044 61615 69843 71432 67895 71125 70118 70914 67535
TOTAL ARGENTINA 75377 120230 164068 160927 135378 129796 124683 124759 122589 111095
Sources:
1900-1915: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Narion, Ministerio de Hacienda de la Republica Argentina, Extracto Estadistico de la Republics Argentina 1915 (Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, Buenos Aires, 1916), pp. 58-73.
1916-1917: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1917 (Imprenta Mercatali, Buenos Aires, 1920), pp. 456-457 and 462-466.
1918-1920: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1918-1920 (L.J. Rosso y  Cia. Buenos Aires, 1922), pp. 620-621 and 628-634.
1921-1923: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1921-1923 (G. Kraft, Buenos Aires, 1924), pp. 646-648 and 655-661.
1924-1926: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1926 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1927), pp. 479-480 and 487-494.
1927-1929: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1929 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1931), pp. 570-571 and 573-575.
1930-1931: Direccion General de Estadistica de la Nacion, Anuario del Comercio Exterior de la Republica Argentina 1932 (Jacobo Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1933), pp. 614-620.
t  'Conserved Tongues' do not include frozen tongues.
* 'Tasajo' includes other salted meat (bovine and porcine) in 1916-1922.
Appendix 28 - Value of River Plate Meat Exports (In Argentinian Pesos) 1900-1932 P. 376
VALUE OF EXPORTS 1900
Argentina Argentinian $ Gold 9526
1900
Uruguay Uruguayan $ 7579
Conversion Rate 0.93
(Uru.S per Arg. $ Gold)
Value in Argentinian $ Go 7048
5 Year Moving Average 0
1900
River Plate Total River Plate Exports i 
Argentinian $ Gold
16574
5 Year Moving Average 0
EXPORTS (VOLUME) 1900
Argentina Volume (Tons) 99652
Uruguay Volume (Tons) 59216
River Plate Volume (Tons) 158868
5 Year Moving Average 0
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905
13143 16978 17155 19101 26568
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905
6333 6166 7569 7795 5737
0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
5890 5734 7039 7249 5335
0 0 0 6592 6250
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905
19033 22712 24194 26350 31903
0 0 0 21773 24839
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905
134054 174889 177222 201353 259938
48372 44747 59232 63948 51044
182426 219636 236454 265301 310982
0 0 0 212537 242960
1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
22428 22761 26977 31412 36951
1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
5954 5395 5450 5869 7250
0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
5537 5017 5069 5458 6743
6179 6036 5642 5283 5565
1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
27965 27778 32046 36870 43694
26625 27638 29209 31313 33671
1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
227831 221904 269602 297717 352805
54147 58398 57827 62145 68971
281978 280302 327429 359862 421776
262870 275003 293198 312111 334269
VALUE OF EXPORTS 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Argentina Argentinian $ Gold 42604 44483 43941 44482 86640 112279 136331 252424 239049 130396 118103
1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Uruguay Uruguayan $ 6960 5618 6755 13706 29733 25875 32873 40629 42994 25837 20757
Conversion Rate 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 1.05
(Uru.S per Arg. $ Gold)
Value in Argentinian $ Go 6473 5225 6282 12747 27652 20959 26627 32909 34825 20928 21795
5 Year Moving Average 5752 5793 6036 7494 11676 14573 18853 24179 28594 27250 27417
1911 1212 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
River Plate Total River Plate Exports i 
Argentinian $ Gold
49077 49708 50223 57229 114292 133238 162958 285333 273874 151324 139898
5 Year Moving Average 37893 42279 45914 49986 64106 80938 103588 150610 193939 201345 202678
EXPORTS (VOLUME) 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Argentina Volume (Tons) 427512 440793 429880 444055 430872 525988 545063 742703 592543 489640 474907
Uruguay Volume (Tons) 71561 67731 82756 90571 114090 100562 123081 130471 154170 119615 96210
River Plate Volume (Tons) 499073 508524 512636 534626 544962 626550 668144 873174 746713 609255 571117
5 Year Moving Average 377688 423333 460374 495327 519964 545460 577384 649491 691909 704767 693681
VALUE OF EXPORTS 1222 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1231 1932
Argentina Argentinian $ Gold 75377 120230 164068 160927 135378 129796 124683 124759 122589 111095 77437
1222 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
Uruguay Uruguayan $ 30791 42268 34832 37432 36891 26872 24157 27994 36506 27558 17850
Conversion Rate 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
(Uru.S per Arg. $ Gold)
Value in Argentinian $ Go 32331 44381 36574 39304 36522 26603 23915 27714 36141 27282 17672
5 Year Moving Average 28558 30852 31202 34877 37822 36677 32584 30812 30179 28331 26545
1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
River Plate Total River Plate Exports i 
Argentinian $ Gold
107708 164611 200642 200231 171900 156399 148598 152473 158730 138377 95109
5 Year Moving Average 191627 167483 152836 162618 169018 178757 175554 165920 157620 150916 138657
EXPORTS (VOLUME) 1222 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
Argentina Volume (Tons) 531311 710605 916034 844264 796938 857763 658825 631732 589313 575678 523931
Uruguay Volume (Tons) 125176 178089 159863 170029 173440 163229 125914 138194 179444 132161 93194
River Plate Volume (Tons) 656487 888694 1075897 1014293 970378 1020992 784739 769926 768757 707839 617125
5 Year Moving Average 691349 694453 760290 841298 921150 994051 973260 912066 862958 810451 729677
Exchange Rates: Argentina: £1 =  5.04 Gold Pesos
Uruguay: £1 =  4.70 Uruguayan Dollars
£1 5.04 Arg. $ Gold Pesos
£1 4.7 Uruguayan Dollars based on $4.7 per £ (Gold Parity)
1 Arg. $ Go! 0.93 Uruguayan Dollars 
Uru. $ per £ Uru. $ per Arg. $




Sources: Uruguayan Exchange Rate Rial Roade, J ., Estadisticas Historicas de Uruguay 1850-1930 (Cuademo 40, CIESU, Montevideo, 1980), Table 4 , p. 102 
Data: See Appendixes 26 and 27.
Appendix 29: Uruguayan Meat Exports (5-Year Moving Averages) 1900-1954 Volume in Tons
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Appendix 30: Argentinian Meat Exports (5-Year Moving Averages) 1900-1954 











































APPENDIX 31: PRODUCTION OF BEEF AND SHEEPMEAT 1951-1985 an  Thousands of Tons)
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
1879 1788 1766 1815 2147 2476 2459
317 302 325 271 254 272 278
2196 2090 2091 2086 2401 2748 2737
3195 3302 3617 4105 4075 4133 4245
406 437 507 549 560 600 632
4489 4907 6329 6627 6870 7300 7134
662 591 686 716 731 763 828
180 195 185 202 229 265 271
19804 20487 22400 23422 24264 25759 26074
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
154 192 192 206 199 185 163
51 62 64 58 67 64 56
205 254 256 264 266 249 219
450 525 532 584 552 578 595
12 14 14 14 14 15 15
236 294 331 333 344 336 321
279 287 401 371 394 386 373
297 353 338 333 351 357 341
4295 4860 5079 5144 5333 5391 5329
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
2033 1980 1958 2021 2346 2661 2622
368 364 389 329 321 336 334
2401 2344 2347 2350 2667 2997 2956
3645 3827 4149 4689 4627 4711 4840
418 451 521 563 574 615 647
4725 5201 6660 6960 7214 7636 7455
941 878 1087 1087 1125 1149 1201
477 548 523 535 580 622 612
24099 25347 27479 28566 29597 31150 31403
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
2541 1944 1893 2145 2379 2605 2019
215 218 249 271 268 290 308
2756 2162 2142 2416 2647 2895 2327
4260 4339 4640 5078 5318 5396 5094
610 578 631 655 665 703 778
6584 6617 7183 7426 7411 7886 8831
804 921 764 643 804 929 1001
273 238 240 237 282 293 287
26135 26370 27075 27730 29205 30847 31197
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
171 164 169 177 176 161 145
62 59 56 56 58 52 53
233 223 225 233 234 213 198
577 664 677 689 690 670 705
14 14 14 16 14 14 14
312 335 348 377 367 349 324
428 500 582 584 596 603 595
358 431 449 458 473 464 490
5509 5981 6098 6133 6264 6256 6270
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
2712 2108 2062 2322 2555 2766 2164
277 277 305 327 326 342 361
2989 2385 2367 2649 2881 3108 2525
4837 5003 5317 5767 6008 6066 5799
624 592 645 671 679 717 792
6896 6952 7531 7803 7778 8235 9155
1232 1421 1346 1227 1400 1532 1596
631 669 689 695 755 757 777
31644 32351 33173 33863 35469 37103 37467
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APPENDIX 31: PRODUCTION OF BEEF AND SHEEPMEAT 1951-1985 (In Thousands of Tons) P. 380
Bovine Meat —
Ovine Meat*
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Argentina 2883 2624 2001 2191 2149 2163 2439 2811 2914 3193 3020 2839 2939 2551 2384 2548 2740
Uruguay 345 379 289 287 297 330 345 403 342 314 270 336 407 383 412 313 328
River Plate 3228 3003 2290 2478 2446 2493 2784 3214 3256 3507 3290 3175 3346 2934 2796 2861 3068
EEC (12) 6066 6428 6518 5969 6096 7212 7266 7130 7004 6992 7392 7668 7463 7210 7465 8002 7891
Canada 846 851 896 898 906 953 1088 1166 1142 1063 947 971 1016 1032 1035 997 1035
USA 9902 10103 10182 10374 9813 10716 11271 12166 11845 11282 9925 9999 10353 10425 10748 10928 10996
Australia 935 1010 1047 1164 1438 1322 1547 1840 1988 2184 2018 1564 1467 1576 1543 1344 1310
New Zealand 371 387 393 410 446 405 508 628 558 562 512 496 498 516 512 433 487
World 37951 38439 38123 38592 38864 41923 43809 45831 46404 46580 45061 44643 44938 45029 46030 46872 47681
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Argentina 204 187 186 143 138 121 131 135 140 137 137 118 120 117 117 109 104
Uruguay 59 87 70 67 48 52 42 38 39 38 30 28 47 49 50 41 41
River Plate 263 274 256 210 186 173 173 173 179 175 167 146 167 166 167 150 145
EEC (12) 690 727 745 740 761 812 826 825 815 825 835 914 880 894 909 913 925
Canada 8 7 8 8 9 7 8 7 6 5 5 5 7 8 9 9 9
USA 249 250 252 246 233 211 186 168 159 140 133 144 153 166 171 172 162
Australia 680 755 825 956 713 467 527 588 549 514 491 549 578 511 530 465 515
New Zealand 555 555 565 576 558 499 492 514 498 502 515 561 627 624 681 669 730
World 6721 6906 7025 7088 6871 6658 6870 6900 6944 7106 7120 7480 7747 7771 7989 8050 8259
& Ovine Meat
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Argentina 3087 2811 2187 2334 2287 2284 2570 2946 3054 3330 3157 2957 3059 2668 2501 2657 2844
Uruguay 404 466 359 354 345 382 387 441 381 352 300 364 454 432 462 354 369
River Plate 3491 3277 2546 2688 2632 2666 2957 3387 3435 3682 3457 3321 3513 3100 2963 3011 3213
EEC (12) 6756 7155 7263 6709 6857 8024 8092 7955 7819 7817 8227 8582 8343 8104 8374 8915 8816
Canada 854 858 904 906 915 960 1096 1173 1148 1068 952 976 1023 1040 1044 1006 1044
USA 10151 10353 10434 10620 10046 10927 11457 12334 12004 11422 10058 10143 10506 10591 10919 11100 11158
Australia 1615 1765 1872 2820 2151 1789 2074 2428 2537 2698 2509 2113 2045 2087 2073 1809 1825
New Zealand 926 942 958 986 1004 904 1000 1142 1056 1064 1027 1057 1125 1140 1193 1102 1217
World 44672 45345 45148 45680 45735 48581 50679 52731 53348 53686 52181 52123 52685 52800 54019 54922 55940
FAO, World Crop tod Livfteck Sudsics, I94S-I9U, Rome, 1987, Tablet 94 tod 93, pp. 698-709.
Notes
— Inrinrtna Buffalo M ol 
* [octudea Gote Mem
